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This thesis examines the evolution of the substantive public policy exclusion in the cross-
border litigation of major Anglo-common law jurisdictions.  
The substantive doctrine of public policy in its domestic and cross-border spheres of 
operation has long courted criticism for its uncertainty, ambiguity, and unruliness. As a 
means by which to exclude foreign law or deny recognition to a foreign judgment, cross-
border public policy ultimately involves a moral evaluation of foreign law. This thesis sets 
out to deepen existing scholarly understanding of the historical and theoretical 
development of the substantive exception in cross-border litigation in Anglo-common 
law jurisdictions. In addition, it aims to rehabilitate the reputation of substantive public 
policy, which is still occasionally characterised as an ‘unruly horse’ in need of taming.  
It fulfils this aim by examining substantive public policy’s modern content in the 
jurisprudence of major Anglo-common law jurisdictions and recommending two new 
species of exception: public international law and foreign governmental interests. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
I INTRODUCING THE SUBSTANTIVE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION AT COMMON  
his thesis is a study of the evolution of the substantive public policy exception 
in Anglo-common law private international law.1 At common law, the doctrine 
of public policy in its substantive sense is traditionally assumed to have two 
spheres of operation.2 The first sphere is occupied by public policy in its internal or 
domestic sense. This type of public policy is applied to wholly domestic cases. A body of 
case law involving internal public policy has developed around contracts and succession 
to property.3 In internal or wholly domestic litigation, public policy may be invoked to 
justify the non-enforceability of a contract, to strike down a testamentary disposition, or 
to invalidate a trust disposition.4 The second sphere of operation is international or, as is 
preferred in this thesis, cross-border5 public policy — the function of public policy in 
private international law. This type of public policy, involving the application of domestic 
or international policy norms to override a foreign law or judgment, is more narrowly 
drawn than domestic public policy. Anglo-common law courts are, as Lord Simon 
observed in Vervaeke v Smith, ‘even slower to invoke public policy in the field of conflict 
of laws than where a purely municipal legal issue is involved’.6 Public policy in its domestic 
sense has long offered a breeding ground for ‘equine metaphors’ counselling against the 
doctrine’s unrestrained use.7 Anglo-common law judges fear that an unfettered discretion 
to displace the law will ‘let loose the “unruly horse” of public policy to a “blind gallop 
through the doctrinal forests of [the law]”.’8 Likewise, cross-border public policy has 
incurred the reproach of judges and scholars for its ‘uncertainty’ and ‘ambiguity’.9 It has 
                                                 
1  All references to public policy in this thesis are to substantive, not procedural, public policy.  
2  See R D Leslie, ‘Aspects of Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws’ (PhD Thesis, The University of 
Edinburgh, 1979) 4–6, 16–17. 
3  Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1, 85–6 [234]–[235] (Hayne J). 
4  Ibid. 
5  Cross-border public policy is the term preferred in this thesis to describe this second sphere of 
operation. 
6  Vervaeke v Smith [1983] 1 AC 145, 163 (Lord Simon). 
7  Fitzgerald v F J Leonhardt Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 215, 232 (Kirby J). See, eg, Richardson v Mellish (1824) 2 
Bing 229; 130 ER 294, 303 (Burrough J); P B Carter, ‘The Rôle of Public Policy in English Private 
International Law’ (1992) 42 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1, 1: ‘Public policy historically has 
been, and continues to be today, only one of several fairly well-trodden escape routes.’ 
8  Fitzgerald v F J Leonhardt Pty Ltd (n 7), quoting Hugh Stowe, ‘The “Unruly Horse” has Bolted: Tinsley v 
Milligan’ (1994) 57(3) Modern Law Review 441, 449. 
9  See, eg, Alex Mills, ‘The Dimensions of Public Policy in Private International Law’ (2008) 4(2) Journal of 
Private International Law 201, 202; Kenny Chng, ‘A Theoretical Perspective of the Public Policy Doctrine 
in the Conflict of Laws’ (2018) 14(1) Journal of Private International Law 130, 131; Mark Hirschboeck, 
T 
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been characterised in a predictably equine manner as one of private international law’s 
‘fairly well-trodden escape routes’.10 
This thesis centres on the doctrine’s second sphere of operation. The successful 
invocation of public policy inevitably involves scrutinising the substantive content of, 
otherwise applicable, foreign law. This scrutiny could lead a court, exceptionally, to deny 
recognition to a foreign judgment or exclude foreign law directed by the usual application 
of choice of law rules. Within private international law, public policy has had the most 
exposure in cases involving contract and status.11 Though this short description reveals 
cross-border public policy to be inherently exclusionary or negative, it may have positive 
or ‘creative’ functions (explored in Chapter 8).12 However, as this thesis explores, modern 
appeals to cross-border public policy have been overcome by judicial reluctance to engage 
the exception, admonitions, and appeals to international comity. Public policy has, over 
the years, become a measure of last resort primed ‘for foreign laws of surpassing evil or 
equivalent objection’.13 The foreign law or foreign judgment must be manifestly 
incompatible with the domestic legal order to engage public policy.14 It must ‘offend some 
moral, social, or economic principle so sacrosanct in [the forum’s] eyes as to require its 
maintenance at all costs and without exceptions’.15 
This thesis has two main purposes. First, it seeks to deepen existing scholarly 
understanding of the historical and theoretical development of the substantive public 
policy exception in Anglo-common law private international law. Secondly, it seeks to 
rehabilitate the ‘maligned’16 exception by outlining public policy’s modern content and 
proposing future directions for the exception. Although this thesis inevitably builds on 
                                                 
‘Conceptualizing the Relationship between International Human Rights Law and Private International 
Law’ (2019) 60 Harvard International Law Journal 181, 192. 
10  Carter, ‘The Rôle of Public Policy’ (n 7) 1. 
11  See Lord Collins (ed), Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws (Sweet and Maxwell, 15th ed, 2012) 
vol 1 102 [5–008]. 
12  See, eg, Lorentzen v Lydden [1942] 2 KB 202, 215–6 (Atkinson J); F A Mann, ‘Extraterritorial Effect of 
Confiscatory Legislation (Note)’ (1942) 5(3) Modern Law Review 262, 263; Adrian Briggs, ‘Public Policy 
in the Conflict of Laws: A Sword and a Shield? A Note on Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraq Airways Co [Nos 4 
and 5]’ (2002) 6 Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 953, 977. Cf Bank voor Handel v Slatford 
[1953] 1 QB 248, 263–4, 266 (Devlin J); Peer International Corp v Termidor Music Publishers Ltd [2004] Ch 
212, 222 [31] (Aldous LJ), 234 [62], [63] (Mance LJ). See also Bobby Lindsay, ‘Resuscitating the Positive 
Aspects of Public Policy in Private International Law’ (Conference Paper, Society of Legal Scholars 
PhD Conference, 4 December 2016). 
13  Briggs (n 5) 956. 
14  Carter (n 4) 2; Mills (n 9) 201. 
15  James Fawcett and Janeen M Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law (Oxford, 14th 
ed, 2008) 140. 
16  Richardson v Mellish (n 7) 303 (Burrough J): ‘I, for one, protest, as my Lord has done, against arguing too 
strongly upon public policy;—it is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know 
where it will carry you. It may lead you from the sound law. It is never argued at all but when other 
points fail.’ 
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existing scholarship, it aims to give a more nuanced historical and theoretical 
understanding of the substantive exception than the scholarship currently provides.  
The remainder of this Chapter is arranged into four parts. Part II provides a 
background to existing scholarship on cross-border public policy. The research questions 
of this thesis are canvassed in Part III. Part IV outlines the research methodology 
employed in this thesis to develop its structure and content. The question of this thesis’s 
originality and contribution to research is answered in Part V. Finally, the structure of this 
thesis is set out in Part VI. 
II NAVIGATING PUBLIC POLICY’S PLACE, SCOPE, AND CONTENT 
The scholarship, for the most part, derives from American law journals published well 
over half a century ago.17 Though much of the existing private international law 
scholarship on public policy is dated, some themes are nevertheless discernible. This Part 
foregrounds two themes that encouraged the development of this thesis’ structure and 
argument. These themes are, first, the place of public policy and, secondly, its scope and 
content. 
A Its Place in Theory 
The first theme is the place of public policy in territorial models of private international 
law. These scholarly models of private international law originate in the territorialism 
inherent in Ulrik Huber’s De Conflictu Legum. Huber’s short work supplied the theoretical 
backbone for 19th century English and American treatises on private international law. By 
the early 20th century, American scholars were emphasising the public policy exception to 
highlight flaws in these territorial-based theories, such as Joseph Beale’s vested rights 
theory, then predominating in the United States.18 Ernest G Lorenzen summarised the 
                                                 
17  See John K Beach, ‘Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights’ (1918) 37 Yale Law Journal 656, 
661; J Kosters, ‘Public Policy in Private International Law’ (1920) 29 Yale Law Journal 745; Ernest G 
Lorenzen, ‘Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws’ (1924) 33 Yale Law Journal 736; Herbert 
F Goodrich, ‘Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts’ (1930) 36 West Virginia Law Quarterly 156; David F 
Cavers, ‘A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem’ (1933) 47 Harvard Law Review 173, 183–4; Note, 
‘The Public Policy Concept in the Conflict of Laws’ (1933) 33 Columbia Law Review 508; Charles B 
Nutting, ‘Suggested Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine’ (1935) 19 Minnesota Law Review 196; 
Milton J Rappoport, ‘Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws’ (1936) 10 University of Cincinnati Law Review 
473; Note, ‘Public Policy of the Forum as Ground for Enforcement of Foreign Contract Discharged by 
Discriminatory Foreign Decree’ (1937) 23 Virginia Law Review 288; Herbert F Goodrich, ‘Foreign Facts 
and Local Fancies’ (1938) 25 Virginia Law Review 26, 35; Monrad G Paulsen and Michael I Sovern, 
‘Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws’ (1956) 56 Columbia Law Review 969. 
18  See Ernest G Lorenzen, ‘Validity and Effect of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws’ (1921) 30 Yale Law 
Journal 655, 673; Lorenzen, ‘Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws’ (n 17) 746; Cavers, ‘A 
Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem’ (n 17) 183. See also Shirley A Wiegand, ‘Officious 
Intermeddling, Interloping Chauvinism, Restatement (Second), and Leflar: Wisconsin’s Choice of Law 
Melting Pot’ (1998) 81 Marquette Law Review 761, 764; Luther L McDougal, ‘Leflar’s Choice-Influencing 
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substance of this criticism in his 1923–4 article, ‘Territoriality, Public Policy and the 
Conflict of Laws’, noting that: 
[t]he notion that the rules of the Conflict of Laws can be derived from some general 
principle or theory is responsible for another doctrine—that of ‘public policy’ … Realizing 
that the logical deductions from their a priori theory could not be justified in all cases, the 
theoretical writers have allowed the ordinary rules, which govern ‘on principle,’ to be set 
aside under certain circumstances by the rules of ‘public policy’ or ‘public order.’19 
Likewise, John K Beach (1918) complained that the public policy exception might be 
invoked between states of the United States over ‘minor matters of expediency, and to 
debatable questions of internal policy’.20 Sustained scholarly criticism of territorial-based 
theories of private international law, in particular the incorporation of the vested rights 
theory into the First Conflicts Restatement,21 contributed to the later 20th century American 
conflicts ‘revolution’. American scholarship on public policy has waned as a result of the 
predominance of interest-based theories of private international law, one product of the 
‘conflicts’ revolution. These theories downplay public policy as part of their process.  
On the other hand, British private international lawyers reject theory and, instead, 
adopt a pragmatic approach. To some extent, this thesis is pragmatic. Pragmatists 
do not see an overarching theory that satisfactorily explains why States apply the rules of 
foreign legal systems, or why they limit their own jurisdiction, or recognise the decisions of 
foreign courts. They know that for many hundreds of years this has happened and assume 
that it will continue to happen. Their attention… ‘is mainly concentrated on the details of 
private international law in force which have increased greatly …’22  
Accordingly, rules of private international law are to be tested in an empirical or pragmatic 
way with justice and convenience as fundamental aims.23 The focus is on developing ‘clear 
rules properly applicable to the generality of cases in a particular field’, rather than tailoring 
‘individual… solutions for each case’.24 The sidelining of territorial-based theories by 
                                                 
Considerations: Revisited, Refined and Reaffirmed’ (1999) 52 Arkansas Law Review 105, 110. McDougal 
described public policy as a ‘cover-up gimmick’ when courts were in fact applying the best law in a 
‘contemporary socio-economic sense’: at 110. 
19  Lorenzen, ‘Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws’ (n 17) 746. 
20  Beach (n 17) 662. 
21  See Lorenzen (n 18); Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 
33 Yale Law Journal 457; Walter Wheeler Cook, ‘“Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws’ 
(1933) 42 Yale Law Journal 333; Walter Wheeler Cook, ‘The Jurisdiction of Sovereign States and the 
Conflict of Laws (1931) 31 Columbia Law Review 368.  
22  A E Anton and P R Beaumont, Private International Law: A Treatise from the Standpoint of Scots Law 
(W Green, 2nd ed, 1990) 42. 
23  PM North and JJ Fawcett, Cheshire and North’s Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 13th ed, 
1999) 32. 
24  Ibid. 
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American scholars and by, for different reasons, British scholars is unfortunate, because 
it conceals the influence institutional writers have had on the shape of the modern 
doctrine of public policy in private international law. 
B Its Scope and Content 
The second theme is the scope and content of the public policy exception, which spills 
over into four related scholarly inquiries.   
The first scholarly inquiry concerns the reasons for the narrow scope of public policy 
at common law. Kosters (1920) and Husserl (1938) offered an early comparative 
perspective on this theme, noticing that the continental concept of ordre public was more 
expansive than public policy at common law.25 During this period, mandatory rules were 
subsumed by ordre public — comparable to but not the same as common law public 
policy.26 Some continental legal orders followed the Romanic school which applied the 
principle of nationality. Nationality was personal, had extraterritorial effect, and trailed 
‘the person wherever he goes’.27 The Romanic school required the application of forum 
law ‘if the law in question is one concerning public policy’.28 Husserl also posited that the 
lex fori had a larger role at common law than it had in continental legal systems.29 English 
conflicts scholar, P B Carter, subsequently reprised this argument. In two journal articles, 
Carter hypothesised that public policy’s narrow scope in English law was attributable to 
the forum-orientated bias ‘built into many English choice of law rules themselves’.30 This 
bias enabled English courts properly to avoid foreign law without having to retreat to the 
doctrine.31 Countering this theory is the contention that English courts have exhibited a 
‘spirit of internationalism’ in the interpretation of the public policy exception.32 
A second scholarly concern is the categorisation or delimitation of case law on public 
policy. In the past, some scholars have suggested that this end is ultimately futile.33 This 
theme is encapsulated in Dicey, Morris and Collins’ Conflict of Laws: ‘no attempt to define the 
limits of that reservation has ever succeeded’.34 Dicey’s text nevertheless concludes that 
                                                 
25  J Kosters, ‘Public Policy in Private International Law’ (1920) 29 Yale Law Journal 745; Gerhart Husserl, 
‘Public Policy and Ordre Public’ (1938) 25 Virginia Law Review 37. 
26  Husserl (n 25) 40. 
27  Kosters (n 25) 750–1; Husserl (n 25) 61. 
28  Nelson Enonchong, ‘Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws: A Chinese Wall Around Little England’ 
(1996) 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 633, 635. 
29  Husserl (n 25) 47. 
30  Carter (n 7) 3; contra Enonchong (n 28). 
31  Ibid. 
32  Enonchong (n 28) 660. 
33  Lorenzen, ‘Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws’ (n 17) 747; Husserl (n 25) 40–1. 
34  Collins (n 4) 102 [5-008]. 
6 CHAPTER 1 
 
 
‘[a]ll that can be done, therefore, is to enumerate the cases in which the recognition or 
enforcement of rights arising under foreign laws has been refused on this ground’.35 As a 
corollary, however, some scholars have suggested that it is in fact possible to devise 
‘principled boundaries’ to discipline the courts’ exercise of the public policy exception.36   
A third scholarly inquiry explores positive or creative functions of public policy. Two 
positive functions have been suggested. First, an English court might supply a legal right 
or claim where none is otherwise available.37 Briggs considered that this particular 
function of public policy ‘is a most uncommon occurrence, but no basis for contending 
that the power is non-existent’.38 The second function is for public policy to intervene in 
the renvoi process.39 For example, the forum court’s transmission of a question to the law 
of a third place is considered by the court to be unacceptable on public policy grounds.40 
This thesis nevertheless maintains that public policy should only be used negatively in a 
manner consistent with the historical foundation and function of the exception. 
A fourth outcome of scholarship on public policy’s content and scope is to consider 
whether there is a transnational dimension to cross-border public policy. Some scholars, 
arguing that transnational public policy is a ‘subset’ of cross-border public policy, suggest 
that it should be informed by principles of international law as well as ‘universal principles 
of justice and morality’.41 However, the metes and bounds of this dimension of public 
policy and the difficulties associated with international law’s recognition in this sense are 
the subject of little scholarship. This topic is explored in Chapter 8. 
III RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis pursues the argument that scholarship in private international law has exerted 
a significant influence on the shape of the modern public policy exception. The 
supporting role of Anglo-common law judges in delimiting the modern substantive 
exception, shown in their reluctance to invoke public policy and their repeated appeals to 
international comity as an abstract concept, is scrutinised as a related argument.  
                                                 
35  Ibid.  
36  See, eg, Carter (n 7); Mills (n 9); Chng (n 9). 
37  Briggs (n 5) 977. See also Janeen M Carruthers and Elizabeth B Crawford, ‘Kuwait Airways Corporation v 
Iraqi Airways Company’ (2003) 52 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 761, 766–9. 
38  Briggs (n 5) 977. 
39  Joost Blom, ‘Public Policy in Private International Law and its Evolution in Time’ (2003) 50 Netherlands 
International Law Review 373, 376. 
40  Ibid. 
41  See Alex Mills, ‘The Dimensions of Public Policy in Private International Law’ (2008) 4(2) Journal of 
Private International Law 201, 214–5; Adeline Chong, ‘Transnational Public Policy in Civil and 
Commercial Matters’ (2012) 128 Law Quarterly Review 88; Jan Oster, ‘Public Policy and Human Rights’ 
(2015) 11(3) Journal of Private International Law 542; Kenny Chng, ‘A Theoretical Perspective of the Public 
Policy Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws’ (2018) 14(1) Journal of Private International Law 130. 
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This thesis addresses four main research questions. The first question posed is the 
content of the substantive exception, the answer to which depends on an analysis of 
historical and contemporary sources on domestic and cross-border public policy. The 
second question concerns the extent to which writers of private international law have 
shepherded the common law’s development of cross-border public policy. This raises 
several other issues including the status of academic scholarship in common law courts 
and whether judicial citation of a legal treatise elevates its authority. The third question 
concentrates on the factors which inform the reluctance to apply the exception in 
multistate cases. The fourth question is whether there is any scope left for the 
development of new exceptions or the recognition of different functions of public policy. 
IV METHODOLOGY 
To address these research questions, this thesis involves qualitative research of a doctrinal 
and comparative nature.  
The thesis mainly employs doctrinal legal analysis to explore the origins, evolution, and 
future of the substantive public policy exception in private international law. The term 
‘doctrine’ takes on a special meaning in the study of law, referring to ‘legal concepts and 
principles of all types – cases, statutes, and rules’.42 A doctrinal analysis is an expected and 
understandable focus of this thesis. Not only is legal research still largely doctrinal in 
Australia,43 law itself is a normative discipline which pays great respect to established legal 
norms derived from case law and statute.44 Since the doctrinal method is an ‘implicit’ or 
‘tacit’ part of legal research methodology, few law students or academics ‘verbalise’ the 
method.45 For this key reason, the doctrinal methodology has attracted little scholarly 
attention46 and, at times, criticism.  
                                                 
42  Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ 
(2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 83, 84. 
43  Dennis Pearce, Enid Campbell and Don Harding, Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (Australian Government Printing Service, 1987) 309 (‘Pearce 
Report’). 
44  Ibid. 
45  Hutchinson and Duncan (n 42) 99. 
46  See, eg, Dan Jerker B Svantesson, ‘The Hypocritical Hype about “Hypothesis”’ (2014) 39 Alternative Law 
Journal 259; Terry Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy 
Burton (eds), Research Methods in Law (Taylor and Francis, 2013) 7; Martha Minow, ‘Archetypal Legal 
Scholarship: A Field Guide’ (2013) 63(1) Journal of Legal Education 65; Hutchinson and Duncan (n 42); 
Terry Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (Lawbook Co, 3rd ed, 2010); Ian Dobinson and Francis 
Johns, ‘Qualitative Legal Research’ in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for 
Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2007) 16; Pearce, Campbell and Harding (n 43); Ernest M Jones, 
‘Some Current Trends in Legal Research’ (1962) 15 Journal of Legal Education 121. 
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Despite the dearth in literature, it is still clear that doctrinal research requires ‘rigorous 
analysis and creative synthesis, the making of connections between seemingly disparate 
doctrinal strands, and the challenge of extracting general principles from an inchoate mass 
of primary materials’.47 In this thesis, the doctrinal methodology is employed to confront 
‘an alleged lack of coherence, disputed issue of application or normative shortcoming in 
a defined area of law’.48  
The methodology’s focus on extracting principles and drawing conclusion from 
primary materials has led to its characterisation as ‘internal’ since it is undertaken by ‘an 
insider in the system’.49 The intuitivism of this approach, developed from scholars’ ‘legal-
professional socialisation’,50 makes it an ‘easy target’ for criticism from scholars in other 
disciplines.51 Nevertheless, the methodology is well-adapted to the aims of this thesis. The 
doctrinal methodology is used to identify, categorise, and define the private international 
law of public policy. However, the methodology requires more than just an identification 
of relevant case law or statute; it also requires analysis and synthesis.  
This thesis accordingly uses the two-part process devised by Hutchinson and Duncan 
for doctrinal research.52 For the first part, relevant sources of law are located.53 The second 
part of the method involves a ‘synthesizing process once the documents are located and 
read’.54 The research for this thesis is drawn from a number of sources. In addition to 
statute and common law, relevant secondary sources are used. Older legal treatises, journal 
articles, and textbooks illuminate the historical context in which private international law’s 
public policy exception emerged. Meanwhile, case law and academic comment shed light 
on the exception’s potential. 
In addition to this doctrinal methodology, a comparative element is introduced in 
Chapters 7 and 8. One purpose of this method is to ‘analyze objectively and systematically 
the solutions which the various systems offer for any given legal problem’.55 The thesis 
employs one species of comparative law study — ‘micro-comparison’ — to understand 
                                                 
47  Council of Australian Law Deans, Statement on the Nature of Legal Research (October 2005) Council of 
Australian Law Deans <https://perma.cc/BG2X-S57R>. 
48  Theunis Roux, ‘Judging the Quality of Legal Research: A Qualified Response to the Demand for Greater 
Methodological Rigour’ (2014) 24 Legal Education Review 173, 182. 
49  Christopher McCrudden, ‘Legal Research and the Social Sciences’ (2006) 122 Legal Quarterly Review 623, 
624. 
50  Roux (n 48) 182. 
51  Ibid 174; Lee Epstein and Gary King, ‘The Rules of Inference’ (2002) 69 The University of Chicago Law 
Review 1, 9–10. 
52  Hutchinson and Duncan (n 42) 110. 
53  Ibid 110. 
54  Ibid 111. 
55  Walther Hug, ‘The History of Comparative Law’ (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1027, 1027. 
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the legal position adopted for substantive cross-border public policy and international law 
in particular jurisdictions.56  
English law is, as a matter of course, the point of reference for this common law study 
of cross-border public policy. The five other legal systems chosen in this study — 
Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Hong Kong and Canada — belong to, or are 
influenced by, the English common law tradition.  
A Delimitation 
This thesis deals only with substantive, rather than procedural, aspects of public policy 
according to the Anglo-common law rules of private international law. The common law 
of the jurisdictions discussed in this thesis treat the denial of natural justice or procedural 
fairness as a separate defence to the recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment at 
common law and under statutory regimes.57 However, the public policy exception has a 
wider import under continental European law, embracing fraud58 and breaches of 
procedural fairness.59 Procedural public policy thus focuses on ‘situations where the 
specific proceedings leading to … judgment were incompatible with fundamental 
principles of procedural fairness’ of the jurisdiction in which recognition or enforcement 
is sought.60  
Given the wider import of public policy under continental European law, substantive 
and procedural aspects of public policy fall within the scope of the defence in European 
Union (‘EU’) private international law instruments,61 international conventions on arbitral 
                                                 
56  Peter de Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (Routledge Cavendish, 3rd ed, 2007) 242–6. 
57  See, eg, Pemberton v Hughes [1899] 1 Ch 781, 790 (Lord Lindley) (CA); Far East Bank and Trust Co v King 
Poo Koo [1980] HKC 377, 380, 381 (Bewley J); Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433, 564–6; Kemp v 
Kemp [1996] 2 NZLR 454, 455 [3]; Hong Pian Tee v Les Placements Germain Gauthier Inc [2002] 2 
SLR(R) 515, 519 [12]; Boele v Norsemeter Holding AS [2002] NSWCA 363, [24] (Giles JA); Beals v Saldanha 
[2003] 3 SCR 416, 440 [35], 441 [40], 448–51 [59]–[70] (Major J); Pro Swing Inc v Elta Golf Inc [2006] 2 
SCR 612, 624 [12] (Deschamps J), 653 [89]–[90], 654 [92], 663 [119] (McLachlin CJ) (dissenting); Reeves 
v OneWorld Challenge [2006] 2 NZLR 184, 193 [37] (O’Regan J); Poh Soon Kiat v Desert Palace Inc (t/a Caesars 
Palace) [2010] 2 LRC 549, 561 [14]; Ross v Ross [2011] NZAR 30, 33–4 [13], 34 [14]; C F Forsyth, Private 
International Law: The Modern Roman-Dutch Law Including the Jurisdiction of the High Courts (Juta, 5th ed, 2012) 
460 (n 315); Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje [2015] 3 SCR 69, 117 [77] (Gascon J); Henderson v Henderson [2016] 
HKCU 874, [48] (Au-Yeung J); LFDB v SM [No 3] [2017] FCA 80, [102]–[124] (Griffith J) (‘gross denial 
of procedural fairness’); LFDB v SM (2017) 256 FCR 218, 226 [29]; Eilenberg v Gutierrez [2017] NZFLR 
471, 481 [30] (Harrison J). 
58  Lord Collins (ed) (n 11) 732 [14–146]. 
59  See especially Bamberski v Krombach [2001] QB 709, 728–9, 731 (ECJ); Régie Nationale des Usines Renault 
SA v Maxicar SpA (C-38/98) [2000] ECR I-2973; Maronier v Larmer [2003] QB 620, 630 [30]. 
60  See, eg, Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, opened for signature 30 June 2005, 44 ILM 1294 (entered 
into force 1 October 2015) art 9(e) (‘2005 Choice of Court Convention’); Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, opened for signature 2 July 2019 (not yet in 
force) art 7(1)(c) (‘HCCH Judgments Convention’).  
61  See Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast) [2012] OJ L 
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awards, 62 and recently concluded Hague Conventions that are strongly influenced by EU 
instruments.63 Explanatory reports for the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
(2005) and Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (2019) 
explain the express inclusion of procedural matters in the defence by observing that ‘in 
some countries fundamental principles of procedural fairness (also known as due process 
of law, natural justice or the right to a fair trial) are constitutionally mandated’.64  
V ORIGINALITY AND CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
This thesis makes at least four contributions to the existing scholarship on the public 
policy exclusion.  
First, this thesis closely examines the historical development of substantive public 
policy in common law private international law. This thesis thus provides more 
meaningful analysis than Lorenzen’s incidental remark that ‘theoretical writers’ bear some 
responsibility for the place occupied by public policy in territorial models of private 
international law.65 In particular, this thesis analyses accounts of public policy in historical 
scholarship on private international law to make out its contours, theoretical 
undercurrents, and compatibility with legal precedent.  
Secondly, this thesis’ scrutiny of specific classes of domestic public policy (Chapter 2) 
goes beyond the existing scholarship in three ways. First, this thesis paints a clearer and 
fuller historical picture of domestic public policy by identifying and examining the classes 
that emerged in English, Scottish, and Irish case law of the 17th through to the early 19th 
century. Secondly, this thesis determines the extent to which historical scholarly accounts 
of the private international law exclusion were compatible with existing conceptions of 
                                                 
351/1 art 45(a) (‘Brussels I Recast’); Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 17 June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations [2008] OJ L 177/7 art 21 (‘Rome I Regulation’); 
Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the Law Applicable 
to Non-Contractual Obligations [2007] OJ L 199/40 art 26 (‘Rome II Regulation’). See also Burkhard Hess, 
Thomas Pfeiffer and Peter Schlosser, ‘Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in the Member 
States’ (Study JLS/C4/2005/03, 2008) 249–50 [559]–[560]; Paul Beaumont and Emma Johnston, ‘Can 
Exequatur be Abolished in Brussels I Whilst Retaining a Public Policy Defence?’ (2010) 6(2) Journal of 
Private International Law 249; Jerca Kramberger Škerl, ‘European Public Policy (With an Emphasis on 
Exequatur Proceedings)’ (2011) 7(3) Journal of Private International Law 461. 
62  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature 10 June 1958, 
330 UNTS 38 (entered into force 7 June 1959) art V(2) (‘New York Convention’). 
63  See, eg, 2005 Choice of Court Convention art 6(c); HCCH Judgments Convention art 7(1)(c). 
64  See Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi, Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements 
(Explanatory Report, Hague Conference on Private International Law, 2007) 831 [189]–[190]; Francisco 
Garcimartín and Geneviève Saumier, ‘Judgments Convention: Revised Draft Explanatory Report’, 
Hague Conference on Private International Law (December 2018) <https://assets.hcch.net/docs/7d2ae3f7-
e8c6-4ef3-807c-15f112aa483d.pdf> 64–5 [291]. 
65  Lorenzen, ‘Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws’ (n 17) 746. 
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domestic public policy in English, Scots, and Irish law. Thirdly, it examines the durability 
of these scholarly accounts of public policy in case law and scholarship.  
Thirdly, analysis of judicial citation in Chapter 5 corroborates the perception in private 
international law scholarship that certain texts have had, and still possess, a persuasive 
value in deciding cross-border cases.66 The thesis takes this one step further by returning 
to the public policy doctrine to specifically identify the weight attached to scholarly 
accounts of public policy in common law decision-making.  
Fourthly, this thesis critically examines public international law as a category of cross-
border public policy to propose that public international law should be a detached 
exception. It elaborates on the content of this proposed public international law exception 
and highlights difficulties associated with the domestic recognition of international law. 
The Australian exception of foreign governmental interests serves as a useful point of 
comparison. 
VI MAPPING THE THESIS 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. This first chapter has introduced the thesis by 
outlining the research problem, its methodologies, the thesis’ originality and contribution 
to scholarship, and — now — its structure.  
Chapter 2 (Common Law Origins) provides a historical perspective on domestic public 
policy by tracing its origins and the contexts in which it arose. The first half of the Chapter 
chronicles this historical background by briefly outlining medieval sources and writings 
that may have influenced its form. The first half concludes by considering the sustained 
criticism of public policy, as it emerged in the early 19th century. Reasons for this treatment 
are explored along with some of the more common uses of public policy in this period. 
The second half of Chapter 2 identifies specific classes of contracts considered contrary 
to public policy in English, Irish, and Scottish courts between the 17th and 19th centuries. 
The cases are arranged thematically to include cases involving corruption, the commission 
of a crime or tort, and sexual immorality. 
                                                 
66  See, eg, Frederic Harrison, On Jurisprudence and the Conflict of Laws (Oxford University Press, 1919) 102; 
C K Allen, Law in the Making (Clarendon Press, 1927) 154–6; Richard Fentiman, ‘Legal Reasoning in the 
Conflict of Laws: An Essay in Law and Practice’ in Werner Krawietz, Neil MacCormick and George 
Henrik von Wright (eds), Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal Systems: Festschrift 
for Robert S Summers (Duncker & Humblot, 1994) 458; C G J Morse, ‘Making English Private 
International Law’ in James Fawcett (ed), Reform and Development in Private International Law: Essays in 
Honour of Sir Peter North (Oxford University Press, 2002) 273, 282–5; Mary Keyes, ‘Order, Illumination 
and Influence: Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws, Fourteenth Edition’ (2007) 3 Journal of Private 
International Law 355, 356–8. 
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Chapter 3 (Theoretical Origins and Sources) addresses the structure that historical 
scholarly accounts of private international law gave to the public policy exception. It 
intends to develop the thesis’ major argument that scholars constructed cross-border 
public policy or, at least, exerted a considerable influence on its modern shape. Scholarly 
accounts of cross-border public policy have not been closely examined in the literature. 
Chapter 3 accordingly considers the coverage of public policy in Ulrik Huber’s De Conflictu 
Legum Diversarum in Diversis (‘De Conflictu Legum’), followed by Joseph Story’s Conflict of 
Laws, John Westlake’s Treatise on Private International Law, and A V Dicey’s Conflict of Laws. 
Instances of overlap between the classes of cases identified in Chapter 2 and content 
within the scholars’ accounts are highlighted. In addition, Chapter 3 prises out elements 
of natural law visible in Story’s account of public policy as well as the influence of 
Austinian positivism on later 19th century accounts of public policy.  
Chapter 4 (Institutional Writers as a ‘Source of Law’) involves a slight detour from the 
focus of Chapters 2 and 3. It provides the platform upon which to examine the influence 
of scholars on the contours of cross-border public policy. Chapter 4 thus responds to the 
emphasis in Chapter 3 on historical scholarship by bearing down on the argument that 
unusual weight has been attached to scholarly accounts in this field. The Chapter provides 
a cameo on the Scots concept of ‘institutional writings’ — works conferred special 
authority by virtue of judicial citation. During the 19th century, judicial citation became 
the benchmark against which to assess institutional status in Scotland. Before the 19th 
century, writings were conferred this status using different standards. The Chapter 
borrows factors thought to have contributed to the appearance of institutional writings 
in Scotland to discern whether these factors were also present in the United States of 
America and England. The Chapter situates these factors alongside 19th century 
improvements to university legal education in the United States, England, and Ireland.  
Chapter 5 (Institutional Writers on Modern Doctrine) underscores the unusual 
influence of scholarship obtaining in private international law jurisprudence. The Chapter 
first identifies three 19th century writers of private international law as ‘institutional’. 
Secondly, it analyses the judicial citation of these writers’ works to discern their 
contributions to modern doctrine. The purpose of emphasising these scholarly 
contributions is to reinforce the argument that institutional writers have not only assumed 
a special authority in private international law but have had a determinative role in shaping 
the public policy exception.  
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Chapter 6 (The Formative Role of Public Policy) considers the influence of 
institutional writers’ accounts of public policy on the premature crystallisation of the 
traditional choice of law rules for torts and marriage. Where institutional writing 
influenced decision-making, Chapter 6 draws attention to this influence. The Chapter also 
highlights the modern status of these choice of law rules, emphasising elements which 
may be seen as embedding or reinforcing considerations of public policy.  
Chapter 7 (The Modern Private International Law of Public Policy) considers the 
contraction of public policy in common law private international law and suggests its 
modern content. The Chapter offers international comity as one prominent factor that 
has neutralised appeals to public policy. However, it also examines factors that may 
encourage Anglo-common law courts to apply the exception with some degree of 
confidence. The discussion in Chapter 7 ends with an examination of two patterns of 
public policy, including transnational public policy, and a brief consideration of the case 
for the exception operating in a positive sense. 
Chapter 8 (The New Species of Exception) advances international law and foreign 
governmental interests as two new species of private international law exception. First, 
Chapter 8 evaluates whether now is an appropriate time to denude public policy of its 
transnational or international law dimension to establish a separate exception. Secondly, 
the Chapter considers English developments on the ‘other public law’ rule together with 
readier acceptance of Australia’s foreign governmental interests doctrine. It emphasises 
that ‘other public laws’ and its Australian successor have arisen as a direct consequence 
of scholarship.  
Chapter 9 is the Conclusion, which brings together points made throughout the thesis 
and reflects on future research directions.  
The next Chapter — Chapter 2 — provides an historical perspective on domestic 
public policy to ground the discussion of cross-border public policy that follows in 






CHAPTER 2: COMMON LAW ORIGINS 
Looking back over the past through the wrong end of the telescope, one has the 
impression—which detailed reference to the law reports would doubtless disprove—that at 
certain times different types of cause have dominated the work of the courts. Thus, I tend 
to think of the typical eighteenth-century case as involving an improvident heir seeking to 
sell his expectancy, that of the nineteenth as involving a disputed will, that of the early 
twentieth as involving some society fracas …1 
SIR THOMAS BINGHAM 
I INTRODUCTION 
ighteenth century and early 19th century courts, particularly in England and 
Scotland, focused on surrounding circumstances that would render an 
agreement unenforceable by reason of illegality or public policy. The particular 
circumstances of the transaction — rather than any fixed and rigid categories of public 
policy that later took shape — were fundamental. For instance, active participation in 
smuggling or a landlord’s knowledge of their tenant’s prostitution at the time of the lease 
invariably transformed an otherwise legal contract into an illegal one.2 
The fact that analogical reasoning connected these specific classes of cases to public 
policy is a reflection, in relative terms, of the disordered state of 19th century English legal 
thought.3 The English textbook tradition of the mid- to late-19th century, which was aimed 
at legitimising legal scholarship and the teaching of law at English universities, is in all 
likelihood responsible for the current systemisation of older cases under the heading of 
public policy.4 In other fields of law such as trusts, legal historians have connected the 
demise of forms of action in the second quarter of the 19th century to the emergence of 
‘“principled” legal treatises… to define their subject matter analytically and arrange 
material around coherent explanatory principles’.5 This 19th century trend of systemisation 
is also exhibited in the nominate reports of judgments that were selected for publication 
                                                 
1  T H Bingham, ‘“There is a World Elsewhere”: The Changing Perspectives of English Law’ (1992) 41 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 513, 513. 
2  See, eg, Lloyd v Johnson (1798) 1 Bos & P 340; 126 ER 939; Bowry v Bennett (1808) 1 Camp 348; 170 ER 
981; Walker v Falconer (1759) Mor 9543; More v Steven (1765) Mor 9545, 9546; Clugas v Penaluna (1791) 4 
D & E 466; 100 ER 1122; Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341; 98 ER 1120. 
3  See generally David Sugarman, ‘Legal Theory, The Common Law Mind, and the Making of the 
Textbook Tradition’ in William L Twining (ed), Legal Theory and Common Law (Blackwell, 1986) 26. 
4  The textbook tradition is considered in Chapter 4. 
5  Michael Lobban, ‘Mapping the Common Law: Some Lessons from History’ (2014) New Zealand Law 
Review 21, 58. 
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in the Revised Reports and the English Reports.6 The editors of these reports sought ‘“to 
weed [the nominate reports] of decisions that are in contradiction with one another; where 
there are opposing decisions, to settle those which ought to remain; and to cleanse out 
and get rid of all matters that are not warranted by the present state of the law, or 
applicable to the existing condition of society”’.7 Footnotes subsequently inserted into 
these curated collections of nominate law reports identify the subject matter or the 
contracting position of the parties of a case under an ordering principle of public policy.8 
In sizeable footnotes, public policy is recognised as the implicit reason that compositions 
with creditors, marriage brokerage bonds, sales of offices, and transactions between 
guardian and ward were set aside in specified Chancery cases.9 
The reports also capture arguments of counsel or judges analogising the circumstances 
of one case to another sometimes, but not necessarily, ‘on the score of public policy’.10 
Analogical reasoning saw a bond given to acquire a public office delivered up, for it was 
‘within the reason of’ marriage brokerage bonds.11 Connections to public policy are made 
explicit in Stone v Lidderdale where Samuel Romilly, as counsel, argued the soundness of 
public policy as ‘a good ground of defence in equity, whether it is so at law or not; as in 
marriage brokage bonds, bonds in fraud of marriage settlements, cases on offices not 
included in the [Sale of Offices Act 1551, 5 & 6 Edw VI, c 16], and many others’.12 Similarly, 
usurious contracts and gaming transactions were identified as proceedings in violation of 
public policy.13  
Toward the end of the 18th century, Scots law on public policy shifted from a pro-
enforcement attitude, notwithstanding subject matter, to a trend of striking down 
contracts for being contra bonos mores.14 The Scottish position aligned with the practice of 
English courts in cases involving the same or similar circumstances. The hardening of 
judicial attitudes towards certain transactions emerged clearly in the early 1760s with the 
                                                 
6  For some background on this process, see Veeder van Vechten, ‘The English Reports, 1292–1865’ 
(1901) 15(1) Harvard Law Review 1. 
7  Ibid 1. 
8  See Ive v Ash (1702) Prec Ch 199; 24 ER 95; Duke of Hamilton v Lord Mohun (1710) 1 Salk 158; 91 ER 
147; Osmond v Fitzroy (1731) 3 P Wms 129; 24 ER 997. 
9  See Osmond v Fitzroy (n 8). 
10  See Law v Law (1735) Cas t Talb 140; 25 ER 705, 706 (Lord Hardwicke LC); Baldwin v Rochford (1748) 1 
Wils KB 229; 95 ER 589, 589–90 (Lord Hardwicke LC); Debenham v Ox (1749) 1 Ves Sen 276; 27 ER 
1029, 1030 (Lord Hardwicke LC); Hanington v Du-Chatel (1781) 1 Bro C C 124; 28 ER 1028, 1028 (Lord 
Thurlow LC); Heathcote v Paignon (1787) 2 Bro C C 167; 29 ER 96, 102 (Scott) (during argument); Atkinson 
v Folkes (1792) 1 Anst 67; 145 ER 802, 803 (Burton, Hollist, and Plumer) (during argument), 804 
(Hotham B); Stone v Lidderdale (1795) 2 Anst 533; 145 ER 958, 960 (Romilly) (during argument). 
11  Law v Law (n 10). 
12  Stone v Lidderdale (n 10) 960 (Romilly) (during argument). 
13  Atkinson v Folkes (n 10) 803 (Burton, Hollist, and Plumer) (during argument). 
14  William W McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland (Thomson/W Green, 3rd ed, 2007) 488–9. 
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Scottish Court of Session finding an Aberdeen wool-combers’ association — a workers’ 
‘combination’ — ‘to be of dangerous tendency, and consequently contra bonos mores’.15 
Though it had some laudable aims — like collecting money for the poor — the workers’ 
combination was thought to be an attempt to ‘cramp[] trade, and tending to make them 
independent of their employers’.16 England and Ireland shared this policy against workers’ 
combinations in statutory form where workers’ combinations were rendered unlawful by 
legislation enacted throughout the early 18th and 19th centuries.17  
Contracts involving smuggling,18 the sale of public offices,19 buying pleas,20 and 
wagers21 were also invalidated, despite 17th and 18th century authorities to the contrary. 
McBryde gives two reasons for this shift in attitude towards illegal contracts in Scots law: 
first, membership of the Court of Session remained stable over the period in question 
and, secondly, ‘utility’ as a philosophical term was used to justify contractual invalidity.22 
Part II of this Chapter gives an account of the historical development of public policy 
at common law and in Scots law. The next part begins with a brief outline of the historical 
antecedents of public policy. Eventually, English courts settled on two terms, ‘public 
policy’ or ‘policy of the law’, in the last half of the 18th century. It ends by considering 
how imprecision of language armed 18th century English judges with varied grounds upon 
which to attack the legitimacy of public policy. Part III addresses the judicial treatment of 
specific classes of public policy appearing in English, Irish, and Scottish cases between 
the 17th and 19th centuries. Before 1922, Irish courts were bound by the principles of 
English courts on the common law doctrine of public policy.23 For this reason, Part III 
also draws attention to specific cases in which the Irish position on public policy diverged 
from English principle. This Chapter concludes by examining the consolidation of 
specific classes of cases under the heading of public policy in the 19th century.  
                                                 
15  Procurator-Fiscal v Wool-Combers in Aberdeen (1762) Mor 1961, 1961. Cf Kirkman v Shawcross (1794) 6 D & 
E 14; 101 ER 410. 
16  Procurator-Fiscal v Wool-Combers in Aberdeen (n 15) 1961. 
17  Journeymen Tailors, London Act 1720, 7 Geo 1 sess 1, c 13; Woollen Manufactures Act 1725, 12 Geo 1, c 34, 
s 1; Frauds by Workmen Act 1748, 22 Geo 2, c 27; Combination of Workmen Act 1824, 5 Geo 4, c 95. See 
also Patrick Park, ‘The Combination Acts in Ireland, 1727–1825’ (1979) 14(2) Irish Jurist 340; John V 
Orth, ‘English Combination Acts of the Eighteenth Century’ (1987) 5(1) Law and History Review 175. 
18  Duncan v Thomson (1776) 5 Bro Sup 531; Duncan v Thomson (1776) Mor 9546. 
19  Dalrymple v Shaw (1786) Mor 9531; McLure v Paterson (1779) Mor 9546; Sibbald v Wallace (1779) 5 NS 532. 
20  McKenzie v Forbes (1774) 5 BS 528. 
21  Bruce v Ross (1787) Mor 9523.  
22  McBryde (n 14) 488–9. 
23  Mary Mathews, ‘Aspects of the Irish Law of Contract’ (1972) 7(2) Irish Jurist (NS) 292, 300. 
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II HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PUBLIC POLICY  
A Medieval Sources and Writings on Public Policy 
The term ‘public policy’ first emerged in law reports during the 18th century.24 The first 
recorded use of the term was by (the later) Lord Mansfield in Stanhope v Cope.25 Before this 
period, no more than ‘wide generalizations’ typified the introduction of public policy in 
English courts.26 Even so, successful appeals to ‘public policy’ emerged only in specific 
classes of cases. Knight contended that an antecedent phrase for public policy, ‘encounter 
common ley’, appeared in a 15th century case, Dyer's Case, dealing with a restraint of trade.27 
That was followed by similar expressions recorded in law French in late 16th and early 17th 
century English cases.28 These expressions ranged from a condition being declared 
‘encounter de ley… encounter le necessity del commonwealth’29 or ‘encounter le ley de 
Dieu’,30 and one which was ‘against the benefit of the commonwealth’31 or the other 
‘covenant ou condition encounter Ley est void’.32  
It is arguable that the works of English institutional writers, most notably Coke on 
Littleton,33 sowed ‘the seeds of formal ideas’ about public policy as it later developed.34 
However, conflating natural law — the idea of ascertaining objective moral standards by 
human reason35 — with the modern idea of public policy is a possible danger of 
speculating meaning that was neither intended nor foreseen by the writers of these early 
modern texts. Indeed, references in the works of Bracton to impossibility and Littleton 
to inconvenience and reason reflect the religious overtones of medieval common law.36 
Sir John Fortescue, for instance, argued that ‘all laws of men acquire their force by 
influence of the law Divine’.37 Likewise, in Coke upon Littleton, it was argued that ‘reason is 
the life of the Law, nay the Common Law itselfe is nothing else but reason, which is to 
                                                 
24  See, eg, Stanhope v Cope (1742) 9 Mod 358; 88 ER 505, 506 (Mr Murray) (during argument); Baldwin v 
Rochford (n 10) 590 (Lord Hardwicke LC); Debenham v Ox (n 10) 1030 (Lord Hardwicke LC). 
25  Stanhope v Cope (n 24) 506 (Mr Murray) (during argument) 
26  W S M Knight, ‘Public Policy in English Law’ (1922) 38 Law Quarterly Review 207, 207. 
27  (1414) 2 Hen V, f 5, pl 26; Knight (n 26) 207. Mr Justice Hull added that the agreement was against 
common law ‘et per Dieu se le plaintiff fuit icy il irra al prison tanque il ust fait fine au Roy.’ 
28  Knight (n 26) 207. 
29  Ibid. 
30  Ibid. 
31  Ibid 208. 
32  Ibid. 
33  See Egerton v Brownlow (1853) 4 HL Cas 1; 10 ER 359, 416 (Pollock CB). 
34  See P H Winfield, ‘Public Policy in the English Common Law’ (1929) 42 Harvard Law Review 76, 82. 
35  Michael Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (Sweet & Maxwell, 9th ed, 2014) 76. 
36  Ibid. 
37  Thomas Fortescue, The Works of Sir John Fortescue, Knight: Chief Justice of England and Lord Chancellor to King 
Henry the Sixth (1869) vol 1, 242. 
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be understood of an artificiall perfection of reason, gotten by long studie, observation and 
experience and not of every mans naturall reason’.38 Coke employed the maxim, nihil enim 
quod est inconveniens est licitum, to argue that law chooses the public good over private good.39  
Medieval Scottish writers also used impossibility as the touchstone for contractual 
illegality.40 In discussing the historical position of Scots law towards illegal contracts (pacta 
illicita), Macgregor has argued that, as sources, Justinian’s Institutes, papal decretals, and the 
Roman law on impossibility may well have given support for this position.41 
The standard of reasonableness was used by the Court of King’s Bench in Le Case de 
Tanistry to refuse recognition of the Brehon or Irish custom of tanistry — succession to 
the ‘most worthy’ male descendant of a common male ancestor.42 That custom was 
‘unreasonable, & va en destruction del commonwealth’.43 Throughout the case, tanistry 
was described as ‘unreasonable’, ‘encounter common droit, or purement encounter ley’,44 
‘trove injurious al multitude’, and ‘prejudicial al commonwealth’.45 It was not until legal 
thought and method systematised and the modern doctrine of precedent settled in the 
19th century that these specific classes of cases were organised under the heading of public 
policy.46 
The origins of the Scottish counterpart of public policy may, on the other hand, be 
shortly stated. Based on two medieval sources, a dishonest agreement or one causing the 
soul’s imperilment would be incapable of enforcement.47 Categories meeting this 
description were not considered in these medieval sources. Likewise, no classification is 
featured in the discussions of Scottish institutional writers on the impossibility of 
performing illegal, dishonest, immoral, or unlawful contracts.48 Once a considerable body 
of case law had developed, a rudimentary classification of illegal contracts was attempted 
for the first time in George Joseph Bell’s text, Principles of the Law of Scotland (1829).49 
                                                 
38  Sir Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (1628) 97b, s 138. 
39  Knight (n 26) 208; Winfield (n 34) 82. 
40  Laura J Macgregor, ‘Pacta Illicita’ in Kenneth Reid and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private 
Law in Scotland (Oxford University Press, 2000) vol 2, 129, 129–30. 
41  Ibid. 
42  See Shaunnagh Dorsett, ‘Since Time Immemorial: A Story of Common Law Jurisdiction, Native Title, 
and the Case of Tanistry’ (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 32, 44. 
43  Le Case de Tanistry (1607) Dav 28; 80 ER 516, 522. 
44  Trans: ‘against common right, or absolutely against law.’ 
45  Le Case de Tanistry (n 43) 520. 
46  See, eg, M H Hoeflich, ‘Law and Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell’ (1986) 30 American 
Journal of Legal History 95; Harold J Berman and Charles J Reid Jr, ‘The Transformation of English Legal 
Science: From Hale to Blackstone’ (1996) 45 Emory Law Journal 437. 
47  Macgregor (n 40) 129–30. 
48  Ibid 130–1. 
49  Ibid 131, citing George Joseph Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland, For the Use of Students in the University 
of Edinburgh (1st ed, 1829). 
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B Nineteenth-Century Treatment of Public Policy 
By the 19th century, the explosion of arguments based on public policy corresponded with 
the emergence of judicial disapproval of the term. Judicial censure was perhaps a salient 
factor contributing to the 19th century reorganisation of public policy. In Richardson v 
Mellish, Burrough J famously described public policy as ‘a very unruly horse, and when 
once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you. It may lead you from the 
sound law. It is never argued at all but when other points fail’.50 Sir William Best CJCP 
was ‘not much disposed to yield to arguments of public policy’ either, questioning the 
extent to which the doctrine had travelled in the common law courts for something that 
was a peculiarly legislative concern.51 Burrough J’s metaphor has eclipsed other less florid, 
but equally relevant, criticisms of public policy.52 
The ‘unruly horse’ metaphor, however, had no immediate effect. Between Richardson v 
Mellish and the House of Lords’ decision in Egerton v Brownlow, only one reported English 
case referred to the dangers of riding the ‘unruly horse’.53 In the 1830 English case of 
Newberry v Colvin, the defendant considered that it was ‘much safer to abide, as nearly as 
possible, by the contract of the parties’ because arguments founded on public policy could 
be ‘well compared to an unruly horse’.54 But this argument was not taken up in the 
decision of Sir Nicholas Tindal CJCP.55 The metaphor was revived from the late 1880s to 
foster a degree of judicial care in enlivening public policy.56 By this stage, judicial 
complaints against public policy had taken more shape with courts reintroducing the 
metaphor to consolidate and define the boundaries of its objection: past authorities 
conflicted with each other, the doctrine escaped definition, the content of policy was 
obscure, and policy opinions varied over time.57 
Thoughtful reasons for discounting public policy arguments figured in an early 19th 
century Admiralty decision, The Elsebe.58  Sir William Scott rebuffed public policy for two 
reasons. First, considerations of public policy should be resolved by ‘wise legislative 
                                                 
50  Richardson v Mellish (1824) 2 Bing 229; 130 ER 294, 303 (Burrough J). 
51  Ibid 299 (Sir William Best CJCP). 
52  The Elsebe (1804) 5 Ch Rob 174; 165 ER 738. 
53  Newberry v Colvin (1830) 7 Bing 190; 131 ER 73. In the intervening years, courts in other common law 
jurisdictions had referred to the metaphor. 
54  Newberry v Colvin (1830) 1 Cr & J 193; 148 ER 1388, 1395 (Campbell) (during argument). 
55  Ibid. 
56  See, eg, Davies v Davies (1887) 36 Ch D 359, 364 (Kekewich J); Mogul Steamship Company Ltd v McGregor, 
Gow & Co [1892] AC 25, 45 (Lord Bramwell); Re Kelcey; Tyson v Kelcey [1899] 2 Ch 530, 534 (Kekewich 
J). 
57  Davies v Davies (n 56) 364–5 (Kekewich J). 
58  The Elsebe (n 52). 
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provisions elsewhere’, not judges charged with interpreting legislative provisions.59 
Secondly, and notably, his Lordship pointed out its unpredictability.60 Arguments based 
on public policy arguments were ‘too vast, and too obvious, not to present themselves to 
every man’s imagination’.61  
English judges’ inclination was to recast public policy using a ‘proper ground’ of law.62 
Indeed, in Egerton v Brownlow, Cresswell J witheringly ‘presume[d] we are not asked our 
opinions as to public policy, but as to the law’.63 His Lordship thought that public policy 
had been ‘used somewhat inaccurately instead of “the policy of the law”’ in law reports.64 
Instead of violating public policy, contracts in restraint of trade were illegal and 
preferences to specific creditors prior to entering bankruptcy were fraudulent and void 
against bankruptcy laws.65 This was the nature of an argument led by Attorney-General 
Rolt in Howard v Earl of Shrewsbury: ‘it is said that the transaction was against the policy of 
the law, but to shew it to be against the policy of the law it must be shewn to be against 
law’.66  
Authorities formerly decided on public policy grounds, like Cole v Gower,67 were 
reinterpreted. According to common law judges in Egerton v Brownlow, the ‘proper ground’ 
of Cole v Gower was statutory interpretation, rather than the substantive public policy 
objections that were raised by the judges 50 years earlier.68 The object of the Bastardy Act 
1733, as considered in Cole v Gower, was the indemnification of a parish against the costs 
of maintaining an ex-nuptial child.69 The Act contained no authorisation allowing parish 
officers to take security for a ‘sum certain’.70 The parish officers had acquired an absolute 
security from the putative father of the child,71 even though it was not for them ‘to 
speculate, but to take the security as a matter of public duty in the form prescribed by the 
Act: and taking it in the form they have done is contrary both to the direct letter and to 
the general policy of the law’.72 
                                                 
59  Ibid. 
60  Ibid. 
61  Ibid. 
62  See, eg, Cole v Gower (1805) 6 East 110; 102 ER 1229, discussed in Egerton v Brownlow (n 33) 391 (Williams 
J). 
63  Egerton v Brownlow (n 33) 394 (Cresswell J). 
64  Ibid. 
65  Ibid. 
66  Howard v Earl of Shrewsbury [1867] LR 2 Ch App 760, 769 (Sir John Rolt, Attorney-General) (during 
argument). 
67  Cole v Gower (n 62). 
68  Egerton v Brownlow (n 33) 391 (Williams J). 
69  Cole v Gower (n 62) 1232 (Le Blanc J). 
70  Egerton v Brownlow (n 33) 391 (Williams J). 
71  Cole v Gower (n 62) 1231 (Lord Ellenborough CJKB). 
72  Ibid (emphasis added). 
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Notwithstanding criticism, public policy was ‘saved’ by the House of Lords in Egerton 
v Brownlow.73 An entire rejection of public policy as a doctrine would have been ‘altogether 
too late in the development of the common law’ and would have constituted a rejection 
of the choices common law judges ‘must make… about the way in which the common 
law is to develop’.74 The struggle of the common law judges hearing the reference from 
the House of Lords in Egerton v Brownlow was reconciling past decisions on public policy 
in a coherent manner.75 Two aspects of the criticism of public policy in the reference are 
notable: its uncertainty and its incompatibility with legislative and judicial functions. The 
common law judges argued that the doctrine was ‘capable of being understood in different 
senses; it may, and does, in the ordinary sense, mean “political expedience,” or that which 
is best for the common good of the community’.76 The House of Lords defended the 
continued existence of public policy, casting off criticisms that it was ‘too uncertain or 
vague to be capable of practical application by Judges’, because ‘there is the same difficulty 
in regard to the application of many other rules and principles admitted to the established 
law’.77 Judicial discretion determined whether a case fell within the ‘well-established rule 
of law’.78 
The reference to the ‘different senses’ in which public policy was invoked, apart from 
its traditional use in specific classes of cases (explored in Part III), offers an explanation 
for the trenchant criticism the doctrine weathered. Public policy was appealed to as a 
paramount principle to which the law must conform or as a mere flourish in argument. 
The term was more commonly given an interpretative function — it provided a basis for 
a particular rule of law or a ‘probable reason’ for the making of specific legislative 
schemes.79 It was this function which Cresswell J attacked in Egerton v Brownlow.80 Thus, 
the Registry Acts — requiring registration of all merchant ships engaged in local and foreign 
trade — stemmed from public policy.81 Specifically, the Acts were enacted with the 
purpose of restricting ‘to British subjects and to British built ships the benefit of British 
                                                 
73  Susan Kiefel, ‘The Role of Policy in the Law of Obligations’ in Charles E F Rickett (ed), Justifying Private 
Law Remedies (Hart Publishing, 2008) 79, 80. 
74  Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 315 CLR 1, 82–3 [226] (Hayne J). 
75  Egerton v Brownlow (n 33) 394 (Cresswell J). 
76  Ibid 409 (Parke B). 
77  Ibid 437 (Lord Truro). 
78  Ibid 423 (Lord Lyndhurst). 
79  Ibid 410 (Parke B). 
80  Ibid 394 (Cresswell J). 
81  See, eg, Shipping Act 1786, 26 Geo 3, c 60; Merchant Shipping Act 1794, 34 Geo 3, c 68; Hay v Monkhouse 
(1817) Holt 603; 171 ER 355, 356; Cox v Reid (1824) Ry & M 199; 171 ER 993, 993 (Sir William Best 
CJCP). 
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trade’.82 If at all, in Robinson v Macdonnell,83 Lord Ellenborough CJKB thought the 
consequential ‘notoriety’ of the Acts was ‘a consequence of the measures adopted to effect 
the policy of the State’.84 In the same vein, public policy was thought to have grounded s 
6 of the Statute of Frauds 1677,85 considered in one case to have barred service of process 
on a Sunday.86 In The Swift, Lord Stowell thought ‘public policy and convenience… are 
good interpreters of that which is doubtful’.87 The failure to separate the limited classes 
of traditional public policy from other ‘inaccurately’ described functions meant that the 
doctrine arguably yielded undeserved criticism. 
III CATEGORIES OF PUBLIC POLICY IN EARLY ENGLISH, SCOTTISH, AND IRISH 
CASES 
In the late-18th and early-19th centuries, marriage brokerage bonds88 and the assignment 
of an officer’s pay were specific classes or species of contracts considered contrary to 
public policy in equity and, later, at common law.89 During the earlier period, courts of 
equity did not pause before intervening in these instances when it was ‘thought’ the 
common law courts could not offer a suitable remedy.90 As Lord Eldon LC remarked in 
Mayhew v Crickett,91 ‘many questions [eg, marriage brokerage bonds] … formerly exclusive 
subjects of equitable jurisdiction, have, since Lord Mansfield’s time become subjects of 
the jurisdiction of courts of law’.92  
English, Irish and Scots law had comparable categories to relieve against contractual 
unfairness from the 17th century to the mid-19th century. In the 18th and early 19th 
centuries, these categories included contracts that involved: (A) restraints of trade; (B) 
public and political corruption; (C) the commission of a crime or a tort; (D) smuggling; 
(E) agreements affecting the administration of justice; (F) sexual immorality and 
matrimonial affairs; (G) betting, gambling and wagers; (H) usury; and (I) expectant heirs.  
                                                 
82  Robinson v Macdonnell (1816) 5 M & S 228; 105 ER 1034, 1038 (Lord Ellenborough CJKB). 
83  Ibid. 
84  Ibid. 
85  29 Car, c 7, s 6. 
86  Taylor v Phillips (1802) 3 East 155; 102 ER 556, 557 (Lord Ellenborough CJKB). 
87  The Swift (1813) 1 Dods 330; 165 ER 1325, 1335–6. 
88  See, eg, Cole v Gieson (1750) 1 Ves Sen 503; 27 ER 1169. 
89  See Layng v Paine (1745) Willes 571; 125 ER 1326; Morris v McCullock (1763) Amb 432; 27 ER 289; 
Garforth v Fearon (1787) 1 Bl H 327; 126 ER 193; Flarty v Odlum (1790) 3 D & E 681; 100 ER 801; Barwick 
v Reade (1791) 1 H Bl 627; 126 ER 357; 100 ER 801; Lidderdale v Duke of Montrose (1791) 4 D & E 248; 
100 ER 1000; Stone v Lidderdale (n 10); Collyer v Fallon (1823) Turn & R 459; 37 ER 1177. 
90  See Layng v Paine (n 89); Peter Sparkes, ‘Morality, Amorality and Equity’ (1990) 5 Denning Law Journal 91, 
92. 
91  Mayhew v Crickett (1818) 2 Swanst 185; 36 ER 585. 
92  Ibid 587 (Lord Eldon LC). See also Cock v Richards (1805) 10 Ves Jr 429; 32 ER 911, 915 (Lord 
Hardwicke LC). 
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For these identifiable factual situations, Chancery judges could offer equitable relief 
based on ‘one of the three traditional heads of Chancery jurisdiction’: fraud.93 In Earl of 
Chesterfield v Janssen,94 Lord Hardwicke LC outlined five species of fraud, the fourth of 
which is connected with public policy as a reason and a justification for equitable 
intervention.95 The fourth species of fraud included marriage brokerage bonds, 
advantageous deeds of composition with individual creditors, and ‘catching bargains’ with 
expectant heirs.96 Equity intervened to prevent the introduction of ‘an unworthy object 
for an unworthy consideration’.97 
A Contracts in Restraint of Trade  
From the early 15th century, an absolute prohibition at common law on agreements in 
restraint of trade was based on the doctrine of public policy.98 This ancient application of 
public policy can be traced to Dyer’s Case. Here, Hull J held that a bond restraining a dyer 
from his trade for six months was contrary to common law and, as noted subsequently, 
‘clearly and absolutely void’.99 In the Tailors of Ipswich, Lord Coke CJKB offered public 
interest as a reason underlying the judge-made prohibition: 
at the common law, no man could be prohibited from working in any lawful trade, for the 
law abhors idleness, the mother of all evil, otium omnium ritiorum mater, and especially in 
young men, who ought in their youth, (which is their seed time) to learn lawful sciences 
and trades, which are profitable to the commonwealth, and whereof they might reap the 
fruit in their old age, for idle in youth, poor in age; and therefore the common law abhors 
all monopolies, which prohibit any from working in any lawful trade.100 
Lord Coke CJKB added that restraints of trade were ‘prejudicial to the commonwealth’.101  
In Mitchel v Reynolds, Lord Parker CJKB qualified the prohibition laid down in Dyer’s 
Case: if reasonable consideration was given, bonds given in partial restraint of trade were 
enforceable.102 However, general bonds were ‘a general mischief to the publick’, ‘against 
the policy of the common law, and contrary to Magna Charta’.103 In explaining social and 
                                                 
93  Warren Swain, ‘Reshaping Contractual Unfairness in England 1670–1900’ (2014) 35 Journal of Legal 
History 120, 126 (‘Reshaping Contractual Unfairness’). 
94  (1751) 2 Ves Sen 125; 28 ER 82. 
95  Earl of Chesterfield v Janssen (1751) 2 Ves Sen 125; 28 ER 82, 100 (Lord Hardwicke LC). 
96  Ibid 84. 
97  Ibid 100. 
98  Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1, 81 [223] (Hayne J). 
99  Elves v Crofts (1850) 10 CB 241; 138 ER 98, 103. 
100  Tailors of Ipswich (1614) 11 Co Rep 53; 77 ER 1218, 1219. 
101  Ibid 1220. 
102  (1711) 1 P Wms 181; 24 ER 347, 348, 351 (Sir Thomas Parker CJQB). 
103  Ibid 348, 351. 
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economic evils accruing from these restraints, his Lordship used the example of a ‘poor 
weaver’ who, after suffering great losses, renounces his trade to a ‘designing fellow’ but 
must break the restraint to support his impoverished family and ‘the cries of his 
children’.104 Though Lord Parker agreed with the ‘indignation that judge expressed [in 
Dyer’s Case]’, his Lordship did not agree with ‘his manner of expressing it’.105 By the end 
of the 18th century, the types of contracts that could be avoided on public policy grounds 
had broadened from those in restraint of trade to immoral and illegal contracts with an 
element of public detriment.  
The bright-line distinction between general restraints and partial restraints — valid if 
based on ‘sufficient or good and adequate consideration’ — was maintained until 
refocused in the English Court of Appeal’s decision of Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and 
Ammunition Company v Nordenfelt.106 Lindley LJ considered the principle underlying the 
distinction between general and partial restraints more important than the division itself.107 
Even if a restriction in a covenant was unlimited as to space, it was not necessarily contrary 
to public policy to restrict an individual from engaging in a particular business.108 Here, a 
covenant given for valuable consideration restricted Nordenfelt from the worldwide gun 
and ammunition business upon his company’s takeover. Quite apart from public policy, 
so long as the restriction as to time and space was ‘reasonably necessary for the protection 
of the interests of the covenantee’ it would be valid.109 The relaxation of the law on 
restraints of trade over the centuries was a reflection of the courts ‘yielding to the progress 
of industry and commerce’ and public policy bending to accommodate ‘expansion or 
modification’.110 Increased trade and new competition necessitated a modification of 
public policy underlying the law on restraints.111  
The Scottish position on restraints of trade emerged in the late 19th century to mirror 
English law. Previously, few Scots cases were of assistance to define the circumstances in 
which a contract would be reduced or found unlawful for interference with someone’s 
trade. In Allan v Skene, the Court of Session reduced a contract that charged the masters 
                                                 
104  Ibid. 
105  Ibid 353. ‘Hall expressed himself thus: A ma intent vous purres aver demurre sur luy que le obligation 
est void, eo que le condition est encountre common ley, et per Dieu si le plaintiff fuit icy, il irra al prison 
tanq ; il ust fait fine au Roy.’ 
106  Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Company v Nordenfelt [1893] 1 Ch 530, 647 (Lindley LJ). 
107  Ibid 650 (Lindley LJ). 
108  Ibid. 
109  Ibid 651 (Lindley LJ), 673 (A L Smith LJ). 
110  Ibid 655 (Lindley LJ), 661 (Bowen LJ). 
111  Davies v Davies (1887) 36 Ch D 359, 364–5 (Kekewich J). The vagueness of the covenant resulted in the 
Court of Appeal reversing the decision of Kekewich J. 
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and crews of several fishing boats an annual rate of £44 for using tacksmen’s boats over 
a period of ‘three nineteen years’.112 The contract — ‘being too great a restraint upon 
natural liberty’ — was reduced on the grounds of minority and lesion.113 In the earlier case 
of Wedderburn v Monorgun, it was held to be unlawful to agree to perpetual banishment of 
a person imprisoned for slaughter without obtaining the King’s consent.114 These cases 
seem to be the exception rather than the rule: the cases indicate that restraints of trade 
predating the late 18th century were considered lawful.115 In the latter half of the 18th 
century, the Scots law on restraints of trade was treated as settled. The inference ‘that the 
law of Scotland has at any time been otherwise treated’ could not, according to Lord 
Kellachy in 1895, be maintained.116 Rather, a restraint of trade limited to a given trade and 
place was legal ‘and not against the liberty of trade’.117 In comparison, unlimited restraint 
as to trade and place — one ‘larger than is reasonably necessary’ — would be unlawful.118 
The discussion of ‘reasonably necessary’ and the citation of English authorities reveals the 
extent to which English law was influential in shaping this category.119  
B Public and Political Corruption 
1 Selling Offices 
The impression that the sale of offices was a common practice,120 though one not tolerated 
outside Scotland, is clear from 17th and 18th century English and Scottish authorities.  
In England, equity traditionally relieved against transactions involving the sale of 
public office that, though not prohibited by the Sale of Offices Act 1551,121 were analogous 
to its statutory prohibitions and to established categories enlivening Chancery’s 
jurisdiction to provide relief.122 The 1551 Act penalised individuals for selling, ‘or receiving 
or agreeing to receive Money for’, particular public offices affecting the administration of 
                                                 
112  Allan v Skene (1728) Mor 9454, 9454–5. 
113  Ibid 9455. 
114  Wedderburn v Monorgun (1612) Mor 9453. 
115  See, eg, Stalker v Carmichael (1735) Mor 9455. This was an agreement between co-partners of a Glasgow 
bookselling business. After three years in partnership, either one was ‘debarred’ from bookselling in 
Glasgow. The Court of Session regarded this agreement as lawful and ‘not contrary to the liberty of the 
subject’. 
116  Meikle v Meikle (1895) 3 SLT 204, 204. 
117  Watson v Neuffert (1863) 1 M 1110, 1112. 
118  Watson v Neuffert (n 117) 1113; Meikle v Meikle (n 116) 204. 
119  See Meikle v Meikle (n 116) 204. 
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justice, the monarch’s revenue, and the oversight of major public places.123 In the past, 
the Court of Chancery would not set aside bonds for the sale of offices not embraced by 
the Act but would rather order repayment of the principal sum advanced with interest.124 
However, in one late 17th century case, the Court ordered repayment but ‘without interest 
or costs’, a decree doubted by a report writer and by subsequent judges.125  
In Law v Law, the procuring of a position with excise was construed to be comparable 
to the revenue restriction in the Sale of Offices Act 1551 though excise ‘was no part of the 
revenue at the time of making the statute’.126 Relief was given because agreements of this 
nature encouraged corruption and extortion,127 and failing to decree would also reward a 
candidate found wanting of ‘[m]erit, industry, and fidelity’.128  
Likewise, in Morris v M’Cullock, the Court of Chancery ordered the plaintiff a refund 
for money advanced to the defendant to procure a commission in the Marines.129 The 
plaintiff had been discharged from the Marines after six months. The original transaction 
was described as ‘a contract of turpitude’ and broadly analogous to established categories 
of marriage brokerage and ‘post-obit’ bonds.130 Lord Henley LC established a rule that 
any sale of ‘an office of trust or service under the Government’ without Crown consent 
would be set aside.131  
‘Public policy’ — as an expression to justify the granting of relief in these cases — did 
not, however, emerge until the last quarter of the 18th century. In 1781, the Court of 
Chancery explicitly employed public policy to relieve against the purchase of an office, 
though it was outside the Sale of Offices Act 1551.132 In Hanington v Du-Chatel,133 the Court 
of Chancery granted a perpetual injunction against a bond in which Lord Rochford sold 
his recommendation as Groom of the Stool for King George III. Though it was not a 
‘statutory’ office, Lord Thurlow LC considered that the case related to ‘a matter of public 
policy of the law… similar to marriage brokage bonds’ because it was a practice ‘publicly 
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detrimental’ even if ‘the parties are private persons’.134 The relief afforded at common law 
was different but justified on the same grounds. 
The equitable rationale that offices should be ‘given to those most worthy’135 was 
followed in courts of law. While the Court of Chancery would decree repayment, a 
common law court would find no cause of action arising from an illegal contract for the 
sale of an office.136 In Blachford v Preston, Lord Kenyon CJKB held that the sale of the 
command of a ship in the service of the East India Company without its consent was 
against public policy and a fraud on the Company.137 With the East India Company treated 
as an office or arm of government,138 Lord Kenyon CJKB followed Hanington to hold that 
‘no money-consideration ought to influence the appointment to … offices [which the 
public has an interest in]’.139 As a corollary, providing monetary inducements could result 
in persons not ‘best qualified’ filling offices.140 This represented a departure from the 
former practice at common law of enforcing such contracts lying outside the Sale of Offices 
Act in order to uphold a private transaction.141   
In the second half of the 18th century, the toleration that the Court of Session had 
previously shown towards the practice ended.142 In Dalrymple v Shaw, the Court declared 
such sales ‘contra bonos mores, and illegal’,143 a conclusion that agreed with the English 
position that had by that point identified an explicit public policy rationale for interfering 
with the practice. Strengthening the Scottish position was the Sale of Offices Act 1809 that 
extended the English Sale of Offices Act 1551144 to Scotland. 
2 Assignments of Half-Pay and Full Pay 
Public policy and paternalism were two reasons given in a small selection of 18th century 
cases inhibiting assignments of military salaries.145 Despite some initial divergence, the 
position at common law and in equity converged in the 1790s so that assignments of both 
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full and half pay were illegal.146 After Stone v Lidderdale, assignments of public pay were 
treated as bad in equity.147 Assignments of a public grant such as officers’ grants raised 
‘the general object of public policy’, which ‘general intent pervades the whole’.148 In 
Barwick v Reade, the non-assignability of the full military pay at common law was premised 
on ‘it being contrary to the policy of the law’ to assign future services to someone who 
could not perform them.149 The substance of this public policy was that office holders 
were granted public pay ‘for the dignity of the State, and for the decent support of those 
persons who are engaged in the service of it’.150 The honour and dignity of serving the 
Crown lent support to a general policy against such assignments.151  
The earlier position in equity balanced the ‘great inconveniences’ of assignments with 
its advantages in individual cases.152 Making provision for family or for accommodation 
while encamped abroad were advantages and legitimate ends encouraging assignment.153 
In Gomez v Philips, an assignment of pay to secure an annuity by a fort major in Nova 
Scotia ‘made upon valuable consideration, and without fraud’ was valid.154 Enforcing the 
assignment, Lord Hardwicke LC noted that fraud, special inconvenience, or contrary 
practice might have invalidated the transaction.155 While Lord Hardwicke LC left the task 
of ‘a restraint against a general practice’ to the legislature,156 a general restraint was 
subsequently introduced at law and in equity.157 
3 Simoniacal Contracts 
In the 1750s, simony — the practice of buying and selling church positions — was 
roundly condemned as ‘ob turpem causam’ in a single Court of Session decision.158 Though 
English legislation had proscribed simony from Elizabethan times,159 it took until the latter 
half of the 18th century before the position of English courts settled on a similar 
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foundation to Scots law, ‘the policy of the law’.160 Not long after the Simony Act 1588 was 
enacted, an Elizabethan court had held that the purchase of a vacant living was 
simoniacal.161 Using this decision, clergy outmanoeuvred the Elizabethan statute by 
purchasing ‘the next presentation at a time when the church was full’.162 The purchase of 
a next presentation was eventually precluded by the Simony Act 1713, although the status 
of resignation bonds (under which a clergyman agreed to resign his living for a named 
person or generally at the future request of his patron) remained unsettled.163  
Between the 16th and early 19th centuries, the English position on simoniacal contracts 
varied between the law courts, where bonds of resignation were generally valid,164 and in 
the Court of Chancery, where their Lordships expressed hesitance at agreements 
suggestive of simony.165 In comparison to this equivocation, the Scottish Court of Session 
had fastened to a personal and punitive solution: it coupled non-actionability of a 
simoniacal agreement with a fine to all those involved to be then applied to poor relief.166  
Chancery decisions relating to this category were either equivocal or unequivocal in 
stating the legal position. In Kirkcudbright v Kirkcudbright, an agreement for taking holy 
orders elicited remarks on the need for ‘purity of the Church establishment’ and for the 
recommendation of meritorious persons to Church vacancies.167 Lord Eldon LC did not 
doubt that these agreements were once against ‘the policy and constitution of the country’ 
and ‘the policy of the law’.168 It was the prevalence of buying and selling public office in 
18th century England and Scotland that may have normalised the practice to ‘men, who… 
would be the last to act incorrectly’, especially in the absence of proper legal advice.169 
During the reign of King George IV, decisive legislative action settled the English 
position on general and special resignation bonds. In the 1801 decision of Legh v Lewis, 
Lord Kenyon CJKB concluded that a resignation bond was ‘good at law’, but that 
Chancery would restrain the improper use of a resignation bond.170 The later House of 
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Lords’ decision in Fletcher v Lord Sondes,171 where a special resignation bond was declared 
simoniacal and void, occasioned the enactment of the Resignation Bonds Act 1827 and the 
Clergy Resignation Bonds Act 1828. 172  Under the 1827 Act, all resignation bonds made after 
9 April 1827 were void.173 Given the prevalence of resignation bonds, the 1828 Act 
clarified that special resignation bonds made before 9 April 1827 were not void if other 
conditions were fulfilled. A bona fide agreement to resign before that date was valid where 
one person or one or two persons related by blood or marriage to the patron was 
specifically named in it to succeed the incumbent.174  
4 Influencing Elections and Parliamentary Decision-Making  
By the beginning of the 19th century, agreements to withdraw opposition to a bill in 
Parliament with monetary inducement or to interfere with the conduct of elections were 
two species of political corruption condemned in English, Irish, and Scottish courts for 
public policy reasons. Common law intervention was a more prevalent occurrence before 
19th century parliamentary reforms were introduced to check bribery and corruption in 
electioneering. In Paterson v Magistrates and Town-Council of Stirling, a bond between three 
men of a borough agreeing that only candidates first approved by them could stand for 
local election was contra bonos mores.175 The Scottish Court of Session considered that the 
men unduly influenced the conduct of local elections for magistrates and counsellors.176 
When considering transactions ‘against public policy as affecting the freedom of election’, 
the Courts of Chancery acted ‘to suppress the mischief’.177 Relief on public policy grounds 
was ‘given upon general grounds, where the public is interested’.178 While legislation 
applicable to these countries reinforced the policy against similar agreements,179 later 
English decisions upheld agreements that had no element of fraud on the individual or 
on the legislature.  
Fraud as a requisite for contractual invalidity was affirmed in the Court of Chancery’s 
decision in Vauxhall Bridge Company v Spencer.180 Securities given by Vauxhall Bridge 
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Company subscribers to induce the proprietors of the Battersea Bridge Company to 
withdraw opposition to a parliamentary bill for a prospective bridge construction over the 
Thames constituted a fraud upon parliament and were consequently contrary to public 
policy. Since it was ‘the first time that this Court [had] been called on to redress frauds 
upon the Legislature’, the defendants urged the judges not to extend the traditional 
categories of public policy to the case.181 The Court accepted the plaintiff’s assimilation of 
the factual circumstances to decisions on marriage brokerage bonds and the sale of 
offices, in which agreements were set aside for public policy reasons.182 The appropriation 
of money collected from tolls to be used for certain purposes added an element of public 
interest to the secret agreement.183 By trying to satisfy the Battersea Bridge proprietors’ 
objections, the Vauxhall Bridge Company sought to apply appropriations for a purpose 
not contemplated by the Act as passed.184 By employing ‘the principle of the cases … 
cited’ in the plaintiff’s argument,185 Sir Thomas Plumer V-C held that the secret agreement 
was ‘a fraud upon the Legislature and contrary to principles of public policy’.186 From the 
1830s, intention to defraud at the time of contracting, not the secrecy of the agreement 
itself, proved to be the decisive factor to set aside an agreement of this nature.187   
C Commission of a Crime or Tort 
It was considered contra bonos mores or against the policy of the law to uphold agreements 
to commit or to conceal crimes and civil wrongs. This heading captured a broad range of 
conduct from printing libellous material188 to stifling a prosecution.189 Thus, agreements 
not to prosecute — the crime of ‘theftboot’ under Scots law — were treated as contra bonos 
mores.190 While the crime was introduced into Scots law for public protection, the 
prohibition against these agreements had persisted in the mid-18th century ‘upon the head 
of expediency’.191 The practice of hiring white bonnets192 to bid at auctions was 
condemned in the Scottish Court of Session on similar grounds.193  
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Nineteenth century English authorities were along the same lines. Knowledge that 
goods were being supplied for an illegal purpose as proscribed under the Duties on Beer Act 
1802 barred an action to recover for sale and delivery.194 In addition to frustrating the 
statutory ends of public health and revenue, the agreement was ‘entered into against the 
policy of the law’.195 Smuggling and ‘bricks sold under the statutable size’ were perceived 
to be analogous to the purchase of supplies for brewing.196 
Aside from the commission and concealment of crimes, agreements involving the 
commission of civil wrong were condemned on grounds characteristic of public policy. 
The value of caricature prints with ‘immoral, obscene, or libellous’ tendency were not 
recoverable in an action of assumpsit.197 Offence to ‘public morals and laws of the country’ 
precluded recovery for work and labour done in printing the memoir of a prostitute.198 A 
lessor could refuse to allow a plaintiff to use his rooms to deliver lectures critiquing 
Christianity lest it be ‘a violation of the first principles of the law’.199 By refusing to lend 
assistance, the courts showed their disinclination to ‘take an account between two robbers 
on Hounslow Heath’.200 
D Smuggling 
While treated as contrary to public policy under English law, agreements to smuggle or 
to sell contraband goods were considered pacta illicita under Scots law. From the mid-18th 
century, the general tendency of the extant Scottish cases, which vastly outnumber any 
comparable English cases, was non-enforceability. Beforehand, the conventional course 
was to hold that actions of this nature were maintainable. In so holding, the Court of 
Session would routinely repel arguments proposing that no action could lie upon 
contraband goods, the suggestion being that each party was as ‘guilty as sin’.201 
Two factors emerged in the late 18th century Scottish cases that became decisive: the 
allegiance of the pursuer or the knowledge of the parties. Initially, foreign merchants could 
recover the value of contraband items in the Court of Session but, from the late 1770s, 
the position fixed upon actual knowledge or active participation.202 Active participation in 
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a smuggling enterprise prevented a seller, who packed goods in a particular way to avoid 
detection, from recovering. 
The importance attached to intention and assistance in smuggling ventures was shared 
in English courts. In Clugas v Penaluna, collusion by packing contraband goods for the 
defendant precluded the plaintiff from recovery in England.203 The ‘immorality’ of evading 
domestic law tainted the whole smuggling agreement, disqualifying it from judicial 
intervention.204 This harmonised with Lord Mansfield CJKB’s judgment in an earlier 
smuggling case, Holman v Johnson. There, his Lordship explained that public policy meant 
‘ex dolo malo non oritur actio. No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of 
action upon an immoral or an illegal act’.205 Parties at equal fault, thus, could not expect 
to recover on a smuggling agreement in Scottish and English courts from the late 18th 
century.206 
E Agreements Affecting the Administration of Justice 
1 Maintenance and Champerty 
By the 19th century, the public policy basis underlying the ancient torts and crimes of 
maintenance and champerty had withered in importance. In Stanley v Jones, Sir Nicholas 
Tindal CJCP recognised that maintenance was ‘in earlier times, and in all countries, an 
offence pregnant with great mischief to the public’, as ancient statutes proved.207 Various 
statutes enacted between the late-13th and mid-16th centuries, such as the Statute of 
Westminster 1275208 and Statute of Westminster 1285,209 focused on these two issues. The two 
Statutes of Westminster were a direct response to an increasing number of individual 
petitions complaining of land magnates’ interference with pending litigation in order to 
enlarge their existing estates.210 To achieve this aim, feudal magnates might fund another’s 
suit for recovery of land in return for a share in the costs of litigation and joint ownership 
of the estate in question.  In prohibiting this practice, Parliament aimed to reduce third 
party interference with litigation whether through the practice of promoting or supporting 
it (‘maintenance’) or, in aggravated form, of seeking a share in the profits of successful 
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litigation (‘champerty’). By the 19th century, arguments based on champerty and 
maintenance more often than not failed, spectacularly so in Persse v Persse.211  
(a) Persse v Persse 
In Persse v Persse, an indenture of covenant was upheld by the House of Lords despite the 
defendant’s arguments that it was void or illegal by reason of champerty, maintenance, 
public policy, fraud, and want of mutuality. 212  All of these grounds failed.  
Robert Persse was the heir presumptive of his cousin, Robert Parsons Persse (‘R P P’). 
His wealthy cousin was unmarried and ‘of unsound mind’.213 On his death, Robert Persse 
would inherit the real estate and personal property of his cousin, R P P. Robert Persse’s 
bankruptcy combined with the mental state of his cousin led Robert to enter into an 
indenture with his eldest son, Dudley Persse. By this indenture it was agreed that Dudley 
would prosecute and fund a commission of lunacy in his father’s name against R P P. 
Upon his cousin’s death, the agreement recited that Robert would convey his cousin’s 
property to Dudley ‘in consideration… of the natural love and affection which he bore’ 
for his son.214 R P P was declared a ‘lunatic’ and died in 1829. On the cousin’s death, 
however, the father settled the remainder of the estate on his second son, Robert Henry, 
contrary to the indenture. 
The father’s first head of argument — that the agreement savoured of champerty and 
maintenance — was rejected out of hand. The lunacy suit was not being maintained and 
there was ‘no property in litigation to be divided’.215 The division of property would only 
take place on the cousin’s demise. Furthermore, an agreement to prosecute a commission 
of lunacy was not contrary to public policy for the lunacy jurisdiction of the Court of 
Chancery was protectionist in nature.216 Engaging the jurisdiction was to be encouraged 
since the object of it was the protection of the mentally ill person and their property.217 It 
would frustrate that object if courts were to hold ‘that all agreements relative to the costs 
of the proceedings or the ultimate division of the property were void’.218  
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2 Secret Compositions with Individual Creditors 
The policy of the law, public protection, violation of ‘essential principles of justice’ and 
fraud coalesced to invalidate secret bargains between bankrupts and individual creditors.219 
On principles of public policy, 19th century English, Irish, and Scottish courts would not 
sustain actions based on bargains advantaging one creditor — either by securing an entire 
discharge of a debt or receiving a larger sum than agreed — to the disadvantage of the 
others.220 In Jackman v Mitchell, Lord Eldon LC ordered costs and decreed delivery up of a 
bond securing the bankrupt’s largest creditor the deficiency of a composition, even 
though the parties were particeps criminis.221 The intention of the bond was to induce the 
creditor to enter a deed of composition in which the bankrupt and his other creditors 
would agree to settle on a percentage of the total amount owed to them.222 The relief 
premised on public policy was awarded ‘on account, not of the individual, but of the 
public’.223 This basis for granting relief was subsequently relied upon in other English cases 
on secret compositions.224  
Language evocative of particeps criminis and public policy was employed with similar 
effect in the Scottish Court of Session. In Cook v Montgomery, the Court of Session set aside 
bills privately obtained from a bankrupt to condition a creditor’s agreement to a voluntary 
composition and discharge.225 Fraud and extortion were present in the transaction, which 
as exceptions to the general ex turpi causa doctrine induced the Court to decree restitution 
of the amounts paid.226 This additional layer of ex turpi causa was absent in the later decision 
of Robertson v Ainslie’s Trustees, where Lord Justice-Clerk Boyle treated an assignment of a 
bankrupt’s whole effects to a single creditor as an illegal contract unenforceable in the 
courts.227 
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F Sexual Immorality and Matrimonial Affairs 
1 Matrimonial Affairs: Marriage Brokerage Contracts  
From the early 17th century,228 the Court of Chancery in England set aside transactions 
‘savouring of marriage brocage’,229 but the reason for doing so had not yet developed an 
explicit public dimension. That is, the equitable position had not at that stage crystallised 
to explicitly declare that these contracts, having caused ‘much mischief to the public’, were 
contrary to public policy.230 These agreements were, however, considered a fraud on ‘the 
open and public agreement of marriage’.231 Throughout the 17th  and the first quarter of 
the 18th century, these contracts — involving the payment of money as a reward for 
procuring a marriage — were described to be ‘of Evil Example’,232 of ‘very ill 
Consequence’,233 ‘of dangerous consequence’234 and, by their nature, ‘odious’.235  In Roberts 
v Roberts, Lord Jekyll MR supposed that the practice of relieving against these bonds in 
equity arose because marriage ‘ought to be free and open’.236 Later, these contracts were 
pronounced to be ‘publicly detrimental’237 and ‘so objectionable on grounds of public 
policy’.238  
The turn in language began in 1735. In Proof v Hines, Lord Talbot LC commented that 
equity relieved against these bonds because it ‘will not suffer any advantage to be taken… 
of the strong bias to obtain what is desired’.239 In addition, Chancery interceded not only 
for the party affected but, as many decisions affirmed, ‘from a public consideration; 
marriage greatly concerning the public’.240 It was ‘on the Account of the Public, that the 
Court relieves; and ‘tis on that Account, that it ought to relieve in the present Case’.241 As 
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the Irish Court of Chancery observed, equitable relief was available to a party ‘involved 
in Difficulties, not sui juris, and compelled by Necessity to enter into the Terms’ of the 
agreement.242 Common law courts later took on this equitable exception based on public 
policy.243 
The Scottish Court of Session, aligning with Chancery practice in England and Ireland 
as well as the language of public detriment, declared a marriage brokerage contract 
unenforceable for the first time in 1770.244 In Thomson v Mackaile, the defender argued that, 
by upholding the contract, the Court of Session ‘would give encouragement to interested 
and designing men to earn an infamous profit, by destroying the peace of families, by 
rendering children undutiful to their parents, and leading them to ruin unperceived till it 
was past redress’.245 Even though the English position formed part of his argument,246 the 
defender instead relied more on the approach of the civil law to ‘immoral bargains 
between the sexes’ or proxenetism.247 The reward for such a bargain was not generally 
recoverable.248 The Court of Session held that the contract in question was contra bonos 
mores.249 
2 Sexual Immorality: Prostitution and Adultery 
In Georgian England, contracts savouring of prostitution were regarded as immoral and 
contrary to public policy. Knowledge — or, rather, strong evidence being led on the 
plaintiff’s knowledge of the contract’s true nature — was the decisive factor that could 
make such contracts contra bonos mores. Thus, assumpsit for use and occupation was not 
maintainable where the plaintiff knowingly let rooms to a prostitute and gave her ‘liberty 
to receive male visitors, for the purpose of prostitution’.250 Recovery was also 
impermissible as soon as the plaintiff knew how his rooms were being used.251 In contrast, 
rooms rented for the sole purpose of sleeping, and not ‘to consort with the other sex’, 
would ensure recovery.252  
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However, basic necessities, such as having shelter, trumped a plaintiff’s knowledge of 
a defendant’s sex work.253 The plaintiff could recover the value of clothing sold254 and for 
the work and labour of washing clothes, even with prior knowledge of the defendant’s 
work.255 In the former case, if the plaintiff had ‘done something in furtherance of [the 
defendant’s work]’, the contract would have been ‘corrupt and illegal’.256 In the latter case, 
the impossibility of separating which clothes were used for which purpose and the 
defendant’s basic need for ‘clean linen’ were such that the plaintiff could recover.257  
Seventeenth and 18th century English and Scottish courts overwhelmingly enforced 
contracts involving adultery, particularly those for the maintenance of former mistresses 
and their ex-nuptial children. Rather than a blanket rejection on public policy grounds, 
English courts used a combination of policy factors, including the protection of affected 
mistresses, ‘honour and conscience’, and the difference between courts of law and 
equity,258 to favour enforcement. In almost all English and Scottish cases, provision for 
the maintenance of ex-nuptial children was enough to sustain a cause of action.259 English 
courts declared bonds given in past consideration of or to discontinue cohabitation,260 and 
annuities granted for life upon separation,261 good at law and sufficient to found a cause 
of action.262 An agreement that formally marked the end of extra-marital cohabitation and 
provided the woman with an annuity conditioned on her leading a ‘sole and chaste’ life 
was good.263 It was seen as comparable to the situation of a husband making provision 
for his wife in the event of his death.  
However, moral consideration was judged insufficient to support an action to 
compensate a former mistress.264 In Beaumont v Reeve, the plaintiff could not rely upon her 
injured character or being ‘deprived of the means of procuring an honest livelihood’ to 
support an action for assumpsit.265 Whether the defendant was the ‘seducer’ leading the 
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plaintiff to lose her virtue was irrelevant to the right of action or to distinguish between 
past comparable cases.266  
G Gambling: Betting, Gaming and Wagering 
Not until the late 18th century did public policy become the ground upon which English 
and Scottish courts found transactions relating to gambling unenforceable. Although the 
plaintiff could set aside an illegal transaction, the English and Irish Courts of Chancery 
refused to extend this public policy rationale to ‘the costs of setting aside an illegal 
transaction which he has entered into with his eyes open’.267 For Scotland, this change of 
position arrived in 1787 when the Court of Session found that a wager on the election of 
a Member of Parliament was not actionable.268 The political nature of the wager was 
treated as ‘a peculiarly improper subject’.269 During the 1780s, the common law position 
also crystallised in a series of cases,270  which clarified that the subject matter of a gambling 
agreement could be the agreement’s death knell.271 Before the Gaming Act 1845 introduced 
restrictions on gaming and wagering agreements,272 an action could be maintained at 
common law on a wager. However, if the subject matter was ‘against public policy, against 
decency, or tending to affect the particular interests of individuals’, the agreement would 
be illegal.273 The subject matter of an idle wager274 on the probable assassination of 
Napoleon Bonaparte between individuals having ‘no special interest’ was considered 
‘against public policy and of immoral tendency’.275 A harmless — and arguably idle — 
wager of ‘a good dinner and wine’ was good at law.276 The subject matter was not immoral 
nor did it affect a third person or require ‘indecent evidence’.277  
Formerly, these courts would leave scope for validity by engineering ways in which to 
circumvent legislation that proscribed gambling in its various forms of betting, gaming, 
and wagering.278 By a 1621 Scottish Act, winnings over 100 merks gained ‘at Cardes, Dyce, 
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and Horse Races’ were to be donated to the church for distribution to the poor.279 In Park 
v Somervell, the Court of Session made a debtor liable for a £100 bond representing ‘money 
lost at cards and dice’, but required it be consigned to ‘the poor till’.280 In another case, 
the Gaming Act 1710 — that made bills and other securities given for gaming ‘utterly void, 
frustrate and of none effect’ — was found not to extend to Scotland.281  
H Usurious Transactions 
English and Irish cases of the 18th and 19th centuries indicate that usurious contracts were 
typically argued to be contrary to public policy on a similar footing to marriage brokerage 
bonds and smuggling contracts.282 Until the Usury Laws Repeal Act 1854,283 it was unlawful 
to charge above the maximum statutory rate of interest on a loan. Transactions treated as 
usurious, under the statutes of usury,284 included those which involved  ‘taking, directly or 
indirectly, any benefit beyond the prescribed rate of interest, under any device, pretence, or 
shift, with other particulars expressed, including bargain and conveyance’.285 In Drew v 
Power, Lord Redesdale LC in the High Court of Chancery in Ireland remarked that the 
statutory prohibition on usurious transactions was ‘founded on great principles of public 
policy’.286 It was observed that ‘it is more advantageous to the public that persons who are 
in possession of money should use their own industry in the employment of their money, 
than that they should sit idle and take the benefit of it through the industry of others’.287 
Until the abolition of usury in 1854, the Court of Chancery regularly intervened to set 
aside transactions in circumvention of the statutory prohibition on usury.288 For breaches 
of the Usury Acts, courts of equity offered different remedies to courts of law.289 Lord 
Redesdale LC, delivering the judgment of the Irish High Court of Chancery in Drew v 
Power, opined that the policy of the law would be: 
defeated if courts were not to be jealous of such transactions as these, and were not to 
watch them with severity, and be sure that they did not permit persons under cover of 
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ordinary dealings between man and man, to obtain an advantage beyond the legal 
interest.290  
Lenders’ supplying goods, rather than money, for resale at an undervalue was one 
method of circumvention seen in the courts.291 Another was the ‘grant of annuities, upon 
a number of contingencies’.292 In pre-1828 Irish Chancery decisions, contemporaneous 
transactions — by which a beneficial lease was granted with or in consideration of a loan 
of money — were routinely set aside as usurious.293 The Irish practice was modified by 
the requirement — introduced in the 1828 Irish Chancery decision of Moore v McKay — 
of evidence beyond the mere contemporaneity of the transactions.294 Public policy ‘in 
cases of usury, illegal insurances, smuggling contracts’, as the defendant in Cooke v Loxley 
explained, was an exception to the general principle that an individual could not rely on 
the illegality in a contract to which he was party.295  
I ‘Catching Bargains’ with Expectant Heirs 
Throughout the late 18th century, the English Court of Chancery disapproved of ‘catching 
bargains’, seeing it as a practice prejudicial to heirs expecting an inheritance and injurious 
to the ‘public weal’.296 Transactions involving young heirs were ‘interdicted for the wisest 
reasons’.297 In Baldwin v Rochford, Lord Hardwicke LC observed that 
[i]n the cases of marriage brocage bonds, contracts with young heirs… this Court 
constantly sets aside such bargains, upon the principles of public policy, and because of the 
great inconveniences such contracts would be to the public if they were suffered to be 
valid.298   
This special class described the practice of improvident young heirs entering unfair or 
unreasonable transactions affecting an expected inheritance. An heir might sell or 
mortgage his prospective inheritance or obtain loans premised on the future receipt of his 
inheritance. Bargains, exploiting youthful weakness or inexperience, provided the basis 
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for the modern law relating to unconscionable bargains.299 Lenders used this method to 
circumvent usury laws that placed a ceiling on the rate of interest charged.300 To protect 
young heirs from dissipating their future inheritances, or to prevent an heir’s 
independence from their family,301 early Chancery cases presumed that catching bargains 
given on unfair terms and without sufficient consideration were unenforceable.302 If the 
Court of Chancery ‘was satisfied that [the expectant heir] had not been adequately 
protected against the pressure put upon them by their poverty’, the transaction would be 
set aside.303 In Twisleton v Griffith, the Court of Chancery in England set aside a sale of a 
reversionary interest by an heir, acknowledging that this decision might strain familial 
relationships.304 As Lord Cowper LC commented, it ‘might force an heir to go home, and 
submit to his father, or to bite on the bridle, and ensure some hardships… [but] he might 
grow wiser, and be reclaimed’.305  
The late 17th century Chancery practice of consistently rebuking these transactions 
made sense in a dominantly ‘dynastic landholding’ society.306 The Court of Chancery 
might, for example, adopt the expedient of denying specific performance to protect the 
young heir’s interest from an improvident sale.307 In Earl of Aylesford v Morris, Lord 
Selborne LC explained that this presumption against validity arose ‘from the 
circumstances or conditions of the parties contracting – weakness on one side, usury on 
the other, or extortion, or advantage taken of that weakness’.308 
IV CONCLUSION 
During the course of the 18th century, public policy took its form as a general invalidating 
principle in a series of analogous cases. The English Court of Chancery particularly led 
the charge by, in the first place, analogically identifying factual circumstances and unequal 
relationships that were unenforceable and, secondly, spelling out a public element that 
justified judicial interference. Though equity led the way, courts of law soon followed.  
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The common thread throughout the English case law is a perception and consequent 
avoidance of public detriment. Public detriment had different shades depending on the 
category of case involved. The public expected public offices to be ‘given to those most 
worthy’.309 It was improper to bet on serious subjects, but wagers on insignificant subjects 
stood up in courts of law. Marriage brokerage bonds were an unacceptable incursion on 
freedom to contract marriage, an institution in which the public had an interest. Young 
heirs needed protection from reckless transactions that might impact their future 
inheritances to personal and real property. While contracts in furtherance of prostitution 
were unenforceable, policy favoured the enforcement of contracts for the maintenance 
of former mistresses and ex-nuptial children.  
By the close of the 19th century, the Scottish and English positions on these categories 
mostly coincided with one another. The trend of the Scottish Court of Session from the 
18th century was to draw inspiration from English categories of public policy to invalidate 
transactions it had previously enforced. In the first half of the 19th century, the practice 
of the Irish High Court of Chancery — with the exception of usury — mirrored that of 
its English counterpart.  
Chapter 2 has explored the development of public policy, both at common law and in 
Scots law. Public policy was exclusively a concept of internal litigation until 1835 when 
the term was first mentioned in a cross-border case.310 Chapter 3 consequently examines 
the historical development of public policy in common law private international law and 
considers the areas of private international law most commonly affected by the public 
policy exception. Only a few categories of public policy discussed in this Chapter played 
a part in the exception’s evolution in private international law. Consequently, Chapter 3 
also considers whether factors besides case law have influenced the private international 
law of public policy. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL ORIGINS AND SOURCES 
I INTRODUCTION 
his Chapter focuses on the transformation of the public policy exception in 
historical private international law scholarship, beginning with the exception’s 
coverage in Ulrik Huber’s De Conflictu Legum Diversarum in Diversis Imperiis (‘De 
Conflictu Legum’) and ending with its consideration in A V Dicey’s Conflict of Laws. It 
explores whether 19th century scholarship associated the common law understanding of 
public policy, considered in Chapter 2, with the private international law ‘escape device’. 
It also scrutinises the influence of natural law and positivist theory on the approaches to 
public policy taken in the texts of Joseph Story, John Westlake, and A V Dicey.  
Part II explores the combined influence of a continental conflict of laws’ framework 
and natural law philosophy on Story’s Conflict of Laws. Against this background, the 
relationship of natural law with Story’s account of public policy will be outlined in Part 
III. Part IV discusses the influence of Austinian positivism on Westlake’s Private 
International Law and Dicey’s Conflict of Laws. The changing shape of public policy in 
successive editions of Westlake’s Private International Law and Dicey’s Conflict of Laws is 
then set out in Parts V and VI respectively. 
II THEORETICAL INFLUENCES ON PUBLIC POLICY IN STORY’S CONFLICT OF LAWS 
This Part sets out two underlying influences on the public policy exception in Story’s 
Conflict of Laws. The first of these influences is the conflict of laws’ framework supplied 
by Ulrik Huber’s De Conflictu Legum. In particular, the focus of Section A is on Huber’s 
prejudicial laws exception. The second influence is William Paley’s Principles of Moral and 
Political Philosophy (1785), which supplied the substance of Story’s natural law philosophy. 
In penning an anonymous article entitled ‘Natural Law’ for Francis Lieber’s Encyclopaedia 
Americana, Story appropriated the essential ingredients of Paley’s natural law philosophy, 
laying emphasis on some features over others.1 Thus, the instances in which law and 
relationships contradict the law of nature in Paley’s Principles are drawn out in Section C 
so that, in Section D, the extent of Story’s borrowing may be highlighted.  
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A Prejudicial Laws in Ulrik Huber’s De Conflictu Legum 
The foundation of early Anglo-American private international law were the three 
axioms in Ulrik Huber’s De Conflictu Legum. These axioms were premised on territorial 
sovereignty and comity. By the first axiom, the laws of country A bound its citizens and 
property within its borders ‘but not beyond’.2 According to the second axiom, a 
sovereign’s subjects as well as temporary visitors to the territory were subject to the power 
of the sovereign.3 The third axiom had, at its centre, comity, ensuring foreign law could 
apply in another country. Whether foreign law applied was a matter for the sovereign’s 
discretion or comity.4 One limit to the sovereign’s exercise of comity was prejudicial 
foreign laws.5 That is, foreign laws were recognised so long as ‘they do not cause prejudice 
to the power or rights of such government or of its subjects.’6 
Huber foresaw contracts and marriage as areas in which the prejudicial laws exception 
might be engaged. In the first place, prejudicial marriages would displace the traditional 
lex loci celebrationis rule for marriage — an exception that would subsequently have a 
profound effect on the English law of cross-border marriages.7 An incestuous marriage 
of a certain degree would fall within this category.8 Manifest evasion of the law was given 
as a second example. Huber’s illustration of evasion was of two young people, requiring 
their guardian’s consent to marry in their home state, marrying instead in ‘eastern Frisia 
or… some other place’ where that consent was unnecessary.9  
Similarly, the reservation would be engaged for foreign contracts of a prejudicial kind.10 
Using the example of smuggling, Huber gave three instances of invalidity. First, the sale 
of contraband goods in country A could not be enforced in its courts.11 The inverse 
situation of the buyer seeking recovery of legitimate goods sold in country B in the courts 
of country A, where the goods were contraband, would be allowable.12 Secondly, a seller 
could not recover the value of contraband goods delivered in country A.13 The delivery 
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was ‘repugnant to the law and interests of the state prohibiting the sale of such goods’.14 
Thirdly, ‘no action will lie no matter where it may be brought’ to recover the value of 
contraband items sold secretly in country A.15  
From Huber’s base, ample scope was left to scholars to develop what was to become 
the public policy exception in common law private international law.  Aside from marriage 
and contracts, no other areas of law or specific examples were proposed to engage the 
reservation. Despite the acceptance of Huber in English and Scottish courts throughout 
the 18th century, references to Huber’s prejudicial law reservation are not identifiable in 
pre-19th century law reports — even those invoking public policy to discourage 
smuggling.16  
B Fundamental Policy and Institutions in Story’s Conflict of Laws 
Joseph Story adopted Huber’s three axioms in his Conflict of Laws. Story’s first principle 
was that a country’s laws were territorial.17 Its laws could bind its own citizens and 
property within its borders only.18 The second point was that no foreign law could have 
extraterritorial effect because all countries were equal to each other.19 However, as a third 
principle, if a foreign law took effect in another country, it depended entirely ‘upon [that 
country’s] own express or tacit consent’.20  
As a limitation to admitting foreign laws under the third principle,21 a country could 
not, in Story’s view, ‘be justly required to yield up its own fundamental policy and 
institutions in favour of those of another nation’.22  Nor could the reverse occur; it could 
not admit laws which were incompatible with its own. Story explained that a foreign law 
may be found in one country due to ‘local or accidental circumstances’,23 and so it would 
be improper to ‘engraft’ it on another polity.24 In illustrating this principle, Story 
distinguished between the laws of Christian countries and of ‘heathen’ countries.25 It is 
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through this distinction that Story, for example, thought a foreign law permitting 
polygamy or, even, incest could not be accepted by a Christian country.26 He concluded 
by stating that ‘there would be extreme difficulty in saying, that other nations were bound 
to enforce laws, institutions, or customs, so subversive of their own morals, justice, 
interest, or polity’.27 Story’s language of subversion finds an echo in the philosophy of 
William Paley. 
C Violating Natural Law in William Paley’s Principles of Moral and Political 
Philosophy (1785) 
The moral and political philosophy of the English Anglican clergyman, William Paley 
(1743–1805), was highly influential in the early American republic, in England, and 
abroad.28 Between the late-18th and mid-19th century, Paley’s Principles of Moral and Political 
Philosophy (1785) was a standard text on the curriculum of many American colleges and 
English universities, including at Cambridge where Paley taught.29 It was also set at 
universities within the British Empire: the University of Sydney and the University of 
Manitoba.30 Paley’s Principles, despite the author’s clear loyalties to the British Crown, was 
cited favourably at two American constitutional assemblies of the late 1780s.31 In the 
1790s, law students at Yale, Brown, and Harvard were introduced to Paley’s thinking.32 
Paley’s plain writing style, combined with his liberal Christianity, utilitarianism, and natural 
rights position are thought to have attracted Americans to the text.33 
Paley’s Principles addressed the main ingredients of natural law over six books. In the 
first book, Paley defined natural law as a ‘science which teaches men their duty and the 
reasons of it’.34 Theological utilitarianism was the centrepiece of Paley’s natural law 
framework. In Paley’s Principles, the existence of God is assumed and human happiness is 
attributed to God’s will. Civil society was seen as ‘conducive to that happiness’.35 Moral 
obligations — the topic of the second book — depended on the utility of a moral rule.36 
The will of God determined the correctness of action, and in civil society that was 
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determined by utility.37 Rules in civil society ultimately originated from ‘divine will’.38 
Whether the will of God supported certain human action required inquiry into the action’s 
‘“tendency… to promote or diminish the general happiness”’.39 Individuals reciprocated 
God’s will by exercising virtue, consisting of ‘doing good to mankind… and for the sake of 
everlasting happiness’.40 An individual owed duties to God,41 to themselves,42 and to others 
within society.  
Under Paley’s framework was a three-fold division of rights possessed by individuals. 
This included rights that were natural or adventitious; alienable or inalienable; and perfect 
or imperfect.43 Belonging to every person and predating civil government, natural rights 
included ‘a man’s right to his life, limbs and property; his right to the produce of his 
personal labour; to the use in common with others, of air, light, water’.44 Adventitious 
rights were an outgrowth of human society, such as ‘a right… in any one man, or 
particular body of men, to make laws and regulations for the rest’.45 Rights created by law 
were alienable; all other rights were inalienable.46 Perfect rights could be ‘asserted by force, 
or, what in civil society comes into the place of private force, by course of law.’47 
Emanating from an individual’s interpersonal relationships were ‘relative’ duties. These 
duties were categorised as determinate, indeterminate and of ‘the constitution of the 
sexes’.48 The right to property, the sanctity of oaths, the obligation to perform contracts, 
and wills were the province of determinate relative duties.49 The obligatory force of 
promises and contracts derived from expectation — ‘the expectations which we 
knowingly and voluntarily excite’.50 Although Paley questioned its utility, the oath against 
simony51 administered to Anglican clergy was considered to be ‘binding upon the 
consciences of those who take it’. 52  
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Charity, used in the limited sense of ‘promoting the happiness of our inferiors’, was the main 
concern of Paley’s initial chapters on indeterminate relative duties.53 Charity obliged a 
master to treat his servants or slaves with fairness.54 Servants and slaves subjected to 
unjustified punishment, ‘unnecessary labour or confinement’, and insulting language was 
‘manifestly wrong; were it only upon the general principle of diminishing the sum of 
human happiness’.55 Christianity placed limits on commencing civil litigation — another 
indeterminate relative law — for vindictive reasons.56  
The final category — ‘of relative duties which result from the constitution of the sexes’ 
— encompassed marriage, impediments to marriage, parental duties, and the duties of 
children to their parents.57 Paley underlined the tendency of fornication, seduction, 
adultery, incest, polygamy, and divorce to impair the institution of marriage.58 Incest and 
polygamy were both ‘forbidden by the law of nature’.59 Restraints on obtaining divorce 
were considered proper and consistent with scripture.60 A general right to divorce was 
‘contrary to the law of nature, which can be proved to be detrimental to the common 
happiness of the human species’.61 As limited grounds of divorce, adultery, desertion and 
personal incapacity were, however, permitted by the law of nature.62 
D Story: Violation of Natural Law 
Two sources — an 1829 speech delivered at Harvard on the ‘Value and Importance 
of Legal Studies’63 and an anonymous article first published in Lieber’s 1832 edition of 
Encyclopaedia Americana — reveal Story’s natural law philosophy.64  Natural law rested at 
‘the foundation of all other laws’65 and was ‘the philosophy of morals’.66 It derived from 
‘human reason … to form his character, and regulate his conduct, and thereby insure his 
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permanent happiness.’67 Natural law — ‘supported and illustrated by revelation’68 — 
united the subjects of Christian countries, and acted as a leveller.69 It would ‘check the 
arrogance of power, and the oppression of prerogative; and becomes the teacher as well 
as the advocate of rational liberty’.70 The immortality of an individual’s soul depended on 
virtuous conduct during the individual’s lifetime because ‘the present life is but the dawn 
of being’.71 ‘Can any man’, thought Story, ‘seriously doubt, that Christianity is recognised 
as true, as a revelation, by the law of England, that is by the common law?’72 Natural law 
equipped individuals with ‘duties, from whence they derive their rights’.73 
In almost every respect, Story’s natural law entry in Lieber’s Encyclopaedia Americana 
was an abridgement of Paley’s natural law philosophy. Just as it did in Paley’s natural law 
framework, Story’s natural law entry made assumptions about the existence of God, 
human happiness being God’s will, an individual’s need to exercise virtue, and man’s 
duties to God.74 Divided along the same lines as Paley’s duties, the individual in Story’s 
philosophy owed ‘duties to God, to himself, to other men, and as a member of political 
society’.75 Legal obligation and God’s will coincided. An individual’s relative duties or 
duties ‘towards other men’ brought about a three-fold division of rights.76  
In Story’s account, imperfect rights corresponded with Paley’s indeterminate relative 
duties.77 Thus, an individual was required ‘to exercise charity in its largest sense; to be just, 
grateful, kind and benevolent’.78 Masters were duty-bound not to insult or to impose 
unnecessary labour on their servants.79 The institution of marriage was based upon the 
law of nature.80 The benefits of marriage included private comfort, procreation, 
monogamy, and permanent family bonds.81 The law of nature, just as Paley explored, 
prohibited anything that detracted from the institution: ‘fornication, incest, adultery, 
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seduction and other lewdness’.82 Divorce was rightly limited to adultery, but the grounds 
could ‘perhaps’ be broadened.83 
Story’s consideration of an individual’s duties ‘as a member of political society’ differed 
from Paley’s philosophy. Paley only separated duties into three areas: an individual’s duties 
to themselves, to God, and to others (relative duties)84 whereas, in Story’s entry, 
splintering off relative duties was a fourth duty arising from an individual’s membership 
of political society.85 By surrendering to the authority of government, individuals — as 
members of that political society — owed certain duties, and in return they secured certain 
rights.86 Story’s fourth duty was to some extent distinguishable from Paley’s Philosophy 
because Story treated these duties as having more weight in ‘political society’.87  
Aside from this difference, the content of Story’s fourth duty mirrored determinate 
relative duties in Paley’s Philosophy. It encompassed ‘the right of property, the obligation 
of contracts, the duty of speaking the truth, the sanctity of oaths’.88 While property rights 
were ‘a creature of civil government’, individuals were not free to do with their property 
as they pleased because the disposal of property depended on each society’s internal 
laws.89 Contracts were ‘indispensable to the social intercourse of mankind’.90 
Consequently, the obligation to perform contracts depended upon precepts of natural 
law: morality, justness, and practicability.91 In turn, natural law demanded of individuals 
‘good faith, and truth, and sincerity, in their intercourse with others’.92 Specific 
circumstances could, however, destroy this obligation. The obligation would be limited if 
contracts 
are immoral, or which have resulted from fraud or oppression; contracts which require 
impossible things, or are repugnant to natural justice; or which are founded in essential 
mistakes, as to persons, characters, or things; or which involve the breach of other 
paramount obligations …93 
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III NATURAL LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY IN STORY’S CONFLICT OF LAWS 
The elaboration of Huber’s prejudicial laws reservation in Story’s Conflict of Laws embodied 
the author’s natural law philosophy.94 In Story’s framework, comity reinforced the central 
role of state sovereignty. The ultimate decision to admit foreign law rested with ‘every 
independent community’, which ‘will, and ought to judge for itself, how far that comity 
ought to extend’.95 Through exercising comity, these communities would not ‘suffer 
prejudice’.96 No state was required to ‘yield up its own fundamental policy and institutions 
in favour of those of another nation’.97 For Story, though, Christian countries would not 
accept a foreign law permitting polygamy, incest, ‘exercises of despotic cruelty’, and 
contracts of moral turpitude.98 The justification for the exception was that ‘there would 
be extreme difficulty in saying, that other nations were bound to enforce laws, institutions, 
or customs, so subversive of their own morals, justice, interest, or polity’.99 Though this 
exception had general application, it had more specific application in discrete subjects 
such as foreign contracts, personal capacity, marriage, and divorce. 
A Public Policy in Story’s Conflict of Laws 
1 Foreign Contracts 
A significant subject in which Story’s reservation emerged was foreign contracts. The lex 
causae for contracts was the law of the place where the contract was made (lex loci 
contractus).100 Domestic courts were not bound to apply the lex causae in contracts, 
according to Story, if it was ‘injurious to their own interests, or to those of their own 
subjects.’101 Story envisaged three heads to this form of public policy.102  
The first head, modelled on Huber’s evasion or fraud of the law exception in De 
Conflictu Legum, followed the trend of common law authorities on smuggling contracts.103 
Story drew upon relevant English case law — including Holman v Johnson and Clugas v 
Penaluna — to synthesise the legal position on smuggling.104 Foreign contracts to smuggle 
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goods into the United States would be void ‘as an intended fraud upon our laws.’105 Like 
the position reached at common law as explored in Chapter 2, the parties’ allegiance was 
immaterial.106 Founding an action on a contract growing out of an illegal transaction would 
result in the litigant being ‘justly punished for the immorality of the act’.107 In contrast, 
contracts ‘wholly unconnected with the illegal act, and… founded on a new consideration’ 
could be valid.108 Apart from discussing all of Huber’s illustrations, Story’s synthesis 
applied the distinction drawn in English smuggling cases — which Story footnoted —  
between actual knowledge or active participation and mere knowledge.109 The degree to 
which the seller knew of the buyer’s illegal purpose ultimately affected contractual 
validity.110 
The second — ‘good morals, or religion, or public rights’111 — and third — against 
‘national policy or institutions’112 — heads of contractual public policy are comparable to 
the modern pattern of courts refusing to recognise or enforce ‘unacceptably repugnant’ 
foreign laws.113 Examples in Story’s second head paralleled some common law grounds 
explored in Chapter 2 and the circumstances in which Story’s natural law philosophy 
would be violated. Contracts involving sexual immorality;114 the commission of a crime or 
tort; public and political corruption; or evading the administration of justice were 
‘excepted contracts’.115 They were void for being ‘founded in moral turpitude, and… 
inconsistent with the good order and interests of society’.116 Story accompanied his 
statement that ‘contracts for future illicit cohabitation and prostitution’ were excepted 
contracts with footnotes to most of the English case law (discussed in Chapter 2) on 
prostitution and adultery.117 However, no authorities were cited for the next six classes of 
cases: 
contracts for the printing or circulation of irreligious and obscene publications; contracts 
to promote or reward the commission of crimes; contracts to corrupt, or evade the due 
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administration of justice; contracts to cheat the public agents, or to defeat the public rights 
…118 
More extensive discussion followed for Story’s third head of contractual public policy: 
contracts ‘which are opposed to the national policy and institutions’.119 The contract in De 
Wütz v Hendricks,120 involving a loan raised to assist Greeks fighting against the Ottoman 
Empire, was considered ‘inconsistent with a just and impartial neutrality’.121 At the time, 
the United Kingdom was friendly with the Ottoman Empire.122  
Story further supported this head by referring to actions involving unrecognised new 
governments, namely Thompson v Powles and Jones v Garcia del Rio.123 However, because 
Guatemala was not recognised as an independent country, the action in Thompson v Powles 
failed.124 In contrast, public policy was not decisive in the failure of the earlier action of 
Jones v Garcia del Rio involving the new and unrecognised Republic of Peru. Though a 
public policy argument was employed (as Story had identified),125 the action failed because 
the plaintiffs ‘had each a demand at law, and each a several demand in equity that they 
could not file a bill on behalf of themselves and the other holders’.126  
Another instance of ‘excepted contracts’ under this third head were contracts used to 
engage in the slave trade or which promoted slavery if concluded by subjects of countries 
prohibiting that trade.127 While the term ‘public policy’ was employed in Jones v Garcia del 
Rio, contract cases about slavery used language strongly paralleling the language of natural 
law. Story, despite the contrary Massachusetts decision of Greenwood v Curtis, concluded 
that slaving ‘contracts would be held utterly void here… as inconsistent with our duties, 
our policy, or our institutions’.128 The citation of Madrazo v Willes, however, supports 
Story’s initial statement of law. In Madrazo v Willes, a Spanish slaver — under whose laws 
the slave trade was lawful — recovered damages against a British subject for seizure of 
Madrazo’s cargo of slaves because domestic legislation against slavery only applied to 
British subjects.129 
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Clear statements of ‘public policy’ seldom occur in pre-19th century slavery cases. Thus, 
Story’s reference to Somerset v Stewart to engage this principle is contentious.130 Academic 
debate about the exact content of Lord Mansfield’s judgment is ongoing.131 While 
Hargrave, during argument, submitted that ‘[i]f the policy of our laws admits not of 
slavery, neither fact nor reason are for it’,132 Lord Mansfield did not speak to this point. 
As Lord Mansfield clarified in a later case, Somerset’s Case went ‘no further than that the 
master cannot by force compel him to go out of the kingdom.’133 In other words, Lord 
Mansfield did not free all slaves in England; however, contemporary misinterpretation of 
the decision was rife. By remaining silent on emancipation and slavery in England, Lord 
Mansfield might have actively encouraged the public’s misapprehension of the decision.134 
Moreover, though the term ‘public policy’ was not used in Somerset’s Case, the language of 
natural law may have supplied an overriding norm of validity.135 
Forbes v Cochrane, one of the cases cited, more clearly supports Story’s statement of 
principle.136 As with Jones v Garcia del Rio, though, the plaintiff’s action failed on a different 
ground to public policy. It was an action between Forbes — a Scottish plantation owner 
resident in the Spanish territory of East Florida — and two admirals in the Royal Navy in 
command of a British warship, which had harboured some of Forbes’ escaped slaves. 
Holroyd J held that foreign laws recognising slavery had no extraterritorial effect: the East 
Florida law was local.137 Once the escaped slaves boarded the British ship, they were 
free.138 While East Florida law on slavery was local, Best J used strong language paralleling 
modern public policy to condemn that law as ‘an antichristian law, and one which violates 
the rights of nature, and therefore ought not to be recognized here’.139 International 
comity could not ‘prevail in any case where [the law] violates the law of our country, the 
law of nature, or the law of God’.140 
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2 Personal Capacity 
Another area in which public policy presented itself was personal capacity or status. Public 
policy supplied a residual exception to Story’s rules on status.141 Since the admission of 
foreign laws was discretionary, the admitting country 
will not suffer its own subjects to evade the operation of its own fundamental policy or 
laws, or to commit frauds in violation of them by acts or contracts made in a foreign 
country; and it will judge for itself, how far it will adopt, or reject such acts or contracts.142  
Furthermore, unless deriving from the law of nature, personal disqualifications were 
territorial.143 One consequence of the territoriality of slavery was that its status could not 
be recognised in countries prohibiting it.144  
3 Marriage 
Although application of the lex loci celebrationis was the traditional choice of law rule for 
marriage, Story offered three exceptions to its application.145 The first exception embraced 
polygamy and incest.146 It was limited to marriages which ‘by the general consent of 
Christendom’ were polygamous or incestuous.147 Story acknowledged the difficulty of 
reaching consensus between Christian nations on ‘the point, at which the law of nature, 
or Christianity, ceases to prohibit marriages between kindred’.148 Some marriages between 
relatives would be considered incestuous as ‘against the law of God and sound morals’.149 
Laws ‘positively prohibited by the public law of a country, from motives of policy’ formed 
the second exception.150 Prohibitions on the marriage of members of the royal family in 
the now-repealed Royal Marriages Act 1772 provided an example of this exception.151 
The Court of King’s Bench decision in Ruding v Smith and two American decisions 
were the basis of the third exception.152 Under this third exception, a marriage celebrated 
abroad was valid where compliance with local forms was impossible but English common 
law requirements of marriage were met.153 In Ruding v Smith, two British subjects were 
married in a private house at the Cape of Good Hope in 1795. A licence had been 
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obtained from the commander-in-chief of the occupying British forces. The Cape’s Dutch 
law required parental consent for both parties of the marriage, which had not been 
obtained.154 Arguing noncompliance with local forms, the husband sought an annulment. 
In upholding the ‘marriage of twenty-five years’ standing’, Lord Stowell remarked 
[o]n the distinct British character of the parties—on their independence of the Dutch law, 
in their own British transactions—on the insuperable difficulties of obtaining any marriage 
conformable to the Dutch law—on the countenance given by British authority, and British 
ministration to this British transaction—upon the whole country being under British 
dominion—and upon the other grounds to which I have adverted … .155 
Although Story linked this third rule to public policy ‘aris[ing] in cases of moral necessity’, 
the first two exceptions that Story named were more frequently explored in subsequent 
cases as the concerns of public policy.   
4 Incidents of Marriage and Foreign Divorces 
The residual exception of public policy appeared in Story’s chapters on the incidents of 
marriage and foreign divorces.156  For the incidents of marriage, the law of matrimonial 
domicile would fail to apply if the foreign country deemed the incidents to be 
incompatible with its policy and injurious to its interests.157 One source, Fergusson on 
Marriage and Divorce, was cited to support this exception.  
The relationship of marriage to Story’s natural law philosophy is unmistakable in his 
chapter on foreign divorces. The benefits of the ‘civil institution’ of marriage were extolled 
as being consistent with Christianity.158 Marriage promoted ‘domestic affections, and the 
delicate relations and duties of parents and children’.159 However, Story did not question 
the competency of domestic legislatures to provide for divorce.160 Foreign divorces not 
rendered in the locus celebrationis could be refused recognition. The ‘fundamental laws and 
policies’ of the place of celebration would intervene.161  
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IV AUSTINIAN INFLUENCES ON LATER 19TH CENTURY WRITERS OF PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In contrast to the natural law theory outlined in Part III, this Part appraises the influence 
of Austinian positivism on two 19th century writers of private international law: John 
Westlake and A V Dicey. Other significant influences likely to have affected these scholars 
are explored in Chapter 4.  
In Section A, a brief background is given of Austin as a prelude to the discussion in 
Section B. Section B initially focuses on key elements of Austinian positivism. It will be 
seen that Austin’s definition of law excluded custom, international law, and natural law 
from the province of jurisprudence, leaving statute law and the common law as its only 
concern. Section B ends by broaching the common law’s place within, and its relationship 
to codification in, Austinian positivism. Section C identifies elements of positivism 
featured in the first and second editions of Westlake’s Private International Law. As natural 
law theory waned and before the full implications of Austinian positivism were 
understood, Westlake’s first edition of Private International Law (1858) appeared. The effect 
this had on Westlake’s methodology between the first and second editions is analysed.  
Section D considers the extent to which Austinian positivism recurred in Dicey’s Conflict 
of Laws, beginning with the first edition published in 1896.  
A Late-19th Century Resurgence of Austinian Positivism  
For close to a century, English jurisprudence was dominated by Austinian positivism or 
the ‘analytical method’.162 Late-19th century English jurisprudence, in the words of A V 
Dicey, ‘generally and inevitably meant the study of Austin’.163 The popularisation of John 
Austin’s works in the early 1860s marked the beginning of this century-long dominance.164 
As professor of jurisprudence (1826–32) at the University of London, Austin (1790–1858) 
had published his first six lectures on jurisprudence in The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 
(1832) but, at the time, its publication did not receive much attention.165 Austin’s widow 
rekindled interest in her late husband’s ideas by republishing The Province of Jurisprudence 
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Determined in 1861.166 Its republication in 1861 was generally well received, and it was soon 
a set text at Oxford and Cambridge.167 Two years later, Austin’s full lectures appeared in 
Lectures on Jurisprudence (1863).   
B Key Elements of Austinian Positivism 
The attractiveness of Austinian positivism lay in its seeking ‘to define law and legal ideas 
in abstract conceptual terms, focusing on the positive law or the command of the 
sovereign’.168 Obedience to law thus depended not on some moral obligation — what the 
law ought to be — but rather the sovereign’s power to command their subjects’ 
obedience. The idea of law as a sovereign command was not new.169 In The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined, Austin initially distinguished between laws ‘properly so called’ and 
laws ‘improperly so called’. Laws ‘properly so called’ were a ‘species of commands’, deriving 
from God — ‘divine laws’ — or from a political superior.170 The latter, described as 
positive laws or ‘law set by political superiors to political inferiors’, was Austin’s 
jurisprudential concern.171 Only statute and the common law were laws ‘properly so 
called’.  
Austin’s conception of ‘positive law’ had three features: a political sovereign, 
commands and sanctions.172 The sovereign was a determinate human superior, habitually 
obeyed by the majority of society and who owed no ‘habit of obedience to a like 
superior’.173 The term ‘command’ had three attributes: ‘[a] wish or desire conceived by a 
rational being, that another rational being shall do or forbear’, consequences resulting 
from non-compliance, and ‘[a]n expression or intimation of the wish by words or other 
signs.’174 Command, duty and sanction were considered to be ‘inseparably connected 
terms’.175 That is, all duties originated in the command of a political sovereign. Commands 
could be general or, alternatively, ‘occasional or particular’.176 They could be express — 
‘signified by words (written or spoken)’ — or tacit — ‘signified by conduct (or by any signs 
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of desire which are not words)’.177 Sanctions followed from the performance of an 
official’s duties; non-performance would likewise result in sanctions being imposed.178    
C Austin on International Law 
According to Austin’s definition of law, international law was not law ‘properly so called’; 
rather, it was positive morality.179 In the absence of a political superior to command states 
and impose sanctions on an international plane, rules of international law did not have 
the quality of law.180 By positive morality, Austin meant laws ‘set by men to men, but not 
by men as political superiors’.181 Positive morality though ‘closely analogous to laws 
proper… are merely opinions or sentiments held by men in regard to human conduct’.182 
In consequence, only when domesticated could international law become law ‘properly 
so called’. 
D Austin on the Common Law, Treatises, and Codification 
In fitting the common law within his command theory, Austin treated the common law 
as the tacit commands of the sovereign.183 Significant to this conclusion was the sanctions 
that would necessarily follow in the event of a subject’s noncompliance with ‘principles 
or grounds of judicial decisions’.184 By virtue of the delegating power of the sovereign, 
judges were empowered to make law.185 Moreover, only when enforced by judges did 
custom become a legal rule — positive law — to be ‘observed as rules of conduct’.186 In 
rejecting Bentham’s ‘disrespectful’ epithet for the common law (‘sham law’), Austin 
argued that judicial legislation was ‘far better made than that part which consists of 
statutes enacted by the legislature’.187 Judicial lawmaking was ‘highly beneficial and even 
absolutely necessary’ to society.188 Defects in ‘judiciary law’ nevertheless induced Austin 
to prefer codification.189 
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As a rule, English legal treatises were not sources of law.190 In Austin’s view, treatises 
‘merely expound’ the proper sources of English law: statutes and case law.191 English legal 
treatises were ‘properly a legal literature drawn from or derived from the sources’ of English 
law.192 Thus, one of the ‘inconveniences’ of the common law was the standing of 
authoritative treatises, which Austin identified as a third source of the common law.193 
The authors of ‘old and authoritative treatises’ had through ‘experience and reason’ 
become influential in English judicial decision-making.194 However, this was 
problematised: English courts had indiscriminately cited these treatises along with less 
authoritative texts.195 To become law, authoritative treatises had to be codified.196 
To open the way for codification, Austin presented four ‘tenable objections’ to the 
common law.197 Identifying the legal rule from the ratio decidendi of a single case or, more 
commonly, a line of cases was the first objection.198 The quantity and length of cases could 
make this process ‘delicate’ and ‘difficult’.199 The second objection on inadequate judicial 
deliberation was moderated by Austin’s view that judges typically made and applied the 
law after proper reflection.200 The retrospectivity of judiciary law was a third objection.201 
Fourthly, Austin was critical of the common law’s unknowable, vague and inconsistent 
nature.202 Two causes were identified for this fourth objection: first, ‘the enormous bulk 
of the documents in which the law must be sought’203 and, secondly, ‘the difficulty of 
extracting the law (supposing the decisions known) from the particular decided cases in 
which it lies imbedded.’204 For these reasons, Austin preferred codification; however, the 
Austinian ideal of codification was ‘a question of time and place’.205  
Austin’s position on the codification of the English common law, as it resurfaced in 
the early 1860s, was that it was possible — and, better yet, ‘expedient’.206 In 1863, the 
Lord Chancellor argued for the revision of the law out of which a digest of statute law 
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and the common law could emerge.207 Austin viewed the publication of legal treatises 
‘many of which are, in effect, codes’ as pointing to the expediency of codification.208 
Rationalisation of statute law and systematisation of the common law would be 
indispensable to this process.209 Being law ‘properly so called’, rules of the common law 
were ‘the general grounds or principles (or the rationes decidendi) whereon the cases are 
decided’.210 Extracting a principle of law from a decided case rendered it possible to do 
this on a larger scale — as in, for all decided cases.211 This larger project would see the 
common law codified, ‘compact and accessible’.212 
E Austinian Influences in Westlake’s Private International Law 
General acceptance of the implications of Austinian positivism between Westlake’s first 
and second editions could explain the methodological refinement of private international 
law in Westlake’s revised first (or second) edition (1880).213 Though not as 
methodologically polished as the second edition, the first edition of Westlake’s Private 
International Law (1858) featured aspects of positivism. The introductory chapter identifies 
private international law as part of a country’s domestic legal system, as concerning private 
rights, and as ‘administered by judges commissioned by human superiors’.214 The 
narrowing of private international law to the realm of domestic law is, however, only one 
sense in which positivism is understood.215 
Predating the resurgence of Austinian positivism, Westlake’s first edition was not a 
model example of analytical positivism. The comparative newness of English private 
international law meant that domestic case law was not exhaustive. In the absence of 
domestic authority, Westlake resorted to foreign authority or foreign scholarship. In 
borrowing language from English case law, Westlake adopted — perhaps unconsciously 
— the natural law language of Forbes v Cochrane to frame an exception to the choice of law 
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rule for foreign contracts.216 English courts would not ‘hold transactions legal which it 
considers to be contrary to the law of nature, or hurtful to the purity of morals, 
notwithstanding that an opposite view may be taken of them elsewhere.’217 From the early 
1860s onwards, Austinian positivism predominated. This philosophy may well have 
brought greater internal coherence to Westlake’s second edition (1880). 
The hallmarks of positivism are more obvious in Westlake’s second edition (1880); 
however, Westlake’s confidence in Austinian positivism was mixed. Despite initially 
acknowledging the significance of ‘Mr Austin’s analysis of the nature of law’, Westlake 
questioned the merits of Austinian positivism for novel legal questions.218 The remaining 
Westlake editions maintained this latter objection. By the fourth edition, however, the 
initial emphasis of this section had been reconfigured; the reference to ‘Austin’s analysis 
of the nature of law’ was removed.219 Instead, Westlake foregrounded the concept of 
sovereignty, incidentally noting that it ‘presents much analogy to Austin’s analysis of 
national law’.220   
As Austin had done in The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Westlake’s second edition 
initially clarified what was meant by ‘law’, distinguishing between natural laws and human 
laws.221 Referring to the continental school of private international law,222 Westlake 
asserted that students had ‘often been cheated by the empty assertion of universal 
agreement.’223 Key elements of the command theory also featured in Westlake’s definition 
of municipal law. Municipal law was ‘a body of rules, to be uniformly applied to the cases 
that fall within them, and of which the breach is redressed or published by a force 
irresistible to the individual subject, and regularly applied through courts of justice’.224 
Westlake pointed to the presence of sanctions as a defining characteristic of municipal 
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law, a feature absent from international law.225 Private international law, being a part of 
national law, typically affected private persons and was ‘administered by national 
courts’.226 In resolving private international law questions, courts ‘must apply any solution 
of these questions which its own national law may be found to prescribe’.227  
An abundance of English case law between Westlake’s first and second editions 
triggered a profound change in Westlake’s presentation of English private international 
law.228 Consistent with the Austinian conception of law, English statutes and cases 
featured prominently in Westlake’s second edition. New case law had enabled Westlake 
to ‘present the English view in a series of propositions or of topics’.229 In the second 
edition’s preface, Westlake observed that ‘English authority has now touched almost every 
part of private international law’.230 These decisions ‘must now … be considered as a part 
of the national law, and therefore binding on the courts unless and until the legislature 
shall alter it.’231 Acting consistently with the positivist’s concern to state what the law is, 
Westlake rejected having to give ‘the reasons why [received English doctrines] should be 
maintained or altered’.232 A focus on foreign scholarship was likewise rejected for it ‘would 
have involved more detail than it seemed proper to afford to … history’.233 
F Austinian Influences in Dicey’s First Edition 
In outlining a ‘method of treatment’ for private international law in the ‘Introduction’ of 
the Conflict of Laws (1896), Dicey showed his support for Austinian positivism.234 Dicey’s 
earlier works had revealed the ‘critical reverence’ with which he regarded Austin.235 
Despite recognising Austin’s ‘extraordinary powers of logical analysis’,236 Dicey was 
equally aware of Austin’s shortcomings.237 Having focused his criticism on weaknesses in 
Austin’s written expression and incomplete jurisprudential scheme, Dicey thought 
Thomas Erskine Holland’s textbook, Elements of Jurisprudence (1880), had mitigated against 
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these defects with a clearer written style and a better grasp of the law.238 Nevertheless, 
Dicey singled out the ‘positive method’ as the appropriate sphere of scholarly activity in 
the Conflict of Laws.239  
Dicey’s view was that two methods had historically preoccupied scholars of private 
international law: the theoretical method and the positive method.240 The theoretical 
school of private international law comprised continental scholars, including Savigny, 
whose focus was on what ought to be the rules of choice of law or, more broadly, of private 
international law.241 In other words, the theoretical school aimed ‘to construct a logically 
consistent body of rules, which actually do agree with the rules as to the choice of law 
upheld in different states, or ought, consistently with sound theory, to prevail in each 
state’.242 An example of the theoretical method was the continental scholars’ quest for the 
appropriate seat of a legal transaction.243  
In contrast, scholars of the ‘positive method’, which included Story, Westlake and 
Phillimore, treated rules of private international law as ‘“laws” in the strict sense of that 
term, and that they derive their authority from the support of the sovereign in whose 
territory they are enforced’.244 The rules of private international law were ‘part of the 
municipal law of some given country’.245 By aiming ‘to discover not what ought to be, but 
what is the law’, these scholars had rightly sought ‘to study the statutory enactments and 
the judicial decisions which embody the law of England or France’.246 Disciples of this 
school were consequently excused from having to rationalise the rules divined from 
statute and the common law.247 A scholar was ‘not required to be an apologist’.248 
Nevertheless, resort could be had to foreign decisions and institutional writers, such as 
Story, if statute and the common law provided no answer.249 
Even Dicey’s choice of title reflected the concerns of an Austinian positivist. The 
parallels to Austin are strong in Dicey’s argument that ‘private international law’ was an 
unsuitable title for a subject concerned with private disputes having a foreign element.250 
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The ‘international law’ component of the subject title was rejected because rules of 
international law, which ‘prevail between and among nations’, were not derived from 
sovereign commands and so not laws ‘properly so called’.251 On the other hand, rules of 
private international law were ‘commands proceeding from the sovereign of a given 
state’.252 
V PUBLIC POLICY IN WESTLAKE’S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW  
A Public Policy in Westlake’s First Edition 
Even if minimal attention was given to public policy in the first edition of Westlake’s 
Private International Law, ideas underlying natural law are arguably evident.253 In the first 
place, a distinction was made between diverse foreign laws offering different solutions to 
the same legal problem and foreign laws violating more fundamental or ‘deep-seated 
moral ideas’ of the interested country.254 In the latter case, the domestic legal system was 
not bound to recognise a transaction ‘it considered to be contrary to the law of nature, or 
hurtful to the purity of morals’.255 In support of this statement, Westlake quoted Lord 
Wynford’s speech in Forbes v Cochrane, which included the language of ‘the law of nature’.256 
Underpinning the second aspect of Westlake’s public policy formulation was a country’s 
duty to sustain moral blamelessness and to prevent its citizens from being influenced by 
‘the evil example’ of recognising a morally unacceptable foreign law.257 
Huber’s third axiom on vested rights was approved.258 Vested rights ‘can only be fully 
carried out between nations which possess common ideas on all topics with which law is 
conversant’.259 The fulfilment of the vested rights theory depended upon similarities 
between the laws of different nations,260 while ‘[d]ifferences on social matters’ encouraged 
the public policy exception.261 Muslim marriages,262 gaming debts,263 contracts that 
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‘facilitate’ divorce and custody proceedings,264 and slavery265 were given as examples of the 
exception in operation. Of all the examples, Westlake devoted the most attention to 
slavery.  
In contrast to Story’s short discussion, the legal status of slavery in 18th and early 19th 
century England is more accurately rendered in Westlake’s textbook.266 Westlake’s 
account of Smith v Browne provides implicit recognition of the limitations of pre-1865 law 
reporting.267 Here, the plaintiff claimed £20 in an action for indebitatus assumpsit ‘for a negro 
sold to the defendant, in the parish of the Blessed Mary of the Arches, in the ward of 
Cheap’.268 Though the sale took place in Virginia,269 the plaintiff employed the ancient 
practice of ‘laying, in foreign cases, a fictitious venue in England’ to bring the matter 
within the jurisdiction of the English courts.270 As Lord Holt CJQB noted, the substantive 
law of England freed a slave when they set foot in England.271 However, his Lordship 
directed that the plaintiff amend his declaration to plead that, though the slave was sold 
in London, the slave was located in Virginia when the sale took place and, by the laws 
there, ‘negroes are saleable’.272 Counsel for the defendant in Santos v Illidge273 interpreted 
this aspect of Smith v Browne to mean ‘indebitatus assumptsit would at the time lie for a 
negro sold in a country where the possession of slaves was not illegal’.274 In the Salkeld 
report, Lord Holt CJQB observed that Virginia was ‘a conquered country’ so ‘their law is 
what the King pleases’.275 Though the imprecision of the declaration saw the action in 
Smith v Browne fail, Westlake was under the impression that ‘but for these objections the 
action would have lain’.276  
In Westlake’s text, the legality of slavery in the United States served as a useful 
counterpoint to the English position against slavery.277 Whereas the legal position in 
England had gradually turned against slavery, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts’ 
decision in Greenwood v Curtis reinforced that contracts facilitating the slave trade could be 
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enforced within the United States.278 The case was for ‘for assumpsit on a promissory note 
for the delivery of slaves [on demand] and the payment of bars… an African currency’.279 
The contract was concluded and the account stated in Guinea.280 The defendant, having 
partly paid the plaintiff for the sale of cargo with slaves, promised to pay the remaining 
balance but, on demand, he did not. To avoid payment, the defendant argued that an 
action founded on a contract with the ‘base and dishonest’ purpose of purchasing slaves 
could not be maintained.281  
The governing law for contracts — the lex loci contractus — was applicable here, though 
two important exceptions were noted in the Massachusetts judgment.282 The first 
exception on smuggling and the second example given emulated Huber’s illustrations of 
the prejudicial laws exception. For the second exception, the defendant had to show that 
the action was ‘a turpis causa, furnishing a pernicious precedent, and so not to be 
countenanced’.283 However, Parsons CJ, giving the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts, found that the slaving contract was not immoral.284 A South Carolina 
merchant could legally recover the balance owed to him for the sale of cargo in Africa to 
be paid for in slaves.285   
Another consideration was the effect that foreign allegiance with a power engaging in 
the slave trade had on legal proceedings.286 Westlake summarised the finding in Madrazo v 
Willes accurately.287 There, a Spanish slaver recovered damages for the value of slaves, 
stores and goods seized from his Spanish brig by Captain Willes of the Royal Navy.288 
Critical to the only issue in the case — the measure of damages — was the coverage of 
the Abolition of Slave Trade Act 1807 and the Slave Trade Act 1811.289 The Court of King’s 
Bench with some hesitancy found that only British subjects were covered by its terms.290 
Though many ‘States of Christendom have now consented to the abolition of the slave-
trade’, Best J pointed out that Spain had not.291 As such, Spanish ‘subjects could not legally 
be interrupted in buying slaves… and have a right to appeal to the justice of this country 
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for any injury sustained by them from such an interruption’.292 The effect of Madrazo was 
to allow slavers from countries permitting the slave trade to recover compensation in 
English courts of justice.293  
B Public Policy in Westlake’s Second Edition 
In the second chapter of Westlake’s second edition (1880), public policy took a 
preeminent role. Public policy regulated ‘all maxims of private international law’. 294 
Articles of the Prussian Code, the Napoleonic Code, the Austrian Code and Italian Code 
were drawn upon in the second chapter to contrast private international law practice in 
Europe with English private international law.295 Westlake’s use of this comparative 
method highlighted the controlling influence of public policy in civilian legal systems.296 
Through this comparison, Westlake accepted the theoretical inevitability of a 
‘[r]eservation in favour of stringent domestic policy’.297 Thus, Westlake rejected that a 
system of private international law could exist between Christian states and ‘nations, like 
the Turks or the Chinese’ because of marked dissimilarities between their laws and 
practices and those of the English.298  
In surveying the private international law of European countries, Westlake compared 
the ‘reservation in favour of stringent domestic policy’ with two provisions resembling 
mandatory rules in the Italian Code and Code Napoleon respectively.299 Preliminary 
Article 12 of the Italian Code provided that 
neither the laws acts or judgments of a foreign country, nor private dispositions or 
contracts, can in any case derogate from prohibitive laws of the kingdom concerning 
property or acts, or from laws which in any way whatever regard public order or good 
morals.300  
The similarly expressed ‘ordre public’ exception in art 6 of the Code Napoleon 
conditioned the legality of private contracts on their compatibility with ‘laws which 
interest public order and good morals’.301 Apart from the treatment in the second chapter, 
                                                 
292  Ibid. 
293  Ibid 693 (Abbott CJ). 
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295  Ibid 24. 
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299  Ibid 39–40. 
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however, the public policy reservation received little attention.302 Limited treatment of 
public policy continued until the fourth edition.  
C Public Policy in Subsequent Editions of Westlake’s Private International Law 
In contrast to past editions, Westlake’s fourth edition (1905) contained a more meaningful 
discussion of public policy in a chapter on foreign contracts.303 The discussion would have 
brought the textbook in line with more recent English case law and other private 
international law treatises, in particular Dicey’s Conflict of Laws.304 As in the second edition, 
the fourth edition maintained the reservation in favour of stringent domestic policy.305 
Thus, in enforcing contracts, the engagement of public policy relied upon ‘conflicts with 
what are deemed in England to be essential public or moral interests’.306 The essentiality of 
public and moral interests to apply the doctrine was for Westlake illustrated by the 
‘difference of opinion among judges’ in Kaufman v Gerson.307 In that decision, the primary 
judge upheld an agreement to settle a criminal charge legal under its governing law 
(France), rejecting arguments that the agreement offended public policy or otherwise 
pointed to duress. All the agreement’s contacts were concentrated on France where the 
contract was made, where it was to be performed and where the parties were domiciled.308 
Nevertheless, on appeal the judges accepted the argument of public policy. By doing so, 
the judges rejected the application of French law that had the strongest connection to the 
agreement and favoured the forum’s notions of public policy.  
Together with this decision, public policy cases similarly invoked in Dicey’s Conflict of 
Laws (discussed next in Part VI) were introduced,309 each case representing a narrow 
contractual class within which public policy had settled. Westlake referenced the collusive 
agreement in Hope v Hope,310 the champertous agreement in Grell v Levy,311 and the contract 
                                                 
302  Public policy was mentioned as Savigny’s justification for the lex fori governing delicts, in relation to 
extradition, and for foreign judgments. See ibid 222, 312, 329. 
303  Westlake and Topham (eds) (1905) (n 219) 283–4. 
304  See, eg, John Alderson Foote, Foreign and Domestic Law: A Concise Treatise on Private International 
Jurisprudence, Based on the Decisions in the English Courts (Stevens and Haynes, 2nd ed, 1890) 367; John 
Alderson Foote, Foreign and Domestic Law: A Concise Treatise on Private International Jurisprudence, Based on the 
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of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws (Stevens and Sons, 1st ed, 1896) 558–9. 
305  Westlake and Topham (eds) (1905) (n 219) 283. 
306  Ibid 283 (emphasis added). 
307  Ibid 284, citing Kaufman v Gerson [1903] 2 KB 114 (Wright J); [1904] 1 KB 591 (Collins, Romer and 
Mathew JJ). 
308  Foote (1904) (n 304) 389. 
309  See, eg, Dicey (1896), ‘Conflict of Laws’ (n 234) 558. 
310  Hope v Hope (1867) 8 De GM & G 731; 44 ER 572. 
311  Grell v Levy (1864) 16 CB NS 73; 143 ER 1052. 
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in restraint of trade in Rousillon v Rousillon.312 By the lex loci contractus, each agreement was 
unquestionably legal; however, the public policy of the lex loci solutionis — England — 
prevailed.313 An inference may be drawn that Dicey therefore has had the predominant 
influence on the shape of public policy. 
VI PUBLIC POLICY IN DICEY’S CONFLICT OF LAWS 
A The Liberal Scheme of Public Policy in Dicey’s First to Sixth Editions 
Of the six general principles that governed private international law in Dicey’s first 
edition, the first and second general principles brought up questions of public policy and 
‘the maintenance of English political institutions’.314 In the first edition, English private 
international law was considered to be a ‘second branch’ of English law concerned with 
‘the extra-territorial operation of law or recognition of rights’.315 By reason of that, Dicey’s 
first general principle was that English courts would recognise or enforce a right duly 
acquired in another ‘civilised’ country.316 As a corollary, the same courts would not 
recognise or enforce a right which had not been duly acquired.317  
For the second general principle, English courts would not recognise a right duly 
acquired in another country if its enforcement was ‘inconsistent with the policy of the 
English law, or with the maintenance of English political institutions’.318 Dicey thus 
framed the exception from two angles, ‘the policy of English law’319 and politics.320 Dicey’s 
former angle was consistent with the 19th century repackaging of public policy authorities 
using a ‘proper ground’ of law.321 Dicey recognised that the term, though ‘vague’, would 
be ‘familiar to English lawyers’.322 By the second edition, Dicey had split the first ground 
into two, maintaining the terminology ‘the policy of English law’ but adding to it ‘the 
moral rules upheld by English law’.323 The phrase, ‘the moral rules upheld by English law’, 
had appeared in the first edition in reference to the collusive agreement in Hope v Hope 
                                                 
312  Westlake and Topham (eds) (1905) (n 219) 284. See Rousillon v Rousillon (1880) 14 Ch D 351. 
313  Westlake and Topham (eds) (1905) (n 219) 284. 
314  Dicey (1896), ‘Conflict of Laws’ (n 234) xliii, 32. 
315  Ibid 3. 
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and the obiter comment on a prostitute’s price in Robinson v Bland.324 For the second (but 
later third) angle, Dicey cited Somerset’s Case on ‘the status of persons in England’,325 two 
authorities on the double actionability rule for foreign torts, and the rule in Birtwhistle v 
Vardill on succession to heritable property in England.326 
The five classes of public policy identified under the second general principle were far 
broader than the exception articulated in Story and Westlake’s texts. Apart from the usual 
morality ground, public policy was seen to lie behind the lex situs rule for immovable 
property,327 the lex fori rule for procedure, the double actionability rule for torts, and the 
non-recognition of foreign penal status.328 The double actionability rule as expressed in 
Phillips v Eyre and its predecessor, The Halley, were cited by Dicey as supporting the second 
angle of public policy: inconsistency ‘with the maintenance of English institutions’.329  
Though Dicey explained it on a public policy footing, the lex situs rule for immovable 
property and, by extension, the rule in British South Africa Co v Companhia de Moçambique 
for foreign land was partially descended from the medieval procedural distinction between 
local and transitory actions.330 Plaintiffs in local actions331 had to plead the ‘very county 
and place that [the action] really did happen’.332 In transitory actions,333 plaintiffs could 
‘declare in what county he pleases’334 because, unlike local actions, there was ‘no necessary 
connection with a particular locality’.335 Actions affecting land were classified as local.336 
Until Moçambique was decided, however, it was thought that the Supreme Court of Judicature 
Act 1873 had removed the procedural requirement to ‘lay the venue’ in local actions.337 
                                                 
324  Dicey (1896), ‘Conflict of Laws’ (n 234) 559 nn 2–3. 
325  Dicey and Keith (eds) (1922) (n 320) 36. 
326  Dicey (1896), ‘Conflict of Laws’ (n 234) 32 (n 5). 
327  This was maintained in the second and third editions: see, eg, Dicey and Keith (eds) (1922) (n 320) 37. 
328  Dicey (1896), ‘Conflict of Laws’ (n 234) 33–6. 
329  Ibid 32 (n 5). The Halley and Phillips v Eyre are discussed in Chapter 6. 
330  See, eg, W Rupert Johnson, ‘The Mozambique Rule and the (Non) Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
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On the other hand, convenience — ‘not policy’ — is the preferred contemporary 
explanation for Dicey’s second class of public policy, the procedure rule.338  
One of Dicey’s uncontroversial — because longstanding — classes of public policy 
was morality. This class involved the projection of English standards of morality on not 
only domestic but foreign transactions.339 The Appendix to Dicey’s first edition footnoted 
more English authorities to demonstrate ‘that an English Court will not enforce any 
contract which is opposed… to the morality supported by the law of England’.340 An 
English court would not enforce ‘transactions, wherever taking place, which our tribunals 
hold to be immoral’.341 Two of the English authorities on prostitution, cited in Story’s 
Conflict of Laws and discussed in Chapter 2, were used by Dicey to support this class of 
public policy.342 Pearce v Brooks was cited in Dicey’s first chapter in support of the principle 
that ‘an agreement which, though innocent in itself, is intended by the parties to promote 
an immoral purpose’.343 There, the plaintiff coachbuilders were unable to recover on a 
contract for hire of a brougham carriage, because they knew the defendant, a prostitute, 
was hiring it to solicit clients, considered ‘an immoral purpose’.344 Knowledge, as discussed 
in Chapter 2, was a decisive factor in 18th century cases on contracts savouring of 
prostitution. In another cited case, Ayerst v Jenkins, the legal position on contracts for past 
and future illicit cohabitation was considered.345 While contracts for past illicit 
cohabitation upheld in courts of law and equity, promises made in consideration of future 
illicit cohabitation were void at law and in equity.346  
With one exception, status was another of Dicey’s uncontroversial classes of public 
policy. Dicey had concluded that a foreign status ‘unknown to English law’ would not be 
accorded recognition in English courts.347 Further, in discussing foreign judgments, Dicey 
suggested that an English court would refuse recognition of a foreign judgment founded 
on a cause of action ‘of such a character that it would not have supported an action in 
England (?)’.348  
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B Public Policy Recast in Dicey’s Seventh Edition 
Dicey’s structure for public policy persisted until the seventh edition (1958), the second 
edition produced under J H C Morris’ general editorship. Morris’ seventh edition 
overhauled Dicey’s original arrangement of the book and some of its key passages — 
public policy included.349 Judicial diffidence towards public policy may have contributed 
to Morris’ recasting of this particular passage, which has resisted meaningful change down 
to the current 15th edition.350 In the seventh edition, the three limbs of Dicey’s ‘General 
Principle No 2’ were reduced to one. It was reworked to provide that 
English courts will not enforce or recognise a right, power, capacity, disability or legal 
relationship created by the law of a foreign country which is ordinarily applicable in virtue 
of English rules of conflict of laws, if the enforcement or recognition of such right, power, 
capacity, disability or legal relationship would be inconsistent with the fundamental public 
policy of English law.351  
Moreover, the commentary attached to public policy in the first six editions, which had 
largely focused on the policy justifying general principles of private international law, was 
abandoned. The seventh edition argued that ‘convenience’ motivated the application of 
the lex fori in matters of procedure, unlike the public policy rationale given in earlier 
editions.352  
Morris’ new commentary on public policy only looked to the classes of cases suggested 
by English case law.353 Morris cited mid-19th century authorities — Grell v Levy354 and 
Rousillon v Rousillon355 — that represented the categories of champerty and restraints of 
trade outlined in Chapter 2. Removing Dicey’s original six categories, Morris identified 
status, contracts, and a small number of ‘other cases’ as characteristic of the doctrine’s 
classes.356 The commentary on contracts and status, the latter having received the most 
judicial attention, enumerated the situations in which the doctrine had been successfully 
engaged.357 The usual suspects were implicated for contracts, including ‘champertous 
contracts, contracts in restraint of trade, contracts entered into under duress or coercion, 
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or contracts involving collusive arrangements for a divorce…’358 For each class of case, 
the authorities conventionally cited in legal textbooks appeared.359 The penal character of 
disabilities imposed on the basis of religious vocation, religion, and race were identified 
for status.360  
In a change suggested by the tenor of recent case law, Morris’ new section counselled 
against the deployment of public policy. The space that Dicey carved out for public policy 
as the underlying reason for elementary doctrines of private international law was 
discarded. Instead, Morris introduced the reservation with the familiar warnings of 
Cardozo J in Loucks v Standard Oil Co and Lord Atkin in Fender v St John-Mildmay against 
public policy’s use.361 According to Cardozo J, foreign law could be rejected on the ground 
of public policy only when ‘its application would “violate some fundamental principle of 
justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the 
common weal.”’362 Lord Atkin warned that judges should only engage public policy ‘in 
clear cases in which the harm to the public is substantially incontestable’.363 Case law was 
what ultimately mattered because ‘“no attempt to define the limits of [public policy] has 
ever succeeded.”’364 Morris’ scheme has remained with additions only made to reflect 
changed law. 
VII CONCLUSION 
This Chapter concentrated on the transformation of the public policy exception in 
historical texts of private international law. In the 19th century texts examined, some 
consolidation of the common law public policy doctrine into Huber’s lacuna of 
‘prejudicial laws’ occurred. Where this consolidation arose, prevailing theories of law — 
natural law and Austinian positivism — had considerable influence. For example, in his 
discussion of public policy, Story assimilated some of the common law grounds (explored 
in Chapter 2) with what constituted corruptions of natural law norms as understood in 
his Paleyan philosophical framework.  
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While natural law philosophy in Story’s Conflict of Laws was transparent, that same 
conclusion could not be applied to Westlake’s work. The first edition of Westlake’s Private 
International Law was published in 1858 before the heyday of Austinian positivism. This, 
combined with factors to be explored in Chapters 4 and 5, is offered as one factor behind 
the first edition blending elements of positivism with the language of natural law. 
Elements of Austinian positivism were much more palpable in Westlake’s second edition. 
Austinian positivism was unquestionably Dicey’s philosophy of law. 
In line with leading theories of law, attitudes towards and the language associated with 
public policy shifted. Story would have rejected foreign law because it undermined 
institutions (such as marriage) that were important to his Paleyan philosophy, which was 
compatible with that era’s generally accepted theory. Meanwhile, Westlake’s treatment of 
public policy enlarged through successive editions as lawyers’ understanding of Austinian 
positivism deepened. 
An explanation of Austinian positivism prefaced this discussion, given its dominance 
for almost a century between the early 1860s and the 1950s. Westlake’s first edition, 
published in 1858, appeared before Austin’s theory flourished; however, the implications 
of Austinian positivism were better appreciated by the time of the publication of the 
second edition. In Westlake’s first edition, close attention to English authorities on public 
policy perhaps involved the unwitting adoption of natural law language indicative of a 
philosophy that was losing currency. By drawing upon the language of European ordre 
public reservations, Westlake attenuated English public policy by attaching weight to 
whether the policy was sufficiently essential to be engaged.  
Essentiality eventually became the focus of the public policy passage in the seventh 
edition of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws (1958). Dicey’s view on public policy — mainly that it 
underlay basic principles of private international law — had prevailed for the first six 
editions of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws until Morris’ general editorship introduced a substantive 
change. In the century and a quarter between Story’s Conflict of Laws and the seventh 
edition of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws, the direction of public policy had transformed from being 
the province of treatise writers to the province of judges. Initially premised by Story on 
the discretionary exercise of comity, public policy became the subject of fresh judicial 
warnings limiting its use to ‘clear cases in which harm to the public is substantially 
incontestable’.365 The absence of authorities on public policy in private international law 
afforded text writers an opportunity to advance their idiosyncratic views; whereas, judges 
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in the early 20th century took the opportunity to reaffirm their reluctance to use the 
doctrine. The latter view has succeeded. 
This thesis is proposing that unusual weight has been attached to institutional writings 
— especially Story and, above all, Dicey — in the development of public policy in its 
private international law sense. Thus, over the next two chapters, this Chapter’s emphasis 
on public policy in historical private international law scholarship is further developed. 
Chapter 4 explores the meaning and taxonomy of ‘institutional writings’ — a source of 
law in Scotland. It also considers contributing factors leading to the judicial citation of 
19th century treatise writers. With this deepened understanding of historical context, 
Chapter 5 discerns areas of law in which Story, Westlake, and Dicey’s works were 
influential by reason of their judicial citation in English, Irish, and Scottish courts.  
 
CHAPTER 4: INSTITUTIONAL WRITINGS AS A 
'SOURCE OF LAW' 
I INTRODUCTION 
he prominence attached to public policy’s transformation as an exception in 
private international law scholarship in Chapter 3 is continued in this Chapter 
from a different perspective. This Chapter lays some of the groundwork for the 
discussion in Chapter 5 on scholarly writing constituting a de facto source of law in 
common law private international law jurisprudence. It borrows the term ‘institutional 
writings’ from the Scottish legal system to describe preeminent legal treatises given 
standing through judicial citation. 
In common law systems, scholarly work is not a recognised source of law; however, 
that is not the case in Scotland. For historical reasons, in Scotland, institutional writers 
are an additional source of law after legislation and case law.1 Between the 17th and early 
19th centuries, Scottish institutional writers were writing on national law as a Scottish 
‘national consciousness’ and the contemporaneous teaching of national law at Scottish 
universities was developing.2 Paralleling these strides, common law jurisdictions in the 
late-18th and 19th centuries were finding their national voice and seeking to improve the 
delivery of legal education.3 Key to this improvement was the production of texts on 
national law and, later, subject-specific treatises. 
Part II considers the meaning of ‘institutional writings’. It first examines the special 
weight assigned to institutional writers in Scots law before and after the 19th century. The 
Scots position is then contrasted with the position under English and Irish law where 
institutional writings do not have the same standing. The reasons for this different 
treatment are explored. Parts III and IV consider factors contributing to the judicial 
citation of institutional writers during the first half of the 19th century. It examines the 
improving state of Anglo-American legal education and the parallel rise of subject-specific 
legal textbooks in the early 19th century.  
                                                 
1  M C Meston et al, The Scottish Legal Tradition (Saltire Society and Stair Society, 1991) 12–13. 
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II THE MEANING OF ‘INSTITUTIONAL WRITINGS’ 
A Special Status of Institutional Writings under Scots Law 
For historical reasons, institutional writings are considered a primary source of Scots law 
together with legislation, case law, custom, and equity.4 From the 17th to the early 19th 
century, institutional writings, in the main structurally similar to Justinian’s Institutes, were 
published in Scotland to provide an elementary and sometimes comprehensive treatment 
of ‘a whole system of law treated as a national law.’5 The writings’ elementary nature was 
indicative of the intended audience: law students or a general audience not particularly 
versed in the law.6 To maximise their impact, the writings were written in English, rather 
than Latin.7 Writing ‘in the vernacular’ was a trend shared by contemporaries writing 
‘institutes’ of national law in France and Spain.8 The structure of the text and the treatment 
of substantive law in institutional writings were ‘simple’ to be ‘readily understood’.9 Works 
given institutional status include — but are certainly not limited to or not necessarily 
agreed upon in all cases — Craig’s Jus Feudale (1655), Stair’s Institutions of the Law of Scotland 
(1681), Erskine’s An Institute of the Law of Scotland (1773), and Bell’s Principles of the Law of 
Scotland (1829).10  
Institutional writings’ special status grew out of a growing sense of Scottish national 
consciousness, ultimately contributing to the teaching of national law at Scottish 
universities during the 18th century.11 The threat of a Cromwellian union, the Glorious 
Revolution Settlement, and the Union of 1707 may have galvanised some institutional 
writers’ nationalist aims.12 Institutional writers of this century intended not only to bring 
Scots law into order but also to set apart Scots law from English law.13 In contrast to these 
aims, a characteristic feature of 18th century institutional writers was the holding of 
recently established chairs in national law at various Scottish universities.14 Their writings 
                                                 
4  Meston et al (n 1) 12–13. 
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were teaching tools set as student texts.15  By the mid-18th century, examination in national 
law was required for admission to the Scottish Faculty of Advocates.16 Previously the 
norm was examination in civil law, which Faculty entrants had learnt at continental 
universities.17 The emergence of institutional writings triggered the Faculty’s proposal and 
requirement — from 1749 — for successful examination in national law.18 The emphasis 
on learning national law necessarily contributed to the decline in Scots travelling abroad 
to study law.19 
Originally conceived as a teaching tool, institutional writings enjoyed a new status as a 
source of law because of judicial recognition in 19th century Scotland. When recognised 
by Scottish courts as falling within the class of ‘institutional writers’, institutional writings 
became authoritative and binding sources of law.20 Blackie attributed this to ‘romantic 
nationalism’, changes in attitude to scholarly work after the Scottish Enlightenment, 
scarcity of case law and legislation, and having to reconcile institutional writings with an 
emerging view of judicial precedent.21 Cairns described the new status as one of ‘judicial 
recognition, even creation’: the focus shifted from comprehensiveness, structure, and the 
topics analysed to whether the institutional writing was ‘recognised by the Scottish courts 
as specially authoritative.’22 An institutional writer’s opinion would be considered 
conclusive in Scottish courts if ‘uncontradicted’.23 In Drew v Drew, for example, Lord 
Benholme found this to be the case with Stair.24 Favourable judicial pronouncements in 
19th century Scottish courts gave the institutional writers a new authority, notwithstanding 
present reliance on these authorities being at a low ebb.25 
B Status of Scholarly Writing under English Law 
Scholarly writing is understood to have only persuasive value under English law. Case law 
and legislation are primary sources binding on English and other common law courts. 
However, secondary sources, though not technically binding nor enjoying the same status 
as institutional writings in Scots law,26 are cited by English and other common law courts 
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for various reasons – of which convenience, accessibility, and authorial eminence are 
key.27 
Recent studies into judicial citation practices in common law jurisdictions also suggest 
that secondary sources can become ‘de facto primary authorities’.28 The argument is that 
citation of certain secondary sources ‘gives [it] authority to some degree and it will thus 
exert some influence on the way the law grows’.29 Merryman labelled this use of 
scholarship as ‘“convenience” or “baseline” citations’.30 Instead of ‘reinventing the wheel’, 
the judge uses the secondary source as a ‘baseline’ for subsequent legal analysis.31 In this 
category, Smyth placed Archbold, Holdsworth, Blackstone and Kenny due to the scale of 
their citation in Australian state Supreme Courts and New Zealand courts over the 20th 
century.32 Eminent subject-specific commentaries are also ‘frequently cited in cases 
dealing with their specific subject matter’.33 By placing ‘the state of the settled law in fuller, 
richer perspective’, whole-of-law and subject-specific legal treatises are arguably ‘easier to 
cite’.34 
Judicial citation studies, though focusing primarily on 20th century practices, could help 
to explain 19th century citation practices in English, Irish, and Scottish courts. Combined 
factors unsettled the typical assumption that scholarly writing was merely persuasive in 
the earlier century. These factors included the movement towards systematic study of law 
at universities, an increased output of legal treatises, and the contemporaneous uptake in 
judicial citation of these sources. 
                                                 
27  See, eg, Russell Smyth, ‘Academic Writing and the Courts: A Quantitative Study of the Influence of 
Legal and Non-Legal Periodicals in the High Court’ (1998) 17 University of Tasmania Law Review 164; 
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Source Citations in the Federal Court’ (2000) 9 Griffith Law Review 25, 29. 
30  Merryman, ‘Toward a Theory of Citations’ (n 29) 413. 
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32  Russell Smyth, ‘Citing outside the Law Reports: Citations of Secondary Authorities on the Australian 
State Supreme Courts over the Twentieth Century’ (2009) 18 Griffith Law Review 692, 714. 
33  Ingrid Nielsen and Russell Smyth, ‘One Hundred Years of Citation of Authority on the Supreme Court 
of New South Wales’ (2008) 31 University of New South Wales Law Journal 189, 193. 
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III INSTITUTIONAL WRITINGS AND LEGAL EDUCATION IN EARLY 19TH CENTURY 
AMERICA 
A market for legal literature emerged in the early 19th century as organised legal education 
was taking hold in the United States.35 Initially abortive attempts were made in the late 
18th century to establish law schools in America, but more success was achieved during 
the second quarter of the 19th century.36 Though other whole or subject-specific accounts 
had been printed,37 Blackstone’s Commentaries and Coke’s Institutes were the legal treatises 
most commonly consulted by American students-at-law under the conventional 
apprenticeship model of this period.38 The first three books of Blackstone’s Commentaries 
adopted a familiar methodology harking back to the traditional division of civil law 
between the law of persons, things, and actions featured, notably, in Justinian’s Institutes.39 
While Blackstone’s ‘Roman terminology’ may have been ‘a convenient extrinsic vehicle 
for the analysis of various kinds of rights’,40 the Commentaries’ main attraction was its 
breadth, orientation towards practising lawyers, and focus on existing case law.41  Indeed, 
to reflect the evolving nature of and increasingly distinctive edge to American law in this 
period, successive American editions of Blackstone’s Commentaries contained annotations 
of the original text together with updates of English and American law.42  
Later supplanting these treatises were American treatises on national law such as James 
Kent’s Commentaries on American Law, the first edition of which appeared in 1826.43 Of 
similar institutional character was Nathan Dane’s eight-volume Abridgement of American 
Law (1823), which, though too voluminous to be practical for student use, ‘influenced 
later treatise writers’.44 By dealing comprehensively with ‘national’ law, Dane and Kent 
were differentiating American law from the English law outlined in the hugely popular — 
but increasingly outdated and unsuitable — Blackstone’s Commentaries.45  
                                                 
35  See John H Langbein, ‘Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal History’ (1993) 93(3) Columbia Law 
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37  Harold J Berman and Charles J Reid Jr, ‘The Transformation of English Legal Science: From Hale to 
Blackstone’ (1996) 45 Emory Law Journal 437, 485. 
38  Sheppard (n 36) 561–2; M H Hoeflich, ‘The Americanization of British Legal Education in the 
Nineteenth Century’ (1987) 8(3) Journal of Legal History 244, 244. 
39  Berman and Reid (n 37) 492. 
40  Ibid 496. 
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42  Sheppard (n 36) 561–2. 
43  Hoeflich, ‘Americanization of 19th Century British Legal Education’ (n 38) 249. 
44  Sheppard (n 36) 575. 
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From the 1830s, the production of subject-specific treatises by American writers was 
part of a general trend to ‘legitimize’ legal study at university and to present it as a better 
alternative to the apprenticeship model.46 The ‘geometric paradigm’ or ‘legal science’, 
following the examples of science and mathematics, proved central to this aim of 
legitimisation.47 By reinforcing legal study as a ‘legal science’ or ‘deductive science’, the 
American treatise writer consulted relevant legal sources, drew ‘first principles’ from the 
mass of material, and set out the law in a ‘principled’ and ‘systematic’ way.48 Viewing law 
as a ‘liberal science’, American treatise writers fulfilled their goal and added legitimacy to 
legal education at university in America and, later, in England.49 
With this prehistory considered, the trends exhibited by 17th and 18th century Scottish 
institutional writers were manifested in accelerated form in post-Revolutionary America. 
Salient elements of the Scottish institutional works — the emergence of national 
consciousness and consequent teaching of national law at university — were fermenting 
in America.50 Before and for almost a half century after the American War of 
Independence, available legal treatises mainly dealt with English law. Subsequent 
American editions of Blackstone’s Commentaries were reactive to this dearth of American 
legal material, with national law progressively added. Dane and Kent supplied the demand 
by publishing standalone accounts of national law in the early 1820s; these developments 
were followed by the successful founding of American law schools and university ‘chairs’ 
devoted to the teaching of national law. Resembling the position of 18th century Scottish 
institutional writers, the American writers published their notes as texts to prescribe as 
teaching material for university-taught law courses.51  
A Joseph Story’s Conventional Legal Training in America: An Exemplar of 19th Century 
Legal Education 
Of particular moment in this respect is Joseph Story, Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States and inaugural Dane Professor of Law at Harvard University. 
From the 1830s until his death in 1845, Story produced a series of 11 ‘systematic treatises’ 
on various areas of law ‘to serve as text-books’ and to complement his teaching of 
                                                 
46  Ibid 245. 
47  M H Hoeflich, ‘Law and Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell’ (1986) 30 American Journal 
of Legal History 95, 108. 
48  Ibid 96, 120, 121. 
49  Ibid 118. 
50  See Cairns, ‘Institutional Writings Reconsidered’ (n 2); Cairns, ‘Blackstone, an English Institutist’ (n 2). 
51  See Sally E Hadden, ‘Legal Publishing in Antebellum America, by M H Hoeflich: Book Review’ (2011) 
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commercial law, constitutional law, maritime law and equity at Harvard.52 The series began 
with bailment (1832) and ended with the topic of promissory notes (1845); each of his 
legal treatises were revised and edited during his lifetime and by others afterwards.53 
Contributing to the treatises’ overall structure was Nathan Dane’s belief54 that law ‘should 
be taught systematically, as a science’ to lift the profile of Harvard and to ‘render effective 
service to the country and the profession’.55 Story’s initial frustrations with his own legal 
education and later ‘enthusiasm for education’ contributed to the ‘scientific’ approach 
taken in his subject-specific commentaries.56 
Story’s legal education in early 19th century Massachusetts was no exception to the 
prevailing apprenticeship model of legal education, of which he was highly critical. 
Eighteenth and early 19th century legal training demanded a period of apprenticeship with 
a practising lawyer and self-tuition comprising ‘solitude, reading and copying from 
English law books’.57 Articled to Congressman Samuel Sewall, Story ‘was left to his own 
devices, studying up to 14 hours a day’.58 Story busied himself with Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, a collection of English law reports, and Coke on Littleton, over which Story 
initially ‘wept bitterly’ as the work was ‘intricate, crabbed, and obsolete’.59 But, unlike John 
Adams’ legal training in the 1750s, Story had the benefit of Blackstone and Mansfield who 
had ‘smoothed the path of the Student’.60 
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54  Dane expressed this belief in a letter to Story inviting him to take up the newly established Dane 
Professorship. 
55  William W Story (ed), Life and Letters of Joseph Story, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (Charles C Little 
and James Brown, 1851) vol 2, 2. 
56  Ibid 2; Select Committee on Legal Education (n 3) 350–1 (‘Letter from Joseph Story to the Principal of 
the Dublin Law Institute’). 
57  W W Story (ed), ‘Vol 2’ (n 55) 69; Sheppard (n 36) 553. This remained the case throughout the 18th 
century. As a young lawyer in the late 1750s, John Adams recorded that his reading of civilian texts and 
common law classics ‘had left but faint Impressions, and [a] very Imperfect system of Law in my Head’: 
Daniel R Coquillette, ‘Justinian in Braintree: John Adams, Civilian Learning, and Legal Elitism, 1758–
1775’ in G D Perrottet, Law in Colonial Massachusetts, 1630-1800 (Colonial Society of Massachusetts and 
University Press of Boston, 1984) 370. 
58  William W Story (ed), Life and Letters of Joseph Story, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (Charles 
C Little and James Brown, 1851) vol 1, 72–3; David Lynch, The Role of Circuit Courts in the Formation 
of United States Law in the Early Republic: Following Supreme Court Justices Washington, Livingston, 
Story and Thompson (Hart Publishing, 1st ed, 2018) ch 5. 
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Like many of his contemporaries,61 Story was critical of the ungainliness of the 
common law written in Coke on Littleton, describing the feudal system as ‘dark and 
mysterious’62 and its processes and pleadings as ‘repulsive and almost unintelligible’.63 
From this point, however, Story developed an ‘enthusiasm for education’ and a ‘love of 
the law as a science’, through being a bibliophile as well as through his service as a 
Supreme Court justice.64 
IV AMERICAN LEGAL LITERATURE: ITS INFLUENCE ON 19TH CENTURY ENGLISH 
LEGAL EDUCATION AND LAW 
Compared with the more advanced state of American legal education, legal education in 
early 19th century England and Ireland was in an embryonic state, but emerging from a 
sustained trough. By the late 17th century, rigorous common law study at the Inns of Court 
had fallen into desuetude.65 Legal education at the Irish Bar was ‘under still greater 
disadvantages’; Irish solicitors fared no better than their counterparts at the Bar.66 As was 
common in 18th and 19th century America, solicitors in England and Ireland trained 
through apprenticeship,67 the quality of which varied depending on the apprentice’s 
master. Because an apprentice worked on ‘matters their master happened to be dealing 
with at the time’, gaps in legal knowledge were a natural corollary.68 The apprentice would 
also engage in self-directed study ‘to acquire a knowledge of their profession’,69 though 
that study might be ‘entirely limited to the technicalities and forms of law.’70  
In contrast, for those intending to practise law at Doctors’ Commons in England, 
sustained study in canon and civil law at Oxford or Cambridge was a longstanding 
requirement. Even though Henry VIII prohibited the teaching of canon law in 1540, civil 
law study continued, leaving unaffected the training expected of civilian lawyers. Owing 
to this training, civilian lawyers were perceived to have special expertise, particularly in 
relation to civil and ecclesiastical courts over which they had exclusive jurisdiction. With 
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Co, first published 1908, 2008 ed) vol 1, 1412. Contemporaries sharing the same opinion on Coke as 
Story included Daniel Webster and John Quincy Adams. 
62  W W Story (ed), ‘Vol 1’ (n 55) 73, 74. 
63  Ibid. 
64  W W Story (ed), ‘Vol 2’ (n 55) 2; Cohen (n 55) xiii. 
65  Select Committee on Legal Education (n 3) xi. 
66  Ibid xvi. 
67  Ibid xvi; David Sugarman, ‘Legal Theory, the Common Law Mind, and the Making of the Textbook 
Tradition’ in William L Twining (ed), Legal Theory and Common Law (Blackwell, 1986) 29. 
68  Fiona Cownie, ‘Are We Witnessing the Death of the Textbook Tradition in the UK?’ (2006) 3 European 
Journal of Legal Education 79, 79. 
69  Select Committee on Legal Education (n 3) xi. 
70  Ibid xvii. 
86 CHAPTER 4 
 
 
civilian jurisdiction drained and appropriated by the common law, however, the demand 
for sustained study in the common law assumed more significance towards the mid-18th 
century. 
Contributing to the eventual teaching of national law at English universities was the 
seizure of civilian jurisdiction for the common law courts, together with the decline of the 
Inns of Courts as a teaching institution by the late 17th century.71 The foundation of the 
Vinerian Professorship of Common Law at Oxford in 1758 provided an early impetus for 
the revitalisation of English legal education and the common law’s literature.72 Other 
chairs in common law were established at the University of Dublin (1761) and at the 
University of Cambridge (1800).73 The first Vinerian Professor, Sir William Blackstone, 
most notably delivered lectures on the common law and bringing it together in four 
volumes (1765–69) of his Commentaries on the Laws of England. Inspiring later legal 
treatises,74 Blackstone’s Commentaries demonstrated what could be achieved for law when 
taught in a university environment.75 However, Blackstone’s successors to the Vinerian 
Professorship were less successful, effectively taking the chair ‘as a sinecure’.76  
The chairs at Oxford and Cambridge proved insufficient to ‘supply the defect… the 
whole has sunk into a mere matter of form’ following the Inns of Courts’ decline as a 
teaching institution.77 Indeed, regulation of law apprentices was so minimal that, beyond 
attendance at Inns of Court term dinners from time to time, nothing else was demanded 
of apprentices.78 Attendance at university lectures on law thus offered no incentive to 
students seeking to supplement their existing legal knowledge.79 Subsequent attempts to 
revive English legal education occurred in the first quarter of the 19th century with the 
establishment of three chairs in law at University College, London.80 In 1846, Oxford and 
Cambridge still had two chairs of law in civil law and on the common law.81 Not until the 
middle of the 19th century, however, was serious, sustained enquiry made into the 
unfortunate state of legal education in England.82 
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American legal treatises from the early 19th century were highly regarded by the English 
judiciary and broader legal profession. Highly critical of legal education in England and 
Ireland, the Report of the Select Committee on Legal Education (1846) treated the American 
model for legal education – in which legal treatises featured prominently — as worthy of 
emulation. James Kent and William Story were singled out in the Report: Story for his 
subject-specific commentaries, which exemplified his knowledge and reputation as a jurist 
and academic, and Kent for similar reasons.83 Regular and favourable citation of Story 
and Kent’s work ‘as authorities in Westminster Hall’ was also noted.84 
Commending the American model was its ‘scientific’ approach with less focus on 
procedure and precedents and more focus on legal principles.85 Given the embarrassing 
state of 19th century English legal education, law academics’ first task would be to 
legitimise university study through ‘systematisation of law’.86 By identifying the first 
principles of law to reduce into textbook form, academics had the facility to teach law 
students specific areas of law in a systematic way.87 In that respect, the Committee Report 
recommended entrance examinations for admission to the Inns of Court and common 
law training at university.88 None of these recommendations were adopted: the existing 
apprenticeship system remained.89 From the 1870s, the image of university legal education 
as a poor alternative to apprenticeship began to rehabilitate in earnest.90 
The importance of institutional writing in the development of private international law, 
and specifically in its influence on the place of public policy in the field, is marked by the 
significant role of A V Dicey in these developments. Dicey was an advocate for legal 
science and for the principled study of law.91 Following his appointment in 1882 as 
Vinerian Professor of English Law at Oxford, Dicey delivered an inaugural lecture 
entitled, ‘Can English Law be Taught at the Universities?’92 In the lecture, Dicey labelled 
the existing system of instruction by apprenticeship ‘deficient’ because of its piecemeal 
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and ‘unsystematic’ nature.93 Legal education of the past ‘never even aimed at the accurate 
analysis or definition of legal ideas’.94  
University legal education could, however, ‘supply all the defects which flow directly 
or indirectly from a one-sided system of practical training’.95 The law academic’s task 
would be ‘to set forth the law as a coherent whole — to analyse and define legal 
conceptions — to reduce the mass of legal rules to an orderly series of principles, and to 
aid, stimulate and guide the reform or renovation of legal literature.’96 By digesting the law 
in this manner, academics would be better placed to isolate the first principles governing 
whole departments of law.97 Dicey thus concluded that English law could be taught at 
English universities ‘if only the teachers are competent, and clearly perceive the limits and 
aim of their teaching’.98  
Apart from this systematic exposition view, Dicey perceived that there was great 
potential for academic writers to have an impact on judges’ decisions.99 In Law and Opinion, 
Dicey observed that judges may unconsciously consult these writers ‘in the search for 
principles’ governing their cases, adding: ‘If an author of ingenuity has reduced some 
branch of the law to a consistent scheme of logically coherent rules, he supplies exactly 
the principles of which a Court is in need’. 100 As the reader is reminded, the evolution of 
English law throughout the 19th century resulted from ‘the writings of the authors who 
have produced the best text-books’.101 Stephen’s Treatise on the Principles of Pleading, Story’s 
Conflict of Laws, and Westlake’s Private International Law were supplied by Dicey as 
examples.102  
Codification represented the other side to this understanding of an academic writer’s 
influence. Dicey regarded codification as ‘the most interesting and perhaps the most 
important sphere of professorial energy’.103 With their textbooks acting as ‘a kind of 
“natural code”’, 19th century academics commanded an influence over the development 
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of whole areas of law, such as contracts, public international law, and private international 
law.104 The production of legal digests and codes was another consequence of this 
systematic ordering of law idea.105 The presentation of Dicey’s Law of Domicil text (1879) 
into the format of rules and exceptions was designed as a vehicle for the potential 
codification of the law of domicile.106 Using this presentation, Dicey reflected that it could 
‘at once codify and explain a branch of English law which specifically needs systematic 
treatment’.107 Two contemporaries sharing a similar codifying spirit as Dicey, Sir Frederick 
Pollock and Sir Mackenzie Chalmers, codified in the 1890s and early 1900s common law 
rules for partnerships, bills of exchange, sale of goods, and marine insurance.108 Emerging 
during the 19th century codification movement, Dicey’s Conflict of Laws (1896) has assumed 
‘quasi-legislative’ status in contemporary English courts.109 The ‘rule, comment and 
illustrations’ style of presentation lent itself to the practitioner and the judge searching for 
a clear statement of law.110  
V CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has highlighted that, before the 19th century, Scottish writers of ‘institutes’ 
or ‘institutions’ were not given special weight in Scottish courts. Rather, the Scottish 
courts’ focus was on the breadth, depth and structural treatment of topics on national law 
in light of the writings’ educational value and intended audience. That audience 
constituted members of the public and, most importantly, Scottish students studying 
national law. With the arrival of the 19th century, however, judicial citation became the 
new benchmark against which to measure the authoritativeness of Scottish institutional 
writers.  
The factors that Cairns identified as contributing to the appearance of institutional 
writers in Scotland — the emergence of national consciousness and consequent teaching 
of national law at university — were manifest and accomplished quickly in post-
Revolutionary America. From the 1820s, comprehensive treatises on national law were 
being published contemporaneously with the establishment of American law schools. In 
this light, a compelling argument can be made suggesting that Story acquired the status of 
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‘institutional writer’ in this legal system.  The success in the early 19th century of American 
legal education, which lay stress on law as a ‘science’ and subject-specific legal treatises to 
supplement teaching at university, offered an ideal model for reforming the poor state of 
English and Irish legal education.  
Scholarly writings, though not enjoying the same status in English-influenced common 
law jurisdictions as Scotland, were influential in improving the rigour of British legal 
education and directing common law judges to useful summaries of the law throughout 
the 19th century. Arguably, the scientific method of legal treatises would have been a boon 
for common law judges for they, like their American counterparts, would have learned 
the law haphazardly under the traditional apprenticeship model. As Chapter 5 explores, 
the writers of the ‘best text-books’ on private international law were influential in the 
development of the common law rules of private international law; the books supplied 
‘exactly the principles of which the [courts were] in need’.111  
Dicey, in setting up conditions by which writers may be treated as authoritative in 
courts, anointed Story and Westlake as institutional writers. Story became a lawmaker 
because of the extent to which he pieced together continental thought and national law. 
And Westlake followed this tradition. The structure of Law of Domicil and Conflict of Laws 
show the ways in which Dicey was consciously positioning himself as an institutional 
writer. The designation becomes, in a sense, a self-fulfilling prophecy so far as stating law 
that is clear. However, given also the way he structured public policy and that he was not 
responding to the authorities, Dicey became a lawmaker. 
The practice of judicially citing legal treatises on private international law is considered 
in the next chapter (Chapter 5). It connects factors contributing to the rise of institutional 
writers, as discussed in this Chapter, with increased judicial citation of private international 
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CHAPTER 5: NINETEENTH CENTURY 
INSTITUTIONAL WRITERS OF PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THEIR INFLUENCE 
ON MODERN DOCTRINE 
For the clashing of theories and dicta of professors there was substituted the authority of leading 
cases. The sphere of speculation at large was limited to cases not covered by authority. 
SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH1 
I INTRODUCTION 
hereas Chapter 4 focused on institutional writings generally, Chapter 5 has 
a more specific focus: the identification of three 19th century writers of 
private international law — Joseph Story, John Westlake, and A V Dicey 
— as ‘institutional’. To provide this focus, this Chapter analyses the judicial citation of 
their works in English, Irish, and Scottish courts between the 19th and 21st centuries.2 This 
Chapter also uses judicial citation to isolate and explain their significant scholarly 
contributions to the shape of selected doctrines of modern private international law. The 
purpose of doing so is to reinforce the argument that these institutional writers have been 
determinative in the development of the public policy doctrine in private international 
law. The ‘institutional writings’ concept, explored in Chapter 4, refers to works that are 
conferred special authority through judicial citation. While the emphasis of this Chapter 
is on judicial citation, it is acknowledged that this was not the only factor contributing to 
the emergence of institutional writings in Scotland or, by extension, in the United States 
and England. As this Chapter nevertheless reinforces, reviewing the practice of judicial 
citation in English, Irish, and Scottish courts verifies that special weight has been accorded 
to scholarship in this field. It may even be suggested that institutional writings, such as 
Dicey, have assumed a de facto authority, particularly so for English courts. 
The first of the scholars examined in this chapter, Joseph Story (1779–1845), was 
introduced in Chapters 3 and 4. Story was an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
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some law reports misspelt his surname — ‘Storey’. In addition, proximity searching of the specific 
author’s name and textbook title and a defined date range proved to be highly useful search strategies. 
Next, the cases were arranged in tabular form. The table had five key features: case citations; judicial 
citation counts; judge or judges; subject matter; and the judicial comment to place the citation in context. 
W 
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the United States (1811–1845), first Dane Professor of Law at Harvard University (1829–
1845), and author of Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (1834).3 The second institutional 
writer identified in this chapter, A V Dicey (1835–1922), was Vinerian Professor of 
English Law at the University of Oxford (1882–1909) and author of the Conflict of Laws, 
the first edition of which was published in 1896.4 As a counterpoint to Story and Dicey’s 
substantial influence, the smaller — though still significant — contributions of another 
19th century English scholar, John Westlake, are outlined.   
This body of this Chapter is organised into two parts. Part II gives a brief background 
to the treatises written by Story, Westlake, and Dicey. Story’s Conflict of Laws, which was 
first published in the United States in 1834, drew attention to the growing importance of 
developing a private international law in the United States. The publication had a ‘knock-
on effect’, elevating the study and importance of private international law on the other 
side of the Atlantic. The English account of private international law that appeared in 
William Burge’s Commentaries on Colonial and Foreign Law (1838) borrowed heavily from 
Story’s Conflict of Laws.5 However, the first comprehensive English treatise on private 
international law appeared with the publication, in 1858, of Westlake’s Treatise on Private 
International Law.6 The reasons for the indifferent reception of Westlake’s Private 
International Law and the singular reception of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws are explained in this 
second part. 
Part III describes and analyses the judicial citation of Story’s Conflict of Laws and Dicey’s 
Conflict of Laws in English, Irish, and Scottish courts. Positioned between an overview of 
Story and Dicey’s judicial citation, two of Westlake’s contributions to English private 
international law are evaluated. Though judicial praise of Story’s Conflict of Laws has 
diminished, the influence of successive editions of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws has endured in 
Scottish and Irish courts but, more particularly, in English courts where the textbook is 
treated as a quasi-code.7 In the result, as discussed in this Chapter, Dicey’s Conflict of Laws 
                                                 
3  For further analysis of Story’s Conflict of Laws, see Chapters 3 and 4. 
4  A V Dicey, A Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws (Stevens and Sons, 1st ed, 
1896). For a detailed analysis of Dicey, refer to Chapters 3 and 4. 
5  William Burge, Commentaries on Colonial and Foreign Laws (Saunders and Benning, 1st ed, 1838). 
6  John Westlake, A Treatise on Private International Law, or the Conflict of Laws, with Principal Reference to its 
Practice in the English and Other Cognate Systems of Jurisprudence, and Numerous References to American Authorities 
(T & J W Johnson & Co, 1st ed, 1859). 
7  See, eg, B A Wortley, ‘Dicey’s Conflict of Laws’ (1960) 5 Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 148, 
148; A J E Jaffey, ‘Dicey & Morris on the Conflict of Laws’ (1988) 104 Law Quarterly Review 470, 472, 
473; Pippa Rogerson, ‘Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws’ (2001) 60 Cambridge Law Journal 220, 
221; Mary Keyes, ‘Order, Illumination and Influence: Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws, 
Fourteenth Edition’ (2007) 3 Journal of Private International Law 355, 355, 357; Andrew Dickinson, ‘Dicey, 
Morris & Collins: The Conflict of Laws’ (2007) 123 Law Quarterly Review 314, 314. 
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has been judicially cited in well over 1000 English, Irish and Scottish cases.8 Due to the 
extent of Dicey’s citation in these courts, this Chapter merely illustrates various judicial 
uses of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws. Part III concludes by reflecting on the continued judicial 
criticism of the ‘other public law’ category — or rule 3 — of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws — 
which had a tangential role in the development of the modern public policy category. 
II 19TH CENTURY ‘INSTITUTIONAL WRITERS’ OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A Joseph Story’s Conflict of Laws 
1 Publication and Reception in the British Isles 
Between 1811 and 1834, American jurisprudence on private international law multiplied 
to such a degree that there was a demand for a subject-specific treatise. The growth in 
jurisprudence was an upshot of a federal system in which States’ ‘political confederacy’, 
and the diversity of state and federal laws loomed large.9 In pre-Revolutionary America, 
the high volume of colonial legislation raised jurisdictional and subject matter conflicts, 
which was also encumbered by the applicability of existing English law.10 By cultivating 
an environment for private cross-border jurisprudence to surface, the United States stood 
in contrast to its former sovereign, the United Kingdom. Scarcely appearing in law 
reports, cross-border cases before English and Scottish courts were often limited to the 
subjects of domicile, succession, or marriage.11  
A look at Story’s unfinished digest on private international law gives a good sense of 
the developing state of American jurisprudence in the field. The 1811 digest included 108 
references to legal writers and Anglo-American decisions up to 1809.12 Two-thirds of the 
decisions in the digest were American, most of which were from New York and from 
Pennsylvania.13 Later, a report writer, Cowen, in a 22-page footnote to the 1825 decision 
of Andrews v Herriot,14 noted the demand for a digest on the conflict of laws.15 Cowen 
arranged the existing case law into twelve categories and cited continental authorities on 
                                                 
8  As at 1 March 2017, 1088 English, Scottish and Irish cases have cited Dicey’s Conflict of Laws. In this 
chapter, Dicey’s Conflict of Laws is used as a shorthand for all editions of the text.  
9  See Andrews v Herriott, 4 Cow 508 (NY Sup Ct, 1825); Frederic Harrison, On Jurisprudence and the Conflict 
of Laws (Oxford University Press, 1919) 118–9; Kurt H Nadelmann, ‘Joseph Story’s Contribution to 
American Conflicts Law: A Comment’ (1961) 5 American Journal of Legal History 230, 235. 
10  Nadelmann, ‘Joseph Story’s Contribution’ (n 9) 235. 
11  See, eg, on marriage: Scrimshire v Scrimshire (1752) 2 Hag Con 395; 161 ER 782; Dalrymple v Dalrymple 
(1811) 2 Hag Con 54; 161 ER 665. See generally Harrison (n 9) 118. 
12  Nadelmann, ‘Joseph Story’s Contribution’ (n 9) 236. 
13  Ibid. 
14  Andrews v Herriott (n 9). 
15  Ibid. 
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the subject, drawing particular attention to Huber’s De Conflictu Legum.16 Moreover, 
scholarship on private international law issues was minimal.17 Before Story’s work was 
published, a minor chapter within a larger volume or a short interview published in a law 
journal was the extent of scholarship.18 
First published in 1834, Story’s Conflict of Laws was a significant milestone in the 
development of American and English private international law. Forsyth touted the text 
as ‘one of the most successful efforts of all time to make bricks without straw’.19 In 1879, 
Harrison wrote that ‘hardly a single case on this subject in America or in England, and 
perhaps few on the Continent, have ever been decided without some reference to this 
learned book’.20 Story lay emphasis on the three maxims of Huber’s De Conflictu Legum, 
explained in Chapter 3, to support the structure of the subject in Anglo-American law.21  
It is understandable that Huber’s text was the theoretical basis for the first detailed 
exposition of private international law in the common law world. Huber’s maxims had 
received the imprimatur of judges on both sides of the Atlantic dating as far back as 
1711,22 and the maxims added theoretical legitimacy to an evolving field of law. With 
Huber at its base, Story’s Conflict of Laws, at a length of 557 pages, merged civilian writers’ 
doctrines with 15 classical categories of the Anglo-American law.23 Over 100 pages alone 
were devoted to foreign contracts. Domicile, capacity, marriage, real property, succession 
                                                 
16  With a note: 'The subject in itself deserves a treatise, but I can do nothing more here than to arrange 
and refer to the authorities, giving the substance of some of them. Huberus, in his title De conflictu legum 
has broken the ground the most effectually, I believe, of all the European writers; but even yet, it must 
be considered as but little more than broken for the use of the American student’. 
17  See Nadelmann, ‘Joseph Story’s Contribution’ (n 9) 236–7; Joel R Paul, ‘The Isolation of Private 
International Law’ (1988–89) 7 Wisconsin International Law Journal 149, 159; G Blaine Baker, ‘Interstate 
Choice of Law and Early American Constitutional Nationalism. An Essay on Joseph Story and the 
Comity of Errors: A Case Study in Conflict of Laws’ (1993) 38 McGill Law Journal 454, 466; M H 
Hoeflich, ‘John Austin and Joseph Story: Two Nineteenth Century Perspectives on the Utility of the 
Civil Law for the Common Lawyer’ (1985) 29 American Journal of Legal History 36, 70. Llewelyn Davies 
considered that Henry’s short treatise, which predated Story’s Conflict of Laws, repeated existing 
continental scholarship and had little influence on Story’s work: D J Llewelyn Davies, ‘The Influence of 
Huber’s De Conflictu Legum on English Private International Law’ (1937) 18 British Yearbook of International 
Law 49, 49. 
18  See Nadelmann, ‘Joseph Story’s Contribution’ (n 9) 236–7; Paul, ‘The Isolation of Private International 
Law’ (n 17) 159. 
19  Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (Arno Press, first published 1834, 1972 ed) 22, quoted 
in Christopher Forsyth, ‘The Eclipse of Private International Law Principle — The Judicial Process, 
Interpretation and the Dominance of Legislation in the Modern Era’ (2005) 1 Journal of Private 
International Law 93, 97. 
20  Harrison (n 9) 119. 
21  Christopher Forsyth, ‘The Value of the Comparative Ethos to the Judicial Process in the Conflict of 
Laws’ in Coenraad Visser, Essays in Honour of Ellison Kahn (Juta & Co Ltd, 1st ed, 1989) 151, 153. 
22  Justice James Allsop, ‘Comity and Commerce’ [2015] Federal Judicial Scholarship 27. See also Hamilton v 
Calder (1706) Mor 2091; Goddart v Swinton [1711] Brn 848. 
23  Story, ‘1972 ed’ (n 19) 22, quoted in Forsyth (n 19) 97. 
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and judgments — perennial features of early Anglo-American conflicts — were also 
addressed. These existing categories were supported by 506 English and American cases.  
Following its 1835 publication in Edinburgh,24  Story’s Conflict of Laws was well received 
in the English and Scottish legal professions. Lord Fraser, Lord Brougham, Lord 
Campbell, and Sir John Coleridge, each writing extra-curially, praised Story’s ability.25 In 
1835, an Edinburgh Law Journal review described Story’s text with adulation as ‘altogether 
of so excellent a description, and betoken a mind so completely imbued with the purest 
principles of legal philosophy’.26 Another reviewer welcomed the text 
not merely on account of its intrinsic beauties, but also as a means of promoting an interest 
in the study of jurisprudence. The power with which [Story] has balanced conflicting 
arguments, and the learning which he has displayed in travelling through the heavy labours 
of his predecessors, and extracting from them the pith of their reasonings, must delight 
every inquisitive mind, and justify us in a hope, which they who peruse the book will not 
think extravagant, that the Treatise on the Conflict of Laws may prove the foundation in 
this country of a school of jurisprudence.27 
In a personal letter to Story, Coleridge observed that he had not read any ‘modern treatise 
of our own [English] production with any thing like the pleasure and instruction it gave 
me’.28 At the same time, advocates and judges in English and Scottish courts cited the text 
regularly with Irish courts soon following suit.29 
English and Scottish courts’ immediate attraction to the text can be simply stated. Story 
had ‘set out so clearly and conveniently all that was valuable in the writings of Continental 
jurists that direct reference to their writings became unusual’.30 Report writers, counsel 
                                                 
24  Norman Clark published Story’s Commentaries in two volumes in 1835. 
25  See Anonymous, ‘Intelligence and Miscellany’ (1835) 14(27) American Jurist and Law Magazine 240, 246; 
William Wetmore Story, Life and Letters of Joseph Story (Little and Brown, 1851) vol 2, 334; Anonymous, 
‘Story’s Commentaries’ (1863) 25 The Monthly Law Reporter 565, 566. 
26  Anonymous, ‘Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign, and Domestic, in regard to Contracts, 
Rights, and Remedies, and Especially in regard to Marriages, Divorces, Successions, and Judgments. By 
Joseph Story, LLD. Dane Professor of Law in Harvard University. Edin T Clark. 8vo, 1834’ (1832–36) 
2(11) Edinburgh Law Journal 427, 427. 
27  Anonymous, ‘Reviewal: Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic, in regard to 
Contracts, Rights, and Remedies, and especially in regard to Marriages, Divorces, Wills, Successions, 
and Judgments. By Joseph Story, LLD, Dane Professor of Law in Harvard University. London, RJ 
Kennett, 59, Great Queen Street’ (1834–35) 4 Legal Examiner and Law Chronicle 512, 513. 
28  W W Story (n 25) 334. 
29  See Re Littles [1846] 110 IR Eq Rep 275. 
30  PR Beaumont and PE McEleavy, Anton’s Private International Law (Thomson Reuters, 3rd ed, 2011) 11. 
See also Forsyth (n 19) 97. 
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and judges resorted to Story’s Conflict of Laws either for extracts from civilian writing within 
the text or for the writer’s synthesis of first principles.31  
Story’s Conflict of Laws was not, however, free from criticism in the 19th century. Though 
praising the text’s comprehensiveness, Harrison was critical of its organisation calling it 
‘one of the least scientific, and… least conclusive books’.32 He was also critical of the 
author’s failure to synthesise and evaluate competing scholarly opinions.33 Remarking on 
Story’s indiscriminating acceptance of scholarly opinion, Harrison concluded the text was 
‘a conflict of opinions… a book of reference, and not a critical work of judgement and 
authority’.34 Hindsight also left others critical of Story’s imprecision.35  Nevertheless, as 
will be outlined in Part III, Story’s Conflict of Laws was still extensively cited in 19th and 20th 
century English, Scottish, and Irish law reports — justifying his suggested status as an 
institutional writer in the field. Judges willingly accepted Story’s statements of law.  
B Westlake’s Private International Law 
The appearance of Westlake’s Private International Law in 1858 was not met with the same 
judicial reception as Story’s Conflict of Laws had two decades earlier.36  Though an 
anonymous reviewer identified the market demand for Westlake’s text, the reviewer 
observed that interest in private international law had ‘hardly kept pace (in England at 
least) with its growing importance’.37 Factors perhaps underscoring this less effusive 
judicial reception include the then-traditional ‘living author’ convention,38 Westlake’s 
youth and active membership at the English Bar as well as the first edition’s comparative 
dimension and ‘academic stiffness of style’.39 In addition, as considered in Chapter 4, 
English and Irish legal education remained in the doldrums until its renaissance in the 
                                                 
31  See R H Graveson, ‘The Comparative Evolution of Principles of the Conflict of Laws in England and 
the USA’ in Académie de Droit International de la Haye, Recueil des Cours (Nijhoff, 1960) vol 1, 21, 33; 
Forsyth (n 19) 97. 
32  Harrison (n 9) 119, 120. 
33  Ibid. 
34  Ibid 120, 121. 
35  A de Lapradelle, ‘John Westlake: Tribute’ (1914) 26 Green Bag 218, 218. 
36  A V Dicey, ‘Private International Law’ (1912) 28 Law Quarterly Review 341, 341. 
37  Anonymous, ‘Art II – A Treatise on Private International Law, or the Conflict of Laws, with Principal Reference to 
its Practice on the English and Other Cognate Systems of Jurisprudence. By John Westlake, Esq, of Lincoln’s Inn, 
Barrister-at-Law, and Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. London Maxwell, 1858’ [1858–9] 12(2) Law 
Magazine and Law Review, or Quarterly Journal of Jurisprudence 229, 229, 234–5. 
38  Dicey (n 36) 341. 
39  Anonymous, ‘Art II’ (n 37) 236. The comparative dimension was excluded from the second edition. For 
similar criticisms of Westlake’s writing style, see: Norman Bentwich, ‘John Westlake, KC’ (1913) 29 Law 
Quarterly Review 260, 262; H C Gutteridge, ‘A New Approach to Private International Law’ (1936–38) 6 
Cambridge Law Journal 16, 16. 
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1870s and 1880s. Against this backdrop, Westlake’s text was unlikely to find a market, or 
influence, amongst academics and students. 
The ‘incomplete and chaotic’ nature of English private international law, described by 
Westlake ‘as a department of municipal law’, offers another perspective on the indifferent 
reception of Westlake’s first edition.40 Judges consulted Story because he was the only 
‘modern writer on the conflict of laws [that was] really well known’.41 Even with the 
comprehensive treatment of private international law in Story’s Conflict of Laws, mid-19th 
century judges inevitably faced novel areas that ‘had received no reply either from statute 
law or judge-made law’.42  
Westlake’s first edition was a reflection of this background: the footnotes exposed the 
case sparseness of English private international law. To supplement this deficiency, 
Westlake’s first edition quoted or cited the Americans Kent, Livermore and Story, and 
Savigny and other continental scholars — including Bartolus, the two Voets, and Huber 
—  to support doctrinal analysis.43 Dicey, in reviewing Westlake’s fifth edition, observed 
that legislation governing areas such as jurisdiction or wills had not been enacted in 1858.44 
Legal principles were unexplored, unsettled, or divergent — such as for domicile and 
matrimonial capacity.45 Significantly, the choice of law rules for movables and for the 
validity of marriages had not reached concrete form until the early 1860s, a few years after 
Westlake’s first edition.46 Eschewing continental sources and reinforcing the authority of 
English case law, successive editions of Westlake’s text arguably cemented the text’s 
reputation in England.47  
Constraining the citation of Westlake’s text during his lifetime, however, was the 
traditional judicial convention operating in the 19th and 20th century not to cite living 
authors.48 Between 1858 and the author’s death in 1913, five editions of Westlake’s Treatise 
had been published, the last of which appeared in 1912.49 The first identifiable judicial 
citation of Westlake’s Treatise in 1882 is revealing to the extent that it shows how long it 
                                                 
40  See Westlake (1859) (n 6) iii; Dicey, ‘Private International Law’ (n 36) 341. 
41  Dicey, ‘Private International Law’ (n 36) 342. 
42  Ibid. 
43  Westlake’s 1st edition cites at least 62 scholars from, among other places, America, England, Scotland, 
France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium and Italy. 
44  Dicey, ‘Private International Law’ (n 36) 342. 
45  Ibid 342–3. 
46  Ibid 342, 343. 
47  Bentwich (n 39) 262; contra Francis Wharton, ‘Late Works on Private International Law’ (1880–1) 6 
Southern Law Review New Series 680, 681, 684. 
48  See, eg, de Lapradelle (n 35) 220. 
49  The publication history of Westlake’s Treatise on Private International Law is: first edition (1858); second 
edition or revised first edition (1880); third edition (1890); fourth edition (1905); fifth edition (1912). 
See, eg, Bentwich (n 39) 262. 
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took for the text to bed down and ‘obtain a real influence upon case law’.50 Indeed, in the 
author’s lifetime, Westlake’s text was judicially cited in 12 English cases, but not always 
approvingly.51 This stands in contrast with the author’s posthumous citation in 30 
decisions from English, Scottish and Irish courts, where citation was far more 
sympathetic.52 
C Dicey’s Conflict of Laws 
Two factors may be singled out as significantly contributing to the immediate attention 
Dicey’s Conflict of Laws received on its publication in 1896 and to its enduring legacy: the 
rebirth of English legal education in the late-19th century and the ‘failed’ Victorian 
codification movement.  
First, the publication of influential English legal treatises53 — giving a rational account 
of particular branches of, mainly private, law — was a direct consequence of a concerted 
effort to revitalise and justify the place of university legal education in the latter half of 
                                                 
50  de Lapradelle (n 35) 219. The first identifiable judicial citation of Westlake’s work was De Geer v Stone 
[1882] 22 Ch D 243, followed by Re Kloebe; Kannreuther v Geiselbrecht (1884) 28 Ch 175, 177 (Pearson J). 
51  See generally Gibbs (Antony) & Sons v La Société Industrielle et Commerciale des Métaux [1890] QBD 399, 407 
(Lord Esher MR), 410 (Lindley LJ) (‘Gibbs (Antony)’); Mayor, Alderman, and Citizens of Canterbury v Wyburn 
[1895] AC 89, 98 (Lord Hobhouse); Re Hayward; Hayward v Hayward [1897] 1 Ch 905, 910 (Kekewich J); 
Armytage v Armytage [1898] P 178, 191–2 (Gorell Barnes J); Pemberton v Hughes [1899] 1 Ch 781, 791 
(Lindley MR); Re Martin; Loustalan v Loustalan [1900] P 211, 238–9 (Vaughan Williams LJ); Hope Vere v 
Hope Vere 1906 13 SLT 774, 777 (Lord Salvesen); Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs v Charlesworth, Pilling 
& Co [1901] AC 373, 383 (Lord Hobhouse); Re Fitzgerald; Surman v Fitzgerald [1903] 1 Ch 933, 940 (Joyce 
J); Re Fitzgerald; Surman v Fitzgerald [1904] Ch 573, 597 (Vaughan Williams LJ); Kaufman v Gerson [1904] 1 
KB 591, 594 (Romer LJ), 599 (Collins MR), 599 (Romer LJ); Kelly v Selwyn [1905] 2 Ch 117, 122 
(Warrington J). 
52  See generally R v Superintendent of Albany Street Police Station [1915] 3 KB 716, 721 (Lord Reading CJ), 726 
(Darling J); Re Suarez; Suarez v Suarez [1917] 2 Ch 131, 138 (Eve J); Casdagli v Casdagli [1918] P 89, 102 
(Warrington LJ); Casdagli v Casdagli [1919] AC 145, 168 (Lord Finlay LC); Mackinnon’s Trustees v Inland 
Revenue 1919 SC 684, 694; Re McSweeney; McSweeney v Murphy [1919] 1 IR 16, 21 (Molony CJ); Celia (SS) v 
SS Volturno [1921] 2 AC 544, 569 (Lord Carson); Re British American Continental Bank Ltd; Credit General 
Liegeois’ Claim [1922] 2 Ch 589, 596 (P O Lawrence J); Re Lorillard; Griffiths v Catforth [1922] 2 Ch 638, 
642–3 (Eve J); Duff Development Co Ltd v Government of Kelantan [1923] 1 Ch 385, 399 (Russell J); Re 
Berchtold; Berchtold v Capron [1923] 1 Ch 192, 205; Republica de Guatemala v Nunez [1927] KB 669, 699, 700 
(Lawrence LJ); Lendrum v Chakravarti (n 52) 102, 103, 104 (Lord Mackay); Grant v Grant 1931 SC 238, 
242 (Lord Fleming); Re Vocalion (Foreign) Ltd (n 52) 209 (Maugham J); Naftalin v London, Midland and 
Scottish Railway Company 1933 SLT 31, 32 (Lord Moncrieff) (‘Naftalin [No 1]’); Naftalin v London, Midland 
and Scottish Railway Company 1933 SC 259, 261 (Lord Moncrieff), 275 (Lord Murray) (‘Naftalin [No 2]’); 
Dalziel v Coulthurst’s Executors 1934 SC 564, 570 (Lord Hunter); Dharamal v Lord HolmPatrick [1935] 1 IR 
760, 763 (Johnston J); MacDougall v Chitnavis 1937 SLT 40 (Lord Jamieson); Kennion’s Executors 1939 SLT 
(Sh Ct) 5, 8 (Sheriff-Substitute D R Scott KC); Boissevain v Weil (n 52) 490 (Denning LJ); Kochanski v 
Kochanska [1958] P 147, 154 (Sachs J); Rainford v Newell-Roberts [1962] IR 95, 99 (Davitt P); Re Langley’s 
Settlement Trusts [1962] Ch 541, 557 (Lord Evershed MR); Cheni v Cheni [1965] P 85, 96, 98 (Sir Jocelyn 
Simon P); Henderson v Henderson [1967] P 77, 82 (Sir Jocelyn Simon P); Coast Lines Ltd v Hudig & Veder 
Chartering NV [1972] 2 QB 34, 46; Red Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouygues SA [1995] 1 AC 190, 200; Royal 
Boskalis Westminster NV v Mountain [1999] QB 674, 731 (Phillips LJ). It is highly likely that Westlake’s 
text worked indirectly to inform English courts’ decision-making as well: see, eg, Coast Lines Ltd v Hudig 
(n 52) 46 (Megaw LJ). 
53  See comment regarding the real influence of textbooks in English law in George Whitecross Paton, A 
Text-Book of Jurisprudence (Clarendon Press, 1st ed, 1946) 200. 
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the 19th century.54 Dicey, as well as taking part in this overhaul of legal education, 
acknowledged the influence or ‘legislative role’ a textbook writer could have with a text 
of quality.55 Indeed, Dicey ‘still rule[s] us from the grave’:56 the rules in Conflict of Laws are 
accepted more or less as axiomatic by English courts.57 In cross-border cases, English 
courts are ‘unusually ready to acknowledge their debt to academic literature’.58 
As Chapter 4 discussed, Dicey was a strong advocate of university legal education. 
During the 1880s, Dicey and Sir Frederick Pollock separately advocated for law’s teaching 
at English universities.59 The need for a justification arose because, as law was traditionally 
studied through apprenticeships, the legal profession questioned the legitimacy of 
university legal education.60 To gain ‘professional legitimacy’ and to mollify the detractors, 
English legal academics — like their American counterparts — wrote treatises (or 
textbooks) that would give a rational account of particular branches of the law for the 
benefit the texts’ primary readership: law students and practising lawyers.61 Through this 
readership, the textbook writer might enjoy a ‘legislative role’ through judicial citation.62 
In an 1883 lecture, Dicey regarded university legal education as the answer to 
contemporary problems in English legal education: it would improve ‘the tone of the 
profession’, converting a trade Dicey pilloried as ‘unsystematic’ and ‘incomplete’ into a 
science for a small ‘elite’.63 University legal education could ‘supply all the defects which 
flow directly or indirectly from a one-sided system of practical training’.64  
Secondly, the Victorian codification movement brought a standard form to 19th-
century legal treatises — controlling rules and illustrations — which Dicey employed in 
his Conflict of Laws.65 This presentation encouraged judicial citation, giving legal 
practitioners and judges a précis of doctrine.  From the codification movement of the 
                                                 
54  David Sugarman, ‘Legal Theory, The Common Law Mind, and the Making of the Textbook Tradition’ 
in William L Twining, Legal Theory and Common Law (Blackwell, 1986) 31 
55  See ibid 32; Richard Fentiman, ‘Legal Reasoning in the Conflict of Laws: An Essay in Law and Practice’ 
in Werner Krawietz, Neil MacCormick and George Henrik von Wright (eds), Prescriptive Formality and 
Normative Rationality in Modern Legal Systems: Festschrift for Robert S Summers (Duncker & Humblot, 1994) 
458. 
56  Fentiman (n 55) 458. 
57  Ibid 458. Part III explores this point in greater detail.  
58  Ibid. 
59  Sugarman (n 54) 30. 
60  Ibid 31. 
61  See ibid 29; Fiona Cownie, ‘Are We Witnessing the Death of the Textbook Tradition in the UK?’ (2006) 
3 European Journal of Legal Education 75, 75. 
62  See Sugarman (n 54) 32; Fentiman (n 55) 458. 
63  Sugarman (n 54) 31; David Sugarman, ‘A Special Relationship? American Influences in English Legal 
Education, c 1870–1965’ (2011) 18 International Journal of the Legal Profession 7, 10. 
64  Sugarman (n 54) 30. 
65  Alan Rodger, ‘The Codification of Commercial Law in Victorian Britain’ (1992) 108 Law Quarterly Review 
570, 570; Sir Roger Toulson, ‘Law Reform in the Twenty-First Century’ (2006) 26 Legal Studies 321, 321. 
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mid- to late-19th century — one which ‘largely failed’ in England66 — emerged a standard 
structure for codifying legislation and legal treatises. Macaulay pioneered this standard 
structure in the Indian Penal Code — drafted in the late 1830s but which only came into 
operation in 1862 — that involved ‘stating the law in general propositions accompanied 
by illustrations’.67 Adaptations to this structure appeared in late-19th century legal treatises, 
such as in the works of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, Mackenzie Chalmers, Frederick 
Pollock, and A V Dicey. 
The codification ‘experiment’ reached its zenith in the last quarter of the 19th century 
with the result that several branches of commercial law were codified into statute. 
Codification was achieved primarily because of ‘commercial lobbying’ from key industry 
groups.68 The success of this codifying legislation, some of which still survives today,69 
can also be attributed to the expertise of the authors chosen to draft the bills that became 
law. The Associated Chambers of Commerce and the Institute of Bankers engaged 
experts to draft ‘clear and accessible commercial rules’ in four predominant areas of 19th-
century commercial activity: bills of exchange, factoring, sale of goods, and the law of 
partnership.70 Mackenzie Chalmers, author of Digest of the Law of Bills of Exchange (1878), 
drafted the Bills of Exchange Act 188271 ‘under instructions from the Institute of Bankers’.72 
The aim of the Digest — ‘to reproduce the existing law… in a codified form’ — was 
achieved.73  
Chalmers’ digest, which was an adaptation of Macaulay’s standard design, had three 
key features: article, explanation, and illustration. Following the success of the 1882 Act, 
Chalmers drafted two other bills that became the Sale of Goods Act 189374 and the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906.75 The draftsman of the Partnerships Act,76 Frederick Pollock, was 
recruited to draft the partnerships bill following the publication of his legal textbook on 
the subject.77 Pollock adopted the same structure used by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen in 
                                                 
66  See comment in M D Chalmers, ‘Experiment in Codification’ (1886) 2 Law Quarterly Review 125, 125; 
Toulson (n 65) 321–2. 
67  Frederick Pollock, Digest of the Law of Partnership (Stevens and Sons, 4th ed, 1888) iv. 
68  Warren Swain, ‘Codification of Contract Law: Some Lessons from History’ (2012) 31 University of 
Queensland Law Journal 39, 45. See also Rodger (n 65) 578–9. 
69  Examples include: Bills of Exchange Act 1882, 45 & 46 Vict, c 61; Partnerships Act 1890, 53 & 54 Vict, c 
39; Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK); compare Sale of Goods Act 1893, 56 & 57 Vict, c 71. 
70  Lord Irvine of Lairg, ‘The Law: An Engine for Trade’ (2001) 64 Modern Law Review 333, 335. 
71  Bills of Exchange Act 1882 (n 69). 
72  M A Chalmers, A Digest of the Law of Bills of Exchange (Stevens and Sons, 2nd ed, 1881) iii. 
73  Ibid. 
74  Sale of Goods Act 1893 (n 69). 
75  Marine Insurance Act 1906, 8 Edw 7, c 41. 
76  Partnerships Act 1890 (n 69). 
77  Pollock (n 67) 161. 
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Digest on the Law of Evidence and Digest of the Criminal Code. In adopting this structure, Pollock 
thought it ‘almost superfluous to say that I agree with him in thinking the Indian Codes a 
desirable model for the exposition of English law’.78 
The structural qualities of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws were appealing to the legal 
profession.79 Dicey chose a structure for the first edition of Conflict of Laws that was 
familiar to him: the same format that he used in his earlier treatise, Law of Domicil. Selected 
with a view to codification, this structure was first developed by Macaulay and improved 
upon by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen. In Dicey’s Law of Domicil, the principles governing 
the law of domicile were ‘systematically arranged’ into rules, exceptions and ‘when 
necessary, elucidated by comment and illustrations’.80 The appearance of Dicey’s Conflict 
of Laws 
as a general and comprehensive treatment of a relatively new subject expressed in the 
dogmatic form of a digest of principles and rules had the greatest influence on the course 
of judicial decision, for it satisfied urgent needs of its time, those for rationalisation of the 
system and proposals for its development.81 
III JUDICIAL CITATION OF INSTITUTIONAL WRITERS IN 19TH CENTURY ENGLISH, 
IRISH AND SCOTTISH COURTS 
A Judicial Citation of Story’s Conflict of Laws 
1 Overview of Judicial Citation: Story’s Conflict of Laws 
Between 1835 and 2013, 158 reported decisions of English, Irish, and Scottish decisions 
cited Story’s Conflict of Laws. As Figure 3.1 shows, judicial citation of Story’s treatise was 
at its height in the 19th century. Since the first edition of Story’s Conflict of Laws was 
published, Scottish and Irish courts have resorted to the treatise less frequently than 
English courts. This is probably best explained by the traditionally greater volume of 
litigation before English courts. From the 1900s, a gradual decline in the citation of Story’s 
work in English courts is apparent because, from this point, Dicey’s Conflict of Laws 
became the favoured text. 
                                                 
78  Ibid iii. 
79  C G J Morse, ‘Making English Private International Law’ in James Fawcett (ed), Reform and Development 
of Private International Law: Essays in Honor of Sir Peter North (Oxford University Press, 2002) 282–5. 
80  Dicey (1896) (n 4) v. 
81  R H Graveson, ‘Philosophical Aspects of the English Conflict of Laws’ (1962) 79 Law Quarterly Review 
337, 341–2. 
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Figure 3.1: Judicial citation of Story's Conflict of Laws in English, Irish and Scottish courts, 
1835–2013 
  CHAPTER 5 103 
 
 
2 Story as a Living Scholar  
During the author’s lifetime,82 Story’s Conflict of Laws was cited in 57 English and Scottish 
decisions. Of these 57 decisions, 19 were Scottish,83 three were Privy Council decisions,84 
and 35 were English.85 In only 14 of these decisions, English and Scottish judges referred 
to Story’s Conflict of Laws,86 citing it as a general authority on a broad range of topics. These 
topics included limitation periods,87 the law of domicile,88 legitimation by subsequent 
marriage,89 succession to property on death,90 the exclusive application of the lex fori in 
procedural matters,91 and the requirements of a common law marriage.92 
It is significant that judicial citation of Story’s Conflict of Laws took place during the 
author’s lifetime. In the past, it was common for counsel and judges to avoid the citation 
of living authors by name or as authority.93 During the first half of the 19th century, 
                                                 
82  Joseph Story died on 10 September 1845 at Cambridge in Massachusetts. 
83  Lippmann v Don (1836) 14 S 241; Don v Lippmann (1837) 5 Cl & F 1; 7 ER 303; Southgate v Montgomerie 
(1837) 15 S 507; Munro v Munro (1837) 16 S 18; McDouall v Dalhousie (1837) 16 S 6; Cameron v Chapman 
(1838) 16 S 907; Kirkpatrick v Irvine (1838) 16 S 1200; Farrar v Leith Banking Company (1839) 1 D 936; 
Rutherford v Carruthers (1839) 1 D 1109; Lindsay v Paterson (1840) 2 D 1373; Ringer v Churchill (1840) 2 D 
307; Brown v McDouall (1840) 7 CL & F 817; Allan v Glasgow’s Trustees (1842) 4 D 494; White v Briggs (1843) 
5 D 1148; Lusk v Elder (1843) 5 D 1279; Robertson v Burdekin (1843) 6 D 17; Alexander v Badenach (1843) 
6 D 322; Arcus (1844) 2 Broun 264; Stewart and Wallace (1845) 2 Broun 544. 
84  Clark v Mullick (1840) 2 Moo Ind App 263; 18 ER 300; Cockerell v Dickens (1840) 2 Moo Ind App 353; 
18 ER 334; Cockerell v Dickens (1840) 3 Moo PC 98; 13 ER 45. 
85  Counted among the Scottish decisions are appeals to the House of Lords from the Court of Session.  
86  Huber v Steiner (1835) 2 Bing NC 202; 132 ER 80; Don v Lippmann (n 83); Southgate v Montgomerie (n 83); 
Munro v Munro (n 83); A-G v Bouwens (1838) 4 M & W 171; 150 ER 1390; Cameron v Chapman (n 83); 
Birtwhistle v Vardill (1840) 7 Cl & F 895; 7 ER 1308; Ringer v Churchill (n 83); Doe v Vardill (1840) West 
HL 500; 9 ER 578; (1840) 6 Bing NC 385; 133 ER 148; Johnstone v Beattie (1843) 10 CL & F 42; 8 ER 
657; The General Steam Navigation Co v Guillou (1843) 11 M & W 877; 152 ER 1061; Robertson v Burdekin 
(n 83); R v Millis (1844) 10 Cl & F 534; 8 ER 844; Baron de Bode’s Case (1845) 8 QB 208; 115 ER 854. 
87  Huber v Steiner (n 86) (Tindal CJCP); Don v Lippmann (n 83) (Lord Brougham). 
88  Munro v Munro (n 83) 44 (Lords Medwyn, Moncreiff and Cockburn), 61 (Lord Corehouse); Ringer v 
Churchill (n 83) 322 (Lord Medwyn). 
89  Munro v Munro (n 83). 
90  Doe v Vardill (n 86) 590 (Tindal CJCP); (1840) 6 Bing NC 385; 133 ER 148, 153 (Tindal CJCP). 
91  The General Steam Navigation Co v Guillou (n 86) 1069 (Parke B). 
92  R v Millis (n 86) 934–5 (Lord Campbell). 
93  See Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 563, 567 (Lord Buckmaster); Alfred Thompson Denning, ‘The 
Restatement of the Law: Its Place in the English Courts’ (1951) 37 American Bar Association Journal 329, 
329; Gordon Bale, ‘WR Lederman and the Citation of Legal Periodicals by the Supreme Court of 
Canada’ (1993) 19 Queen’s Law Journal 36, 51–2; Russell Smyth, ‘The Citation Practices of the Supreme 
Court of Tasmania, 1905-2005’ (2007) 26 University of Tasmania Law Review 34, 42; Alexandra Braun, 
‘Burying the Living – The Citation of Legal Writings in English Courts’ (2010) 58 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 27. 
 
 In R v Ion (1852) 2 Den 475; 169 ER 588, the following exchange took place at 594:  
 
 ‘Metcalfe. That is going farther than the present case. There there would be an obtaining credit upon it. In the 11th 
edition of a work, formerly edited by one of your Lordships, Arch Crim Pl, by Welsby, Mr Welsby, who may be 
cited as authority, comments on the words, “utter or publish.”  
 
 Pollock CB—Not yet an authority. 
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however, this historical convention was ‘more honoured in the breach than in the 
observance’.94 Lord Denning once suggested that the convention arose because living 
writers may intrude on the province of judges and shape the common law.95 Another 
reason could be the ‘non-authoritative’ nature of living authors’ work in the common law 
system.96 However, common law judges — by acknowledging the accurateness of the 
principles in a living author’s work — could indirectly violate this convention.97 This 
supports Dicey’s idea, explored in Chapter 4, that Story gained a special authority in the 
19th century English courts. Story, as an American, clearly occupied a unique position in 
English courts. Though Story’s treatises were not technically authority, Story’s English 
counterparts clearly appreciated his legal expertise, particularly given his long tenure on 
the Supreme Court and his immense scholarly outputs. 
During Story’s lifetime, sections of his treatise were received into law.98 Less than a 
year after Conflict of Laws was published in 1834, Story’s right-remedy distinction for 
matters of substance and procedure was introduced into English law in Huber v Steiner.99 
Before Story’s treatise was published, the distinction had received attention in the English 
courts but only through continental scholarship.100  In Huber v Steiner, the Court of 
Common Pleas, in deciding whether a French limitation period was substantive or 
procedural, expressly relied upon the distinction in Story’s newly published treatise. If the 
limitation period ‘affected only the creditor’s remedy, and not the merits of the contract’ 
then the lex fori governed.101 The lex causae would govern the rights of the parties if they 
were resident in the foreign jurisdiction while the limitation period was running there.102 
The House of Lords in Don v Lippmann, referring to the discussion in Huber v Steiner, 
approved the residence qualification that Story had advanced.103 Story’s distinction 
                                                 
 Metcalfe. It is no doubt a rule that a writer on law is not to be considered an authority in his lifetime. The only 
exception to the rule, perhaps, is the case of Justice Story.  
 
 Coleridge J—Story is dead.’ 
94  R v Ion (n 93) 594. See also Braun (n 93) 31. 
95  See Denning (n 93) 329. 
96  Braun (n 93) 40. 
97  Ibid 37. 
98  See Huber v Steiner (n 86) 83, 85 (Tindal CJ); Kurt H Nadelmann, ‘An Appropriate Distinction in an 
English Citation’ (1951) 38 American Bar Association Journal 253, 253. 
99  See Llewelyn Davies (n 17) 50. 
100  British Linen Co v Drummond (1830) 10 B & C 903; 109 ER 683 (Lord Tenterden CJ). 
101  Huber v Steiner (n 86) 83 (Tindal CJCP); Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and 
Domestic (Hilliard, Gray, and Co, 1st ed, 1834) 487–8. 
102  Don v Lippmann (n 83) 309 (Lord Brougham). 
103  Ibid.  
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received subsequent approval in General Steam Ship Navigation Co v Guillou104 and on several 
other occasions after the author’s death.105 
Praise of Story’s Conflict of Laws and its author was common during the author’s 
lifetime. In R v Millis, Story was described as one of America’s ‘two greatest legal 
luminaries’.106 In other decisions, the ‘learned’107 author was praised for his ‘learning, 
acuteness, and accuracy’.108 The treatise was ‘admirable’.109 Legal principles and 
distinctions drawn in Story’s Commentaries were labelled as ‘well founded’,110 ‘excellent’,111 
‘well digested’,112 ‘well collated and observed upon’,113 and ‘sound and just’.114 The 
reported decisions imply that the treatise’s authoritativeness resulted from its accurate and 
truthful account of existing English law.115 By consolidating common law decisions with 
continental scholarship, Story’s Conflict of Laws provided judges with an accessible source 
on private international law at a time when domestic authorities on it were either non-
existent or scarce.116 Positive descriptions continued after the author’s death in 1845. 
3 Uses of Story’s Conflict of Laws: Post-1845 
Following the author’s death in 1845, judicial citation of Story’s Conflict of Laws in English 
courts increased. For the rest of the 19th century, some of the leading uses of Story’s 
Conflict of Laws included to reinforce general doctrine in passing, to highlight differences 
of opinion, and its use as an authority. In a late-19th century Irish decision, the judge 
observed that Story’s treatises ‘are always appealed to as of almost equivalent authority to 
actual decisions’.117  
Of the first of these uses, the courts confirmed incidentally the accuracy of Story’s 
statement of legal doctrine.118 In Leith v Leith, Lord Cuninghame noted, before quoting 
                                                 
104  (1843) 11 M & W 877; 152 ER 1061, 1069 (Parke B). 
105  See, eg, Ruckmaboye v Lulloobhoy Mottichund (1852) 5 Moo Ind App 234; 18 ER 884; (1852) 8 Moo PC 4; 
14 ER 2; Jefferys v Boosey (1854) 4 HL Cas 815; 10 ER 681, 683 (Lord Brougham); The Zollverein (1856) 
Sw 96; 166 ER 1038, 1039 (Dr Lushington); Alverez de la Rosa v Prieto (1864) 16 CB NS 578; 143 ER 
1253, 1256 (Byles J); The Halley (1867–69) LR 2 A & E 3, 11, 12 (Sir Robert Phillimore). 
106  R v Millis (n 86) 934 (Lord Campbell). 
107  Cameron v Chapman (n 83) 914 n 12 (Lord Ordinary). 
108  Huber v Steiner (n 86) 83 (Tindal CJCP). 
109  Birtwhistle v Vardill (n 86) 1323 (Tindal CJCP); Doe v Vardill (n 86) 590 (Tindal CJCP). 
110  Huber v Steiner (n 86) 83 (Tindal CJCP). 
111  Don v Lippmann (n 83) 309 (Lord Brougham); Munro v Munro (n 83) 44 (Lords Medwyn, Moncrieff and 
Cockburn). 
112  Cameron v Chapman (n 83) 914 n 12 (Lord Ordinary). 
113  Johnstone v Beattie (n 86) 686 (Lord Cottenham). 
114  Cameron v Chapman (n 83) 914 n 12 (Lord Ordinary). 
115  See also Braun (n 93) 35–6. 
116  See Forsyth (n 19) 98. 
117  Tighe v Tighe [1877] 11 Ir Eq 203, 207 (Chatterton V-C). 
118  See, eg, R v Griffin [1879] 4 LR Ir 497, 503 (Lawson J). 
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Story, that he was ‘the best authority on’ the question of land transfers complying with 
local formalities.119 In another case, Lord Denman CJQB drew attention of counsel to an 
‘important note’ in Story’s text about illegality in contracts.120 Dr Lushington did the same 
in The Segredo when considering whether a ship was sold out of urgent necessity.121 Mid- 
to late-19th century judges, as in Story’s lifetime, noted that ‘[a]ll the authorities are 
collected and very ably commented upon’ or that the legal principles were ‘so clearly 
stated’ in Story’s Conflict of Laws.122 
Secondly, the courts indicated differences of opinion between Story and other treatise 
writers. In Robertson’s Trustee v Bairds, the First Division of the Court of Session had to 
decide whether a Scottish seller of goods had a right of retention over property sub-
purchased by another. The original buyer, having paid for the first order in England, owed 
money to the seller for subsequent purchases. Before delivery of the first order was 
effected, a Scottish buyer purchased the goods from the English buyer. Though a lien 
existed under Scots law, it did not under English law. Since the contract was concluded 
in England, Lord Cuninghame adopted Story’s view that a court would not enforce a lien 
not found in the lex loci contractus: England.123 Lord Ivory thought, contrary to Story, that 
the locus solutionis — Scotland — provided the law that applied to the enforcement of a 
contract.124 The French author, Jean-Jacques Gaspard Foelix, disputed that the lex loci 
contractus regulated all incidents of a contract as Story had argued.125 In another case, Story 
and Pardessus’ treatment of the applicable law for bills of exchange was discussed but 
distinguished.126 In Gibbs v Fremont, the Court of Exchequer held that Los Angeles’ law 
applied to a bill of exchange drawn there once the defendant received notice of its 
dishonour in that jurisdiction. This was despite the view of Story that the indorsement of 
a bill of exchange in another place was a ‘new drawing’, while Pardessus considered that 
action was ‘only a new drawing of the same bill’.127  
                                                 
119  Leith v Leith (1848) 10 D 1137, 1187 (Lord Cuninghame). 
120  Bailey v Harris (1849) 12 QB 905; 116 ER 1109, 1113 (Lord Denman CJ). 
121  The Segredo (1853) 1 Sp Ecc & Ad 36; 164 ER 22, 34–5 (Dr Lushington). 
122  Bank of Australasia v Nias (1851) 16 QB 717; 117 ER 1055, 1062 (Lord Campbell); Duchess of Buckingham 
v Winterbottom (1851) 13 D 1129, 1147 (Lord Murray). 
123  Robertson’s Trustee v Bairds (1852) 14 D 1010, 1019 (Lord Cuninghame). 
124  Ibid 1021 (Lord Ivory). 
125  Ibid 1020. 
126  Gibbs v Fremont (1853) 9 Ex 25; 156 ER 11, 14 (Alderson B). 
127  Ibid. 
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Thirdly, judges quoted tracts from Story’s text as authority for general principles, 
particularly on domicile,128 the substance-procedure distinction,129 and general maxims of 
the field.130 For domicile, courts cited Story on intention and residence required to acquire 
a domicile of choice,131 to establish the revival of a domicile of origin doctrine,132 to 
confirm that the lex domicilii governed succession to personal property on death,133 and on 
the applicability of the lex domicilii to transfers of personal property.134 Significant reliance 
was placed on Story to reach the conclusions in Brook v Brook135 and in British South Africa 
Co v Companhia de Moçambique (‘Moçambique’).136 In the latter case, the reasons of the 
Divisional Court, Court of Appeal and House of Lords bristle with references to Story’s 
Conflict of Laws.137 
Despite its overwhelmingly positive judicial reception, Story’s Conflict of Laws was not 
immune from critical assessment during the 19th century. In Forbes v Forbes, Page-Wood 
V-C noted the absence of authorities on a principle in Story’s Conflict of Laws, which had 
connected a married man’s domicile with his family’s residence over his place of 
business.138 Later in the 1850s, Sir Richard Torin Kindersley V-C found fault in one of 
Story’s Latin-to-English translations on the law of domicile, remarking that ‘in order to 
give something intelligible he has sacrificed accuracy of translation’.139 In Brook v Brook,  
Lord Wensleydale was unprepared to accept one of Story’s exceptions to the traditional 
choice-of-law rule for marriage, the lex loci celebrationis, if Story meant to invalidate an 
                                                 
128  Jefferys v Boosey (n 105) 727 (Parke B) (lex domicilii governing succession to personal property); Forbes v 
Forbes (1854) Kay 341; 69 ER 145, 155 (Page-Wood V-C); Anderson v Laneuville (1854) 2 Sp Ecc & Ad 
41; 164 ER 296, 297–8 (Sir John Dodson); Bremer v Freeman (1857) 10 Moo PC 306; 14 ER 508, 527 
(Lord Wensleydale). 
129  See, eg, Ruckmaboye v Lulloobhoy Mottichund (n 105) 896–7 (Sir John Jervis) (statute of limitation); The 
Zollverein (n 105) 1039 (Dr Lushington); Bremer v Freeman (n 128) 527 (Lord Wensleydale). 
130  See, eg, Caldwell v Vanvlissengen (1851) 9 Hare 415; 68 ER 571, 575 (Turner V-C). 
131  See, eg, Anderson v Laneuville (n 128) 297–8 (Sir John Dodson); Lord v Colvin (1859) 4 Drew 366; 62 ER 
141, 145 (Sir R T Kindersley V-C); A-G v Kent (1862) 1 Hurl & C 12; 158 ER 782, 787 (Martin B); Re 
Capdevielle (1864) 2 Hurl & C 985; 159 ER 408, 412 (Martin B). 
132  See Udny v Udny (1866–69) LR 1 ScDiv 441, 451 (Lord Chancellor), 453, 454 (Lord Chelmsford), 459 
(Lord Westbury). 
133  Anderson v Laneuville (n 128) 297–8 (Sir John Dodson); In the Goods of Margaret Gentili, Deceased [1875] 9 Ir 
Eq 541, 543–4, 549. 
134  Jefferys v Boosey (n 105) 683 (Parke B); Lynch v Provisional Government of Paraguay (1869–72) LR 2 P & D 
268, 271 (Lord Penzance). 
135  Brook v Brook (1861) 9 HL Cas 193; 11 ER 703, 710, 712 (Lord Campbell LC), 717, 718 (Lord 
Cranworth), 722, 723, 724 (Lord Wensleydale). 
136  [1893] AC 602. 
137  See, eg, Companhia de Moçambique v British South Africa Co [1892] 2 QB 358, 366 (Wright J), 394–5, 396, 
398 (Lord Esher MR), 412 (Fry LJ), 419–20 (Lopes LJ); British South Africa Co v Companhia de Moçambique 
[1893] AC 602, 622–3, 623, 623–4, 624, 626–7 (Lord Herschell LJ), 631 (Lord Halsbury). 
138  Forbes v Forbes (n 128) 155 (Page-Wood V-C). 
139  Lord v Colvin (n 131) 145 (Sir R T Kindersley V-C). 
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incestuous marriage only if it was classified as such ‘in universal Christendom’.140 On the 
whole, however, such criticisms were uncommon.  
4 Derivative Citations to Story’s Conflict of Laws in the 20th and 21st Centuries 
Most references to Story’s treatise in the 20th and 21st centuries have been derivative 
citations — that is, to leading authorities relying upon Story’s Conflict of Laws. Quotations 
in 20th and 21st century decisions drawn from Brook v Brook,141 Freke v Lord Carbery,142 
Huntington v Attrill,143 and Moçambique144 attest to Story’s continued legacy.  
Great pains were taken in three modern English decisions to highlight the intellectual 
debt owed to Story’s Conflict of Laws in the House of Lords’ formulation of the Moçambique 
rule.145 In Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth, Lord Walker JSC and Lord Collins JSC expressly 
acknowledged this debt, noting that ‘[t]he speeches of Lord Herschell LC and Lord 
Halsbury (and, in the Court of Appeal, of Lord Esher MR, whose dissenting judgment 
was upheld in the House of Lords) are substantially based on Story’s Conflict of Laws’.146 In 
two earlier decisions, the debt was borne out through the courts’ quotation of extracts 
from Moçambique relying upon Story’s Conflict of Laws.147 Derivative citations of Story’s 
work highlight that his scholarship has shaped modern doctrine in private international 
law, even if that influence is now concealed within the reasons of leading judicial 
authorities.  
B Judicial Citation of Westlake’s Private International Law 
1 Overview of Judicial Citation: Westlake 
As Figure 3.2 bears out, the citation of Westlake’s Private International Law in English, 
Irish and Scottish courts has been negligible compared with the number of judicial 
                                                 
140  Brook v Brook (n 135) 723 (Lord Wensleydale). 
141  Re Bozzelli’s Settlement; Husey-Hunt v Bozzelli [1902] 1 Ch 751, 754, 755, 757 (Swinfen Eady J); Ogden v 
Ogden [1908] P 46, 77 (Sir Gorell Barnes P); Swifte v Swifte [1910] 2 IR 140, 148 (Sir Andrew Porter MR); 
Cheni v Cheni (n 52) 99 (Sir Jocelyn Simon P); Westminster City Council v C [2009] 2 WLR 185, 208 (Wall 
LJ); HAH v SAA [2010] 4 IR 1, 35 [78] (Dunne J). 
142  Rea v Rea [1902] 1 IR 451, 461 (Sir Andrew Porter MR); Macdonald v Macdonald’s Executrix 1931 SC 644, 
650 (Lord Hunter). 
143  R v Owen [1957] 1 QB 174, 178 (Donovan J); A-G (New Zealand) v Ortiz [1982] QB 349. 
144  The Tolten [1946] P 135, 141 (Scott LJ), 165 (Somervell LJ), Cohen LJ (168); Cheni v Cheni (n 52) 93, 94, 
95, 96, 97, 98 (Sir Jocelyn Simon P); Tyburn Productions Ltd v Conan Doyle [1991] Ch 75, 81, 83 (Vinelott 
J); Pearce v Ove Arup Partnership Ltd [2000] Ch 403, 426, 429, 430, 431, 434 (Roch LJ); Lucasfilm Ltd v 
Ainsworth [2012] 1 AC 208, 230 [56]–[57] (Lord Walker JSC and Lord Collins). 
145  Tyburn Productions Ltd v Conan Doyle (n 144) 81, 83 (Vinelott J); Pearce v Ove Arup Partnership Ltd [2000] Ch 
403, 426, 429, 430, 431, 434 (Roch LJ); Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth (n 144) 230 [56]–[57] (Lord Walker JSC 
and Lord Collins). 
146  Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth (n 144) 230 [56]–[57] (Lord Walker JSC and Lord Collins). 
147  Tyburn Productions Ltd v Conan Doyle (n 144) 81, 83 (Vinelott J); Pearce v Ove Arup Partnership Ltd (n 144) 
426, 429, 430, 431, 434 (Roch LJ). 
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citations to the private international law works of Story or Dicey. Between 1882 and 1999, 
50 English, Irish, and Scottish reported decisions cited Westlake’s Private International Law 
for guidance on topics ranging from the proper law of the contract to the requirements 
for a valid international marriage.148 Use of Westlake was more frequent in England, 
chiefly between the 1890s and the 1920s. Except for the six decisions in the 1930s, 
Scottish courts seem to be underwhelmed by, or unaware of, Westlake’s treatise.149 More 
unremarkable still are the three Irish cases citing Westlake’s Treatise.150 Based only on 
citation count, Westlake’s influence would appear to be small but, in practice, the truth of 
this is tested in two areas: the proper law of the contract and his criticism of Story’s 
‘civilised nations’ gloss on common law private international law. 
                                                 
148  English cases: Royal Boskalis (n 52); Red Sea Insurance (n 52); Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim (Chancery 
Division, Chadwick J, 11 October 1994); Coast Lines Ltd v Hudig & Veder Chartering NV (n 52); Henderson 
v Henderson (n 52); Cheni v Cheni (n 52); Re Langley’s Settlement Trusts (n 52); Kochanski v Kochanska (n 52); 
Boissevain v Weil (n 52); Re Vocalion (Foreign) Ltd (n 52); Republica de Guatemala v Nunez (n 52); Duff 
Development (n 52); Re Berchtold (n 52); Re Lorillard (n 52); Re British American Continental Bank Ltd (n 52); 
Celia v Volturno (n 52); Casdagli v Casdagli [1919] (n 52); Dynamit Actien-Gesellschaft v Rio Tinto Co Ltd [1918] 
AC 260; Casdagli v Casdagli [1918] (n 52); Re Suarez (n 52); R v Superintendent of Albany Street Police Station 
(n 52); Moulis v Owen [1907] 1 KB 746; Kelly v Selwyn (n 51); Re Fitzgerald [1904] (n 48); Kaufman v Gerson 
(n 51); Re Fitzgerald [1903] (n 48); Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs v Charlesworth, Pilling & Co (n 48); Re 
Martin; Loustalan v Loustalan (n 51); Pemberton v Hughes [1899] Ch 781; Armytage v Armytage (n 48); South 
African Breweries Ltd v King [1899] 2 Ch 173; Re Hayward [1897] Ch 905; Mayor, Alderman, and Citizens of 
Canterbury v Wyburn (n 51); Heinemann & Co v S B Hale & Co [1891] 2 QB 83, 87 (Cave J); Gibbs (Antony) 
(n 51) 407 (Lord Esher MR), 410 (Lindley LJ); Abd-ul-Messih v Farra (1888) 13 App Cas 431, 440; Re 
Kloebe (n 50); De Geer v Stone [1882] 22 Ch D 243; Scottish cases: Kennion’s Executors (n 52); MacDougall 
v Chitnavis (n 52); Dalziel v Coulthurst’s Executors (n 52); Naftalin [No 1] (n 52); Naftalin [No 2] (n 52); Grant 
v Grant (n 52); Lendrum v Chakravarti (n 52); Lord Advocate v Jaffrey 1919 SC 684; Hope Vere v Hope Vere 1n 
48); Irish cases: Rainford v Newell-Roberts (n 52); Dharamal v Lord HolmPatrick (n 52); McSweeney v Murphy 
(n 52). 
149  Kennion’s Executors (n 52); MacDougall v Chitnavis (n 52); Dalziel v Coulthurst’s Executors (n 52); Naftalin [No 
1] (n 52); Naftalin [No 2] (n 52); Grant v Grant (n 52); Lendrum v Chakravarti (n 52); Lord Advocate v Jaffrey 
1919 SC 684; Hope Vere v Hope Vere (n 48).  
150  Rainford v Newell-Roberts (n 52); Dharamal v Lord HolmPatrick (n 52); McSweeney v Murphy (n 52).  
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Figure 3.2: Judicial citation of Westlake’s Private International Law in English, Irish and 
Scottish courts, 1882–1999 
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2 Areas of Influence: The Proper Law of the Contract 
The ‘closest and most real connection’ test for determining the proper law of the contract 
in the absence of express choice originated in Westlake’s Treatise.151 Beginning with the 
revised first (or second) edition (1880), the Treatise had favoured a more nuanced rule for 
determining the governing law in contractual cases, instead of the automatic application 
of the lex loci contractus.152 Based on Lord Mansfield’s dictum in Robinson v Bland,153 and 
influenced by Savigny’s search for the proper seat,154 Westlake suggested that the 
contractual lex causae had to be selected on more ‘substantial considerations, preference 
being given to the country with which the transaction has the most real connection, and 
not to the law of the place of contract as such’.155  
Westlake’s test was accepted by another English private international lawyer, 
Cheshire,156 whose formulation was taken up in Boissevain v Weil and in the Privy Council 
decision of Bonython v Commonwealth of Australia.157 In Bonython, Lord Simonds, in adopting 
Cheshire’s formulation,158 defined proper law to mean ‘the system of law by reference to 
which the contract was made or that with which the transaction has its closest and most 
real connexion’.159 The formulation became part of English private international law in 
1961.160 But, it was not until 1972 that Westlake’s hand in shaping the proper law doctrine 
was finally judicially acknowledged.161 
                                                 
151  See Coast Lines Ltd v Hudig & Veder Chartering NV (n 52) 46 (Megaw LJ). See also F A Mann, ‘The 
Proper Law in the Conflict of Laws’ (1988) 36 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 437, 443–4. 
152  John Westlake, Treatise on Private International Law (William Maxwell & Son, 1st ed rev, 1880) 237; John 
Westlake, Treatise on Private International Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 3rd ed, 1890) 258; John Westlake and 
Alfred Frank Topham, Treatise on Private International Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed, 1905) 280, 285; John 
Westlake and Norman Bentwich, Treatise on Private International Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 6th ed, 1922) 288, 
289; Norman Bentwich, Westlake’s Treatise on Private International Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 7th ed, 1925) 
304. 
153  (1760) 1 Wm Bl 256; 96 ER 141, 141 (Lord Mansfield CJ). Paralleling Huber, Lord Mansfield suggested 
that the lex loci contractus would be displaced if contractual parties intended another place to govern. 
154  Westlake (1880) (n 152) 237. 
155  Ibid. 
156  G C Cheshire, Private International Law (Clarendon Press, 3rd ed 1947) 312.  
157  [1949] 1 KB 482, 490, 491 (Lord Denning); Bonython v Commonwealth of Australia [1951] AC 201, 219 
(Lord Simonds). See also Joost Blom and Elizabeth Edinger, ‘The Chimera of the Real and Substantial 
Connection Test’ (2005) 38 University of British Columbia Law Review 373, 374–5. 
158  Bonython v Commonwealth of Australia (n 78) 219 (Lord Simonds). 
159  Ibid. See also BSE Trading Ltd v Agroslavonija Work Organisation for Domestic and Foreign Trade (High Court 
of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Commercial Court, Thomas J, 10 December 1999), in which 
Westlake appears in a quote taken from the 12th edition of Dicey & Morris on the ‘closest and most real 
connection’ test. 
160  Re United Railways of Havana and Regla Warehouses Ltd [1961] AC 1007, 1068 (Denning LJ), 1081 (Lord 
Morris of Borth-y-Gest). 
161  Coast Lines Ltd v Hudig & Veder Chartering NV (n 52) 46 (Megaw LJ). 
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3 Areas of Influence: Criticism of ‘Civilised Nations’ Concept 
Criticism of Story’s ‘civilised nations’ gloss on marriage is another way that Westlake’s 
Treatise has found its way into the law reports. In Story’s Conflict of Laws, the lex loci 
celebrationis was given as the choice of law rule for marriage, though that was qualified.162 
One qualification to it was polygamy and incest; however, ‘care must be taken to confine 
the doctrine to such cases, as by the general consent of Christendom are deemed 
incestuous’.163 This and two other qualifications were discussed at length in Brook v Brook. 
Because the House of Lords’ decision in Brook v Brook was the leading case for bifurcating 
the marriage choice of law rule,164 Story’s exceptions had re-emerged in the law reports as 
derivative citations.165 Westlake was highly critical of this civilised nations gloss, arguing 
that ‘[t]here was no necessity to make an exception… because no country with which the 
communion of private international law exists has such marriages’.166 Sir Jocelyn Simon P 
accepted the validity of this criticism — as Dicey was deign to do after the first edition’s 
publication — in Cheni v Cheni.167  
C Judicial Citation of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws 
The first judicial reference to Dicey’s Conflict of Laws can be found in the 1898 decision of 
Armytage v Armytage.168 That same year a Privy Council opinion approved Dicey’s 
statement of the principle, mobilia sequuntur personam, and the personal connection required 
for it.169  
From this point, judicial citation of the work has gradually increased.170 Since 1898, 
more than 1000 Scottish, Irish and English decisions have cited Dicey’s Conflict of Laws. It 
is thought that the convenience of the ‘rule-commentary based format’ has been part of 
its ongoing appeal to the legal profession and the judiciary.171 Kahn-Freund considered 
                                                 
162  Story (1834) (n 101) 102. 
163  Ibid 104. 
164  The reasons for doubting subsequent judicial and scholarly interpretations of Brook v Brook were 
explored in Chapter 3. 
165  See, eg, Re Bozzelli’s Settlement; Husey-Hunt v Bozzelli (n 141) 754–5 (Swinfen Eady J); Ogden v Ogden (n 
141) 59, 70 (Sir Gorell Barnes P). 
166  See, eg, Westlake and Topham (1905) (n 152) 60; Westlake and Bentwich (1922) (n 152) 58. See also 
Cheni v Cheni (n 52) 96 (Sir Jocelyn Simon P). 
167  Ibid. 
168  Armytage v Armytage (n 48) 186, 192 (Gorell Barnes J). 
169  Harding v The Commissioners of Stamp for Queensland [1898] AC 769, 774 (Lord Hobhouse). Cf Andrew 
Dickinson (n 7) 314. Dickinson identifies South African Breweries v King (n 148) 179, 182 as ‘[t]he first 
traceable judicial approval of a statement in the work’; however, there is the earlier Privy Council opinion 
of Harding. 
170  In 2001, Rogerson pointed out that Dicey’s ‘work has been referred to in at least 480 reported 
judgments, usually favourably’. See Rogerson (n 7) 221. 
171  Dickinson (n 7) 317; William W Park, ‘Rules and Standards in Private International Law: The Conflict 
of Laws, Dicey, Morris and Collins, 14th edition’ (2007) 73 Arbitration 441, 441–2. Cf Rogerson (n 7) 221. 
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the format to have produced a ‘private Code’ of this field of law.172 In addition, Foster 
observed that Dicey’s Conflict of Laws was dangerous because courts were prone to take its 
‘always pontifical’ rules for granted.173 Indeed, in reviewing the 11th edition of the text, 
Jaffey reprised this point by observing that 
[t]he correctness of the rule is taken for granted. The relevant cases (admittedly few) are 
not discussed, nor is there any attempt to justify the rule. Not to apply the Dicey & Morris 
rule verges on the per incurium. If Dicey & Morris is presumed to be correct, it is not actually 
binding. … Perhaps the use of numbered rules, which could hardly be ventured today by 
a book of lesser reputation, increases the tendency of the courts to rely on the work, for 
rules are easy to cite, and their form may provide a haven of certainty in a sea of doubt or controversy.174 
1 Overview of Judicial Citation Practice: Dicey 
By looking at citation counts alone, Figure 3.3 shows an increasing dependence on 
Dicey’s Conflict of Laws with a marked upsurge towards the end of the 20th century. From 
the 1980s, judicial citation of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws has demonstrably increased in 
England.  
Two general observations may be made to explain this increase. First, law reporting 
has in recent decades expanded beyond the traditional law report series. More generalist 
and subject-specific law reports have emerged. Moreover, the internet has given the public 
and the legal profession greater access to reasons for judgment.175 In particular, courts in 
common law jurisdictions began to publish their reasons for judgment online from the 
early 2000s.  
As a result, the data in Figure 3.3 extending from the early 2000s to 2017 is a reflection 
of the modern dependence on information technology. It includes unreported cases 
(official transcripts),176 cases reported in official law report series (ICLR), cases reported 
                                                 
172  O Kahn-Freund, General Problems of Private International Law (1974) 143 Recueil des Cours 139, 279, 280, 
281; See also Morse (n 79) 283. 
173  J G Foster, ‘Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws’ (1935) 16 British Yearbook of 
International Law 84, 102–3. 
174  Jaffey (n 7) 472, 473 (emphasis added). 
175  See Petal Kinder, ‘The Adoption and Use of Computerised Legal Research Information in Australia’ 
(2005) 30 Canadian Law Library Review 68; Justice Stephen Gageler, ‘What is Information Technology 
Doing to the Common Law?’ (2014) 39 Australian Bar Review 146. 
176  See, eg, Transoceanic Shipping Co Ltd v Avery Midgen & Co (Court of Appeal in England, Stephenson LJ 
and Sir Stanley Rees, 8 April 1981); Janred Properties Ltd v Ente Nazionale Italiano Per Il Turismo (The Italian 
State Tourist Office) (Court of Appeal in England, Dunn LJ and Slade LJ, 14 July 1983); The Forum 
Craftsman (Court of Appeal in England, Lord Justice Ackner, Lord Justice Browne-Wilkinson and Sir 
John Megaw, 20 December 1984); Cramer v Cramer (Court of Appeal in England, Stephen Brown LJ, 
Mustill LJ and Balcombe LJ, 1 January 1986); Re the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975 v 
Re A Civil Action Now Pending Before the City Court of Sandefjord, Norway (Court of Appeal in England, Kerr 
LJ, Glidewell LJ and Ralph Gibson LJ, 12 February 1986); Adams v Cape Industries Plc (Court of Appeal 
in England, Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C, Parker LJ and Ralph Gibson LJ, 18 March 1987); 
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in unofficial law report series,177 and cases with a court-designated neutral citation after 
2001.178 Prior to the 1980s, very few non-ICLR law report series carried cases referring to 
Dicey.179 In the 2000s, just over 70 per cent of the total number of English cases citing 
Dicey were unreported cases, in unofficial law report series, or neutral citations. For the 
2010s, this figure was closer to 80 per cent.180  
Secondly, from the early 1990s an increasing number of cases have concerned the 
interpretation of European Union instruments on private international law. It would 
appear that Dicey, Morris and Collins’ Conflict of Laws was one of the few textbooks that 
comprehensively addressed the interpretation of these instruments.181 For example, the 
11th edition, published in 1987, dealt with the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (UK) 
that implemented the Brussels Convention into British law. The implementation of the 
Brussels Convention ‘[brought] with it a mass of case law from the European Court, all fully 
and expertly expounded in both works’.182 
The logical consequence is that counsel and judges have placed heavy reliance on 
Dicey, Morris and Collins’ Conflict of Laws to cope with unsettled or new terrain brought 
about by the United Kingdom’s entry into the European Economic Community in 1973. 
Before the Rome I Regulation took effect on 17 December 2009, much judicial attention 
was given to the interpretation of the Rome Convention in sch 1 to the Contracts (Applicable 
Law) Act 1990 (UK).183  Confidence was thus placed on the correctness of its treatment 
in Dicey, Morris and Collins’ Conflict of Laws.  
Two explanations may be suggested for the lesser weight given to Dicey in Scotland. First, 
lower volumes of international litigation in Scottish courts may account for the 
disproportionately large gulf between the citation of Dicey in English courts and in 
                                                 
Naviera Amazonica Peruana SA v Compania Internacional De Seguros Del Peru (Court of Appeal in England, 
Kerr LJ, Russell LJ, Sir Denys Buckley, 10 November 1987). 
177  See, eg, Union Bank of the Middle East v Clapham (1981) 125 SJ 497; Flores v Scott [1984] RTR 363; Def Lepp 
Music v Stuart-Brown [1986] RPC 273; Degazon v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1988] 1 FTLR 17. 
178  See, eg, Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd v SACE [2001] EWCA Civ 1932; Samcrete Egypt Engineers and Contractors 
SAE v Land Rover Exports Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 2019; Kuwait Oil Tanker Company SAK v Qabazard [2002] 
EWCA Civ 34. 
179  See especially Zanelli v Zanelli [1948] 64 TLR 556; Re Wallach [1950] 1 All ER 199; Redwood Music Ltd v 
Francis, Day & Hunter Ltd [1978] RPC 429.  
180  As at 1 March 2017. 
181  Other textbooks dealing with these changes included Cheshire and North and A E Anton and P R 
Beaumont, Private International Law: A Treatise from the Standpoint of Scots Law (W Green, 2nd ed, 1990) 
248–59. 
182  Jaffey (n 7) 471. 
183  See, eg, Bank of Baroda v Vysya Bank Ltd [1994] CLC 41; Egon Oldendorff v Libera Corp [No 2] [1996] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 380, 387; Canada Trust Co v Stolzenberg [No 2] [1998] 1 WLR 547, 556; Definitely Maybe 
(Touring) Ltd v Marek Lieberberg Konzertagentur GmbH [2001] 1 WLR 1745, 1748 [10] (Morison J); [2001] 
EWCA Civ 2019, [18], [25], [37], [43]; [2002] CLC 533, [25]–[26]; Halpern v Halpern [Nos 1 and 2] [2008] 
QB 195, 208–9 [21]. 
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Scottish courts. Secondly, the publication of a Scottish textbook, Anton’s Private 
International Law,184 in 1967 may have contributed to the gradual displacement of Dicey’s 
Conflict of Laws, the citation of which was already modest.185  
                                                 
184  A E Anton, Private International Law: A Treatise from the Standpoint of Scots Law (W Green, 1st ed, 1967); 
Anton and Beaumont (n 181); Paul Beaumont and Peter McEleavy, Anton’s Private International Law 
(Thomson/W Green, 3rd ed, 2011).  
185  Not long after the first edition’s publication in 1967, Anton’s Private International Law was judicially cited: 
see, eg, Hoy v Hoy 1968 SC 179, 183 (Lord Robertson); Scottish National Orchestra Society Ltd v Thomson’s 
Executor 1969 SLT 325, 327, 328, 329 (Lord Robertson); Brodin v A/R Seljan 1973 SC 213, 217, 219, 220 
(Lord Kissen). 
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Figure 3.3: Judicial citation of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws in English, Irish and Scottish courts, 
1898–2017 
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2 Uses of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws, 1898–2017 
The judicial uses of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws may be distilled into five areas. First, judges 
are prone to simply ‘adopt as correct’ statements or rules within Dicey’s Conflict of Laws.186 
Here, Jaffey’s earlier noted criticism has force. Before or after introducing a quotation 
from Dicey’s Conflict of Laws, judges usually declare that Dicey’s statement of law is correct. 
In Ralli Brothers v Compañia Naviera Sota y Aznar, Dicey’s rule on unlawful performance in 
the lex loci solutionis was accepted.187 Lord Sterndale MR and Scrutton LJ prefaced their 
quotations by opining that ‘the law is correctly stated by Professor Dicey’.188 Likewise, 
responding to an agreement alleged to be contra bones mores, Lord Sorn in Luszczewska v 
Luszczewska accepted as correct the law ‘so stated in Dicey’ that courts would not ‘apply 
any foreign law, if and in so far as its application would lead to results contrary to the 
fundamental principles of public policy of the lex fori’.189 Similarly, in Red Sea Insurance Co 
Ltd v Bouygues, Dicey’s reformulation of rule 203 — the double actionability rule — was 
endorsed as ‘a correct statement of the law’.190 
A second use, which is related to the first, is to cite Dicey as general support for a legal 
proposition: ‘see Dicey’. This use started with the first judicial citation of Dicey and has 
continued throughout the 20th and 21st centuries.191 Legal propositions concerning the 
                                                 
186  See, eg, Ralli Brothers v Compañia Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 2 KB 287, 291 (Lord Sterndale MR), 295 
(Warrington LJ), 300 (Scrutton LJ); Re Korvine’s Trust; Levashoff v Block [1921] 1 Ch 343, 347–8 (Eve J); 
Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 KB 470, 497 (Scrutton LJ); Kleinwort, Sons & Co v Ungarische Baumwolle Industrie 
Aktiengesellschaft & Hungarian General Creditbank [1939] 2 KB 678, 696–7 (du Parcq LJ); Re Delhi Electric 
Supply and Transaction Co Ltd [1954] Ch 131, 156 (Evershed MR); Re Langley’s Settlement Trusts (n 52) 555 
(Lord Evershed MR), 558 (Donovan LJ); Re Flynn, deceased; Flynn v Flynn [1968] 1 WLR 103, 115 (Megarry 
J); Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd v James Miller and Partners Ltd [1970] AC 583, 612 (Viscount 
Dilhorne); 616 (Lord Wilberforce); International Tank and Pipe SAK v Kuwait Aviation Fuelling Co KSC 
[1975] QB 224, 232 (Denning MR), 234 (Browne LJ); Hesperides Hotels Ltd v Aegean Turkish Holidays Ltd 
[1979] AC 508, 535, 541 (Lord Wilberforce); 542 (Lord Fraser of Tullybelton); Coupland v Arabian Gulf 
Oil Co [1983] 1 WLR 1136, 1147 (Hodgson J). 
187  Ralli Brothers (n 186) 291 (Lord Sterndale MR), 295 (Warrington LJ); 300 (Scrutton LJ). 
188  Ibid 291 (Lord Sterndale MR), 300 (Scrutton LJ). 
189  Luszczewska v Luszczewska 1953 SLT (Notes) 73 (Lord Sorn). 
190  Red Sea Insurance (n 52) 199, 206, 207 (Lord Slynn of Hadley). 
191  See, eg, Armytage v Armytage (n 48) 186 (Gorell Barnes J); Re Martin; Loustalan v Loustalan (n 51) 232 
(Lindley MR); The Attorney-General v The Jewish Colonization Association [1901] 1 QB 132, 142 (Stirling LJ); 
Moulis v Owen (n 148) 751 (Collins MR); Emanuel v Symon [1908] 1 KB 302, 306–7 (Lord Alverstone CJ); 
British South Africa Company v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd [1910] 2 Ch 502, 523 (Kennedy LJ); R v Local 
Government Board; Ex parte Arlidge [1914] 1 KB 160, 199–200 (Hamilton LJ); Tingley v Müller [1917] 2 Ch 
144, 173 (Scrutton LJ); Casdagli v Casdagli [1918] (n 52) 109 (Scrutton LJ); Guaranty Trust Company of New 
York v Hannay & Co [No 2] [1918] 2 KB 623, 635 (Pickford LJ); Sedgwick Collins & Co v Rossia Insurance 
Co of Petrograd Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation [1926] 1 KB 1, 16 (Sargant LJ); Von Lorang v 
Administrator of Austrian Property 1926 SC 598, 612 (Lord President Clyde); Hannah v Hannah 1926 SLT 
370 (Lord Moncrieff); Lendrum v Chakravarti (n 52) 102 (Lord Mackay); Re Ross; Ross v Waterfield [1930] 
1 Ch 377, 406 (Luxmoore J); Re Russian Bank for Foreign Trade [1933] Ch 745, 768 (Maugham J); Naftalin 
[No 1] (n 52) 32 (Lord Moncrieff); The Njegos [1936] P 90, 102 (Sir Boyd Merriman P); Scott v Scott 1937 
SLT 632, 633 (Lord Russell); The State (Dowling) v Brennan [No 1] [1937] 1 IR 483, 506 (Gavan Duffy J); 
Spain v National Bank of Scotland 1939 SC 413, 421 (Lord Jamieson). 
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scope of the natural justice defence for resisting the enforcement of foreign judgments,192 
the proper law for immovable and movable property,193 and proof of foreign law194 have 
all been supported with reference, not to leading authorities, but to Dicey instead.195 In 
Armitage v Armitage, Dicey’s first edition was used as general support for the legal principle 
that personal status generally depends on the lex domicilii.196 Judges have supported the 
general principle that the respective antenuptial domiciles of each matrimonial party 
governs capacity to marry with statements from Dicey.197 The text’s commentary on 
public policy — for example, as a device used exceptionally to refuse recognition to a 
foreign adoption or to a foreign judgment — have also received the imprimatur of 
judges.198 
Another common use is for a rule in Dicey to be discussed because it was put in issue 
by counsel.199 For this use, courts invariably summarise submissions concerning an 
interpretation of legal principle in Dicey’s Conflict of Laws. In Republica de Guatemala v Nunez, 
the Court of Appeal had to decide whether the law of England or Guatemala governed 
the validity of an assignment of money to the appellant, Nunez, who was a minor. The 
correctness of rule 153 of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws was at the heart of the parties’ arguments 
and the Court’s decision.200 
At the time, rule 153 of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws provided that ‘[a]n assignment of a 
movable which cannot be touched, ie of a debt, giving a good title thereto according to 
                                                 
192  R v Local Government Board; Ex parte Arlidge (n 191) 199–200 (Hamilton LJ). 
193  See British South Africa Company v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd (n 191) 523 (Kennedy LJ); Cripps Warburg 
v Cologne Investment [1980] IR 321, 336 (D’Arcy J); Castanho v Brown and Root (UK) Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 833, 
854, 857 (Lord Denning MR); A-G (New Zealand) v Ortiz (n 143) 364 (Staughton J). 
194  See, eg, Rossano v Manufacturers’ Life Insurance Co [1963] 2 QB 352, 374 (McNair J); O’Toole v Whiterock 
Quarry Co Ltd 1937 SLT 521, 522 (Lord Keith). 
195  R v Local Government Board; Ex parte Arlidge (n 191) 200 (Hamilton LJ). 
196  Armytage v Armytage (n 48) 186 (Gorell Barnes J). 
197  See, eg, Padolecchia v Padolecchia [1968] P 314, 336 (Sir Jocelyn Joyce P); Radwan v Radwan [No 2] [1972] 3 
WLR 939, 950 (Cumming-Bruce J); Lawrence v Lawrence [1985] Fam 106, 122 (Ackner LJ). 
198  See, eg, Merchant International Co Ltd v Natsionalna Aktsionerna Kompaniya ‘Naftogaz Ukrayiny’ [2011] EWHC 
1820 (Comm), [31] (QBD); JSC VTB Bank v Skurikhin [2014] EWHC 271 (Comm), [29] (Simon J) 
(QBD); Superior Composite Structures LLC v Parrish [2015] EWHC 3688 (QB), [5] (McGowan J); Spliethoff’s 
Bevrachtingskantoor BV v Bank of China Ltd [2016] 1 All ER (Comm) 1034, 1062 [130] (Carr J); OJSC Bank 
of Moscow v Chernyakov [2016] EWHC 2583 (Comm), [5] (Cranston J); Midtown Acquisitions LP v Essar 
Global Fund Ltd [2018] EWHC 2545 (Comm), [24] (Moulder J); Re A (Foreign Adoption Recognition) [2018] 
EWHC 3468 (Fam), [8] (Theis J); Process and Industrial Developments Ltd v Nigeria [2018] EWHC 3714 
(Comm), [63] (Bryan J); Re N (A Child) [2018] Fam 117, 147 [86] (Sir James Munby P); XX v Whittington 
Hospital NHS Trust [2019] 3 WLR 107, 130 [77] (McCombe LJ) (CA). 
199  See, eg, Republica de Guatemala v Nunez (n 52) 683–4 (Bankes LJ), 692–3 (Scrutton LJ); St Pierre v South 
American Stores (Gath v Chaves) Ltd [1936] 1 KB 382, 390 (Grier LJ); Shanks v Shanks 1965 SLT 330, 331 
(Lord Fraser); Metal Industries (Salvage) Ltd v Owners of the ST ‘Harle’ 1962 SLT 114, 116; Sinclair v Sinclair 
[1968] P 189, 224 (Scarman J); Brodin v A/R Seljan 1973 SC 213, 218–9, 220–1 (Lord Kissen); Tee v Tee 
[1974] 1 WLR 213, 215; Hesperides Hotels Ltd v Aegean Turkish Holidays Ltd (n 186) 536 (Lord Wilberforce). 
200  Republica de Guatemala v Nunez (n 52) 695 (Lawrence LJ). 
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the lex situs of the debt (in so far as by analogy a situs can be attributed to a debt) is valid’.201 
According to Dicey, the lex situs of ‘“[d]ebts, choses in action, and claims of any kind must 
be held situate where the debtor or other person against whom a claim exists resides; or, 
in other words, debts or choses in action are generally looked upon as situate in the 
country where they are properly recoverable or can be enforced”’.202 It was the appellant’s 
argument that the debt in question was situate in England because it was contracted and 
payable in England. The respondents, on the other hand, pointed to Dicey’s rule to draw 
attention to confusion in case law over which law governed for transfers of debt.203  
Bankes LJ agreed with Dicey’s proposition that choses in action had a location or 
quasi-location identifying the law applicable to the contract. His Lordship also remarked 
that Dicey’s rule 153 ‘finds support under some circumstances’.204 Lawrence LJ also found 
that rule 153 was a correct statement of law.205 In scrutinising the authorities used to 
support rule 153, Scrutton LJ thought that criticism of the authorities by the primary judge 
and by Cozens-Hardy J in Re Maudslay was warranted.206 The authorities did not support 
finding that an English debt, void by the law of the country where it was transacted and 
by the law of the parties’ domicile, was ‘valid in the country where the debt is deemed to 
be situated’.207  
Fourthly, derivative or secondary citations of Dicey became more frequent during the 
20th century.208 The English courts’ approval of Dicey’s statement of foreign state 
immunity in The Jupiter and Compania Naviera Vascongado v SS Cristina has recurred.209 Early 
editions of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws expressed this principle as: ‘The Court has no 
jurisdiction to entertain an action against any foreign sovereign. Any action against the 
                                                 
201  Ibid 683 (Bankes LJ). 
202  Ibid 674. 
203  Ibid 677. 
204  Ibid 684 (Bankes LJ). 
205  Ibid 695–6 (Lawrence LJ). 
206  See Re Maudslay [1900] 1 Ch 602, 610 (Cozens-Hardy J), cited in Republica de Guatemala v Nunez (n 52) 
692 (Scrutton LJ). 
207  Republica de Guatemala v Nunez (n 52) 693 (Scrutton LJ). 
208  See generally Kleinwort, Sons & Co (n 186) 697 (du Parcq LJ); United States of America v Dolffus Mieg et Cie 
SA [1952] AC 582, 616 (Lord Radcliffe); Nizam of Hyderabad v Jung [1957] Ch 185, 203 (Upjohn J), 232 
(Lord Evershed MR); Rahimtoola v Nizam of Hyderabad [1958] AC 379, 393–4 (Lord Radcliffe); Trendtex 
Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] QB 529, 555 (Lord Denning MR); Belhaj v Straw [2017] 
AC 964, 1128 [189]. 
209  See especially The Jupiter [1924] P 236; Compania Naviera Vascongado v SS Cristina [1938] AC 485. See also 
United States of America v Dollfus Mieg et Cie SA [1952] AC 582, 616 (Lord Radcliffe); Ysmael (Juan) & Co 
Inc v Indonesian Government [1955] AC 72, 86–7 (Earl Jowitt); Nizam of Hyderabad v Jung (n 208) 203 (Upjohn 
J), 232 (Lord Evershed MR). Note: the common law governed state immunity before the State Immunity 
Act 1978 (UK) became law. 
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property of a foreign sovereign is an action or proceeding against such person’.210 
Immunity would hold at common law if a state was directly or indirectly impleaded ‘in 
relation to property in its ownership’.211  
In The Jupiter, the Russian Government successfully used the doctrine of foreign state 
immunity to set aside the plaintiff company’s writ claiming ownership of the steamship 
Jupiter. Scrutton LJ agreed with Dicey’s statement of the doctrine in concluding that the 
issue of the writ was an attempt to implead the Russian Government, which claimed a 
right in the steamship.212 The circumstances of the Cristina case were factually similar to 
The Jupiter. Here, the ownership and possession of a vessel requisitioned by the Spanish 
Government was at issue. In the course of finding for the Spanish Government, Lord 
Wright approved of Scrutton LJ’s quotation of Dicey in The Jupiter.213 In contrast, Lord 
Maugham approached the question of sovereign state immunity ‘with the greatest care’, 
arguing that Dicey did not mean a blanket immunity from jurisdiction if proof of title was 
at stake.214  
Following the Cristina, Dicey’s sovereign immunity rule has been ‘repeated 
religiously’.215 In Dollfus Mieg, Lord Radcliffe approved of the rule as ‘quoted with approval 
in The Jupiter’.216 The rule was considered to be ‘expressed as well as may be in Dicey’s 
Conflict of Laws, 6th edition’.217 What amounted in Dicey’s rule to ‘an action “against the 
property of a foreign sovereign” in any particular case’ remained in question.218 In any 
event, Lord Radcliffe was content with the clarity of the rule in Dicey’s Conflict of Laws,219 
as was Viscount Simonds in Rahimtoola v Nizam of Hyderabad.220 In the Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom’s recent decision of Belhaj v Straw, citation of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws 
inevitably resulted from a consideration of the history of the state immunity doctrine at 
common law.221 
                                                 
210  A V Dicey and A Berriedale Keith, A Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws 
(Stevens and Sons, 3rd ed, 1922) 215, quoted in The Jupiter (n 209) 243 (Scrutton LJ). 
211  Belhaj v Straw (n 208) 991 [35] (Lord Dyson MR), 1064 [15] (Lord Mance JSC), 1065 [18] (Lord Mance 
JSC), 1127 [187] (Lord Sumption JSC and Lord Hughes JSC). The common law is preserved in ss 6(4) 
and 10 of the State Immunity Act 1978 (UK).  
212  The Jupiter (n 209) 243 (Scrutton LJ). 
213  Compania Naviera Vascongado v SS Cristina (n 209) 508 (Lord Wright). 
214  Ibid 517 (Lord Maugham). 
215  Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria (n 208) 555 (Lord Denning MR). 
216  United States of America v Dolffus Mieg (n 208) 616 (Lord Radcliffe). 
217  Ibid. 
218  Ibid. 
219  Ibid. 
220  Belhaj v Straw (n 208) 1129 [190] (Lord Sumption JSC and Lord Hughes JSC). 
221  Ibid. 
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A fifth use is where judges corral together the scholarly authorities on a specific legal 
point. Leading reasons for judicially citing scholarly authorities include cases subject to 
adverse comment,222 an absence of authorities,223 scholarly consensus,224 and scholarly 
conflict.225  
Adverse comment of Harris v Taylor226 led to considerable discussion of case law and 
scholarly writing in Henry v Geoprosco International Ltd.227 In that case, the Court of Appeal 
enforced an Alberta default judgment and, in doing so, felt bound to follow ‘the well-
known and much criticised decision of the Court of Appeal in Harris v Taylor’.228 The 
defendant’s appearance before the Alberta court merely to invite the court in its discretion 
not to exercise jurisdiction was a voluntary submission to jurisdiction. Geoprosco had 
taken no further part in the Alberta proceedings after its application to set aside service 
and stay the proceedings failed in Alberta. Similarly, the earlier decision of Harris v Taylor 
saw the Court of Appeal enforcing a Manx default judgment on the ground that the 
defendant’s conditional appearance was a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the 
Manx court.229 The defendant’s motion to set aside the writ and its service failed, after 
which the defendant took no further part in the proceedings and default judgment was 
obtained against him.230 The appellant relied upon a statement from the second edition of 
Dicey’s Conflict of Laws to argue that a protest against the court’s jurisdiction did not 
amount to a submission to its jurisdiction.231 This was rejected: the defendant could have 
‘done nothing’ on being served, but ‘he did something he was not obliged to do’.232  
The courts in Re Dulles’ Settlement [No 2] and NV Daarnhouwer & Co Handelmaatschappij 
v Boulos had approached Harris v Taylor with circumspection.233 Denning LJ in Dulles 
limited Harris v Taylor to a question of res judicata, a reading challenged in Geoprosco.234 
                                                 
222  See, eg, Buchanan (Peter) Ltd v McVey [1955] AC 516, 524 (Kingsmill Moore J); Henry v Geoprosco 
International Ltd [1976] QB 726, 746 (Roskill LJ). 
223  See, eg, J D’Almeida Araujo Lda v Sir Frederick Becker & Co Ltd [1953] 2 QB 329, 333–4 (Pilcher J). 
224  See, eg, The Amazone [1940] P 40, 45 (Slesser LJ); In the Estate of Maldonado [1954] P 223, 227 (Barnard 
J); 244–5 (Evershed MR); 247 (Jenkins LJ); Abate v Abate [1961] P 29, 32 (Lloyd-Jones J); Carl Zeiss 
Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd [No 2] [1967] 1 AC 853, 969 (Lord Wilberforce); Black-Clawson International 
Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG [1974] QB 660, 681 (Scarman LJ). 
225  See, eg, Leon v Leon [1967] P 275, 283 (Baker J); The Hollandia [1982] QB 872, 887 (Ackner LJ). 
226  Harris v Taylor [1915] 2 KB 580. 
227  Henry v Geoprosco (n 222). 
228  Henry v Geoprosco (n 222) 735 (Roskill LJ). 
229  Harris v Taylor (n 226). 
230  Ibid 581. 
231  Henry v Geoprosco (n 222) 737 (Roskill LJ). 
232  Harris v Taylor (n 226) 587 (Buckley LJ). 
233  Re Dulles’ Settlement [No 2] [1951] Ch 842, 849 (Evershed MR); 851 (Denning LJ); NV Daarnhouwer & 
Co Handelmaatschappij v Boulos [1968] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 259. 
234  See Re Dulles’ Settlement [No 2] (n 233) 851 (Denning LJ); Henry v Geoprosco (n 222) 743–4 (Roskill LJ). 
122 CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Megaw J’s decision to follow Re Dulles in Daarnhouwer was also met with disapproval in 
Geoprosco.235 However, in that decision, Megaw J was a puisne justice who was ‘free to 
choose between two conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeal’ and so he ‘unhesitantly 
preferred’ the reasoning in Re Dulles.236 The editors of the ninth edition of Dicey and 
Morris’ The Conflict of Laws opined that Harris v Taylor was ‘“revolting to common sense”’237 
and that Re Dulles had obviated the need to follow ‘the supposed shackles of Harris v 
Taylor’.238 Equally, the editor of Cheshire’s Private International Law was of the view ‘“that 
to protest is not necessarily to submit. The tide is setting in the opposite direction.”’239 
But, insofar as Dicey and Cheshire criticised the correctness of Harris v Taylor, the Court 
of Appeal in Geoprosco disapproved.240 The Court remarked that ‘however distinguished 
the authors and editors of these textbooks, the law must be taken to be as laid down by 
the courts, however much their decisions may be criticised by writers of such great 
distinction’.241 
3 Dissent from Dicey’s Conflict of Laws 
The foregoing discussion has revealed more discerning treatment of Dicey’s Conflict of 
Laws in English courts than Jaffey’s comments — noted in III(C) — suggest. Indeed, it 
is not unavoidably the case that ‘[t]he correctness of the rule [in Dicey] is taken for 
granted’.242 In this section, an example of a notable judicial dissent is given, which is of 
relevance to the more specific question of public policy: Dicey’s ‘political law’ or ‘other 
public laws’ exception.243 
(a) ‘Political Law’ or ‘Other Public Laws’ Exception  
Since being introduced, versions of Dicey’s ‘political law’ and ‘other public laws’ exception 
have been criticised by judges and scholars alike.244 The defence’s recast from ‘political 
law’ to ‘other public laws’ in the seventh edition (1958) did little to curb judicial and 
                                                 
235  Henry v Geoprosco (n 222) 742 (Roskill LJ). 
236  NV Daarnhouwer & Co Handelmaatschappij v Boulos (n 233) 268. 
237  J H C Morris (ed), Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (Stevens and Sons, 9th ed, 1973) 996, quoted in 
G Solomons, ‘Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Jurisdiction of Foreign Court’ (1976) 25 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 665, 672. 
238  Henry v Geoprosco (n 222) 742 (Roskill LJ). 
239  P M North (ed), Cheshire’s Private International Law (Butterworths, 9th ed, 1974) 638, quoted in G 
Solomons, ‘Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Jurisdiction of Foreign Court’ (1976) 25 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 665, 672. 
240  Henry v Geoprosco (n 208) 746 (Roskill LJ). 
241  Ibid. 
242  Contra Jaffey (n 7) 472, 473. 
243  Chapter 8 considers this exception in light of foreign governmental interest analysis. 
244  See generally F A Mann, ‘Prerogative Rights of Foreign States and the Conflict of Laws’ (1954) 40 
Transactions of the Grotius Society 25; Regazzoni v KC Sethia (1944) Ltd [1956] 2 QB 490, 524 (Parker LJ). 
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scholarly criticism of the rule’s ambiguity. Exceptionally, in Spycatcher, Brennan J resorted 
to public policy in preference to the ‘other public laws’ defence, though it has been 
similarly criticised — and for a longer period of time.245 In the third edition of Dicey’s 
Conflict of Laws (1922), the rule was that English courts had no jurisdiction to enforce 
‘either directly or indirectly’ a penal or revenue law.246 In the fourth edition (1927), 
‘political laws’ followed ‘revenue’.247 Within a year of the addition, it was judicially 
mentioned.248 
The correctness of the ‘political laws’ addition was first seriously questioned in obiter 
remarks in Regazzoni v KC Sethia (1944) Ltd.249 Birkett LJ was content with the expressions 
‘revenue’ and ‘penal’ in Dicey’s rule, but thought ‘political’ was ‘so vague that it is really 
difficult to attach to it any special or particular meaning’.250 A similar problem has been 
traditionally recognised with the public policy defence.251 Reservations were also 
expressed by Parker LJ, who commented that 
I share the difficulty to which my Lords have referred as to what in this connexion is meant 
by a political law. I have not discovered how the word “political” first crept into the rule 
referred to in Dicey, and it may be that it is merely dealing with the case of a foreign 
sovereign seeking to enforce some prerogative or sovereign right.252 
In the House of Lords, Viscount Simonds expressed similar doubts about the extent to 
which the doctrine covered laws of ‘a “political” or “public” character’.253 In a case note 
on Regazzoni, Mann shared the same concerns as Birkett LJ by noting that [t]he uncertainty 
of the adjective is in itself sufficient to arouse suspicion, for in a sense any legal rule is 
“political.”’254 In another case note, Jennings recommended clarification of the term ‘if 
the term… is retained in the next edition’.255 
                                                 
245  The ambiguities of both defences are explored in further detail in Chapters 7 and 8. See A-G (UK) v 
Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 30 (‘Spycatcher’). 
246  Dicey and Keith, ‘3rd ed’ (n 210) 230. 
247  A V Dicey and A Berriedale Keith, A Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws 
(Stevens and Sons, 4th ed, 1927) 224. 
248  Re Visser; HM The Queen of Holland (Married Woman) v Drukker [1928] Ch 877, 882 (Tomlin J). It was only 
mentioned because the defendants were challenging the accurateness of the 3rd edition’s addition of 
‘revenue’ to the rule. 
249  Regazzoni v KC Sethia (1944) Ltd (n 244). 
250  Ibid 520 (Birkett LJ).  
251  This is explored in Chapter 8. 
252  Ibid 524 (Parker LJ). Chapter 8 will suggest a legitimate place for the foreign governmental interests 
exception — detached from public policy — as the flipside of foreign sovereign immunity. 
253  Regazzoni v KC Sethia [1958] AC 301, 318 (Viscount Simonds). 
254  Michael Mann, ‘Decisions: Regazzoni v K C Sethia (1944) Ltd’ (1956) 5 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 293, 294. 
255  R Y Jennings, ‘Conflict of Laws—Contract Illegal by Foreign Law—Whether Enforceable in England’ 
(1956) 14 Cambridge Law Journal 141, 142. 
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The detractors remained with the substitution of ‘political laws’ to ‘other public law’ 
in the seventh edition (1958), which was ‘intended to be equivalent to “prerogative 
right”’.256 By the time of Attorney-General of New Zealand v Ortiz, the rule was expressed as: 
‘English courts have no jurisdiction to entertain an action (1) for the enforcement, either 
directly or indirectly, of a penal, revenue, or other public law of a foreign state’.257 
Staughton J, the trial judge in Ortiz, did not think there was a legal basis for Dicey’s third 
category.258 However, Denning LJ in the Court of Appeal agreed with Dicey and Morris’ 
‘other public laws’ formulation, proposing that it meant ‘laws which are eiusdem generis with 
“penal” or “revenue” laws’.259 
Recent English authority is, however, against a general ‘other public law’ category.  The 
Court of Appeal in Iran v Barakat Galleries Ltd found that this residual category was only 
supported by dicta; there was no binding authority to support a ‘rule which prevents the 
enforcement of all foreign public laws’.260 Lord Phillips CJ observed that ‘[o]n the 
authorities as they now stand the only category outside penal and revenue laws which is 
the subject of an actual decision… is a claim which involves the exercise or assertion of a 
sovereign right’.261 An English court’s refusal to enforce a law involving ‘the exercise or 
assertion of a sovereign right’ echoed the High Court of Australia’s decision in the 
Spycatcher case not to enforce a foreign government interest.262 The Australian Spycatcher 
test was approved for being ‘consistent with the English authorities’ and ‘a helpful and 
practical test’.263 
IV CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has examined the influence of three institutional writers — Story, Westlake, 
and Dicey — on the shape of modern doctrine in private international law. It has used 
judicial citation of their works in English, Irish and Scottish courts to measure this 
influence. In Chapter 4, judicial citation was identified as the key factor for assigning 
institutional status to writers under Scots law. Using this premise, Part II provided a 
background to each writer and, then, Part III studied the common uses of their works in 
courts of the British Isles. 
                                                 
256  Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran v Barakat Galleries Ltd [2009] QB 22, 55 [113] (Lord Phillips CJ). 
257  Attorney-General of New Zealand v Ortiz (n 143) 366, 368 (Staughton J). 
258  Ibid 371 (Staughton J). 
259  Attorney-General of New Zealand v Ortiz [1984] AC 1, 20 (Lord Denning MR). 
260  Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran v Barakat Galleries Ltd (n 256) 57 [125] (Lord Phillips CJ). 
261  Ibid. 
262  Ibid 57–8 [125]–[126]. 
263  Ibid 58 [125]; Spycatcher (n 245) 50 (Brennan J). 
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Judicial citation of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws has greatly exceeded the citation of Story’s 
Conflict of Laws and, even more so, Westlake’s Treatise — despite Dicey himself according 
those works an institutional eminence. By looking closely at the case law, however, Story’s 
influence is still apparent in established doctrines of private international law such as the 
Moçambique rule and the penal laws exclusion. Following the first edition of Dicey’s Conflict 
of Laws, English — and, to a lesser extent, Scottish and Irish — courts have routinely 
referred to it for confirmation of the law, adding force to Jaffey’s complaint, noted in Part 
III(C), that the rules in Dicey’s Conflict of Laws are ‘taken for granted’.264 Moreover, it would 
appear that in English courts ‘[n]ot to apply the Dicey & Morris rule verges on the per 
incurium’.265 It was still observed that dissent from Dicey’s views is not an uncommon 
occurrence in the law reports. While Westlake has not been given the weight that Dicey 
or Story have, two areas in which Westlake was signally influential were the ‘closest and 
most real connection test’ for the proper law of the contract and Westlake’s influential 
criticism of the ‘civilised nations’ concept.  
The next two chapters explore judicial considerations of public policy to reinforce two 
basic claims of this thesis. The first claim argues that Dicey structured the place of public 
policy in modern private international law. The second claim suggests that institutional 
writers gave public policy its initial content. These writers’ influence on the public policy 
exception has remained derivative, although it has been qualified by judges’ reluctance to 
apply it and the use of anti-Diceyan considerations of comity. Chapter 7 reinforces that 
today’s common law judges have regulated the unrestrained use of private international 
law’s public policy doctrine by employing countervailing factors that encourage the 
application of foreign law and the recognition of foreign judgments.  
Accordingly, Chapter 6 evaluates the formative role that scholarly accounts of public 
policy played — at least initially — in the judicial development of choice of law rules in 
private international law. In Chapter 7, the focus shifts to the scope of, and limits on, the 
modern private international law of public policy. This Chapter draws attention to 
international comity as the main countervailing factor used to restrain courts from, on the 
score of public policy, disapplying foreign law or refusing to recognise foreign judgments.  
 
                                                 
264  Jaffey (n 7) 473. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE FORMATIVE ROLE OF PUBLIC 
POLICY IN ENGLISH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
I INTRODUCTION 
his Chapter explores the formative role that scholarly accounts of public policy 
played in the development of traditional rules of common law private 
international law. As Chapter 5 clearly demonstrated, institutional writers had 
— and, indeed, still have — a significant influence on private international law decision-
making. This was particularly apparent from Chapter 5’s analysis of English decisions 
citing Dicey’s Conflict of Laws. The analysis revealed an upward citation trend from the 
late-1990s through to the present day — a trend which shows no signs of continuing 
unabated.  
This Chapter provides a supplement to this analysis by developing on Kahn-Freund’s 
thesis about the ‘premature crystallisation’ of public policy into independent rules of 
English private international law.1 Kahn-Freund’s contention was that public policy, as a 
‘principle’, encouraged the development of ‘special rules applied without any reference to 
the idea of public policy in which they originated’.2 This Chapter seeks to reinforce the 
influence of institutional writers on this ‘premature crystallisation’ with a particular focus 
on the formation of the traditional choice of law rules for torts and marriage. It also 
highlights the modern legal status of these rules, emphasising elements which may be seen 
as embedding or reinforcing considerations of public policy. 
The body of this Chapter unfolds in two parts, with each part emphasising the public 
policy background of these two traditional choice of law rules. Part II focuses on the 
public policy dimension of the House of Lords’ decision in Brook v Brook.3 It argues that 
judicial reinterpretation of Brook v Brook — minus public policy — is responsible for the 
bifurcation of the traditional choice of law rule for marriage. The rule in Sottomayer v De 
Barros [No 2],4 regarded by Kahn-Freund as a crystallised rule of public policy, is given 
separate consideration. The first part concludes by exploring how mandatory statutory 
                                                 
1  See Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘Reflections on Public Policy in the English Conflict of Laws’ (1953) 39 
Transactions of the Grotius Society 39, 48–59. 
2   Ibid 48. 
3  Brook v Brook (1861) 9 HL Cas 193; 11 ER 703 (HL). 
4  Sottomayer v De Barros [No 2] (1879) 5 PD 94 (‘Sottomayer [No 2]’). 
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requirements for marriage have crystallised in statutory form elements of the common 
law choice of law rule for marriage.  
Meanwhile, Part III explores the inbuilt public policy dimension of the first limb of 
the double actionability rule or the rule in Phillips v Eyre,5 which saw the lex fori applied to 
tortious liability.6  In a subsequent section of Part III, the influence and decline of the first 
limb in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand is explored. Central to 
this Chapter is the evolution of embedded public policy considerations in choice of law 
rules at common law. 
II CHOICE OF LAW IN MARRIAGE 
A Brook v Brook 
Story’s public policy-based exceptions to the traditional marriage choice of law rule — 
the lex loci celebrationis — proved signally influential in the Brook v Brook litigation. Between 
the 18th and mid-19th centuries, the exclusivity of the lex loci celebrationis rule for all 
questions on the validity of marriage had become settled law in England. The rule had 
been firmly established by a line of decisions from the ecclesiastical courts,7 which 
possessed exclusive jurisdiction over marriage until the Matrimonial Causes Act 18578 
transferred its jurisdiction to the new Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes. 
However, the possibility of exceptions to the traditional rule was first broached in English 
and Scottish decisions from the mid-1850s and 1860s.9  
These exceptions were synthesised in section 113 of Story’s Conflict of Laws, a text 
which — as examined in Chapter 5 — figured prominently in early English case law on 
private international law.10 Story’s seminal private international law text identified three 
exceptions to the lex loci celebrationis rule as was discussed in Chapter 3: first, marriages 
deemed polygamous or incestuous ‘by the general consent of Christendom’;11 secondly, 
marriages ‘positively prohibited by the public law of a country, from motives of policy’;12 and, 
                                                 
5  Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1. 
6  Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘Delictual Liability and the Conflict of Laws’ [1968–II] Recueil des Cours 1, 24. 
7  See, eg, Scrimshire v Scrimshire (1752) 2 Hag Con 395; 161 ER 782, 789 (Sir Edward Simpson); Middleton 
v Janverin (1802) 2 Hag Con 437; 161 ER 797, 801 (Sir W Wynn), quoting Butler v Freeman (1756) Amb 
301; 27 ER 204 (Lord Hardwicke LC); Dalrymple v Dalrymple (1811) 2 Hag Con 54; 161 ER 665, 667 
(Lord Stowell); Ruding v Smith (1821) 2 Hag Con 371; 161 ER 774, 781–4 (Lord Stowell). 
8  Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, 20 & 21 Vict, c 85. 
9  See especially Fenton v Livingstone (1856) 18 D 865, 878 (Lord Curriehill) (IH); Brook v Brook (HL) (n 3); 
Simonin v Mallac (1860) 2 Sw & Tr 67; 164 ER 917. 
10  Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (Hilliard, Gray, and Co, 1st ed, 1834) 104. 
11  Ibid. 
12  Ibid (emphasis added). 
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thirdly, marriages ‘celebrated in foreign countries by subjects entitling themselves under 
special circumstances to the benefit of the laws of their own country.’13  
The first two of Story’s exceptions were engaged in Brook v Brook against the backdrop 
of Lord Lyndhurst’s Act 1835.14 Passed on 31 August 1835, Lord Lyndhurst’s Act proscribed 
future marriages within prohibited degrees of consanguinity and affinity as defined by 
canon law, the most prominent of which was the marriage of a widower to his deceased 
wife’s sister.15 At the heart of the Brook v Brook litigation was the validity of a marriage 
celebrated at Wandsbek, in the Duchy of Holstein, in 1850 between William Leigh Brook 
and Emily Armitage, who was the sister of William’s deceased first wife, Charlotte.16 This 
second marriage, while valid by the laws of Holstein, would have been void in the 
common domicile of the parties before and after the marriage, England. Wandsbek was 
a deliberate choice because, at least in theory, Lord Lyndhurst’s Act had no extraterritorial 
effect.17 
Until 1835, ‘in-law’ marriages were voidable if challenged in the ecclesiastical courts 
during the married couple’s lifetime.18 A 1533 Henrician statute was the source of the 
ecclesiastical procedure for annulling marriages within prohibited degrees of affinity.19 
With the enactment of Lord Lyndhurst’s Act, marriages contracted before 31 August 1835 
within prohibited degrees were validated. Future in-law marriages contracted after that 
date were void. The Act ‘was passed primarily with the intention of protecting future 
inheritance lines’ from the off-chance of a legal challenge.20 Legal challenge was more 
probable for affluent families where inheritance to property might have depended on 
                                                 
13  Ibid. 
14  Lord Lyndhurst’s Act 1835, 5 & 6 Wm 4, c 54. 
15  For some background, see Nancy F Anderson, ‘The “Marriage with a Deceased Wife’s Sister Bill” 
Controversy: Incest Anxiety and the Defense of Family Purity in Victorian England’ (1982) 21(2) Journal 
of British Studies 67; Charlotte Frew, ‘The Marriage to a Deceased Wife’s Sister Narrative: A Comparison 
of Novels’ (2012) 24(3) Law and Literature 265, 265–6 (‘Deceased Wife’s Sister Narrative’); Maebh 
Harding, ‘The Curious Incident of the Marriage Act [No 2] 1537 and the Irish Statute Book’ (2012) 
32(2) Legal Studies 78, 91–2. 
16  Adam Kuper, Incest and Influence (Harvard University Press, 2009) 69: ‘Affluent people regularly traveled 
abroad to marry in order to evade the English restrictions; a favored venue was Altona in Schleswig 
Holstein (then part of Denmark).’ The reference to Altona as part of Schleswig Holstein is incorrect. 
Altona was in Holstein. At the time of the Brooks’ marriage, Schleswig and Holstein were two 
independent duchies governed by Denmark. Following defeat in the Second War of Schleswig, 
Denmark ceded the two duchies, respectively, to the Kingdom of Prussia and the Austrian Empire in 
1865. 
17  Brook v Brook (1858) 3 Sm & G 481; 65 ER 746, 765. 
18  For background, see Charlotte Frew, ‘Marriage to a Deceased Wife’s Sister in Australia and England, 
1835–1907’ (PhD Thesis, Macquarie University, 2012) (‘Marriage to a Deceased Wife’s Sister’); Frew, 
‘Deceased Wife’s Sister Narrative’ (n 15). 
19  See Anderson (n 15) 67; Frew, ‘Marriage to a Deceased Wife’s Sister’ (n 15) 51. 
20  David G Barrie, Sin, Sanctity and the Sister-in-Law: Marriage with a Deceased Wife’s Sister in the Nineteenth 
Century (Routledge, 2018). For similar comments, see Frew, ‘Marriage to a Deceased Wife’s Sister’ (n 
15) 49, 54, 55, 57, 94–5. 
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whether a child of a voidable marriage was legitimate or illegitimate.21 For example, a 
‘scheming’ relative might have brought a legal challenge knowing they stood to inherit a 
fortune if only the ecclesiastical courts would render their relative’s affinal marriage void. 
In fact, Lord Lyndhurst introduced the bill into Parliament to protect the seventh Duke 
of Beaufort, whose second marriage in 1822 to his deceased wife’s sister had produced an 
only son — the heir to the dukedom.22 Despite opposition throughout the 19th century, 
the restriction on in-law marriages remained the law in England until the passage of the 
Deceased Wife’s Sister’s Marriage Act 1907.23 
Though in-law marriages were void after 31 August 1835, a question mark remained 
over the validity of affinal and consanguineous marriages contracted abroad. Favouring 
Altona and Wandsbek in the Duchy of Holstein as marriage destinations, affluent British 
couples sought to evade the restrictions of Lord Lyndhurst’s Act by contracting their 
otherwise void marriage abroad.24  The potential invalidity of these marriages weighed 
heavily on the minds of Members of Parliament as parliamentary debates of the late-1840s 
reveal:  
He was aware especially of the great evils connected with foreign marriages of this nature. 
They had been told that it often happened that persons of wealth who were anxious to 
contract such marriages went abroad, and, above all, to Hamburg or Altona, and after a 
short residence were married. Were these marriages legal? What would be the effect of 
them upon the offspring?25 
Following the deaths of Mr and Mrs Brook in 1855, an opportunity arose for the 
Crown to settle the law on these marriages by testing the validity of the Brooks’ marriage. 
In his will, William Leigh Brook divided his property among the children of both 
marriages.26 A son of the second marriage, Charles Armitage Brook, died in 1856. An 
issue arose as to how the deceased child’s share of real estate and personal property would 
                                                 
21  See Charlotte Frew, ‘Marriage to a Deceased Wife’s Sister in Australia and England, 1835–1907’ (PhD 
Thesis, Macquarie University, 2012) 49, 54, 55, 57, 94–5. 
22  Kuper (n 16) 66. 
23  Deceased Wife’s Sister’s Marriage Act 1907, 7 Edw 7, c 47.  
24  Roundell Palmer, A Speech Delivered in the House of Commons, on Thursday, May 3, 1849, on the Motion for the 
Second Reading of Mr Stuart Wortley’s Bill for Altering the Law of Marriage (John Henry Parker, 1849) 29–30. 
For references to marriages celebrated in Altona, see United Kingdom, First Report of the Commissioners 
Appointed to Inquire into the State and Operation of the Law of Marriage, as Relating to the Prohibited Degrees of 
Affinity, and to Marriages Solemnized Abroad or in the British Colonies; with Minutes of Evidence, Appendix and 
Index (No 973, 1847–8) xvii, xviii, xxx, 2, 3, 13, 25, 26, 28, 79. 
25  Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates: Third Series, Commencing with the Accession of William IV (Cornelius Buck, 
1850) vol 59, 435. 
26  The will of William Leigh Brook describes the children of his second marriage as follows: ‘to my reputed 
son Charles Armitage commonly so called to my reputed daughter Charlotte Amelia Brook commonly 
so called and to my reputed daughter Sarah Helen Brook commonly so called’. 
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be distributed.27 The children of both marriages sought a declaration as to their rights to 
and interest in William Brook’s estate. The Attorney-General put in issue the validity of 
the second marriage. The invalidity of the second marriage and the consequent 
illegitimacy of the children of that marriage would result in the deceased child’s share 
escheating to the Crown.  
1 The First Instance Decision in Brook v Brook 
The statutory construction of Lord Lyndhurst’s Act was the focus of the first instance 
decision in the new Court for Divorces and Matrimonial Causes. At this stage of the 
litigation, the central issue was whether the Act was extraterritorial in operation or 
otherwise imposed a personal disability ‘wheresoever they may be abroad’.28 The plaintiffs 
attributed the validity of marriage to the place of celebration exclusively, relying on 
English ecclesiastical authorities and scholarly opinion on marriage to this effect.29  This 
argument failed; instead, the Court admitted exceptions to the traditional rule for 
marriage. 
As English case law was silent on exceptions, the Court discussed three exceptions to 
the traditional lex loci celebrationis rule at section 113 of Story’s Conflict of Laws.  Cresswell J 
declined to apply Story’s first exception — that is, marriages deemed polygamous and 
incestuous ‘by the general consent of all Christendom’ — because it tested the proper role 
of English judges. The criticism, repeated in the House of Lords’ decision in Brook v 
Brook,30 focused on the difficulties of defining incest and then on determining its 
treatment in different countries: 
How is a Judge sitting in an English Court of Justice, called upon to decide whether a 
marriage be incestuous or not, to be guided in his decision? Surely, if the law of his own 
country has already settled what is incestuous or the contrary, by that he must be governed. 
Is he to inquire into the opinions of all other nations in which Christianity exists, and to 
adopt that rule which is ascertained to prevail among the greater number, and to say that it 
                                                 
27  Cf R S Welsh, ‘Legitimacy in the Conflict of Laws’ (1947) 63(1) Law Quarterly Review 65, 80; Brian Davis, 
‘The Marriage Amendment Act 1985 – The Reason Why’ (1987) 11(1) Adelaide Law Review 32, 41–2; 
Wendy A Adams, ‘Same-Sex Relationships and Anglo-Canadian Choice of Law: An Argument for 
Universal Validity’ (1996) 34 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 103, 112. Mr William Leigh Brook 
was a wealthy Yorkshire cotton mill owner, railway speculator and magistrate. His will left real estate to 
his two sons and personal property to all his children. The deceased child’s share in real estate might 
have been distributed to the son of the first marriage while his share in the personal property might 
have gone to the surviving next of kin of Mr Brook. The third alternative was that the son’s whole share 
reverted to the Crown because the second marriage was invalid and the son of the second marriage was 
illegitimate. This was the end result of the litigation. The deceased child’s share escheated to the Crown. 
28  Brook v Brook (1858) (n 17) 748. 
29  Ibid 750 (Sir F Kelly, Mr Malins, and Mr George Lake Russell) (in argument). 
30  See, eg, Brook v Brook (HL) (n 3) 710 (Lord Campbell LC), 723–4 (Lord Wensleydale). 
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shall be acted upon in defiance of the law of his own country? This would, indeed, be 
enlarging the comitas gentium to an extent hitherto unheard of.31 
Sir John Stuart V-C’s decision, which affirmed the legal opinion of Cresswell J, 
emphasised Story’s second exception: marriages ‘“positively prohibited by the public law 
of a country, from motives of policy”’.32 Though Sir John Stuart V-C recognised the lex 
loci celebrationis rule, the ‘settled principle of the law of England not to recognise or give 
effect to any contract illegal or immoral, or against public policy’ applied.33 For marriage, 
the principle meant that ‘the law of the country where a marriage may happen to be 
celebrated cannot prevail where it is opposed to the municipal institutions of the country 
of the domicile and allegiance of the contracting parties’.34  His Lordship concluded that 
Lord Lyndhurst’s Act was ‘an integral part of our law and public policy. Therefore, by the 
established principles of international law, it must have paramount effect, and cannot be 
evaded by having resort to the laws of any foreign country.’35  
2 The House of Lords’ Decision 
The treatment given to Story’s exceptions in the Court for Divorces and Matrimonial 
Causes continued in the House of Lords. Lord Campbell LC, Lord Cranworth, and Lord 
Wensleydale accepted the traditional choice of law rule for marriage, subject to Story’s 
exceptions.36 In other words, the lex loci celebrationis was retained as the general rule for 
choice of law in marriage. This reading of Brook v Brook to encompass Story’s exceptions 
reflected the orthodox position in the United States during this period. This position on 
marriage (of a general rule coupled with exceptions) was adopted, compatibly with its 
emphasis on territoriality, in the United States’ Restatement (First) on the Conflict of Laws 
(1935).37 The entrenched territorialism in the Restatement reflected the private 
international law methodology of its American drafter, Joseph Henry Beale (discussed in 
Part II(B)(3)). Although four separate speeches were delivered in the House of Lords, 
subsequent consideration of Brook v Brook has focused almost exclusively on the leading 
speech of Lord Campbell LC.38  
                                                 
31  Brook v Brook (1858) (n 17) 760 (Sir John Stuart V-C). 
32  Ibid 767 (Sir John Stuart V-C), quoting Story (n 10) 104 s 113. 
33  Brook v Brook (1858) (n 17) 767 (Sir John Stuart V-C). 
34   Ibid. 
35  Ibid. 
36  Brook v Brook (HL) (n 3) 209–10; 710 (Lord Campbell LC); 224; 716 (Lord Cranworth); 241–2; 722 (Lord 
Wensleydale). 
37  Peter D Maddaugh, ‘Validity of Marriage and the Conflict of Laws: A Critique of the Present Anglo-
American Position’ (1973) 23(2) University of Toronto Law Journal 117, 123. 
38  See Geoffrey Sawer, ‘Conflict of Laws – Essential Validity of Marriage’ (1939–41) 2 Res Judicatae 125, 
127–8. 
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(a) Bifurcation of the Choice of Law Rule in Marriage 
Bifurcation of the marriage choice of law rule is the orthodox interpretation of Brook v 
Brook.39 This rule, suggested in Lord Campbell LC’s speech, refers questions of the 
formalities of the marriage ceremony — formal validity — to the lex loci celebrationis and 
questions of legal capacity to marry — essential validity — to ‘the lex domicilii, the law of 
the country in which the parties are domiciled at the time of the marriage, and in which 
the matrimonial residence is contemplated’.40 However, passages from Huber’s De 
Conflictu Legum and Story’s Conflict of Laws quoted in Lord Campbell LC’s speech offered 
limited support for bifurcation.41   
Lord Campbell’s quotations to scholarship overwhelmingly supported a 
straightforward exception to the lex loci celebrationis rule. The first quotation in Lord 
Campbell LC’s speech was of Huber’s third axiom in Latin, which recognised the limit of 
comity in ‘prejudicial laws’ (discussed in Chapter 3), that is: ‘Sovereigns will so act by way 
of comity that rights acquired within the limits of a government retain their force 
everywhere so far as they do not cause prejudice to the power or rights of such government or 
of its subjects.’42 The next quotation, also from Huber, referred the validity of marriage 
to the lex loci celebrationis ‘with the reservation that its example is not too revolting—for 
example… an incestuous marriage’.43 The only support for the distinction between formal 
and essential validity was in the example of marriage that accompanied Huber’s rule for 
contract:  
the place, however, where a contract is entered into is not to be considered absolutely; for 
if the parties had in mind the law of another place at the time of contracting the latter will 
control. Hence the place of matrimony is not so much the place where the ceremony is 
performed as the place where the contracting parties intended to live.44 
The discussion of Story’s three exceptions in Lord Campbell’s speech offers the 
clearest support for ‘the lex loci celebrationis with Story’s exceptions’ interpretation of Brook 
v Brook. While Lord Campbell LC criticised the ‘general consent of Christendom’ 
qualification to Story’s first exception, his Lordship accepted Story’s second exception 
                                                 
39  See, eg, Richard Fentiman, ‘The Validity of Marriage and the Proper Law’ (1985) 44(2) Cambridge Law 
Journal 256; Adams (n 27) 110–15. 
40  Brook v Brook (HL) (n 3) 709 (Lord Campbell LC). 
41  Ibid 709–10. This is despite Lord Campbell LC’s statement that ‘[t]his qualification upon the rule that 
“a marriage valid where celebrated is good everywhere,” is to be found in the writings of many eminent 
jurists who have discussed the subject’: at 709. 
42  Ibid 709. For the leading Latin-English translation of Huber’s De Conflictu Legum, see Ernest G 
Lorenzen, ‘Huber’s De Conflictu Legum’ (1918–19) 13 Illinois Law Review 374. 
43  Brook v Brook (HL) (n 3) 709. 
44  Ibid 710. 
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relating to marriages ‘positively prohibited by the public law of a country from motives 
of policy’.45 The next section (II(B)(1)) considers how the marriage choice of law rule lost 
this dimension of public policy.   
B Choice of Law in Marriage after Brook v Brook 
1 Sottomayer v De Barros [No 1] and [No 2] 
An inability to contend with distinct premarital domiciles steered the English courts 
towards a bifurcated choice of law rule in marriage, which was readily demonstrated in 
the Sottomayer v De Barros litigation.46 The three decisions comprising Sottomayer v De Barros 
promoted two unwieldly rules for choice of law in marriage.47 For traditional writers in 
private international law, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Sottomayor v De Barros [No 1] 
demanded a bifurcated choice of law rule for marriage; in other words, a consideration of 
the formal and essential validity of marriage.48 Despite the Court of Appeal’s assertion 
that this rule was ‘well-recognised’,49 only Lord Campbell LC’s speech in Brook v Brook 
provided some support for this claim. The rule in Sottomayer v De Barros [No 2] is the 
second rule. Kahn-Freund argued that it was ‘a crystallised rule of public policy’,50 because 
its use inevitably leads to forum law being applied.51 
The Sottomayer litigation concerned the validity of an 1866 marriage celebrated in 
England between first cousins of Portuguese descent, Ignacia Sottomayor and Gonzalo 
de Barros. At the time of contracting marriage, Sottomayor and de Barros were minors. 
Ignacia Sottomayor petitioned for an annulment, arguing that her domicile of dependence 
at the time of marriage, Portugal, prohibited such marriages without papal dispensation. 
At first instance, Sir Robert Phillimore upheld the marriage.52 The Court of Appeal 
reversed the first instance decision in Sottomayor v De Barros [No 1], remitting the matter to 
the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division to determine questions of fact. On the 
                                                 
45  Ibid. 
46  Sottomayor v De Barros (1877) 2 PD 81, 86–7 (PDA) (‘Sottomayor (PDA)’); Sottomayor v De Barros [No 1] 
(1877) 3 PD 1, 5–6 (CA) (‘Sottomayor [No 1]’); Sottomayer [No 2] (n 4). See also Davis (n 27) 53. 
47  See, eg, J H C Morris (ed), Dicey’s Conflict of Laws (Stevens and Sons, 6th ed, 1949) 758 r 168, 784 
(exception 1). See also Ronald H Graveson, ‘Matrimonial Domicile and the Contract of Marriage’ (1938) 
20(1, 4) Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 55, 65; Sawer (n 38) 126. Cf Edward I Sykes, 
‘The Essential Validity of Marriage’ (1955) 4(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 159, 161. 
48  See, eg, Sawer (n 38) 126; Graveson (n 47) 65; E I Sykes, ‘Capacity and the Conflict of Laws’ (1950) 1(2) 
University of Western Australia Annual Law Review 266, 268–9. 
49  Sottomayor [No 1] (n 46) 5. Cf Sottomayer [No 2] (n 4) 100. 
50  Kahn-Freund, ‘Reflections on Public Policy’ (n 1) 53, 55. 
51  Ibid. See comment about it creating ‘an ungainly exception to the dual domicile theory”, here: P St J 
Smart, ‘Interest Analysis, False Conflicts, and the Essential Validity of Marriage’ (1985) 14 Anglo-
American Law Review 225, 229. 
52   Sottomayor (PDA) (n 46). 
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remittal reported as Sottomayer v De Barros [No 2], Sir James Hannen P upheld the marriage. 
Evidence on the parties’ respective domiciles at the time of marriage was central to the 
different outcomes. 
In Sottomayor v De Barros [No 1], the parties were assumed to have had a common 
Portuguese domicile at the time of marriage.  The first instance judge, Sir Robert 
Phillimore, concluded that a court of the lex loci celebrationis was not ‘bound to recognize 
the incapacities affixed by the law of the domicile on the parties to the contract, when 
those incapacities do not exist according to the lex loci contractus’.53 The marriage was not 
void because the law of Portugal considered the union incestuous nor was the union, in 
light of section 114 of Story’s Conflict of Laws, ‘incestuous according to the general consent 
of Christendom’.54 On appeal, this decision was reversed.55 The Court of Appeal 
determined that the parties’ personal law — their common domicile of Portugal — 
governed the essential validity of marriage. Cotton LJ pronounced that ‘it is a well-
recognised principle of law that the question of personal capacity to enter into any 
contract is to be decided by the law of domicile’.56 As the lex domicilii governed essential 
validity, the marriage was invalid because the parties’ common domicile considered it 
incestuous.57  
However, by the time of the decision in Sottomayer v De Barros [No 2], newly adduced 
evidence suggested that the husband had an English domicile at the time of marriage. The 
incapacity under Portuguese law only affected the wife. Despite the Court of Appeal’s 
pronouncement on personal capacity, Sir James Hannen P referred the validity of the 
marriage to the lex loci celebrationis and upheld the marriage.58 The earlier Court of Appeal 
decision was not applied because it was, in the language of the Court of Appeal, ‘confined 
to the case where both the contracting parties are at the time of their marriage domiciled 
in a country the laws of which prohibit their marriage’.59  
To this end, Sir James Hannen P rightly challenged the cogency of the proposition 
advanced by the Court of Appeal that the law of domicile governed personal capacity to 
marry.60 His Lordship remarked that 
                                                 
53   Ibid 87. 
54  Ibid 86. 
55  Sottomayor [No 1] (n 46). 
56  Ibid 5 (Cotton LJ). 
57  Ibid 5–6. 
58  Sottomayer [No 2] (n 4) 104. See also J H C Morris (ed), Dicey’s Conflict of Laws (Stevens and Sons, 7th ed, 
1958) 264 n 41. 
59  Sottomayer [No 2] (n 4) 99–100. 
60  Ibid 100. 
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the doctrine thus laid down has not hitherto been “well recognised.” On the contrary, it 
appears to me to be a novel principle, for which up to the present time there has been no 
English authority. What authority there is seems to me to be the other way.61  
The Court of Appeal’s decision ‘has only been to define a further condition imposed by 
English Law, namely, that the parties do not both belong by domicil to a country the laws 
of which prohibit their marriage’.62 The case before Sir James Hannen P was 
distinguishable because it involved ‘the marriage of a British subject in England, where 
the marriage is lawful, with a person domiciled in a country where marriage is 
prohibited’.63 Accordingly, Sir James Hannen P felt that the authorities, which referred 
the question of validity to the lex loci celebrationis, ‘remain[ed] with undiminished effect’.64 
The rule that emerged from Sottomayer v De Barros [No 2] effectively validated any 
marriage lawfully celebrated in England between a person domiciled in England and a 
person with a foreign domicile, whose law imposes an incapacity unknown to English 
law.65 This bias towards the forum led to the rule’s criticism as ‘anomalous’, ‘illogical’ and 
‘xenophobic’.66 However, the law on capacity to marry that developed subsequently would 
have invalidated the marriage.67 English law, in any case, is still not free from doubt on 
the theory courts are to apply on capacity to marry. 
2 The Demise of Story’s Incest Exception – Cheni v Cheni68 
In Cheni v Cheni, Sir Jocelyn Simon P brought an end to Story’s exception on marriages 
incestuous ‘by the common consent of all Christendom’.69 The exception’s appearance in 
Cheni v Cheni demonstrated that it had ‘a certain tenacity in survival’.70  The case concerned 
the validity of an uncle-niece marriage celebrated in the parties’ domicile, Egypt, in 
                                                 
61  Ibid. 
62  Ibid 101. 
63   Ibid. 
64  Ibid 102. 
65   Ibid 105. 
66  See C M V Clarkson, ‘Marriage in England: Favouring the Lex Fori’ (1990) 10 Legal Studies 80, 85 and 
sources cited therein. 
67  See eg, Re Paine [1940] Ch 46, 49 (Bennett J). 
68  Cheni v Cheni [1965] P 85. 
69  Ibid 98. Short shrift has been given to this aspect of the judgment in journal articles. See, eg, Michael J 
Higgins, ‘Conflict of Laws: Conversion of Polygamous Marriage into Monogamous Union’ (1963) 26(2) 
Modern Law Review 205, 208 n 20; P R H Webb, ‘Potentially Polygamous Marriages and Capacity to 
Marry’ (1963) 12(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 672, 678 n 26. Cf P E Nygh, ‘Foreign 
Status, Public Policy and Discretion’ (1964) 13(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 39, 45–7. 
Nygh described this exception as ‘a dead letter’, which ‘was effectively disposed of by Sir Jocelyn Simon 
P in Cheni v Cheni, a decision on the validity of a marriage between an uncle and his niece: see Nygh (n 
69) 46. 
70  Nygh (n 69) 46. Still, Nygh commented that the exception was ‘difficult to apply, and has therefore 
remained a dead letter’: at 46. 
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accordance with Egyptian law and the religious law of the parties.71 The wife petitioned 
for nullity of the marriage on the basis that the union was ‘incestuous by the general 
consent of all Christendom, or… by the general consent of civilised nations or by English 
public policy’.72 Sir Jocelyn Simon P found that this argument, based on Story’s exception, 
did not represent English law.73 As the judge noted, judicial treatment of Story’s 
exception, starting with Brook v Brook, had been unfavourable.74  
This judicial disapproval was contrasted with the seeming indomitability of the 
exception in scholarly writing. References to Story’s exception had appeared in the first 
edition of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws (1896), the 1910 edition of Burge’s Colonial and Foreign 
Law, and a 1954 edition of Halsbury’s Laws of England.75 However, Dicey excluded the 
exception from subsequent editions of his Conflict of Laws ‘in deference to Westlake’s 
observation… that there was no necessity for it, “because no country with which the 
communion of private international law exists has such marriage”’.76 Sir Jocelyn Simon P, 
in expressly adopting Westlake’s criticism as valid, considered: ‘the true rule to be that the 
courts of this country will exceptionally refuse to recognise and given effect to a capacity 
or incapacity to marry by the law of the domicile on the ground that to give it recognition 
and effect would be unconscionable in the circumstances in question’.77  
3 Concluding Remarks — Essential Validity of Marriage 
The English bifurcation of the marriage choice of law rule was resisted by the American 
scholar Joseph Henry Beale in his Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1935).78 Here, Beale 
observed that essential validity was not a long settled requirement of English law.79 He 
challenged the accuracy of Cotton LJ’s pronouncement in Sottomayor v De Barros [No 1] on 
personal capacity to marry, adding that ‘previous authorities had been to the contrary’.80 
Rather, Beale’s account of marriage reinforced the supremacy of the lex loci celebrationis, ‘as 
stated by Story and Bishop’, for all questions relating to the validity of marriage.81 He 
remarked that ‘American law is clear upon this point. Capacity to marry, being a condition 
                                                 
71  Cheni v Cheni (n 68) 93. 
72  Ibid. 
73  Ibid 98. 
74  Ibid 94–6. 
75  Ibid 96–7. 
76  Ibid 98. 
77  Ibid. 
78  Joseph Henry Beale, Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (Voorhis & Co, 1st ed, 1935) vol 2. 
79  Ibid 673. 
80  Ibid. 
81  Ibid 669. 
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of the marriage contract, is governed by the law of the place of marriage’.82 Just as Story 
had done a century earlier,83 Beale offered exceptions to the ordinary application of the 
lex loci celebrationis rule.84 One of the exceptions, targeting the evasion of the law of domicile 
by one or both of the parties to marry, included familiar cases of polygamous, incestuous, 
and otherwise ‘socially odious’ marriages.85 
In several common law jurisdictions, the bifurcated choice of law rule for marriage is 
maintained in one form or another. In Australia, for example, matters of essential validity 
are embedded in the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) in at least two ways. First, the common law 
rules are preserved in the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) for marriages solemnised in Australia 
before 7 April 1986 and, where the statutory grounds of recognition do not apply, for 
marriages solemnised outside Australia.86 Secondly, while the statutory grounds of 
recognition assert the lex loci celebrationis as the general rule,87 s 88D of the Marriage Act 
1961 requires that the marriage also be essentially valid under Australian law. This 
statutory requirement of essential validity under Australian law reinforces strong domestic 
policy requiring the parties’ real consent to marry, a minimum marriageable age, and that 
the married parties not be in a statutorily prohibited consanguineous relationship.88  
Statutory provisions requiring essential validity are not a uniquely Australian 
experience. New Zealand’s Marriage Act 1955 applies ‘to the marriage of any person 
domiciled in New Zealand at the time of the marriage, whether the marriage is solemnised 
in New Zealand or elsewhere’.89 Thus, a person domiciled in New Zealand at the time of 
their marriage would be unable to evade the Act’s capacity requirements, such as 
marriageable age, simply by marrying abroad and returning to New Zealand. These 
provisions simply serve to elevate stringent domestic policy to the level of a mandatory 
rule. 
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III CHOICE OF LAW IN TORT 
A The Double Actionability Rule — Phillips v Eyre 
Until recently, the double actionability rule or the rule in Phillips v Eyre was the tort choice 
of law rule in most common law jurisdictions.90 In this case, a resident of Jamaica, 
Alexander Phillips, brought an action against the former Governor of Jamaica, Edward 
Eyre, for trespass and false imprisonment committed during Eyre’s suppression of a 
rebellion at Morant Bay in October 1865. Eyre relied upon an Act of Indemnity, passed by 
the Jamaican House of Assembly soon after the rebellion, which retrospectively validated 
acts done to suppress the rebellion. The Court of Queen’s Bench found in favour of Eyre. 
On appeal, the Court of Exchequer Chamber affirmed the decision at first instance. Willes 
J, who delivered the Court of Exchequer Chamber’s judgment, laid down the double 
actionability rule: 
As a general rule, in order to found a suit in England for a wrong alleged to have been 
committed abroad, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the wrong must be of such a 
character that it would have been actionable if committed in England … Secondly, the act 
must not have been justifiable by the law of the place where it was done.91 
As originally stated, the rule in Phillips v Eyre required actionability under the law of the 
forum and proof that the act constituting the wrong was ‘not justifiable’ in the lex loci 
delicti.  
After the decision in Phillips v Eyre, two conflicting views were expressed on the 
meaning of ‘not justifiable’.92 Under the first view, the expression ‘not justifiable’ merely 
indicated that civil actionability was required under the lex loci delicti.93 That is, the rule 
demanded wrongfulness under the lex fori and the lex loci delicti.94 The second view, 
obtained from Machado v Fontes,95 suggested that ‘not justifiable’ meant ‘not innocent’96 or, 
alternatively, not ‘authorised or innocent or excusable’.97 During the 20th century, the 
correctness of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Machado v Fontes was questioned in 
                                                 
90  For a general background on the lex loci delicti regimes of Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom, 
see: Reid Mortensen, ‘Homing Devices in Choice of Tort Law: Australian, British, and Canadian 
Approaches’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 839, 839–41, 842–50. The double 
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see Private International Law (Choice of Law in Tort) Act 2017 (NZ). 
91  (1870) LR 6 QB 1, 28–9 (Willes J) (Exch). 
92  The M Moxham (1876) 1 PD 107; cf Machado v Fontes [1897] 2 QB 231 (CA). 
93  The M Moxham (n 92) 111 (Mellish LJ). 
94  Ibid.  
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Canada98 and in Australia,99 leading to its rejection by the High Court of Australia in Koop 
v Bebb.100 Machado was subsequently overruled by the House of Lords in Boys v Chaplin.101 
In Boys v Chaplin, Lords Hodson and Wilberforce developed a flexible exception to the 
‘general rule’ of double actionability.102 The issue in Boys v Chaplin was the measure of 
damages recoverable in an action arising from a motor accident in Malta between two 
members of the British armed forces temporarily stationed there. The general damages 
for pain and suffering available to the respondent under English law were far more 
substantial than under Maltese law. Maltese law only permitted special damages for 
proven loss of earnings and expenses. The respondent recovered the more substantial 
sum in the House of Lords. For Lords Hodson and Wilberforce, this flowed from the 
application of a flexible exception. 
The parties’ lack of connection with the place of accident, Malta, influenced Lords 
Hodson and Wilberforce’s adoption of a flexible exception. It was adapted from the 
proper law of the tort theory and s 145(1) of the United States’ Restatement (Second) Conflict 
of Laws. In exceptional circumstances, the law of the forum could have exclusive 
application if ‘a particular issue between the parties’ had ‘the most significant relationship 
with the occurrence and the parties’.103 The inverse situation — disapplication of the lex 
fori under the first limb of the double actionability rule — occurred in Red Sea Insurance 
Ltd v Bouygues (‘Red Sea’).104 Whether the rule in Phillips v Eyre was a choice of law rule or 
imposed a threshold justiciability requirement also occupied courts of other major 
common law jurisdictions during the 20th century.  
In Australia, the rule in Phillips v Eyre proved to be ‘both venerable and notorious’ until 
the High Court of Australia was able ‘to kill it off’.105 It was unclear whether the rule 
concerned justiciability, choice of law, or both.106 It was also unclear whether there was a 
‘flexible exception’ to it.107 In the 1965 decision of Anderson v Eric Anderson Radio & TV 
Pty Ltd, the High Court evinced a strong forum bias by recognising that the rule imposed 
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a threshold requirement of justiciability.108 Once jurisdiction was established using the two 
limbs of the rule in Phillips v Eyre, the lex fori was applied as the tort choice of law rule.109 
For decades, the Anderson decision appeared to represent the Australian position because 
subsequent High Court authorities (emerging from the late-1980s) were plagued with a 
lack of unanimity.110 
B The First Limb of the Double Actionability Rule — The Halley 
The first limb of the rule in Phillips v Eyre has long been considered to be a form of public 
policy control — that is to say, ‘a technique of forum control specifically applicable in 
tort cases’.111 The first limb’s requirement of actionability in the lex fori originated in The 
Halley as a public policy exception.112 At issue in this case was a collision in Belgian waters 
between a Norwegian barque, Napoleon, and a British steamship, The Halley, which was 
under compulsory pilotage. Under Belgian law, the owners of a vessel under compulsory 
pilotage were vicariously liable for the pilot’s negligent acts.113 English law provided a 
complete defence to shipowners for the negligent or unskilful acts of a compulsory 
pilot.114 The Privy Council refused to recognise the Belgian compulsory pilotage law, 
emphasising that it was 
alike contrary to principle and authority to hold, that an English Court of Justice will 
enforce a Foreign Municipal law, and will give a remedy in the shape of damages in respect 
of an act which, according to its own principles, imposes no liability on the person from 
whom the damages are claimed …115 
1 The ‘Brooding Influence’116 of 19th Century Scholarship in The Halley 
The influence of 19th century German scholars, Savigny and Wächter, and the American 
Story on the Privy Council’s opinion in The Halley has been explored in scholarly writing 
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112  The Halley (1867–69) LR 2 AE 3. See Bederman (n 111) 1083. 
113  Ibid 3–4. 
114  Ibid 4 (Brett QC and Cohen) (in argument). 
115  The Liverpool, Brazil, and River Plate Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Benham (1868) LR 2 PC 193, 203 (Selwyn 
LJ) (‘The Halley (PC)’). 
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and judicial decisions.117 In the mid-19th century, the law governing delictual liability, 
though unsettled, was dominated by two schools of thought. Under the first position 
championed by Savigny and Wächter, the lex fori — the ‘positive stringent law of the 
forum’118 — governed delictual liability. Similarity between tortious liability and crime 
influenced this choice. Westlake and von Bar offered a second perspective on the 
governing law in tort, under which the lex loci delicti applied to tortious liability. 
For Savigny and Wächter, whether the lex loci or the lex fori applied to delictual liability 
depended on how the wrong was initially classified.119 The lex fori applied if the wrong was 
penal and ‘implicated both domestic and international public orders’.120 The centrality of 
compensation and redress to a wrong could see the lex loci delicti applied.121 The lex fori was 
Savigny’s preference because delicts bore a striking resemblance to ‘penal law, as part of 
the public law’.122 As Westlake’s revised first edition (1880) explained of Savigny’s choice, 
‘all laws relating to delicts have such a close connection with public order as to be entitled 
to the benefit of what I have called the reservation in favour of a stringent domestic 
policy’.123  
Sir Robert Phillimore, the judge at first instance in The Halley, rejected Savigny’s lex fori 
characterisation.124 Phillimore ascribed the determination of tortious liability to the lex loci 
delicti,125 finding ‘greater’ support for his position in the writings of continental scholars.126 
Phillimore criticised Savigny’s perception that obligations resulting from wrongs (‘obligatio 
ex delicto’) occasioned an exception in favour of the lex fori.127 Savigny considered that the 
enforcement of an obligatio ex delicti ‘border[ed] very closely upon the administration of 
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criminal law’.128 From Westlake’s first edition (1858), Savigny’s comparison to crime was 
challenged.129 Likening torts to contracts, Westlake referred ‘the obligation arising from a 
delict’ to the lex loci delicti.130 Despite this back and forth, however, support for the Privy 
Council’s opinion in the appeal of The Halley ultimately derived from the general 
‘prejudicial laws’ maxim in Story’s Conflict of Laws.131  
The parlous state of English private international law jurisprudence and ‘mid-Victorian 
parochialism’132 contributed to the Privy Council’s characterisation of the compulsory 
pilotage law in The Halley as contrary to public policy.133 Since the recognition of foreign 
law in early private international law depended on the simple notion of a sovereign’s good 
will, domestic courts could just as easily justify rejecting a foreign law as ‘prejudicial’ to its 
country’s interests. In addition to this early normative justification concerning foreign law, 
jurisprudence applying public policy to choice of law was undeveloped.134 The Halley 
preceded the growth of ‘case law precluding, on public policy grounds, what otherwise 
would be a choice of foreign law as the lex causae’.135  
2 The Intersection between Statutory Construction and ‘Prejudicial Laws’ 
Statutory construction techniques used before The Halley also influenced the outcome.136 
In The Amalia, it was held that the limited liability provision — s 54 — of the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1854, as amended in 1862, ‘applied equally to British and Foreign vessels’.137 
Rules of statutory construction were used to extend the statute’s application to foreign 
vessels.138 The imposition of liability under Belgian law in The Halley thus conflicted with 
the domestic policy evinced in the domestic shipping legislation affording protection to 
English shipowners.139 As Selwyn LJ explained in The Halley, assisted by a quote from para 
31 of the fifth edition of Story’s Conflict of Laws (1857): ‘it is difficult to conceive upon 
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what ground a claim can be rested to give to any Municipal law an extra-territorial effect, 
when those laws are prejudicial to the rights of other Nations or to those of their 
subjects’.140 The assertion of public policy in The Halley using Story’s general maxims of 
private international law is all the more remarkable given that Story’s Conflict of Laws does 
not mention torts.141 
C The First Limb after Phillips v Eyre 
1 United Kingdom 
Before the existing common law rules were replaced,142 the first limb of the rule in Phillips 
v Eyre ‘received unquestioned judicial acceptance’ in England.143 Application of the first 
limb yielded two principal objections focusing on the limb’s inbuilt forum bias. First, the 
first limb denied recognition to foreign torts unknown to English domestic law.144 
Secondly, application of the first limb was not avoided simply because a real connection 
with the forum was lacking.145  
The Privy Council in Red Sea Insurance Ltd v Bouygues weakened this objection without 
abandoning double actionability.146 In Red Sea, the requirement of actionability in the first 
limb of Phillips v Eyre ‘formed part of the ratio decidendi of an English decision’ ‘for the 
first time since The Halley’.147 The Privy Council considered that exceptional cases might 
exist to demand the exclusive application of the lex loci delicti if that law ‘had the most 
significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties’.148 The exception was 
applied in Red Sea to displace the lex fori — the law of Hong Kong — under the first limb 
of the double actionability rule. The law of Saudi Arabia, which had the most significant 
relationship with the claim, wholly prevailed.  
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Prioritisation of the lex loci delicti in the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 1995 (UK) eliminated the forum control previously inherent in the traditional choice 
of law rule for tort. Under the 1995 Act, the generally applicable law in tortious claims is 
the lex loci delicti, subject to a rule of displacement or flexible exception.149 The general rule 
can be displaced in favour of the law of another country with a stronger connection to 
the dispute.150 The common law rules were abolished,151 except for defamation claims.152 
The traditional safeguard of public policy and the rule of non-enforcement for penal, 
revenue or other public laws was maintained in the 1995 Act.153  
An explicit, narrowly defined public policy exception is recognised in the Rome II 
Regulation, the second major reform to English choice of law in tort. The general rule of 
the Rome II Regulation is the lex loci damni concept;154 however, special rules and exceptions 
are admitted for individual torts.155 Though the place of damage is at the forefront of the 
regime, application of the lex loci damni may be avoided if its ‘application is manifestly 
incompatible with the public policy (ordre public) of the forum’.156 The extraordinary role 
of the defence is reinforced by the words ‘manifestly incompatible’. 
2 New Zealand 
The double actionability rule no longer forms part of the law of New Zealand. The Private 
International Law (Choice of Law in Tort) Act 2017 (NZ), which abolished the rule, is modelled 
on the UK’s 1995 Act.157 The Act provides that the lex loci delicti is the general choice of 
law rule for all torts.158 That general rule is subject to a ‘rule of displacement’ or flexible 
exception.159 The exception — in line with the 1995 Act, Boys v Chaplin, and Red Sea — 
gives the New Zealand court a discretion to apply the substantive160 law of another 
country with a more significant connection to the parties and the dispute.161 Factors of 
significance in this determination include the parties,162 ‘any of the events that constitute 
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the tort in question’,163 or ‘any of the circumstances or consequences of those events’.164 
Moreover, public policy and the penal, revenue, or other public law exceptions may be 
applied to avoid the lex loci delicti’s application.165  
3 Australia and Canada 
The adoption of the lex loci delicti rule in Australia and Canada stimulated discussion of 
possible exceptions to its application. In both countries, the rule applies to intra-national 
and international torts. The only significant difference between the Australian and 
Canadian approaches to choice of law in tort is Canada’s recognition of a flexible 
exception for international torts. In Tolofson v Jensen, the Supreme Court of Canada 
embraced the lex loci delicti rule as the governing law for interprovincial and international 
torts.166 A flexible exception was recognised in international cases,167 but not in 
interprovincial cases mainly because of federal and constitutional considerations.168  In 
Australia, the abandonment of double actionability unfolded in two parts. First, the High 
Court in John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson adopted the lex loci delicti rule as the governing law 
for interstate torts.169  Constitutional considerations encouraged the High Court to adopt 
the lex loci delicti rule and to reject a flexible exception for intra-national cases.170 The same 
constitutional considerations prohibited a public policy defence within the Australian 
federation.171 Secondly, the High Court extended the ruling in Pfeiffer to international torts 
in Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang.172 The High Court rejected a flexible 
exception for international cases; however, a public policy exception was recognised.173  
The insularity of the first limb of Phillips v Eyre received criticism in the Canadian and 
Australian decisions. In Zhang, the High Court of Australia frankly recognised the forum 
control or public policy considerations inherent in the first limb of Phillips v Eyre.174 
Maintaining the threshold requirement of actionability would require the court ‘to favour, 
in Westlake’s terms, “a stringent domestic policy”’.175 The inherent forum control in the 
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first limb ‘[took] it beyond its public policy root’.176 The arbitrariness of The Halley 
threshold requirement and a matured ‘“experience” of the law’ encouraged the majority 
to reject a continued role for the first limb under Australian law.177 Meanwhile, the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Tolofson portrayed the first limb as reflecting 19th century 
considerations of British rule, which ‘probably led to the temptation, not always resisted, 
that British laws were superior to those of other lands’.178 In the Canadian Supreme 
Court’s view, the difficulties of proving foreign law and English courts’ suspicion of 
foreign legal systems said to have influenced the first limb had diminished in relevance 
with advances in transportation and communication.179 
IV CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has explored the public policy dimension of the traditional choice of law 
rules in marriage and in tort. Throughout the Chapter, much emphasis was placed on the 
formative role of scholarship in the common law development of both these choice of 
law rules. 
With respect to marriage, Part II argued that hard cases involving distinct premarital 
domiciles contributed to a clearly bifurcated rule referring questions of form to the lex loci 
celebrationis and questions of capacity to the lex domicilii. Two reasons were suggested for 
the emergence of the rule in Sottomayer v De Barros [No 2]. First, before the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Sottomayer v De Barros [No 1], English courts nearly always referred 
questions of form and capacity to the lex loci celebrationis. Secondly, consideration of the 
parties’ personal capacity to marry had not arisen before Brook v Brook. The public policy 
exception to the lex loci celebrationis was suppressed because of the English courts’ fresh 
focus on domicile.  
Moreover, Part II reinforced that the requirement at common law of essential validity 
embeds considerations of public policy into the positive choice of law rule for marriage. 
Statutory restrictions on capacity to marry are modern-day reflections of a country’s 
stringent domestic policy on the classes of people who are capable of contracting 
matrimony. For example, while Australian law reform ensured the reappearance of the lex 
loci celebrationis as a general rule for the validity of overseas marriages, the general rule is 
tempered by the statutory requirement that the marriage be essentially valid under Australian 
law.  
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Part III considered the public policy control in the first limb of the rule in Phillips v 
Eyre. The background to the litigation in Phillips v Eyre and The Halley prefaced this 
discussion. It briefly explored the uncertain effect of the rule and its inflexibility. 
Dissatisfaction with the rule’s homeward trend led to its ‘practically’ complete abolition 
in the United Kingdom,180 and its complete abolition in Canada and Australia, at the close 
of the 20th century. In 2017, New Zealand abolished the rule.181 Except for Australia, each 
jurisdiction recognises a flexible exception to the lex loci delicti rule, enabling the application 
of the law of another country possessing a stronger connection with the parties and the 
dispute. In Australia, the reforms in choice of law in tort nevertheless required that public 
policy be treated as an exception. It is significant that, irrespective of the course of their 
choice of law reform, each jurisdiction recognises the residual and exceptional role of 
public policy if the lex loci delicti violates fundamental policy of the forum.  
In the second half of the 19th century, English courts were prepared to apply the 
controlling principle of public policy, as expressed in 19th century institutional writings, to 
strike down foreign laws that it considered ‘prejudicial’ to England’s interests. In The 
Halley, the Privy Council applied the general principle of public policy in Story’s Conflict of 
Laws without any regard to its content or its applicability to foreign torts. The principle 
was used as a convenient device with which to exclude foreign law. The decision in The 
Halley also preceded the growth of ‘case law precluding, on public policy grounds, what 
otherwise would be a choice of foreign law as the lex causae’.182As the choice of law rules 
matured at common law, the explicit foundation of the rules in public policy was 
abandoned. Considerations of public policy became crystallised, embedded in the 
structure of the choice of law rule.  
The next Chapter sets out to examine the current scope of the public policy exception 
in private international law. It also seeks to explain why public policy is exceptionally 
applied and proposes international comity as a guiding principle encouraging the 
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CHAPTER 7: THE MODERN PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PUBLIC POLICY 
I INTRODUCTION 
n the 19th century, public policy offered fertile ground on which to cultivate new 
rules of private international law. That was observed in Chapter 6 with the evolution 
of the choice of law rules for marriage and tort. Both rules metamorphosed from 
evincing the public policy reservation to secreting those concerns beneath a different 
façade. This Chapter, on the other hand, considers the narrowing of the private 
international law of public policy and, then, suggests its modern content. In private 
international law jurisprudence, arguments of public policy have been neutralised by the 
dangers of its unrestrained use, encapsulated in Burrough J’s ‘unruly horse’ metaphor,1 
and the modern trend towards recognising foreign law. 
Judicial consideration of public policy — characterised as one of private international 
law’s ‘fairly well-trodden escape routes’2 — inevitably involves scrutinising the substantive 
content of foreign law that is otherwise applicable. This scrutiny could lead a court, 
exceptionally, to deny recognition to a foreign judgment or exclude a foreign law that is 
directed by the usual application of choice of law rules. It has, over the years, become a 
measure of last resort primed ‘for foreign laws of surpassing evil or equivalent objection’.3 
Within private international law, public policy has had the most exposure in cases 
involving contract and status.4 And, though public policy is functionally negative or 
exclusionary, it may have positive or ‘creative’ functions.5  
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Two types of public policy have been consistently assumed in academic writing.6 The 
first type of public policy — domestic or internal public policy — has exclusive 
application in wholly domestic cases.7 The second type is international public policy, 
which is the function of public policy in private international law.8 At a broad level, this 
involves the application of domestic policy norms to override a foreign law or judgment. 
However, the doctrine is not freely invoked in common law jurisdictions because, as Lord 
Simon remarked in Vervaeke v Smith, ‘the court will be even slower to invoke public policy 
in the field of conflict of laws than when a purely municipal legal issue is involved.’9 
Throughout this Chapter, the term ‘cross-border public policy’ is favoured over 
‘international public policy’. More recently, a third type of public policy has come into 
sharper relief. This third type is preoccupied with rules of international law and moral 
interests of universal applicability.10 Suggested labels for it include ‘transnational’,11 ‘really 
international’,12 ‘truly international’13 or ‘global’14 public policy.  
This Chapter re-examines cross-border public policy to define its current scope of 
operation. The aim of this Chapter is then to suggest additional constrictions on an already 
exceptionally applied exclusion in Anglo-common law private international law.15 This 
point is developed in two parts. Part II of this Chapter expounds international comity as 
an important modern justification for applying foreign law and for recognising foreign 
judgments. This discussion therefore begins with historical background on comity to 
explain its development and its modern uses. International comity, connected with 
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judgments and choice of law, is next reinforced as a restraint which consolidates the 
common law courts’ reluctance to engage with public policy arguments.  
Guided by this development, Part III identifies the present scope of the public policy 
doctrine. In this part, the salient considerations underpinning the doctrine’s application 
and the normative categories of cross-border public policy are considered. The positive 
and negative consequences of excluding foreign law using public policy conclude this 
discussion in Part III.  
II INTERNATIONAL COMITY IN MODERN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A Origins of International Comity 
1 Huber’s Comity  
The modern conception of comity in private international law can be traced to the 17th 
century Dutch scholar, Ulrik Huber.16 Following its asserted independence from Spanish 
rule in 1581,17 the Dutch Republic had grown into an important trading nation.  
Expansion in trade increased contact and commercial intercourse with other nations, an 
inevitable consequence of which was conflicting laws between traders and between the 
Dutch provinces.18 Seventeenth century Dutch jurists — including the Voets, Christian 
Rodenburg, and Huber — sought a solution to this problem of applying foreign law in 
domestic courts without damaging international commerce or impairing the 
independence of the newly independent Dutch Republic.19 The solution was comity, 
which reconciled the application of foreign law in domestic courts with the imperative of 
absolute territorial sovereignty — limiting a sovereign’s laws to its territorial borders.20 
The expansion of international commerce in the Dutch Republic, organised into 
independent provinces, thus provided the background to the comity principle developed 
in Huber’s De Conflictu Legum (1689).  
Comity featured prominently in the third axiom of Huber’s De Conflictu Legum. Huber 
used three axioms to reconcile a nation’s claim to absolute territorial sovereignty with the 
cross-border enforcement of laws. Comity, meaning ‘a sentiment of friendship and 
                                                 
16  Comity had a history before Huber: see, eg, Cameron Sim, ‘Choice of Law and Anti-Suit Injunctions: 
Relocating Comity’ (2013) 62(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 703, 715.  
17  Independence was formally recognised by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. 
18  Joel R Paul, ‘Comity in International Law’ (1991) 32(1) Harvard International Law Journal 1, 15. 
19  See, eg, Hessel E Yntema, ‘The Comity Doctrine’ (1966–67) 65(1) Michigan Law Review 9, 20; Paul (n 18) 
14. 
20  See, eg, Paul (n 18) 14. 
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courtesy between sovereigns’,21 mediated this tension. Huber’s first two axioms 
recognised the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty. The first axiom accepted that 
‘[t]he laws of each state have force within the limits of that government, and bind all 
subject to it, but not beyond’.22 By the second axiom, Huber bound people within the 
territory of a sovereign to that country’s laws: ‘All persons within the limits of a 
government, whether they live there permanently or temporarily, are deemed to be 
subjects thereof.’23 The third axiom resolved the critical issue of why the courts of one 
country might apply the strictly territorial laws of another sovereign. It was comity that 
explained why foreign laws might be applied by the courts of another country.  Huber’s 
third axiom provided: ‘Sovereigns will so act by way of comity that rights acquired within 
the limits of a government retain their force everywhere so far as they do not cause 
prejudice to the power or rights of such government or of its subjects’.24 
The doctrine of comity in Huber’s third axiom was more explanatory than ‘practical’ 
or ‘prescriptive’.25 Comity explained ‘why a sovereign nation would choose to forego 
exercising its own power and recognise another state’s power instead’.26 The doctrine left 
the decision to admit foreign law entirely to the sovereign’s discretion.27 It operated ‘out 
of a sense of hospitality and affability toward the foreigner’, bringing to mind good 
neighbours lending each other a hand.28 Huber also recognised the commercial 
expediency of applying foreign laws in domestic courts by observing that ‘nothing could 
be more inconvenient to commerce and to international usage than that transactions valid 
by the law of one place should be rendered of no effect elsewhere on account of a 
difference in the law’.29 In the early 18th century, Huber’s doctrine of comity was received 
into Scottish courts and subsequently progressed to English and American courts. 
2 Comity in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries 
In the 18th century, Huber’s doctrine of comity was received into the common law world 
by way of Scotland.30 Scottish students, who studied law at Dutch universities in the 17th 
and 18th centuries, were familiar with the writings of continental scholars which would 
                                                 
21  Reid Mortensen, ‘Comity and Jurisdictional Restraint in Vanuatu’ (2002) 33(1) Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review 95, 98. 
22  Ernest G Lorenzen, ‘Huber’s De Conflictu Legum’ (1918–19) 13 Illinois Law Review 375, 376. 
23  Ibid. 
24  Ibid. 
25  Justice James Allsop, ‘Comity and Commerce’ [2005] Federal Judicial Scholarship 27 [25]. 
26  Ibid. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Paul (n 18) 17. 
29  Lorenzen (n 22) 403. 
30  See Kurt H Nadelmann, ‘Introduction – The Comity Doctrine’ (1966-7) 65(1) Michigan Law Review 1, 2. 
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have included Huber and the Voets.31 In 1711, the Scottish Court of Session in Goddart v 
Swinton interpreted comity as demanding ‘respect and civility, but not as excluding 
review’.32 The Court recognised that foreign decrees were enforced out of comity, not ‘ex 
necessitate’.33 To be enforceable, foreign decrees had to possess ‘two qualities, viz That they 
be founded on principles agreeable to the law of nations, and contain nothing contrary to 
the particular laws of the place where they are craved to be put in execution’.34 Reciprocity 
was identified as a condition for the enforcement of English decrees in Scotland: ‘And 
there is no reason to sustain their decrees here, till the English pay the same respect to 
ours, which they do not.’35 
In the 18th and 19th centuries, Huber’s view of comity as courtesy provided the basis 
for private international law in the common law world. Scottish lawyers introduced the 
concept of comity to English courts.36 In England, Lord Mansfield exposed the local legal 
community to the private international law scheme set out in Huber’s De Conflictu Legum. 
Notably, in Robinson v Bland — a case involving the validity of a French gaming contract 
— Lord Mansfield observed that ‘the general rule established ex comitate et jure gentium is, 
that the place where the contract is made, and not where the action is brought, is to be 
considered in expounding and enforcing the contract’.37 Comity’s place within common 
law private international law was definitively recognised in Joseph Story’s 1834 text, 
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws. 
Story’s Conflict of Laws used Huber’s three axioms as the basis for American private 
international law.38 By adopting the doctrine of comity, which ‘is, and ever must be 
uncertain’,39 Story continued Huber’s idea that domestic courts applied interstate or 
federal law based on discretionary considerations, not from obligation.40 Story observed 
that ‘whatever force and obligation the laws of one country have in another, depends 
solely upon the laws, and municipal regulations of the latter, that is to say, upon its own 
proper jurisprudence and polity, and upon its own express or tacit consent’.41 By placing 
comity at the forefront of private international law, Story provided ‘a mediating principle 
                                                 
31  D J Llewelyn Davies, ‘The Influence of Huber’s De Conflictu Legum on English Private International 
Law’ (1937) 18 British Year Book of International Law 49, 53; Paul (n 18) 17–18. 
32  Goddart v Swinton (1711) 4 Bro Sup 848, 849. 
33  Goddart v Swinton (1713) Mor 4533, 4534. 
34  Ibid 4535 (as in original). 
35  Goddart v Swinton (1709) Mor 6445, 6445. 
36  Llewelyn Davies (n 31) 53; Paul (n 18) 17–18. 
37  Robinson v Bland (1860) 1 Bl W 256; 96 ER 141, 141 (Lord Mansfield CJ). 
38  Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (Hilliard, Gray and Co, 1st ed, 1834) 30 s 29. 
39  Ibid 29 s 28. 
40  Ibid 33 s 33. 
41  Ibid 24 s 23. 
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between free and slave states’ which would ‘save the republic’.42 The focus of Story’s 
Conflict of Laws was ‘the internal tensions of federalism’.43 
Story’s interpretation of comity corresponded with his natural law framework 
discussed in Chapter 3. Story’s characterisation of comity as an ‘imperfect obligation like 
beneficence, humanity, and charity’ used the recognisable language of Reverend Paley.44 
In recent scholarship, the ‘imperfect obligation’ language has been anachronistically 
attributed to Gray J in the 1895 Supreme Court of the United States’ decision, Hilton v 
Guyot.45 However, Story’s natural law philosophy — gleaned from an anonymously written 
encyclopaedia entry (as outlined in Chapter 3) — contained a nuanced understanding of 
imperfect rights and obligations modelled after Paley’s Principles of Moral and Political 
Philosophy. While imperfect rights were not enforceable by law, the obligations that arose 
from them were ‘deemed as imperative, as if they also possessed the strongest earthly 
sanctions; since they arise from the commands of God, and are to be done in obedience 
to his will’.46 This idea of imperfect obligation was the prism through which Huber’s 
comity doctrine was understood. Comity in the private international law context arose 
‘from mutual interest and utility; from a sense of the inconveniences, which would result 
from a contrary doctrine; and from a sort of moral necessity to do justice, in order that 
justice may be done to us in return’.47  
3 Recharacterising Comity in the United States 
American conflicts scholars gradually abandoned Story’s conception of comity as the 
theoretical basis for private international law.48 Following the example of A V Dicey, 
Joseph Beale popularised the vested rights approach in early 20th century America. Vested 
rights removed any consideration of comity by focusing on whether a right vested in 
another forum, such as a cause of action, would be enforced in a domestic forum.49 Story’s 
comity doctrine was expressly rejected because it was an ‘enabling principle’ which 
                                                 
42  Paul (n 18) 20, 22. See also the slavery example in Story (1834) (n 38) 28–9. 
43  Paul (n 18) 25. 
44  Story (1834) (n 38) 33 s 33. But see Paul (n 18) 24. Paul argued that Gray J in Hilton v Guyot was the one 
to interpret ‘comity as relying on an imperfect obligation’: at 24. 
45  Paul (n 18) 24. 
46  Valerie L Horowitz (ed), The Unsigned Essays of Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Early American Views of 
Law (Talbot Publishing, 2015) 262. Story’s characterisation of comity as an ‘imperfect obligation’ reflects 
the terminology used in explaining his natural law philosophy, which drew on William Paley’s Principles 
of Moral and Political Philosophy. For a summary of Paley’s work, see Chapter 3. 
47  Story (1834) (n 38) 34 s 35. 
48  Donald Earl Childress III, ‘Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws’ 
(2010–11) 44(1) University of California Davis Law Review 11, 35–46. 
49  Ibid 35–9. 
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provided no guidance on the rule to be applied in a given case.50 This scholarly 
‘unmooring’ of comity continued with the spread of interest analysis in the latter half of 
the 20th century.51 Unseating the vested rights theory, Currie’s governmental interest 
analysis was concerned with identifying a sovereign’s interest in litigation.52 
Academic criticism has not, however, dissuaded the judiciary from continuing to 
invoke comity in American case law, making it possible to identify three species of 
comity.53 Prescriptive comity — the first and earliest species of comity — indicates 
deference to foreign lawmakers.54 In the first half of the 20th century, considerations of 
prescriptive comity were deemed relevant to the exercise of personal jurisdiction or the 
extraterritorial reach of domestic statutes.55 This use of comity ‘manifested’ itself in tests 
requiring interest balancing or minimum contacts before exercising personal jurisdiction 
or before giving extraterritorial effect to domestic statutes.56 The principle of 
reasonableness in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Third) militates 
against the unreasonable exercise of personal jurisdiction by importing an interest 
balancing test.57 
Deference to courts of another sovereign, generally referred to as ‘comity of courts’,58 
‘judicial comity’59 or ‘adjudicatory comity’,60 is the second trend of American case law.61 
Rules for recognising foreign judgments and for giving judicial assistance to foreign courts 
are leading examples of this second trend.62 Adjudicatory comity is also considered to be 
the basis for the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens, which requires American 
courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction if another jurisdiction is ‘more appropriate in the 
interests of justice’.63 The third species of comity is sovereign party or executive comity, 
                                                 
50  Joseph H Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1916) s 71, quoted in Childress (n 48) 37. 
51  Childress (n 48) 35, 39–43. 
52  Ibid 39–43. 
53  Ibid 47. 
54  N Jansen Calamita, ‘Rethinking Comity: Towards a Coherent Treatment of International Parallel 
Proceedings’ (2006) 27(3) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 601, 606; Childress 
(n 48) 16; William S Dodge, ‘International Comity in American Law’ (2015) 115(8) Columbia Law Review 
2071, 2099–2105. 
55  Dodge (n 54) 2093–5. 
56  Ibid.  
57  Paul (n 18) 45. 
58  Hartford Fire Insurance Co v California, 509 US 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia J). 
59  Michael D Ramsey, ‘Escaping “International Comity”’ (1998) 83 Iowa Law Review 893, 897–906; Anne-
Marie Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’ (2003) 44(1) Harvard International Law Journal 191, 
194; Childress (n 48) 16. 
60  Calamita (n 54) 606; Thomas Schultz and Niccolo Ridi, ‘Comity in US Courts’ (2018) 10(1) Northeastern 
University Law Journal 280, 325–42. 
61  See, eg, Calamita (n 54) 606; Dodge (n 54) 2105. 
62  Dodge (n 54) 2105; Allsop (n 25) [68]–[75]. 
63  Calamita (n 54) 631–41, 637. 
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which implicates deference to executive acts of foreign sovereigns.64 For each species, 
comity can operate as a ‘principle of recognition’ or ‘a principle of restraint’.65 In other 
words, the application of domestic law or the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction demands 
restraint ‘to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other 
nations’.66 However, comity also demands recognition be given to foreign law, foreign 
judgments, and foreign sovereignty.67 
The justifications for comity in American law have changed over time. Public 
rationales for the comity doctrine became more pronounced in early 20th century 
decisions.68 Not only did comity comprehend the commercial convenience of private 
parties, as Huber had conceived it, comity also implicated deference to foreign sovereignty 
and the maintenance of ‘friendly relations’.69 Initially, considerations of public interest 
manifested in 19th century American jurisprudence as ‘a justification for not extending 
comity to foreign laws’ considered prejudicial.70 From the early 20th century, American 
courts began to appreciate that applying American laws extraterritorially or questioning a 
foreign act of state could be offensive to foreign sovereigns.71 This revised conception of 
comity to justify restraint recognises that another country’s courts might have a legitimate 
interest in resolving a dispute.72 
The Hilton v Guyot73 definition of comity is oft-quoted throughout the common law 
world as a definitive statement on comity. The context of the definition was the 
enforcement of a French executory judgment against a US citizen. A slim majority in the 
Supreme Court of the United States decided that its courts would only give full faith and 
credit to a foreign judgment if the foreign court granted reciprocal treatment to judgments 
of the United States,74 which French courts did not do. In giving the majority opinion, 
Gray J observed that comity meant: 
neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, 
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the 
legislative, executive and judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to 
                                                 
64  Childress (n 48) 47; Schultz and Ridi, ‘Comity in US Courts’ (n 50) 342–54.  
65  Dodge (n 54) 2078, 2099. 
66  F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd v Empagran SA, 542 US 155, 164 (2004). 
67  Dodge (n 54) 2078. 
68  Ibid 2095.  
69  Ibid 2095–6, 2097–8. 
70  Ibid 2096. 
71  Ibid 2097. 
72  Ibid 2098. 
73  Hilton v Guyot, 159 US 113 (1895). 
74  Ibid 228.  
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international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons 
who are under the protection of its laws.75 
4 Decay and (Partial) Rehabilitation of International Comity in English Law 
Unlike its American counterpart, the English idea of comity is still relatively 
underdeveloped. This is in part due to the consolidated disdain of leading 19th and 20th 
century text writers towards the concept.76 Dicey, in his first edition of Conflict of Laws 
(1896), described comity as ‘a singular specimen of confusion of thought produced by 
laxity of language’.77 Dicey rejected the implication that recognition or enforcement of 
foreign laws depended on comity, adding that the application of foreign law was ‘not a 
matter of caprice or option’.78 More guarded language appears in the 15th edition of Dicey, 
Morris and Collins in which comity is characterised as ‘a term of very elastic content’.79 
Cheshire consolidated his disdain for the ‘meaningless or misleading’ term over several 
editions of his text.80 From the sixth edition (1961) of his text, Cheshire questioned 
comity’s consistency ‘with the judicial function’ because ‘comity is a matter for sovereigns, 
not for judges required to decide a case according to the rights of the parties’.81 Elsewhere, 
the concept was described as ‘far too vague’ and variable ‘to serve as a satisfactory 
theoretical underpinning for a sophisticated system of private international law’.82 As a 
consequence, it has been observed that ‘[r]eferences to comity… should only be made 
with caution, and preferably dropped altogether’.83 
However, despite disdain from scholars and judges alike, the concept persists in the 
decisions of English and other common law courts where it has different connotations in 
different contexts.84 Writing in 2000, Lord Collins observed that he had ‘come across 
                                                 
75  Ibid 163–4. 
76  Lawrence Collins, ‘Comity in Modern Private International Law’ in James Fawcett (ed), Reform and 
Development of Private International Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Peter North (Oxford University Press, 2002) 
89, 91; Adrian Briggs, ‘The Principle of Comity in Private International Law’ (2012) 354 Recueil des Cours 
de l’Académie de Droit International 65, 81–2; Sim (n 16) 715. 
77  A V Dicey, The Conflict of Laws (Stevens and Sons, 1st ed, 1896) 10. 
78  Ibid. 
79  Collins, Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 4) 5 [1-008]. 
80  Sir Peter North and JJ Fawcett, Cheshire and North’s Private International Law (Butterworths, 13th ed, 1999) 
5, quoted in Collins, ‘Comity in Modern Private International Law’ (n 76) 89, 91. 
81  North and Fawcett (n 80) 5, quoted in Collins, ‘Comity in Modern Private International Law’ (n 76) 89, 
91–2. 
82  J G Collier, Conflict of Laws (Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed, 2001) 379. 
83  Peter Kaye, ‘Jurisdictional Discretion of English Courts’ (1990) 134(3) Solicitors Journal 703, 706. For a 
similar comment, see Briggs, ‘Comity’ (n 76) 87 (‘It cannot be denied that there is an air of wariness 
associated to appeals to comity’). 
84  Collins, ‘Comity in Modern Private International Law’ (n 76) 89, 95; Ralf Michaels, ‘Public and Private 
International Law: German Views on Global Issues’ (2008) 4(1) Journal of Private International Law 121, 
216. 
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more than thirty decisions in the British Commonwealth in the last twenty years citing 
Hilton v Guyot on comity, and more than 100 decisions in the United States in the same 
period’.85 Lord Collins, in the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom’s decision Agbaje v 
Agbaje, identified three uses for comity from the existing authorities.86 In the first place, 
comity was ‘sometimes used not simply in the sense of courtesy to foreign states and their 
courts, but also in the sense of rules of public international law which establish the proper 
limits of national legislative jurisdiction in cases involving a foreign element’.87 Not unlike 
the trend of American authorities on prescriptive comity, this sense of comity constrains 
the application of United Kingdom legislation ‘involving a foreign country when the 
United Kingdom has no reasonable relationship with the situation’.88 Deference to foreign 
institutions characterises the second use of comity which requires that ‘a court in one 
country should not lightly characterise the law or judicial decisions of another country as 
unjust’.89 Thirdly, comity may provide ‘the basis for the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments’.90 
In general, English courts employ the comity doctrine to limit the application of 
domestic laws or, in exceptional cases, ‘to question, limit, or refuse the application of 
foreign laws’.91 Comity is used to enjoin courts to exercise restraint and to show ‘respect 
for the operation of different legal systems’.92 For example, historically, English judges 
invoked comity to question the ‘exorbitance’ of jurisdiction claimed by English courts in 
service-out applications.93 In more recent years, comity has been relevant to the granting 
of anti-suit injunctions with English courts reinforcing the ‘great caution’ required before 
one is granted.94 English courts have recognised the reality that anti-suit injunctions, 
though in personam, indirectly interfere with foreign proceedings.95 Comity interacts with 
                                                 
85  Collins, ‘Comity in Modern Private International Law’ (n 76) 89, 95. 
86  Agbaje v Agbaje [2010] 1 AC 628. 
87  Ibid 671 [52] (Lord Collins). 
88  Ibid. 
89  Ibid 671 [53]. 
90  Ibid 671 [54]. 
91   See generally Briggs, ‘Comity’ (n 76) 96–115; Dodge (n 54) 2072. 
92  See Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd [No 3] [2009] QB 503, 514 [16] (Lawrence Collins 
LJ); Ecobank Transnational Inc v Tanoh [2016] 1 WLR 2231, 2261 [132] (Christopher Clarke LJ) (CA). 
93  Collins, ‘Comity in Modern Private International Law’ (n 76) 99. For comments on the sufficiency of 
connections with the forum to counter questions of jurisdictional exorbitance, see Re Paramount Airways 
Ltd [1993] Ch 223, 239–40 (CA); Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd [No 2] [2009] QB 
450, [34]–[36]. For a more recent account, see Tiger Yacht Management Ltd v Morris [2019] FCAFC 8. 
94  See, eg, Collins, ‘Comity in Modern Private International Law’ (n 76) 101; Sim (n 16) 713. 
95  See, eg, Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119, 139 (Lord Goff) (HL(E)); Collins, ‘Comity in 
Modern Private International Law’ (n 76) 101; Sim (n 16) 713. 
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anti-suit injunctions by insisting that ‘the English forum should have a sufficient interest 
in, or connection with, the matter in question’.96 
B Comity in Modern Private International Law: Judicial Restraint and Public Policy 
In Anglo-common law jurisdictions, judicial application of cross-border public policy has 
been ‘comparatively rare’.97 Adverse judicial and scholarly comment has generally 
followed where Anglo-common law courts have applied the exclusion in commercial and 
family law cases.98 For Australian courts, the reluctance to employ public policy is quite 
pronounced. In the Marriage of El Ouiek is the only reported case in which an Australian 
court has applied the public policy exception.99  
The forum-orientated bias of English choice of law rules and English courts’ increased 
internationalism have been ventured as distinctive reasons for the ‘smallness’ of English 
public policy (compared to its civil law counterpart).100 In particular, the restriction of 
English public policy has been attributed to the predominance of the lex fori in family 
matters.101  The converse argument is that modern-day courts are more amenable to 
foreign law in cross-border litigation than previously had been the case: ‘“judicial 
chauvinism has been replaced by judicial comity”’.102 As a corollary — the argument goes 
— the public policy doctrine is only exceptionally applied in many Anglo-common law 
jurisdictions.103  
                                                 
96  Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119, 139 (Lord Goff) (HL(E)). 
97  For comments of this nature, see: Collins, Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 4) 100 [5–004]; Carter, ‘The Rôle 
of Public Policy’ (n 2) 3; Nelson Enonchong, ‘Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws: A Chinese Wall 
Around Little England?’ (1996) 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 633, 636–7. 
98  See, eg, Canada: Sangi v Sangi [2011] BCSC 523, [287], [290] (Gray J), questioning the exception’s 
application in Vladi v Vladi (1987) 79 NSR (2d) 356; Gerald B Robertson, ‘Public Policy and Recognition 
of Foreign Divorces: Zhang v Lin and Marzara v Marzara’ (2012) 49(3) Alberta Law Review 745, 748–9, 
critiquing the successful invocation of public policy in Zhang v Lin 2010 ABQB 420 [68] (Veit J) and 
Marzara v Marzara 2011 BCSC 408, [77], [79] (Ross J). Cf Genova v Knight [2005] 11 WWR 32 (the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal set aside a lower court’s finding that child support provisions in a New Jersey 
divorce order were contrary to the public policy of British Columbia). New Zealand: Reeves v OneWorld 
Challenge LLC [2006] 2 NZLR 184, 198 [65], citing Jones v Poffenroth (High Court of New Zealand, Smellie 
J, 14 March 1986): ‘in Jones v Poffenroth… Smellie J refused to enforce a judgment where the 
proceedings in the State of California had been tainted by maintenance and champerty. In our view, that 
set the bar too low, and the weight of judicial and academic authority would tell against such a 
low threshold’. 
99  In the Marriage of El Ouiek (1977) 29 FLR 171. 
100  Gerhart Husserl, ‘Public Policy and Ordre Public’ (1938) 25(1) Virginia Law Review 37, 47; Collins, Dicey, 
Morris and Collins (n 4) 100 [5–004]; Carter, ‘The Rôle of Public Policy’ (n 2) 3; Enonchong (n 97) 636–
7. 
101  Carter, ‘The Rôle of Public Policy’ (n 2) 3. 
102  Enonchong (n 97) 642, quoting The Abidin Daver [1984] AC 398, 411, 411 (Lord Diplock). The quote 
from The Abidin Daver was given in the context of English courts’ receptiveness towards the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens.  
103  Enonchong (n 97) 642. 
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Indeed, ‘extreme reserve’104 has been the symptomatic response of Anglo-common law 
courts to public policy arguments. Avoidance of these arguments arguably casts a pall 
over the content of public policy — the circumstances under which the defence most 
likely applies. What is left is Anglo-common law courts’ commentary on the unsuitability 
of public policy arguments, which emphasise the exception’s narrow compass,105 the high 
threshold required before the doctrine may be engaged in private international law106 and 
the need for comity.  
Anglo-common law courts have clearly indicated that differences in legal solutions 
between jurisdictions are ‘not of itself sufficient’ to engage the private international law 
doctrine.107 As Atkinson J of the Supreme Court of Queensland observed in De Santis v 
Russo, ‘different jurisdictions… adopt different solutions to similar problems without 
suffering the ignominy of being described as contrary to public policy’.108 The well-known 
comments of Cardozo J in Loucks v Standard Oil Co of New York are apt in this context: 
‘[w]e are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because we 
deal with it otherwise at home’.109  
1 Comity and the Recognition of Foreign Judgments 
Motives of international comity militate against the public policy exception operating to 
deny recognition of a foreign judgment under common law principles and, to some extent, 
statutory regimes.110Comity expressed through ‘the respect and recognition of the 
                                                 
104  Vervaeke v Smith (n 9) 164 (Lord Simon). 
105  See, eg, Holt v Thomas (1987) 38 DLR (4th) 117, 137 [26] (O’Leary J) (AB QB); United States of America v 
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[2006] 2 SCR 612, 664 [121] (McLachlin CJ) (dissenting); ML v YJ [2008] 3 HKC 362, 374 [48] (Lam J); 
Lane v Questnet Ltd [2010] NZAR 210, 219 [47] (Ellen France J); Ross v Ross [2011] NZFLR 440, 447–9 
[28]–[29] (Allan J); Sangi v Sangi (n 98) [284] (Gray J); Kok v Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd (2017) 323 
FLR 95, 101 [18] (Martin CJ); Mudajaya Corp Berhad v Chua [2019] NZHC 1436, [69] (Fitzgerald J). 
106   See, eg, Block Bros Realty v Mollard (1981) DLR (3d) 323, [17] (Craig JA) (BCCA); Stern (n 105) [143] 
(Tamberlin J) (‘Stern’); Genova v Knight (n 98) [21], [24], [26] (Low J); Vargo v Saskatchewan 2006 SKQB 
253, [24] (Gabrielson J). 
107  De Santis v Russo (2001) 27 Fam LR 414, 419 [18] (Atkinson J); International Farmers Fertiliser Cooperative v 
Legend International Holdings Inc (2016) 52 VR 1, 14 [52] ؘ–[53] (Randall AsJ). 
108  De Santis v Russo (n 107) 419 [18]. 
109  Loucks v Standard Oil Co of New York, 224 NY 99, 111 (1918) (Cardozo J). 
110  For general comments to this effect, see Jenton Overseas Investment Pte Ltd v Townsing (2008) 21 VR 241 
243 [9], 246 [20] (Whelan J); Kok v Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd (n 105) 100–1 [17] (Martin CJ). Cf  
160 CHAPTER 7 
 
 
institutions of other sovereign states’ discourages the operation of the public policy 
defence in Anglo-common law jurisdictions.111 However, some care should be taken when 
using the term ‘comity’ in this context; ‘international comity’ and ‘reciprocity’ once 
prevailed as theoretical bases for recognition and enforcement at common law.112 In any 
case, sufficiently strong grounds must be mustered before an enforcing court will refuse 
on public policy grounds to recognise a foreign judgment that is ‘final and conclusive’ and 
for a definite sum of money. A factor — or motive — consistently invoked in favour of 
sustaining foreign judgments is ‘the public policy of acting consistently with international 
comity’ or ‘judicial comity’.113 The court’s refusal to ‘go behind’ a foreign judgment 
maintains the interests of comity with recognition serving the countervailing public policy 
of finality in litigation.114 As Kirby P observed in Bouton v Labiche, ‘[t]he interests of comity 
are not served if the courts of the common law are too eager to criticise the standards of 
the courts and tribunals of another jurisdiction or too reluctant to recognise their order 
…’115 In consequence, few reported Anglo-common law decisions have denied 
recognition to a foreign in personam judgment on the basis of public policy.116 One outlier, 
though, is Singapore where foreign judgments on gambling debts have been denied 
recognition.117  
A series of counterweights are required to tip the balance from international comity to 
non-recognition using the public policy defence. The defence is a blunt instrument 
because it involves passing judgment on the quality of foreign law. The enforcement of a 
foreign judgment can be prevented only if it ‘is founded on a law contrary to the 
fundamental morality of the [domestic] legal system’.118 Courts thus express extreme 
reserve towards public policy arguments and exercise restraint before invoking the 
doctrine. By rejecting arguments of this nature, courts emphasise the high threshold 
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required before public policy counteracts the policies that are strongly in favour of 
enforcement.119 The maintenance of international comity, the principles underlying 
statutory registration and enforcement schemes, and ‘the inherent volatility of the notion 
of “public policy”’ are policies encouraging enforcement.120  
Judges are liable to point out that the offence to public policy must be ‘fundamental’ 
to the domestic forum to enliven the public policy defence.121 Enforcement of the foreign 
judgment ‘must offend some principle of [domestic] public policy so sacrosanct as to 
require its maintenance at all costs’.122 Thus, the different solutions to legal problems taken 
in different jurisdictions are not sufficient to engage the defence.123 Rather, the defence 
may be engaged if foreign law raises ‘questions of moral and ethical policy; fairness of 
procedure, and illegality, of a fundamental nature’.124 Because the content of public policy 
shifts over time, the relevant authorities take a broad view of the types of fundamental 
domestic norms that could engage the defence. 
2 Comity and Choice of Law 
Comity regulates the judicial discretion to accept or to reject foreign law suggested by the 
choice of law method. The multilateral approach demands that judges select the governing 
law based on objective criteria and apply that law without usually passing judgment.125 
The comity principle is implicated in the multilateral approach because the rejection of 
foreign law is ‘exceptional’.126 Private international law is concerned with public policy of 
a higher order than the domestic doctrine of public policy, the historical development of 
which was discussed in Chapter 2.  Judges seldom ‘evaluate’ or ‘conduct a quality audit’ 
on the content of the selected law or the legal system from which that law derives, even 
if invited to do so.127 For example, the common law gives effect to the confiscation of 
property located within the territorial jurisdiction and done in accordance with the law of 
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a foreign country; the reverse is true for confiscations outside the territory’s jurisdiction.128 
In certain circumstances, however, the content of the foreign law ‘is so disgraceful that it 
really does not count as law at all’.129 Here, the doctrine of public policy intervenes as a 
corrective against the regular application of the multilateral approach.130 
III THE MODERN DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC POLICY 
The initial focus of Part III is on the salient considerations that directly or indirectly 
inform an Anglo-common law court’s discretion whether to refuse to apply foreign law 
or to recognise or enforce a foreign judgment using common law or statutory public 
policy. For this purpose, Mills’ three parameters that suggest the circumstances in which 
public policy may be justified — proximity, relativity of the norm, and seriousness of the 
norm breached — are adopted.131 Mills’ model sees the application of public policy 
depend on the proximity of the dispute to the forum (‘proximity’), the extent to which a 
norm is shared or absolute (‘relativity’), and the degree to which the norm was breached 
(‘seriousness of breach’).132 This third consideration — seriousness — will not be 
discussed: it aligns with modern judicial practice in many common law jurisdictions. In 
other words, courts are looking for something more than a minor breach of norms of 
public policy.  
Despite adopting these parameters as relevant considerations, Part III assumes a 
different premise to Mills’. Instead of suggesting ‘that the use of public policy must be 
restricted’, this Part posits that public policy’s use is, in fact, restricted.133 As this restriction 
has been gradual, it has been possible for judges and scholars to calibrate established 
categories of public policy as well as to forecast new categories. Scholarly writing, for 
example, anticipated that violations of international law were within the doctrine’s remit. 
The academic and judicial sidelining of notorious public policy decisions has also 
sharpened the ‘continuum’ of public policy norms — internal public policy, cross-border 
public policy, and ‘truly international’ public policy.134 The latter two norms have been the 
focus of recent common law cases. Moreover, cross-border comity has been an important 
modern restraint. For example, ‘international comity combines with English domestic 
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public policy to militate against [the] enforcement’ of agreements that violate the law of a 
connected foreign country.135 In the result, not only is the exercise of this exception 
exceedingly rare in Anglo-common law jurisprudence, the case law reveals that the 
discretion is not ‘unrestrained’ as critics have suggested.136 Rather, the distinct impression 
to be had is of judicial restraint as a manifestation of cross-border comity.137 Thus, the 
following discussion will also explore the content of public policy emerging from or 
suggested in common law decisions to sketch the modern normative content of the 
substantive doctrine in Anglo-common law private international law. 
A Salient Considerations 
1 Relativity 
The concept of relativity is well-articulated in European legal scholarship on public policy. 
The concept recognises that the legal norms comprising public policy are inherently 
variable. In German and Swiss legal scholarship, relativity is evaluated against temporal, 
material, and territorial considerations.138 Territorial relativity is analogous to proximity in 
Mills’ framework. Temporal relativity or zeitliche Relativität responds to the issue of public 
policy’s variability over time.139 That is, the greater the impact of applying foreign law in 
the present, the more likely a court might invoke public policy.140 Material relativity,141 on 
the other hand, is concerned with whether the application of public policy relates to the 
main issue of the dispute or, instead, a preliminary or incidental matter.142 A weak material 
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connection with the forum on an incidental or preliminary143 issue is unlikely to enliven 
the exception.144  
Mills’ conception of relativity is narrower in its construction.  Rather than subsuming 
other considerations, the consideration of relativity in Mills’ framework merely refers to 
the degree to which public policy has a shared or absolute character.145 It foresees that 
relativity may be reduced as norms of public policy are shared bilaterally, regionally, 
universally, or absolutely in the sense of ‘essential national interests’.146 For example, 
regional human rights norms in the European Convention on Human Rights are ‘norms 
which are viewed as fundamental and shared between the states that are parties to the 
ECHR’.147 The distinction drawn in scholarship between three categories of public policy 
— domestic, cross-border and ‘truly’ international public policy — simply represents 
‘positions on a continuum’.148  
2 Proximate Disputes 
The idea of territorial relativity articulated in German and Swiss scholarship closely relates 
to Mills’ proximity factor.149 The latter’s consideration of proximity is informed by choice-
of-law rules implicating some form of policy analysis, either of a legal system’s greater 
interest in or closer proximity to the dispute.150 Territorial relativity — Inlandsbeziehung (in 
Germany and Austria)151 or Binnenbeziehung (in Switzerland) — subordinates the 
application of public policy by requiring that sufficient links with the forum are 
established.152 Principles of public policy are violated only to the extent that an issue is 
closely connected to, or has significant effects (effets sensibles), in the forum.153 The idea is 
that the forum has to have a fairly strong connection with the case before imposing public 
policy is to be regarded as legitimate. However, the more fundamental the principle of 
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public policy and the more serious the effect of its application, the lesser the weight that 
is usually attached to establishing a link between the issue and the forum.154 
B Patterns of Public Policy  
The previous section, Section A, considered salient considerations informing the court’s 
discretion whether to refuse to apply foreign law, or to recognise or enforce a foreign 
judgment. The present section, Section B, is concerned with the durability of specific 
categories of cross-border and ‘truly international’ cross-border public policy in light of 
the relativity consideration.  
1 Cross-Border Public Policy — The Protection of National Interests 
Public policy cases centring on the protection of national interests are the focus of this 
discussion on cross-border public policy. The case law reveals two sides to this category, 
one of which is ‘inward-looking’ and the other is ‘outward-looking’ — concerned with 
the maintenance of international comity. 
(a) Maintenance of International Comity  
Transactions tending seriously to prejudice international relations in ‘deliberate violation 
of the laws of a friendly country’ have been refused enforcement in English courts based 
on public policy and ‘international comity’.155 In Foster v Driscoll, a syndicate entered an 
agreement to smuggle whisky into the United States at the height of Prohibition.156 
English law was the governing law of the partnership agreement. The agreement, though 
not performed, was considered void by the English Court of Appeal on public policy 
grounds. Enforcement of the agreement ‘would furnish a just cause for complaint by the 
United States Government against our Government… and would be contrary to our 
obligation of international comity as now understood and recognized, and therefore 
would offend against our notions of public morality.’157  
This ratio was used by the House of Lords in Regazzoni v KC Sethia (1944) Ltd to refuse 
enforcement of a contract involving the export of jute bags from India to Genoa — 
‘officially’ destined for resale in South Africa.158 The parties to the agreement knew that 
performance could not be effected without violating Indian law, which prohibited the 
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export of goods to South Africa due to the latter country’s apartheid policies.159 The 
governing law of the export contract was English law. The buyer claimed damages for the 
seller’s failure to deliver the Indian jute bags. The seller company defended its non-
performance by arguing that the sale breached Indian export controls; the buyer 
characterised the controls as penal and therefore not entitled to recognition. The seller 
succeeded before the High Court of Justice,160 the Court of Appeal,161 and the House of 
Lords.162 
In the House of Lords, Lord Reid commented that ‘it is quite impossible for a court 
in this country to set up as a judge of the rights and wrongs of a controversy between two 
friendly countries… if we tried to do so, the consequences might seriously prejudice 
international relations’.163 Modelling the Court of Appeal’s language in Foster v Driscoll, 
Lord Keith could ‘see no escape from the view that to recognize the contract… would 
give a just cause for complaint by the Government of India and should be regarded as 
contrary to conceptions of international comity’.164 The sense in which public policy was 
used in Foster v Driscoll and Regazzoni v KC Sethia (1944) Ltd was positive or outward-
looking:165 it was employed to prevent the English courts from causing harm to foreign 
and friendly nations (as those nations understand ‘harm’). Though the contracts in both 
cases were governed by English law, it has been suggested that the outcome would have 
been the same even if the governing law was foreign.166  
(b) Economic Duress — Repugnancy to Domestic Public Policy 
Decisions invoking public policy to avoid international contracts obtained by means of 
economic duress are a specific example of the protection of national interests.167 But in 
contrast to the internationalism in Foster v Driscoll and Regazzoni v KC Sethia (1944) Ltd, this 
example displays a more inward concern of maintaining forum policy. The touchstone 
for this example is offensiveness to ‘essential principles of morality or justice’ in the 
                                                 
159  Ibid 324 (Lord Reid), 327 (Lord Keith). 
160  Regazzoni v KC Sethia (1944) Ltd [1956] 2 QB 490. 
161  Ibid. 
162  Regazzoni (n 158). 
163  Ibid 326 (Lord Reid). 
164  Ibid 327 (Lord Keith). 
165  See, eg, S Lee, ‘Restitution, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws’ (1998) 20 University of Queensland Law 
Journal 1, 4–6; Chong, ‘Public Policy and Mandatory Rules’ (n 6) 33. 
166  See Lord Collins (ed) (n 4) [32–192]; PB Carter, ‘Rejection of Foreign Law: Some Private International 
Law Inhibitions’ (1984) 55 British Yearbook of International Law 111, 125; Chong, ‘Public Policy and 
Mandatory Rules’ (n 6) 33. 
167  Martin Davies, Andrew Bell and Paul Le Gay Brereton, Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia (LexisNexis 
Butterworths Australia, 9th ed, 2014) 431–3. 
  CHAPTER 7 167 
 
forum.168 A form of this expression, which was directly shaped by the scholarly writings 
of Story and Westlake, appeared in the early 20th century English decision of Kaufman v 
Gerson.169  
In Kaufman v Gerson, the English Court of Appeal refused to enforce, on the basis of 
domestic public policy, a French contract procured by moral coercion. The plaintiff, 
domiciled in France, sought to recover from the defendant, also domiciled in France, the 
balance owing under a contract made in Paris. The defendant’s entry into the contract 
was induced by threats of a prosecution against her husband for embezzlement. The 
defendant ‘in consideration of the plaintiff’s forbearing to prosecute her husband, … 
agreed that she would within a period of three years pay to the plaintiff the amount 
misappropriated by her husband’.170 The contract was upheld at first instance because it 
was valid under the law of France where the contract was made (the lex loci contractus). 
However, the Court of Appeal would not uphold a contract, though valid in the lex loci 
contractus, which had been ‘obtained in a manner which, in the case of an English contract, 
the law deems contrary to morality’.171 According to Collins MR, the principle was ‘well 
established by authority’, using quotations from Story’s Conflict of Laws and Westlake’s 
Private International Law to bear this out.  
The synthesised principle — what ‘the law deems contrary to morality’ — assimilated 
the natural law considerations implicit in Story’s Conflict of Laws with Westlake’s public 
policy reservation that had drawn inspiration from European ordre public clauses. This was 
explored in Chapter 3. The quotation that Collins MR extracted from the seventh edition 
of Story’s Conflict of Laws bears the unmistakable imprint of the author’s natural law 
philosophy, which had been eclipsed by the popularity of legal positivism in late-19th 
century England:  
all contracts which in their own nature are founded in moral turpitude or are inconsistent 
with the good order and solid interests of society: ‘All such contracts, even though they might 
be held valid in the country where they are made, would be held void elsewhere, or at least 
ought to be, if the dictates of Christian morality, or of even natural justice, are allowed to 
have their due force and influence in the administration of international jurisprudence.’172 
Further, the Court would not enforce a contract which — reprising Westlake’s general 
reservation in favour of stringent domestic policy — ‘“conflicts with what are deemed in 
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England to be essential public or moral interests… notwithstanding it may have been 
valid by its proper law”’.173 The moral coercion — the threat of prosecution of the 
plaintiff’s husband and the accompanying shame on their family — was so great as to 
have offended ‘an essential moral interest’ of English law.174  
Essential public or moral interests were not encroached in Masefield AG v Amlin 
Corporate Member Ltd (The Bunga Melati Dua).175 In this decision, the Court of Appeal found 
that ransom payments were not against English public policy. On 19 August 2008, the 
Bunga Melati Dua and its cargo were seized by Somali pirates en route to Rotterdam. The 
vessel, crew and cargo were released on payment of a US$2 million ransom. The piratical 
seizure, together with the ransom payment, occasioned a marine insurance claim for actual 
total loss of the vessel and its cargo. The claim of actual total loss was not made out since, 
as Rix LJ observed: ‘It was not an irretrievable deprivation of property. It was a typical 
“wait and see” situation.’176 The claimant’s last-ditch argument was that the ransom 
payment, being contrary to English public policy, should be disregarded in determining 
actual total loss. The Court was unconvinced, finding that the payment of a ransom was 
neither illegal under British legislation nor against public policy.177 In fact, ransom 
payments can be recovered as sue and labour expenses.178 Conflicting public interests 
between pirates, commerce, and government uncovered 
morally muddied waters… no universally recognised principle of morality, no clearly 
identified public policy, no substantially incontestable public interest, which could lead 
courts, as matters stand at present, to state that the payment of ransom should be regarded 
as a matter which stands beyond the pale, without legitimate recognition.179 
The point at which public policy draws the line between legitimate and illegitimate 
pressure in contractual bargaining and the legal consequences of duress was considered 
in Royal Boskalis Westminster NV v Mountain and, to a lesser degree, in Dimskal Shipping Co 
SA v International Transport Workers Federation.180 In Royal Boskalis Westminster, Phillips LJ 
recognised ‘a class of duress so unconscionable that it will cause the English court, as a 
matter of public policy, to override the proper law of the contract’.181 The focus of Royal 
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Boskalis Westminster was the effect of duress on the validity of a finalisation agreement 
governed by Iraqi law and its bearing on the third and fifth plaintiffs’ (the ‘joint venture’) 
insurance claim. Under the finalisation agreement, which had been entered following 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, two of the plaintiffs — a joint venture — waived their claims 
under a contract for dredging carried out at an Iraqi port in close proximity to Kuwait in 
1990. The dredging contract included an arbitration clause. The joint venture negotiated 
the finalisation agreement with Iraqi authorities to ensure the safety of its personnel and 
fleet. Payments due under the finalisation agreement were made, so that the joint venture’s 
personnel would not be used as ‘human shields’ by the Iraqi regime. If the waiver was 
ineffective, the joint venture’s insurance claim would fail. If it was effective, the joint 
venture could recover for loss arising from the waived claims under the ‘sue and labour’ 
clause of the insurance contract.  
The decision turned on the legal effect of duress where the proper law of the contract 
is foreign — a contrast to the proper law that governed in Dimskal Shipping. As a general 
rule, the proper law governs the essential validity of a contract, including the legitimacy 
and effect of duress.182 In Dimskal Shipping, English law was the proper law of written 
agreements induced by the threatened and actual blacking of the respondents’ ship, Evia 
Luck, while it was in Sweden. As the proper law of the agreements was English, the House 
of Lords in Dimskal Shipping only needed to consider the effect of the duress under 
English law. Under English law, the pressure exerted on the shipowners amounted to 
illegitimate economic duress.183 The House of Lords was not having to determine whether 
to accept the consequences of duress under the law of Sweden, where the type of 
industrial action taken by the appellant trade union and the pressure exerted on the 
respondent shipowners was lawful.184 On the other hand, in Royal Boskalis Westminster, the 
general choice-of-law position was complicated by a validly made foreign contract 
‘induced by a duress of a type which is offensive to English public policy’,185 in which case 
‘the distinctive policy of English law over any provision of foreign law’ may 
predominate.186  
The reference to ‘the distinctive policy of English law’ led the Court of Appeal to 
consider and accept two classes of duress suggested in Dicey & Morris’ Conflict of Laws.187 
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The first class was of duress ‘so shocking’ that an English court would not enforce the 
contract, though valid under its proper law.188 The second class represented ‘a lesser form 
of duress’, by which the legitimacy and effect of the duress were to be determined by the 
proper law of the contract.189 An English court, as Phillips LJ recognised, would not 
‘automatically refuse to recognise the effects of a valid foreign law contract that has been 
procured by duress of a type which offends against English public policy’.190 However, 
the threat in this case — using the joint venture’s personnel as ‘human shields’ — was 
considered by Phillips LJ to be ‘about as cogent and as unconscionable a form of duress 
as one can imagine’ that the proper law was overridden.191 
2 ‘Truly International’ or Transnational Public Policy 
Scholarship increasingly recognises transnational public policy as an ‘emerging category 
of public policy’ in private international law.192 The seeds of transnational public policy 
were planted by the German émigré lawyer, F A Mann, who in 1954 predicted that 
breaches of international law were ‘liable to become… of considerable practical 
importance’ to municipal courts.193 Critically, Mann argued that domestic courts should 
apply rules of public international law to foreign law ‘if and in so far as it expresses or 
results from an international delinquency’.194 Because its yardstick is international law, this 
category has been described as ‘truly international’ or ‘really international’ public policy.195 
The intensifiers distinguish this category from ‘international public policy’ or public policy 
in private international law, which implicates — as the previous section emphasised — 
highly forum-centric principles.196  
However, transnational public policy is not just an abstract concept.  Using English 
public policy, English courts have refused to recognise foreign laws in breach of 
international law. Until the House of Lords’ decision in Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways 
Co [Nos 4 and 5],197 there was some debate about whether public policy was limited to 
‘grave infringements of human rights’198 or if it indeed went beyond this formulation to 
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encompass violations of international law.199 At least for English courts, Kuwait Airways 
[Nos 4 and 5] establishes that public policy has evolved ‘with the times’ to take in breaches 
of ‘clearly established rules’ of international law.200 As the words ‘clearly established rules’ 
suggest, however, not all impugned foreign laws will discharge this standard of non-
enforceability.201 There is a higher expectation: it would not be sufficient merely to 
indicate that the foreign lex causae in some way contravenes rules of international law. Put 
simply, ‘this sense of public policy is, and is intended to be, a rule resorted to only in 
extremis’.202 
The domestic application of international norms had been foreshadowed in Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co Ltd v Jaffrate (The Rose Mary)203 and in F A Mann’s 1954 article.204 At first 
sight, this suggestion encounters some difficulties in a dualist legal system where 
international law is not automatically received or incorporated into domestic law (a point 
discussed in further detail in Chapter 8). Rather than directly apply international law to 
override foreign law, domestic courts are more likely to apply international law indirectly 
using the public policy doctrine.205 Courts have evinced a ‘reluctance to arrogate to 
themselves a supranational jurisdiction’.206 Faced with conflicting forum and transnational 
public policies, a modern court would almost without doubt favour forum public policy 
over transnational public policy.207  
Reservations about invoking transnational public policy deepen where the court 
engages highly relative norms of international law.  This arguably occurred in The Rose 
Mary, where a foreign expropriation decree was evaluated against and denied recognition 
according to (ill-defined) standards of international law, which were apparently 
incorporated into the law of Aden. Though the reasoning of The Rose Mary has been 
doubted,208 it is still acknowledged as the starting point for the development of this 
category at common law. 
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(a) The Rose Mary 
In The Rose Mary, Campbell J in the Supreme Court of Aden relied upon international law 
to refuse recognition of an Iranian law nationalising the property of the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company (‘AIOC’), which was majority-owned by the British government. Following the 
Second World War, the already tense relationship between Iran and AIOC dramatically 
worsened. In 1933, AIOC was granted a 60-year concession to extract oil in Iran. This 
replaced the D’Arcy Concession that was granted in 1901 by the Shah of Persia ‘in 
exchange for a 16 percent annual royalty on net income’.209 The Iranian government long 
suspected that AIOC — then called the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (‘APOC’) — was 
miscalculating its profits, which were used to calculate the annual royalty. In late 1932, 
Iran cancelled the D’Arcy Concession. Iran set its sights on a new concession with APOC, 
the terms of which would be more ‘equitable and fair’ to Iranian interests.210  
Though significantly reducing the concessionary area and revising the royalty 
calculation,211 the 1933 concession was still on terms highly favourable to APOC. The 
Iranian government soon realised that part of revised royalty calculation resulted in a 
similar return to that under the D’Arcy Concession.212 With increased demand for oil after 
the Second World War, the royalties paid to the Iranian government plummeted to 
‘historically low levels’.213 Indeed, between 1933 and 1951, APOC/AIOC paid more in 
taxes to the British government than in royalties to Iran.214 Post-war efforts to renegotiate 
the 1933 concession failed. In early 1951, the Iranian government cancelled the 1933 
concession, nationalised AIOC’s assets, and created the National Iranian Oil Company. 
The British government, which was still the majority shareholder in AIOC, reacted to 
the nationalisation with acts of intimidation against Iran and a worldwide boycott of Iran’s 
nationalised oil.215 The United Kingdom submitted a case to the International Court of 
Justice, which failed because the Court lacked jurisdiction. AIOC threatened legal action 
against any party that purchased Iranian oil.216 In spite of the British blockade on Iranian 
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oil, an Italian company, EPIM, purchased oil from the National Iranian Oil Company to 
be sold to a Swiss company, Bubenberg AG. An Italian tanker, The Rose Mary, loaded with 
a cargo of Iranian oil put to port in Aden. AIOC commenced an action in detinue in the 
Supreme Court of Aden. It claimed title to the oil, arguing that the Iranian nationalisation 
was confiscatory. AIOC contended that recognition of the foreign law in the forum would 
be contrary to ‘public policy or essential principles of morality’ or was ‘contrary to 
international law or in flagrant violation of international comity’.217 
The confiscation of foreign-owned property in violation of international law was 
considered sufficient to deny recognition being given to the Iranian nationalisation law. 
Campbell J was ‘satisfied that, following international law as incorporated in the domestic law 
of Aden, this court must refuse validity to the Persian Oil Nationalization Law in so far as 
it relates to nationalized property of the plaintiffs which may come within its territorial 
jurisdiction’.218 Campbell J reached this conclusion that expropriation of the property of 
non-nationals without compensation violated international law by distinguishing the facts 
of The Rose Mary from the general principle laid down in AM Luther Co v James Sagor & 
Co219 and Princess Olga Paley v Weisz,.220 Under this principle, a forum court would validate 
acts of confiscation done within the territory of ‘a sovereign State of the property of its 
nationals’.221 In Campbell J’s view, neither case had anything to say about ‘property of 
those not its own subjects’.222 This interpretation of Luther and Princess Olga Paley — that 
the general principle was limited to nationals — was criticised by Upjohn J in Re Claim by 
Helbert Wagg & Co.223  
(b) Subsequent Developments: Laws Constituting ‘Grave Infringements of Human Rights’ 
The residual power of domestic courts to disregard fundamentally unacceptable foreign 
laws was considered in Oppenheimer v Cattermole.224 The main issue for determination was 
whether Meier Oppenheimer, a German-Jewish émigré, was entitled to double taxation 
relief in the United Kingdom, which was only available if he had dual British and German 
nationality.  German nationality law would determine whether Oppenheimer lost or 
retained his nationality. The validity of a 1941 decree, by which Jewish émigrés were 
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deprived of their German nationality, was examined — but the House of Lords ‘need not 
have done so’.225 Oppenheimer ceased to be a German citizen under post-Nazi legislation 
and, in the meantime, ‘the Nazi decree had been abrogated’.226 The willingness of the 
House of Lords to scrutinise the 1941 decree, though ‘entirely obiter’, ‘imbued [it] with a 
special authority’.227 
Lord Cross, in strong obiter comments, considered that public policy required English 
courts to apply clearly established rules of international law.228 In some cases, it might be 
difficult to identify the rule of international law.229 However, in this case, the decree was 
plainly discriminatory: only Jewish émigrés were stripped of their nationality. Then, the 
deprivation of nationality ‘was used as a peg upon which to hang a discriminatory 
confiscation of their property’.230 The 1941 decree was ‘so grave an infringement of 
human rights that the courts of this country ought to refuse to recognise it as a law at 
all’.231 Similarly, Lord Salmon considered that it was not ‘contrary to international comity 
or to any legal principles hitherto enunciated for our courts to decide that the 1941 decree 
was so great an offence against human rights that they would have nothing to do with 
it’.232 
(c) Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co [Nos 4 and 5]233 
The House of Lords in Kuwait Airways [Nos 4 and 5] found that international law forms 
part of English public policy. Indeed, the elevation of local values ‘into public policy on 
the transnational level’ was not done lightly.234 The issue in this case was whether an 
English court would recognise a foreign law nationalising the property of a private 
company in clear violation of international law. In general, English courts decline to 
examine the validity of foreign legislative acts, such as title to property situate in another 
sovereign state or foreign nationalisation laws.235 Furthermore, the lex situs determines 
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ownership to property. Piecing these principles together, foreign nationalisation laws ‘are 
only struck down in truly exceptional cases’.236  
Kuwait Airways [Nos 4 and 5] concerned the commercial implications of the First Gulf 
War. Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, ten aircraft owned by Kuwait 
Airways Corp (‘KAC’) were seized by Iraqi forces. In September 1990, the Revolutionary 
Command Council of Iraq enacted Resolution 369 to dissolve KAC and to transfer its 
assets worldwide, including the aircraft, to Iraqi Airways Co (‘IAC’). The United Nations 
Security Council set a January 1991 deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Iraq’s 
refusal to comply with this deadline prompted immediate coalition military action. 
Between January and February 1991, coalition bombing destroyed four of the aircraft 
stationed at Mosul (‘the Mosul Four’). The remaining six were evacuated to Iran for 
safekeeping (‘the Iran Six’). Only after protracted negotiation, and the exchange of 
substantial sums of money, were the Iran Six returned to KAC. Yielding to international 
pressure and the demands of the United Nations to withdraw, Iraq enacted Resolution 55 
in March 1991, under which Resolution 369 was repealed with retroactive effect.  
Before the Security Council’s deadline for withdrawal, KAC instituted proceedings in 
England against IAC for conversion of the ten aircraft. As the relevant tortious acts were 
committed before 1 May 1996, the double actionability rule — requiring actionability 
under the law of the forum and the law of the tort — applied to the English 
proceedings.237 Applying the double actionability rule, without the flexible exception, 
would have been fatal to KAC’s claim since Resolution 369 — part of the lex situs and the 
lex loci delicti — transferred ownership of the aircraft to IAC. IAC thus argued that, in 
accordance with Iraqi law, they had acquired good title to the aircraft. However, the 
double actionability rule was satisfied because the House of Lords denied recognition to 
Resolution 369 on the basis of English public policy. In the result, ownership of the 
aircraft had not transferred to IAC. In giving effect to English public policy, Resolution 
369 was excised ‘from the corpus of Iraqi law’, 238 and the Iraqi law of usurpation was 
applied to IAC’s conduct. 
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The reality of an ‘ever more interdependent’ world strengthened the House of Lords’ 
conclusion that serious breaches of international law were the legitimate province of 
English public policy.239 The House of Lords found that ‘[i]n appropriate circumstances 
it is legitimate for an English court to have regard to the content of international law in 
deciding whether to recognise foreign law’.240 There was a ‘need to recognise and adhere 
to standards of conduct set by international law’.241 It would have been contrary to the 
United Kingdom’s international obligations and domestic public policy, which 
incorporated its obligations under international law, to recognise Resolution 369.242 From 
the outset, Iraq’s purported annexation of Kuwait attracted ‘universal international 
condemnation’.243 The international response to the invasion and annexation was ‘prompt 
and comprehensive’.244 Shortly after the invasion, the UN Security Council had decreed 
the annexation ‘null and void’ and set a January deadline for Iraq to withdraw from 
Kuwait.245 A series of United Nations Security Council Resolutions further denounced 
Iraq’s actions ‘as a breach of international peace and security’.246 The aim of Resolution 
369 was odious: not only was it ‘a governmental expropriation of property’, it was an 
‘attempt to extinguish every vestige of Kuwait’s existence as a separate state’.247  
Kuwait Airways [Nos 4 and 5] demonstrates that, while a dispute might lack proximity 
to the forum state, ‘a strongly shared or absolute policy’ — in the form of clearly 
established rules of international law — might be sufficient for a domestic court to invoke 
public policy and exclude a foreign lex causae.248 When F A Mann wrote in 1954, he 
questioned whether public policy was a ‘sufficient weapon’ for domestic courts to use in 
order to combat international delinquencies.249 The House of Lords’ decision in Kuwait 
Airways [Nos 4 and 5] suggests that cross-border public policy can itself be a ‘sufficient 
weapon’ with which to combat ‘flagrant violations of rules of international law of 
fundamental importance’.250 Chapter 8 questions this proposition. 
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C Positive Functions of Public Policy 
The possibility that public policy may be used as a ‘sword’, rather than a shield against 
fundamentally objectionable foreign laws, has been broached in academic literature and, 
as in Kuwait Airways [Nos 4 and 5], case law.251 Ordinarily, public policy demands ‘a pre-
existing legal relationship between the parties which it then proceeds to modify’.252 An 
alternative view of public policy would have it used to create a right or cause of action 
where otherwise absent from the foreign lex causae.253 Whether public policy applies to 
‘enable’ as well as to ‘disable’ has engendered two distinct theories on the potentially 
positive role of public policy.254   
First, public policy may be invoked to give effect to foreign law despite there being a 
choice-of-law rule to the contrary. This theory emerged from Lorentzen v Lydden, an 
unorthodox wartime decision in which Atkinson J used English public policy to give 
extraterritorial effect to a foreign requisition decree.255 In Lorentzen, the defendants, a 
London-based firm, agreed to charter a Norwegian ship to carry pulp between Oslo and 
Leith. In late 1939, the Norwegian Government issued a decree, which requisitioned (with 
compensation) all Norwegian-registered ships located outside Nazi-occupied territory. 
The decree also appointed a curator who was empowered to collect claims on behalf of 
the owners of requisitioned ships. The curator sued the charterers for breach of the 
charter party. The charterers challenged the curator’s right to sue in England, arguing that 
the lex situs of the chose in action was English and, under English law, ownership of the 
chose had not transferred. Atkinson J held that, since England and Norway were ‘engaged 
together in a desperate war for their existence’ and the decree was not confiscatory, 
English public policy demanded that recognition be given to the decree.256 Wartime 
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conditions supplied the public policy norm which, according to Atkinson J, required the 
application of foreign law even though the lex situs was English.  
Weathering occasional criticism, Atkinson J’s decision in Lorentzen endured as an 
authority until the English Court of Appeal’s decision in Peer International Corp v Termidor 
Corp Music Publishers Ltd.257 In Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart NVv Slatford [No 1], a 1953 
decision of the English Court of Appeal, Devlin J had been loath to recognise Atkinson 
J’s formulation as a new head of public policy which, apart from being contrary to 
established precedent, required the court to assess the ‘political merits’ of foreign law.258 
Half a century after Bank voor Handel, the Court of Appeal in Peer International again 
declined to use public policy as an exception to the lex situs rule. The Court agreed with 
Devlin J’s earlier criticisms and overruled Lorentzen.  
Peer International concerned Cuban legislation which purported to confiscate the 
English copyright of musical works composed by Cubans. The claimants unsuccessfully 
argued that public policy supplied an exception to the general lex situs rule, which 
prevented foreign confiscatory legislation having any effect on property rights held in 
another sovereign country. In addition to Lorentzen being ‘wrongly decided’, Aldous LJ 
thought the decision was ‘contrary to the overwhelming statement of judicial opinion’ 
and, somewhat ironically, ‘also contrary to public policy’.259 The effect of recognising this 
exception would be to ‘subordinate English property law to that of a foreign state’ based 
on the variability and uncertainty associated with public policy.260  
The second theory was suggested by the House of Lords’ decision in Kuwait Airways 
[Nos 4 and 5]. In effect, it enables a forum court to excise offensive aspects of a foreign 
lex causae and, in its place, to graft on it either provisions of the lex fori or what is left of 
the lex causae. The latter was the course adopted by the House of Lords in Kuwait Airways 
[Nos 4 and 5]. As a result of that decision, Briggs suggested that an English court may 
fashion an appropriate remedy using the pretext of public policy if no legal claim or right 
is available under the lex causae, but should be in a particular case.261  
Though an attractive concept to Briggs, the positive use of public policy is at variance 
with the 19th century institutional writers’ conception of public policy as an exclusionary 
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doctrine. As Chapter 3 examined, the exclusion of foreign law on the score of public 
policy was a corollary of comity and territoriality that underpinned 19th century Anglo-
American private international law scholarship. Foreign law was only admitted insofar as 
it did not cause prejudice to the forum.262 Effectively, domestic courts are finding the 
foreign lex causae to be so offensive to domestic public policy that it is left with no other 
choice but to withdraw so the courts are left with the lex fori. The idea of taking a ‘blue 
pencil’ to the lex causae, as suggested by Lord Hope in Kuwait Airways [Nos 4 and 5],  is 
inconsistent with this approach.263 The better outcome in Kuwait Airways [No 4 and 5] 
would have been for the House of Lords to use public policy in its traditional sense, 
rejecting Iraqi law altogether and instead having recourse to the English law on 
conversion.  
IV CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of this Chapter, the maintenance of international comity was identified 
as an important modern restraint on courts invoking public policy to exclude a foreign 
law or to deny recognition to a foreign judgment. It was observed that, as a matter of 
course, common law courts reject arguments of public policy influenced not only by 
comity but also the trend of authorities — both domestic and international — stressing 
the formidably high threshold for the doctrine. However, the threshold required is far 
from transparent or, indeed, concrete. Consequently, the discussion moved to Mills’ 
salient considerations that suggest a method by which modern courts might legitimately 
invoke public policy.  
The subsequent discussion identified two patterns of public policy, suggesting that 
English courts are more likely to invoke the doctrine based on fundamental national 
interests or clearly established breaches of international law. The discussion in Part III 
closed by discussing two potentially positive functions for public policy. The first positive 
function is defunct. The second positive function, though it is not per se ‘defunct’, was 
rejected as contrary to the traditional understanding of public policy as ‘exclusionary’. 
Even so, uncertainty in application is a compelling reason in itself to reject this second 
positive function. 
The scope of transnational public policy, the second category of public policy 
examined in this Chapter, is explored in Chapter 8. This penultimate Chapter evaluates 
whether the ‘time is ripe’ for an international law exception as distinct from it being — as 
                                                 
262  Ernest G Lorenzen, ‘Huber’s De Conflictu Legum’ (1918–19) 13 Illinois Law Review 374, 376. 
263  Kuwait Airways [Nos 4 and 5] (n 197) 985 [369] (Lord Hope). 
180 CHAPTER 7 
 
 
it is now — a category of cross-border public policy. The Chapter also raises several issues 
with the recognition of a freestanding exception of this nature. Chapter 8 concludes by 
considering, as a point of comparison, the gradual recognition of ‘other public laws’ and 
foreign governmental interests. 
 
CHAPTER 8: THE NEW SPECIES OF EXCEPTION 
The golden rule is that care must be taken not to expand its [the public policy exception] 
application beyond the true limits of the principle. These limits demand that, where there is 
any room for doubt, judicial restraint must be exercised. But restraint is what is needed, not 
abstention. And there is no need for restraint on grounds of public policy where it is plain 
beyond dispute that a clearly established norm of international law has been violated.1 
I INTRODUCTION  
hapters 3, 6, and 7 underscored the increasingly exceptional role played by 
substantive, as distinct from procedural, public policy in the common law of 
private international law. Because public policy is sparingly deployed by courts 
in major Commonwealth jurisdictions, key English decisions have so far given a better 
sense of the doctrine’s development. English courts have had the opportunity to examine 
and develop its content owing to the greater levels of cross-border litigation encountered 
by its courts, a fact which was observed in Chapter 5. A salient example of the doctrine’s 
potential lies in the English courts’ development of an international law dimension to 
public policy. It was observed in Chapter 7 that this pattern of public policy, involving 
clearly established breaches of international law, is comparatively recent in origin. The 
House of Lords’ decision in Oppenheimer v Cattermole offered one of the earliest 
articulations of it, and was examined in Chapter 7 in light of other formative English cases 
on the subject. 
This Chapter suggests the use of transnational public policy (Chapter 7) and the foreign 
governmental interests doctrine (Chapter 5) as new species of exception in private 
international law. First, this Chapter argues that public international law could be freed 
from the yoke of public policy to form a detached private international law exception.2  
This Chapter also draws on case law from major Anglo-common law jurisdictions that 
suggest a general judicial willingness to consider public international law in decision-
making. Still, this penultimate Chapter emphasises that public international law is a 
fledgling, and potentially provocative, category of cross-border public policy. Courts, 
following the English trend of transnational public policy, will have to confront some 
broader issues that largely centre on the interaction between domestic law and 
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international law. Secondly, this Chapter argues that the foreign governmental interests 
doctrine is — at least in Australia — already detached from the public policy exception. 
Chapter 8 is devoted to these two suggested species of exception. Part II focuses on 
the international law dimension of cross-border public policy. After examining the 
formative English cases, Part II discerns the controlling principles of this pattern of public 
policy. The concluding portions of Part II discuss certain issues arising from a broader 
recognition of a distinct public international law exception; however, it also questions the 
logic of enclosing public international law in a public policy envelope. Partly informing 
this discussion of the distinct worth of public international law are legal developments in 
transnational human rights litigation post-9/11.3 In contrast to Part II, Part III considers 
‘other public’ laws and the foreign governmental interests doctrine as exceptions detached 
from public policy. The frame of reference for this discussion is the High Court of 
Australia’s decision in Attorney-General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Pty Ltd (‘Spycatcher’).4 
II THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DEVELOPING 
PUBLIC POLICY 
Academic literature supports the use of international law and ‘universal principles of 
justice and morality’ to inform the development of transnational public policy, which is 
regarded as a ‘subset’ or ‘species’ of cross-border public policy.5 Mills considered that this 
form of public policy comprised absolute norms or ‘norms shared in a universal sense’.6 
In the same literature, norms of customary international law and international human 
rights are consistently introduced as examples of this subset of public policy.7 Aside from 
this scholarly discussion, two recent English decisions on the foreign act of state doctrine 
— namely Belhaj v Straw8(‘Belhaj’) and Law Debenture Trust Corp plc v Ukraine9 (‘Law Debenture 
Trust’) — signal a greater receptivity towards using higher order norms of international 
                                                 
3  For a general discussion of this trend in Canada and the United Kingdom following 9/11, see François 
Larocque, ‘Recent Developments in Transnational Human Rights Litigation: A Postscript to Torture as 
Tort’ (2008) 46(3) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 605. 
4  A-G (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Pty Ltd [No 2] (1988) 165 CLR 30 (‘Spycatcher’). 
5  See Alex Mills, ‘The Dimensions of Public Policy in Private International Law’ (2008) 4(2) Journal of 
Private International Law 201, 214–5; Adeline Chong, ‘Transnational Public Policy in Civil and 
Commercial Matters’ (2012) 128 Law Quarterly Review 88, 91–101; Jan Oster, ‘Public Policy and Human 
Rights’ (2015) 11(3) Journal of Private International Law 542, 546–9; Kenny Chng, ‘A Theoretical 
Perspective of the Public Policy Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws’ (2018) 14(1) Journal of Private 
International Law 130, 133, 134–6. 
6  Mills (n 5) 214–5. 
7  See Mills (n 5) 214–5; Chong (n 5) 100–1; Oster (n 5) 546–9; Chng (n 5) 135–6. 
8  Belhaj v Straw [2017] AC 964 (Supreme Court) (‘Belhaj’). 
9  Law Debenture Trust Corp plc v Ukraine [2019] 2 WLR 655 (Court of Appeal). 
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law (jus cogens or peremptory norms) from which no derogation is permitted to influence 
domestic conceptions of the public policy exception at common law.10  
The English courts’ consideration of public international law as a means of filtering 
cross-border claims arguably signals a qualified return to the natural law thinking that 
underpinned the public policy exclusion in Story’s Conflict of Laws (as considered in 
Chapter 3). At its most basic, natural law requires laws to be judged by a higher standard 
of norm. Grave violations of human rights and public international law meet this basic 
definition. 
The first section of Part II explores these recent English decisions with a view to then 
explaining the foothold of public international law on cross-border public policy. 
Supposing that this subset of cross-border public policy is recognised as a distinct 
common law concept in England, a strong argument follows for its application in other 
jurisdictions in the common law tradition. The second half of Part II is therefore devoted 
to examining whether major common law jurisdictions exhibit a corresponding degree of 
receptivity to international law in order to address some unresolved issues with 
international law’s recognition as part of public policy. The first issue to be addressed is 
the status and treatment of public international law in dualist legal systems with a 
particular focus on the Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand positions. The 
identification of jus cogens or peremptory norms of international law is examined as a 
second issue. Examination of jus cogens is necessary because, although these ‘super norms’ 
of customary international law are brought up in these recent English decisions, the 
judgments are unclear on how to establish or to identify these norms. 
A Consolidating International Law 
The public policy invoked in Kuwait Airways [Nos 4 and 5] that condemned Iraq’s actions 
as ‘flagrant breaches of public international law’ has been regarded as ‘truly 
international’.11 The House of Lords’ approach to English public policy, which gave 
‘indirect effect’ to international law,12 could not therefore be characterised as parochial.13  
Rather, as Lord Steyn remarked in Kuwait Airways [Nos 4 and 5], this approach was 
consistent with an outgrowth of French scholarship elucidating principles of truly 
international public policy ‘in relation to subjects such as traffic in drugs, traffic in 
                                                 
10  See especially ibid 704 [180] (Dame Elizabeth Gloster, Sales and David Richards LJJ). 
11  Kuwait Airways [Nos 4 and 5] (n 1) 1103 [115] (Lord Steyn). 
12  Chong (n 5) 94. 
13  Kuwait Airways [Nos 4 and 5] (n 1) 1103 [115] (Lord Steyn). 
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weapons, terrorism, and so forth’.14 The House of Lords’ conclusion was assisted by the 
United Kingdom’s obligations under the Charter of the United Nations (‘UN Charter’)15 and 
‘the existence of several binding UN Security Council… resolutions condemning the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait’ and Iraq’s actions post-invasion.16 All legal binding Security Council 
Resolutions are given effect in the United Kingdom through legislation.17 
1 The Obstacles of Public International Law 
However, as Chong and Ruys have adroitly highlighted, an appeal to rules of public 
international law is not without difficulty.18 Orams v Apostolides19 and Peer International Corp 
v Termidor Music Publishers Ltd [No 1]20 accentuate some of these difficulties. Both, 
according to Chong, involved failed ‘attempts to capitalise on the principle of Kuwait 
Airways’.21 Orams v Apostolides concerned the enforcement of two Greek Cypriot default 
judgments in England under the Brussels I Regulation.22  In the courts of the Greek Cypriot 
southern area of Cyprus (the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus), Mr 
Apostolides claimed ownership of a plot of land located on the Turkish Cypriot northern 
area of the island, the de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (recognised only by 
Turkey). He also sought damages for loss of enjoyment of the land. Following the Turkish 
invasion of northern Cyprus in 1974, Mr Apostolides was forced to vacate the land. In 
2002, a British couple, Mr and Mrs Orams, purchased the land from a third Turkish 
Cypriot party, who was the then registered owner of the land.  
The Orams resisted enforcement of the two Cypriot judgments pursuant to the public 
policy proviso in art 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation. The British husband and wife argued 
that it was contrary to international public policy to enforce the judgments, referring to 
Protocol No 10 on Cyprus annexed to the 2003 Act of Accession by which Cyprus and nine 
other European countries acceded to the European Union.23 Protocol No 10 suspended the 
                                                 
14  Ibid. 
15  Charter of the United Nations, signed 26 June 1945, 557 UNTS 143 (entered into force 24 October 1945) 
(‘UN Charter’). 
16  See Tom Ruys, ‘Case Comment: The Role of State Immunity and the Act of State in the NM Cherry 
Blossom Case and the Western Sahara Dispute’ (2019) 68(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 67, 
85. 
17  United Nations Act 1946, 9 & 10 Geo 6, c 45, s 1(1). See also Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth) 
ss 6–11. 
18  Chong (n 5) 96–8; Ruys (n 16) 85. 
19  Orams v Apostolides [2011] QB 519. 
20  Peer International Corp v Termidor Music Publishers Ltd [2004] Ch 212 (Court of Appeal) (‘Peer International’). 
21  Chong (n 5) 98. 
22  Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters [2001] OJ L 12/1 (the ‘Brussels I Regulation’). 
23  Orams v Apostolides (n 19) 525 [6] (Advocate General Kokott) (European Court of Justice). See also Act 
Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the 
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operation of the acquis communautaire in the northern area of Cyprus.  In recognising the 
‘Cyprus problem’, Protocol No 10 reaffirmed the Member States ‘commitment to a 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, consistent with relevant United 
Nations Security Council resolutions, and their strong support for the efforts of the 
United Nations Secretary General to that end’.24 The Orams argued that, in light of the 
‘political sensitivities’ of the Cyprus problem, enforcement of Cypriot judgments ‘would 
be to prejudice peace negotiations and is thereby contrary to public policy in England and 
Wales which, reflecting UN Security Council resolutions, does not permit the process to 
be prejudiced in this way’.25  
However, Advocate General Kokott was not prepared to infer from these appeals to 
UN Security Council resolutions or international consensus ‘any obligation to refrain 
from recognising judgments of Greek Cypriot courts which relate to claims to ownership 
of land in the Turkish Cypriot area’.26 The Court of Appeal agreed with the opinion of 
the Advocate General. The Orams had not identified a principle of international public 
policy ‘requiring a conclusion that the enforcement of the Cypriot judgment would be 
manifestly contrary to public policy in the United Kingdom’.27 It was one thing to identify 
an international consensus encouraging the peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem; it 
was another — an overreach — to then suggest that all Cypriot judgments were 
‘manifestly contrary to public policy in the United Kingdom’.28  Drawing this conclusion 
would be a ‘very large step’.29 The Court of Appeal was compelled to enforce Cypriot 
judgments by countervailing public policy considerations, such as mutual trust in the 
administration of justice within the European Union and the United Kingdom’s 
obligations under international law.30 The disconnect in Orams v Apostolides between 
encouraging a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem and the free movement of 
judgments under the Brussels enforcement regime point irresistibly to the conclusion that 
mere or slight breaches of international law will not be sufficient to engage English public 
policy.31  
                                                 
Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, 
the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovakk Republic and the Adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union 
is Founded [2003] OJ L 236/940. 
24  Orams v Apostolides (n 19) 525 [6] (Advocate General Kokott) (European Court of Justice). 
25  Ibid 571 [27]–[28] (Pill LJ) (Court of Appeal). 
26  Ibid 532–3 [45] (Advocate General Kokott). 
27  Ibid 577 [58] (Pill LJ). 
28  Ibid 578 [59]. 
29  Ibid. 
30  Ibid 578 [62]. 
31  Chong (n 1) 99. 
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The attempt in Peer International to take advantage of the Kuwait Airways principle 
likewise failed.32 Cuban Law 860, which came into effect in August 1960, purported to 
divest Peer International of its UK copyright in thousands of Cuban musical works. The 
Peer companies had acquired copyright in Cuban musical works over the 1930s and 1950s 
allegedly through the exploitation of Cuban musicians.33 The musicians were struggling 
to subsist on money earned from public performances in Cuba. Ralph Peer, the founder 
and owner of the Peer companies, was ‘the only person seeking to exploit Cuban music’.34 
Peer’s companies ‘controlled all the music that was being exploited in Cuba and 
throughout the Caribbean’.35 The failure of the Peer companies to pay royalties to Cuban 
musicians was a significant source of complaint.36 Following the Cuban Revolution in 
1959, the Castro regime sought to protect Cuba’s musical culture by enacting Cuban Law 
860 in order to ‘control the exploitation of the copyright in Cuban music’.37 Under the 
law, agreements signed between publishers and Cuban authors or composers had to be 
presented to Editora Musical de Cuba (EMC) for approval; otherwise, the rights of the 
publishers were forfeited.38 Peer had not sought approval under the Cuban law. 
The claimants, EMC, accordingly sought declarations claiming ownership of the UK 
copyright. EMC argued that there was a public policy exception to the general lex situs 
rule by which an English court would not give effect to a foreign law purporting to have 
extraterritorial effect on property located in England. The claimants were using the 
reasoning in Kuwait Airways [Nos 4 and 5] to argue that: 
[a]n English court can give effect to the legislation of a foreign state affecting property in 
the United Kingdom where that foreign state is regularising a matter of legitimate interest 
and the legislation accords with United Kingdom law and public policy widely accepted 
internationally.39 
The Court of Appeal was not prepared to ‘give positive effect to a foreign 
government’s act in relation to property in England; and to elevate public policy to the 
level of an appropriate connecting factor, using it to displace the ordinary law of copyright 
applicable in the English situs’.40 The construction offered by Peer would be to 
‘subordinate English property to that of a foreign state’ through the use of a doctrine 
                                                 
32  Ibid 98. 
33  Peer International (n 20) 217 [12] (Aldous LJ). 
34  Ibid. 
35  Ibid. 
36  Ibid. 
37  Ibid 218 [13]. 
38  Ibid 218–9 [16]–[19]. 
39  Ibid 229 [45]. 
40  Ibid 234 [63] (Mance LJ). 
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criticised for its changeable character over time.41 By refusing to elevate public policy to a 
positive status, the Court not only spelt an end to the wartime decision of Lorentzen v 
Lydden but also rejected the claimants’ contention ‘that there is an internationally accepted 
view on public policy as to assignments of copyright’.42  
2 Belhaj v Straw 
The public international law dimension to the domestic public policy doctrine was again 
considered in the 2017 UK Supreme Court judgment of Belhaj v Straw.43 The British 
government invoked the state immunity and foreign act of state doctrines to strike out 
the claims of Abdul Belhaj and his wife, Fatima Boudchar. Belhaj, a Libyan citizen and 
former political opponent of Colonel Gaddafi, and his wife, a Moroccan citizen, alleged 
that British officials were complicit in their unlawful abduction, kidnapping and removal 
to Libya. The claimants alleged that while on route to the United Kingdom to seek asylum 
they were detained and tortured in Malaysia and Thailand. When the couple were in 
Malaysia, British intelligence tipped off the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency. 
From Bangkok, the claimants were then flown to Libya in a US-registered plane where 
their detention and torture continued. Boudchar, heavily pregnant at the time, was 
released after three months’ detention. Belhaj was released six years later.  
The British Government’s strike out application failed. The Supreme Court held that 
the claims were not barred by the state immunity or the foreign act of state doctrine. 
Although Lord Mance gave the leading judgment, and Lords Neuberger and Sumption 
delivered concurring judgments, Lord Neuberger’s view on the foreign act of state 
doctrine commanded majority support.44 Lord Wilson agreed with the judgment of Lord 
Neuberger while Lady Hale and Lord Clarke agreed with the reasoning of Lord 
Neuberger. The Supreme Court held the foreign act of state doctrine was qualified by a 
public policy exception where there is ‘a serious violation of international law’.45 The case 
— ‘assuming that the claimants were detained, kidnapped and tortured as they allege’ — 
would engage the public policy exception.46 
Four of the justices considered the role of international law in determining the content 
of domestic public policy. Lord Neuberger stressed that the public policy exception was 
                                                 
41  Ibid 230 [46] (Aldous LJ). 
42  Ibid 230 [46]. 
43  Belhaj (n 8). 
44  Natasha Simonsen, ‘Belhaj v Straw & Rahmatullah [No 1] v Ministry of Defence (UK Sup Ct)’ (2017) 56(5) 
International Legal Materials 951, 952–3. 
45  Belhaj (n 8) 1119 [153] (Lord Neuberger). 
46  Ibid 1122 [168]. 
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grounded in ‘domestic rule of law considerations’; however, ‘generally accepted norms of 
international law are plainly capable of playing a decisive role’.47 Lord Dyson similarly 
concluded that it was appropriate to consider the strength of the international prohibition 
on torture to assess ‘the attitude of the public policy of the forum towards torture’.48 
Unlawful rendition, as Belhaj and Boudchar had experienced, ‘must occupy a position 
high in the scale of grave violations of human rights and international law’.49  
The extent to which English public policy absorbed breaches of jus cogens was a point 
of disagreement between Lord Sumption and Lord Neuberger. Neither Supreme Court 
justice gave details on what amounted to a breach of jus cogens which, as previously 
mentioned, are higher level norms of public international law from which derogation is 
not permitted. Instead, Lord Sumption was conscious that English law abides by the 
dualist theory of international law.50 His Lordship added that ‘[r]ecognition of the 
influence of international law does not mean that every rule of international law must be 
adopted as a principle of English public policy, even if it is acknowledged as a peremptory 
norm (jus cogens) at an international level’.51 Lord Neuberger, however, thought that ‘any 
treatment which amounts to a breach of jus cogens or peremptory norms would almost 
always fall within the public policy exception’.52 Lord Neuberger’s uncritical acceptance 
of jus cogens is somewhat surprising, given (as will be later discussed) the relative newness 
of the international law concept and scholarly disagreement over which norms are in fact 
jus cogens. 
Lord Mance was, by far, less willing to unite the public policy exception with the 
concept of jus cogens.53 Those ‘individual rights recognised as fundamental by English 
statute and common law’ was Lord Mance’s point of reference for analysing the public 
policy exception to the foreign act of state doctrine.54 The common thread seems to be 
that, while international law may have some influence in determining the content of cross-
border public policy, domestic considerations are paramount. In summary, the 
international law dimension to English public policy was disciplined by an appeal by some 
of the justices to domestic law analogues. 
                                                 
47  Ibid 1119 [154]. 
48  Ibid 1026 [116] (Lord Dyson). 
49  Ibid. 
50  Ibid 1159 [252] (Lord Sumption). 
51  Ibid 1161 [257]. 
52  Ibid 1122 [168] (Lord Neuberger). 
53  Ibid 1107 [107] (Lord Mance). 
54  Ibid. 
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3 Law Debenture Trust Corp plc v Ukraine 
In the latter half of 2018, Lord Neuberger’s analysis of international law in Belhaj v Straw 
was re-examined by the English Court of Appeal in the Law Debenture Trust Corp plc v 
Ukraine. In a unanimous judgment, the Court of Appeal catalogued six reasons that 
cumulatively explained why the public policy defence to the foreign act of state doctrine 
was made out.55 
The Law Debenture Trust Corp plc sought recovery of US$3 billion with interest from 
Ukraine owing under Eurobond notes held solely by Russia. The notes were issued under 
a trust deed governed by English law. Ukraine resisted Russia’s application for summary 
judgment on several grounds including for duress. Russia claimed that the matter was 
non-justiciable because it involved a foreign act of state; meanwhile, Ukraine contended 
that the public policy exception to the doctrine applied. In that respect, Ukraine alleged 
that Russia exerted ‘massive, unlawful and illegitimate economic and political pressure’ to 
dissuade it from signing an association agreement with the European Union.56 Rather than 
sign the EU association agreement, Ukraine was induced to accept Russian financial 
support.57 To do this, Russia ‘chose’ a Eurobond for its loan relationship with Ukraine, 
which included English choice of law and choice of forum clauses.58 Before Ukraine 
signed the loan agreement, Russia seized Crimea and, in addition, supported and 
encouraged insurgent military action in eastern Ukraine.59  
The unanimous judgment reinforced — as a sixth reason for invoking public policy 
— the domestic character of the public policy doctrine, which was ‘not restricted to cases 
of grave infringements of human rights’.60 The justices highlighted ‘an especially strong 
public policy in this country that no country should be able to take advantage of its own 
violation of norms of ius cogens’.61 The Court expressed its position on peremptory norms 
widely ‘by reference to the category of ius cogens itself’, rather than confining itself ‘to the 
particular norms relevant to the case’.62 Here, Russia could not take advantage of its 
violation of art 2(4) of the UN Charter — that is, the prohibition against the use of force 
— because it was a norm ‘fundamental to the system of international law and the principle 
                                                 
55  The Law Debenture Trust Corp plc v Ukraine (n 10) 702 [174]. 
56  Ibid 663 [8]. 
57  Ibid. 
58  Ibid 702 [175]. 
59  Ibid 703 [179]. 
60  Ibid 704 [180]. 
61  Ibid. 
62  Ibid. 
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of the rule of law’.63 For a strike out application, the Court of Appeal’s cursory discussion 
of jus cogens was to be expected.  
General judicial references to jus cogens are a promising sign for the future development 
of this species of exception, either as transnational public policy or as a distinct public 
international law exception. There is still a risk of oversimplification because, so far, 
English courts have only vaguely defined the jus cogens concept. 
B Elevating Customary International Law in Domestic Law 
From these recent English cases, at least three points may be gleaned about the English 
common law position. First, the public policy exception is domestic in nature, but an 
English court may derive assistance from generally accepted norms of international law.64 
By perceiving English public policy as thoroughly domestic in nature, English courts are 
implicitly rejecting F A Mann’s suggestion, considered in Chapter 7, of a freestanding 
international law exception.65  Secondly, norms of international law include peremptory 
or jus cogens norms, defined broadly by reference to the category of jus cogens and not 
restrictively on a case-by-case basis.66 Thirdly, the public international law dimension to 
public policy is not confined to grave infringements of human rights.67 While public policy 
plainly provides an indirect means of recognising norms of public international law under 
English law, the position is less clear in other Commonwealth jurisdictions — formerly 
dominions of the British Empire — that are based on the English common law tradition. 
The next Section identifies the strong persuasive value of these recent English decisions 
in other common law jurisdictions. 
The following section sets the wider recognition of the international law dimension to 
public policy against the backdrop of three related issues, some of which were touched 
upon in the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2014 decision of Kazemi Estate v Islamic Republic of 
Iran.68 A key issue in Kazemi was whether there was an overriding exception to state 
immunity in Canada’s State Immunity Act based on principles of fundamental justice, as 
recognised in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.69 The plaintiff unsuccessfully tried 
to establish that the international prohibition against torture represented a principle of 
                                                 
63  Ibid. 
64  Belhaj (n 8) 1119 [154] (Lord Neuberger). 
65  Mann (n 2). 
66  The Law Debenture Trust Corp plc v Ukraine (n 10) 704 [180]. 
67  Ibid. 
68  Kazemi Estate v Islamic Republic of Iran [2014] 3 SCR 176 (‘Kazemi Estate’). 
69  Ibid 214–5 [61] (Le Bel J); State Immunity Act, RSC 1985, c S-18; Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11, sch B pt I 
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fundamental justice, reflecting customary international law which had been incorporated 
into Canadian law and, so it was argued, prevailed over inconsistent treatment in the State 
Immunity Act.70 Giving judgment for the Court, Le Bel J observed that: 
not all commitments in international agreements amount to principles of fundamental 
justice. Their nature is very diverse. International law is ever changing. The interaction 
between domestic and international law must be managed carefully in light of the principles 
governing what remains a dualist system of application of international law and a 
constitutional and parliamentary democracy. The mere existence of an international 
obligation is not sufficient to establish a principle of fundamental justice. Were we to equate 
all the protections or commitments in international human rights documents with 
principles of fundamental justice, we might in effect be destroying Canada's dualist system 
of reception of international law and casting aside the principles of parliamentary 
sovereignty and democracy.71 
Accordingly, the first issue to address is the definition and status of customary 
international law — as opposed to treaties — in legal systems that are part of the English 
common law tradition including Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.72 Customary law, 
which has been described as ‘international law’s most controversial source’,73 is listed as 
one of four sources of international law in art 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice. A key question is whether customary international law automatically becomes 
part of the common law of a country (incorporation or adoption) or whether it is merely 
influential. A second issue is the interaction between international law and domestic law. 
For example, in the event of an inconsistency between norms of international law and a 
country’s human rights instrument, which prevails?  
A final issue for general discussion is the concept of jus cogens, which the English Court 
of Appeal mentioned in Belhaj v Straw and Law Debenture Trust within the context of 
generally accepted norms of international law.  How is the concept defined? Which norms 
are jus cogens norms? By what means does a domestic court determine whether a doctrine 
of international law has received general acceptance or assent among the international 
community? Each of these issues is now discussed in turn. 
  
                                                 
70  Kazemi Estate (n 68) 214–6 [59]–[63]. 
71  Ibid 248–9 [150]. 
72  The dualist system was discussed by Le Bel J in Kazemi Estate (n 68): at 248–9 [150]―[151]. 
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1 Definition and Status of Customary International Law in Dualist Legal Systems: Incorporation 
or Transformation? 
The status of customary international law in domestic law varies amongst the major 
common law jurisdictions. The English position at common law is a logical starting point 
for this discussion. English courts take the view that international law is ‘part’ of the 
common law, which is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of incorporation.74 
Blackstone considered international law to be part of the English law, observing that ‘the 
law of nations (where any question arises which is properly the object of its jurisdiction) 
is here adopted in its full extent, and is held to be part of the law of the land’.75 Although 
Blackstone wrote in an age of pervasive natural law thinking, the theory of incorporation 
remains the favoured theory in English law. 
The emergence of a second theory of international law — the doctrine of 
transformation — coincided with a rising late-19th century interest in Austinian legal 
positivism. The doctrine originated in Cockburn CJ’s judgment in the 1876 case of R v 
Keyn: 
For writers on international law, however valuable their labours may be in elucidating and 
ascertaining the principles and rules of law, cannot make the law. To be binding, the law 
must have received the assent of the nations who are to be bound by it. … Nor, in my 
opinion, would the clearest proof of unanimous assent on the part of other nations be 
sufficient to authorize the tribunals of this country to apply, without an Act of Parliament, 
what would practically amount to a new law. In so doing we should be unjustifiably 
usurping the province of the legislature.76  
Although this theory received some subsequent support,77 Lord Denning MR in Trendtex 
Trading Corp v Central Nigeria Bank accepted the doctrine of incorporation as a correct 
statement of English law.78 
Although the doctrine of incorporation has represented English law ‘for nearly 300 
years’,79 it has several important limits.80 First, acts of parliament are ‘supreme’.81 Under 
English law, statutes are hierarchically superior to the common law, which takes in rules 
                                                 
74  Andrew Clapham, Brierly’s Law of Nations: An Introduction to the Role of International Law in International 
Relations (Oxford University Press, 7th ed, 2012) 89, 91–2. 
75  William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–69) 67. 
76  R v Keyn [1876] 2 Ex D 63, 202–3 (Cockburn CJ). 
77  Notably in Chung Chi Cheung v The King [1939] AC 160, 167–8 (Lord Atkin). 
78  Trendtex Trading Corp v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] QB 529, 554 (Lord Denning MR) (‘Trendtex’). 
79  See Buvot v Barbuit (1737) Cas t Talbot 281; 25 ER 777 (Lord Talbot LC), approved in Triquet v Bath 
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81  Ibid 92. 
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of international law.82 Secondly, as a consequence of the principle of separation of powers, 
treaties do not automatically become part of domestic law.83 Though the Executive 
possesses a prerogative power to conclude treaties, the legislative branch of government 
must transform a treaty into an act of parliament before it has any domestic effect.84 
Thirdly, British courts ‘accept[] information from the Executive… on matters which they 
regard as falling within the Executive sphere’;85 for example, whether a country is 
recognised by the British Government. Fourthly, domestic law considerations will 
inevitably influence the domestic court that is addressing international law issues.86 Finally, 
international crimes are not automatically received or recognised in domestic law without 
the imprimatur of the legislature.87  
Canada also takes a hybrid approach to the reception of international law,88 tempered 
in all cases by principles governing the country’s constitutional and parliamentary 
democracy.89 It is generally accepted that Canada is a dualist system for treaties and 
international conventions,90 while Canada’s system of receiving customary international 
law is in all likelihood monist.91 The Canadian position on customary international law, 
though ‘still not clear of all doubt’,92 seems to align with the English position which 
supports the doctrine of incorporation or adoption.93 Treaties are not self-executing in 
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90  See Kazemi Estate (n 68) 248 [149] (Le Bel J); van Ert, ‘Dubious Dualism’ (n 88) 928–31; Stéphane 
Beaulac and John H Currie, ‘Canada’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), International Law and Domestic Legal Systems: 
Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion (Oxford University Press, 2011) 116, 144–5. 
91  LeBel and Chao, ‘Fugue or Fusion?’ (n 88) 33; Currie, ‘Weaving the Tangled Web’ (n 89) 60–71; Beaulac 
and Currie, ‘Canada’ (n 90) 145. 
92  Beaulac and Currie, ‘Canada’ (n 90) 138. 
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Canada. For an international treaty to have direct legal effect in Canadian law, 
implementation by federal or, in some cases, provincial94 legislation is required.95  
Canadian law maintains a rebuttable presumption that legislation will ‘comply with the 
values and principles of customary and conventional international law’.96 In R v Hape, the 
presumption of conformity was considered to be an interpretative principle of domestic 
law.97 International law’s ‘values and principles form part of the context in which statutes 
are enacted, and courts will therefore prefer a construction that reflects them’.98 But, the 
presumption of conformity ‘remains just that — merely a presumption’; it ‘can be 
rebutted by clear words of the statute under consideration’.99 It was in this context that 
LeBel J in R v Hape remarked: ‘[p]arliamentary sovereignty requires courts to give effect 
to a statute that demonstrates an unequivocal legislative intent to default on an 
international obligation’.100  Sources of international law may be ‘“relevant and persuasive 
sources”’ that aid in the interpretation of provisions in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.101  
Australia is a ‘strictly dualist’ legal system in relation to customary international law 
although, unlike Canada and many other modern democracies, it has no federal-based 
human rights instrument.102 One important consequence is that international law crimes, 
evidenced by treaty or custom, are not offences under Australian law until specifically 
implemented by domestic legislation.103 Thus, the scheduling of the Genocide Convention 
to the Genocide Convention Act 1949 (Cth) was not sufficient to transform the customary 
international law prohibition on genocide into an offence under Australian law until 
legislation amending the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) did so in 2002.104  Moreover, 
customary international law is not a ‘part’ of the common law, but it is one of its sources.105 
Rules of customary international law are limited by inconsistent legislation and binding 
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judicial precedent ‘inconsistent with the putatively adopted rule’.106 Just as in Canada, 
constitutional design and the separation of powers principle place important limits on the 
incorporation of customary international law into the common law of Australia.  
New Zealand adopts a dualist approach to treaties but is traditionally presumed to take 
a monist approach to customary international law.107 New Zealand case law rests on the 
assumption that Blackstone’s theory on the direct incorporation of customary 
international law is correct.108 Using Blackstone’s theory, rules of customary international 
law automatically become part of New Zealand’s domestic law.109 As both Hopkins and 
Dunworth highlight, however, New Zealand law textbooks accept Blackstone’s 
proposition but ‘few’ offer evidence of its practical application.110 Despite the dearth of 
New Zealand case law on customary international law,111 it is probable that rules of 
sovereign immunity and the law of the sea fall within its remit.112 According to Dunworth, 
Blackstone’s theory requires adaptation by New Zealand courts to reflect a ‘more 
complicated world’.113 Dunworth argued that this may demand ‘a self-conscious pedigree 
approach’ by which New Zealand courts decide which rules of customary international 
law are received into the common law.114  
Values fundamental to the New Zealand legal order, such as the right not to be 
deprived of life115 or not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment,116 that correspond 
with international law are enshrined in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ). The 
Bill of Rights ‘is intended to be woven into the fabric of New Zealand law’.117  
                                                 
106  Stephen Hall, Principles of International Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2016) 160 [3.20]. 
107  Treasa Dunworth, ‘Hidden Anxieties: Customary International Law in New Zealand’ (2004) 2(1) New 
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(Oxford University Press, 2011) 429, 442; Susan Glazebrook, ‘Cross-Pollination or Contamination: 
Global Influences on New Zealand Law’ (2015) 21 Canterbury Law Review 60, 62, 68–9. See also Zaoui v 
A-G [No 2] [2006] 1 NZLR 289, 302 [24], 321 [90] (‘Zaoui’). 
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109  Chief Justice Sian Elias, ‘The Impact of International Conventions on Domestic Law’ (Speech, 
International Association of Refugee Lawyer Judges, 10 March 2000) 
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112  Ibid 81, 83. 
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117  R v Goodwin [1993] 2 NZLR 153, 156 (Cooke P) (CA). 
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2 Interaction between International Law and Domestic Law 
Common law presumptions of interpretation have been applied by courts in the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand to ensure compliance with fundamental 
values of the legal order or conformity with international law.118 To rebut the presumption 
of conformity to international law, clear statutory wording is required.119 The common 
law presumption of compliance may be seen to ‘reinforce’ provisions within national 
human rights instruments requiring compliance with the fundamental values it 
enshrines.120 On the other hand, the presumption of conformity with international law 
may be seen as a destabilising force on a country’s constitutional order.121  
In Zaoui v Attorney-General [No 2], protections within the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
and New Zealand’s ‘closely related’ international obligations against arbitrary deprivation 
of life and torture combined to condition the exercise of the Minister’s power to deport 
under immigration legislation.122 The decision centred on the judicial review of a security 
risk certificate issued under s 72 of the Immigration Act 1972 (NZ) against an Algerian, 
Ahmed Zaoui, who had been granted refugee status in New Zealand.123 The Minister 
intended to rely upon the certificate to have Zaoui deported.124 Reviewing the certificate 
in light of New Zealand’s international obligations, the Supreme Court of New Zealand 
read a limitation in s 72 using the common law presumption of consistency and s 6 of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights.125 Section 6 required an interpretation of s 72 that was consistent 
with the rights and freedoms contained in it,126 including the right not to be deprived of 
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and Dawson JJ), 53; New Zealand: Cropp v Judicial Committee [2008] 3 NZLR 774; Zaoui (n 107) 321; 
New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council [2018] NZSC 59 (‘New Health New Zealand’); 
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life and the right not to be subject to torture or cruel treatment.127 The power in s 72 could 
not be exercised where the person being deported ‘faces a real risk of torture or arbitrary 
deprivation of life’.128 In the result, the Supreme Court found that the deportation of 
Zaoui would lead to New Zealand breaching its international obligations.129  
The presumption of conformity with international legal obligations has also received 
attention in Canadian courts. Where domestic legislation is unambiguous, the 
presumption of conformity has no application.130 Inconsistency with international law 
does not affect this result.131 In Kazemi Estate, the Supreme Court of Canada refused to 
use a norm of customary international law as an exception to the general rule of state 
immunity, codified in the State Immunity Act.132 The invoked sections of the State Immunity 
Act could not be characterised as ‘genuinely ambiguous’ or requiring ‘clarification’.133 If 
the statutory provisions were unclear, the Court could then consult the common law or 
international law.134  
The materials and evidentiary methods employed by domestic courts to identify a 
customary norm also emerges as an issue worth briefly mentioning. As a general rule of 
Anglo-common law private international law, foreign law must be pleaded with sufficient 
detail and proved by expert evidence.135 In contrast to this position, courts in 
Commonwealth countries adhering to Blackstone’s theory of incorporation may take 
judicial notice of international law — including custom.136 Thus, as Stephenson LJ 
observed in Trendtex Trading Corp v Central Bank of Nigeria: 
rules of international law, whether they be part of our law or a source of our law, must be 
in some sense “proved”, and they are not proved in English courts by expert evidence like 
foreign law: they are “proved” by taking judicial notice of “international treaties and 
conventions, authoritative textbooks, practice and judicial decisions” of other courts in 
other countries which show that they have “attained the position of general acceptance by 
civilised nations”.137  
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Legal submissions and argument, as opposed to expert evidence, may be all that is 
necessary to prove international law.138 Though Stephenson LJ’s observation appears 
straightforward, it leaves unresolved — as Malcolm Shaw pointed out — the question 
of how a domestic court ascertains a rule of customary international law.139 This problem 
is magnified by common law judges’ natural focus on domestic cases and statute.140   
Common law judges, who are accustomed to the analysis of domestic sources of law, 
are less skilled at examining foreign and international sources of law.141 Before 
determining whether a rule is one of customary international law, these judges have the 
formidable task of ‘sorting through and evaluating the conduct of states in order to 
determine both the existence of a state practice and the presence of the opinion [sic] juris’.142 
Indeed, in a recent qualitative study by Ryngaert and Hora Siccama, a large proportion of 
the domestic courts analysed truncated their analysis of state practice or opinio juris and, 
more often than not, took shortcuts to identify whether a norm constituted custom.143 
The courts — both civil law and common law — did so by consulting a larger range of 
sources as ‘proxies for a thorough analysis of state practice and opinio juris’.144 The 
ratification of multilateral treaties, the existence of non-binding instruments, scholarly 
doctrine, and the ‘persuasive authority’ of international case law were relied upon by the 
domestic courts analysed as evidence of the existence of a norm.145 More exceptionally, 
some of the courts thoroughly analysed relevant legislation and case law of the connected 
place to determine state practice.146 The standard of proof and standard of uniformity 
required to establish a rule of customary international law are related issues.147 
C Related Issues: Violation of Jus Cogens or Peremptory Norms of International Law 
Peremptory or jus cogens norms of international law may be considered to be functionally 
equivalent to cross-border public policy administered at a domestic level. Just as domestic 
conceptions of public policy draw on ‘fundamental interests and sentiments’ of the 
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forum,148 peremptory norms seek to protect norms and interests fundamental to and 
shared amongst the international community of nations. Whereas existing categories of 
norms of public policy preserve important domestic interests, peremptory norms — the 
‘super norms’ of international law — are increasingly invoked in private law proceedings 
to denounce internationally egregious conduct where recourse before international courts 
or another foreign jurisdiction is inapt. This is primarily because multinational 
corporations lack legal personality before international tribunals. Alternatively, claimants 
from developing countries may be denied ‘substantial justice’ in their home jurisdiction 
because of combined factors including poverty and inadequate resources to fund large 
group litigation.149  
1 The Concept of Jus Cogens within International Law 
International law is ‘a system of horizontal rules which are binding only if states in some 
way agree to be bound by them’.150 A roadmap of the general sources of international law 
is provided in art 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. These sources are 
international conventions, international custom, general principles of law, and judicial 
decisions as well as the teachings of publicists.151 The first three items in art 38(1) — 
conventions, custom and general principles — are sometimes considered to be formal 
sources from which the actual content of international law is drawn.152 Custom comprises 
two elements — consistent state practice (usus) and opinio juris — which are, respectively, 
objective and subjective.153 For a rule to be considered customary international law, both 
elements must be satisfied. 
Norms qualified as ‘peremptory’ or ‘mandatory’ challenge the common perception that 
international law is a system of horizontal rules under which no legal obligation is regarded 
as hierarchically superior to another.154 However, writings on international law draw a 
distinction between a State’s ability to derogate from or abrogate rules of international 
law (jus dispositivum) and a State’s inability to derogate from rules fundamental to the 
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international order (jus cogens).155 The latter suggests a system of vertical rules — a special 
category of norms that are ‘intrinsically superior’ to other norms, ‘inalienable’, and 
universal.156 The International Court of Justice observed in the Barcelona Traction case that 
particular international obligations were ‘the concern of all States. In view of the 
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their 
protection; they are obligations erga omnes’.157 The concept of jus cogens, denoting a non-
derogable norm of fundamental importance to the international community of nations, 
falls within this category. From 2015, the International Law Commission has directed its 
attention to this topic, placing it on its current programme of work with almost full 
international support.158 
The concept of jus cogens has flourished following its inclusion in the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’), which was adopted in 1969.159 It is considered by some to 
be analogous to the public policy exception in municipal legal orders.160 The term jus cogens 
originated in a 1958 report on the law of treaties and, in this context, was used to describe 
a limitation on States’ ability to depart from rules of international law.161 Article 53 of the 
VCLT defines peremptory norms as norms ‘accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can 
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character’.162 Unpacked, art 53 suggests two criteria for the identification of a jus cogens 
norm.163 First, the norm must be a norm of general international law.164 Secondly, the 
norm must be ‘accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted’.165 Article 53 further provides 
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that a treaty in conflict with a peremptory norm of general international law is void; 
meanwhile, article 64 makes provision for the emergence of new peremptory norms.  
Article 53 is the typical frame of reference for international courts and tribunals seeking 
out criteria for the identification of jus cogens norms.166 As the International Law 
Commission observed in 2017, many States also support using art 53 to develop criteria 
for jus cogens.167 So, despite first being recognised in the context of treaty law, the concept 
of jus cogens extends beyond the Vienna Convention; the concept is no longer the exclusive 
province of treaty law.168 Jus cogens norms can derive from custom evidencing a form of 
‘super-custom’.169 While the existence of the jus cogens concept no longer engenders 
controversy, disagreement still surrounds its scope and content.170 In particular, the main 
bone of contention appears to be the means by which peremptory norms are identified.  
2 Which Norms are Jus Cogens Norms? 
Though the concept of jus cogens is loosely defined, some consensus exists on the norms 
possessing a jus cogens character.171 Prohibitions against the use of force,172 aggression or 
aggressive force, and the denial of self-determination are commonly cited examples.173 
Other strong contenders include the prohibition against torture,174 genocide,175 slavery,176 
apartheid and racial discrimination, and crimes against humanity.177 The International 
Court of Justice has recognised the prohibition on the use of force and genocide as jus 
cogens in both explicit and implicit terms.178 Other courts and tribunals on international 
and domestic planes have also identified genocide as a peremptory norm.179 Similarly, the 
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prohibition against torture has received support in domestic courts as a peremptory 
norm.180 Beyond these norms, though, disagreement abounds — not simply in relation to 
the content of each recognised norm but, more generally, how norms of jus cogens are 
made.181 
D Conclusion: Assimilating International Law with Cross-Border Public Policy 
Three key points were addressed in this Part. First, the unique characteristics of Kuwait 
Airways [Nos 4 and 5] were identified to underline the difficulties of mounting a public 
policy argument based on public international law at common law. At the very least, the 
House of Lords’ decision in Kuwait Airways [No 4 and 5] reveals the need for cogent 
evidence pointing to an international consensus or universal condemnation of a state’s 
behaviour. Secondly, Part II identified that jus cogens may represent part of the public policy 
doctrine at common law. While English courts have referred to the jus cogens concept, they 
have not adequately addressed the general concept or specifically identified norms of jus 
cogens. As a third point, this Part focused on the amenability of Anglo-common law courts 
to matters of international law and issues related to this recognition. These points serve 
to highlight that public international law is a recognised, albeit fledgling and tendentious, 
category of public policy. 
The authorities are clear on cross-border public policy; it ‘exists within very narrow 
limits’.182 The public policy exception, as Field J concluded in Empresa Nacionale de 
Telecomunicaciones SA v Deutsche Bank AG, ‘is concerned with violations of international law 
and/or with breaches of fundamental universal human rights’.183 
This Chapter has suggested that public international law is a recognised category of 
cross-border public policy in Anglo-common law jurisdictions. If it is a recognised 
category, then it is suggested that the logic of preserving its place within an envelope of 
public policy rapidly diminishes. Three arguments are raised here to promote public 
international law’s detachment from the public policy exception at common law. First, an 
appeal to public international law has the same practical result as an appeal to the public 
policy exception, but without the reproach of ‘palm tree’ justice.184 In the end, a law or, 
more rarely, a judgment in personam is excluded. As a second reason, a detached exception 
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further narrows the Anglo-common law exception. It also strengthens the central claim 
of Chapter 7 that cross-border public policy is a severely constrained exception, which is 
only rarely and very exceptionally invoked in modern Anglo-common law jurisprudence. 
As a third reason, public international law is more precise in its focus than the public 
policy exception. Thus, using public international law may not incur the same reproach as 
the public policy exception. It does not involve riding the ‘unruly horse’ of public policy 
‘to wreak havoc in international pastures’.185  
At the same time, this Chapter has highlighted a ‘dualist’ problem, deep ‘uncertainty’ 
about what constitutes customary international law, and what is encompassed by jus cogens. 
Thus, the argument pursued in this Chapter for a detached public international law 
exception is a potentially provocative one that will have to address three related problems. 
First, a standalone exception would appear to elevate all public international law to higher 
law. However, in dualist countries such as the United Kingdom, domestic statute receives 
priority over public international law. Secondly, treaty-based public international law has 
no status in domestic law unless a state becomes a party to it or some aspects of it become 
customary international law. Indeed, the conclusion and ratification of treaties falls within 
the prerogative of the Crown. Treaties have no effect until Parliament, in line with the 
separation of powers principle, passes enabling legislation. Thirdly, replacing public policy 
clauses, in existing international treaties and regional legislation with a public international 
law exception may be considered unreasonable. These clauses may encompass ‘truly 
international’ public policy already.  
The foreign governmental interest exception is next introduced to complement this 
Part’s analysis of public international law as a potentially new species of exception.  
III FOREIGN GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS 
This Part explores the scope of the antipodean analogue to the residuary category of ‘other 
public law’ in English law: the foreign governmental interests doctrine. The ‘other public 
law’ category was originally foreseen as a limitation on courts’ subject matter 
jurisdiction,186 but recent English jurisprudence has interpreted the rule more broadly. A 
succession of English cases beginning with Attorney-General of New Zealand v Ortiz and 
concluding with Islamic Republic of Iran v Barakat Galleries Ltd187 are considered in Part III 
to explain how the ‘other public laws’ rule has matured over time. This Part also discusses 
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the foreign governmental interests doctrine taken by the majority of the High Court of 
Australia in the Spycatcher case compared with Brennan J’s public policy approach. Part III 
ultimately argues that the ‘foreign governmental interests’ doctrine is — at least from an 
Australian law perspective — already detached from the public policy exception. 
A The ‘Other Public Law’ Rule 
Within the context of judicial citation practices, Chapter 5 briefly explored the changing 
character of the ‘other public law’ rule in successive editions of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws. 
The fourth edition (1927), edited for the first time by Arthur Berriedale Keith, introduced 
political law as a third restraint on subject matter jurisdiction alongside penal and revenue 
laws.188 Aside from Emperor of Austria v Day and Kossuth, support for this add-on was 
minimal.189 From the seventh edition (1958), ‘other public law’ replaced the term ‘political 
law’190 most likely prompted by the scholarly and judicial criticisms of F A Mann191 and 
Parker LJ in Regazzoni v KC Sethia (1944) Ltd.192 The replacement term (rule 21) in the 
seventh edition was ‘intended to signify the residuary category of those rules which are 
enforced purely as an assertion of sovereign power’.193 The ‘other public law’ category is 
now situate in rule 3(1) of Dicey, Morris and Collins, which reads: 
English courts have no jurisdiction to entertain an action: (1) for the enforcement, either 
directly or indirectly, of a penal, revenue or other public law of a foreign state; or (2) 
founded on an act of state.194 
At present, English law suggests three main uses for this category.195 In the first place, 
a court declines to apply the foreign lex causae because it requires the application of a penal, 
revenue, or other public law.196 Secondly, enforcement of a foreign judgment involves the 
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direct or indirect enforcement of a foreign penal, revenue or other public law.197 Thirdly, 
a claim may be non-justiciable because it involves the exercise or assertion of a sovereign 
right.198  
B From Attorney-General of New Zealand v Ortiz199 to Spycatcher 
Whether rule 3(1) extended to the non-enforceability of a foreign public law was 
considered in Attorney-General of New Zealand v Ortiz. Ortiz concerned the New Zealand 
Government’s attempts to recover a Maori carving lawfully purchased in New Zealand 
but exported to England in violation of the Historical Articles Act 1962 (NZ). Under the 
New Zealand statute, historical articles exported without permission were forfeited to the 
Crown in right of New Zealand. New Zealand argued that the 1962 Act provided for 
automatic forfeiture, which was rejected in both the Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords. However, in the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning MR also concluded that the New 
Zealand statute was a public law that could not be enforced.200 Upholding the ‘other public 
law’ category in rule 3 of Dicey and Morris, Lord Denning thought it was ‘eiusdem generis 
with “penal” or “revenue” laws’.201 Further, claiming a distinction made by F A Mann, his 
Lordship suggested that claims involving acts performed ‘by virtue of… sovereign 
authority’ were not enforceable.202 Lord Denning was, however, alone in holding that the 
rule covered foreign public laws.203  
In the Spycatcher case, the New South Wales Court of Appeal and the High Court of 
Australia critically examined the third residual category of ‘other public laws’.204 The rule 
was examined in the context of a private law action brought by the United Kingdom 
government against Peter Wright and his Australian book publisher, Heinemann 
Publishers. The Attorney-General of the United Kingdom sought an injunction to restrain 
publication of Wright’s memoirs, Spycatcher, alleging that the book contained confidential 
information acquired during his time with the British Security Service. The action could 
not be maintained. In the NSW Court of Appeal, Street CJ and Kirby P both thought the 
action was one which, in substance, involved the indirect enforcement of a foreign public 
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law.205 Kirby P characterised the other public law rule as one of private international law.206 
Reprising F A Mann, Kirby P also held that ‘acts… done by a sovereign jure imperii, that 
is by virtue of sovereign authority, will not be enforced in the courts of other sovereign 
states’.207 McHugh JA stated the principle differently by basing it instead on public 
policy.208  He held that ‘the courts of Australia have a right to refuse to entertain an action 
based on legal rights or obligations acquired or imposed by the law of a foreign country 
if the determination of that action is contrary to the national interest of Australia’.209 This 
pattern of public policy was explored in Part III(B)(1)(a) of Chapter 7. 
The High Court also held that the claim, in substance, involved an attempt to enforce a 
foreign ‘governmental interest’.210 The British Government’s argument in Spycatcher that 
‘private, not public, obligations’ were being enforced failed to ‘withstand close 
examination’.211 The Spycatcher majority reinforced that ‘the action is to be characterized 
by reference to the substance of the interest sought to be enforced, rather than the form 
of action’.212 To do otherwise would be ‘to overlook the appellant’s central interest in 
bringing the action’.213 Consideration of F A Mann’s article on prerogative rights 
influenced the High Court’s preference for ‘governmental interests’ over ‘other public 
law’. This preference was justified on the basis of ‘the difficulty of identifying the foreign 
laws or rights that fall within the rule’.214 It was considered ‘more apt to refer to “public 
interests” or, even better, “governmental interests” to signify that the rule applies to 
claims enforcing the interests of a foreign sovereign which arise from the exercise of 
certain powers peculiar to government’.215 Brennan J, in a concurring judgment, isolated 
public policy as the case’s ‘governing principle’.216  
Following the Spycatcher decision, the governmental interest approach taken by the 
High Court was much criticised.217 One major criticism centred on the equation of public 
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law with public interests or governmental interests ‘since interests do not necessarily 
derive[] from laws’.218 Another criticism concerned the ‘theoretical or practical value’ of 
insisting on foreign public law as an exclusionary principle because it ‘often duplicated 
the exclusion of foreign laws on the basis of public policy’.219 In United States of America v 
Ivey, Sharpe J of the Ontario Court of Justice rejected the defendants’ public law argument 
following an extensive analysis of the doctrine.220 His Lordship highlighted that, although 
Denning MR’s judgment in Ortiz and the High Court of Australia’s decision in Spycatcher 
‘represent the strongest judicial statements of the doctrine’, it still had a ‘rather shaky 
foundation’.221 
Arguably, however, the governmental interest approach is ‘more searching’ in its 
nature than public policy or, indeed, the residual ‘other public law’ category.222 First, the 
normative content of public policy is diffuse and, though a universally recognised 
reservation,223 it really should be a last resort ‘invoked only in clear cases, in which the 
harm to the public is substantially incontestable, and does not depend on the idiosyncratic 
inferences of a few judicial minds’.224  
Secondly, the foreign governmental interests doctrine is a more refined duplication of 
the pattern of public policy involving the protection of national interests.225 Indeed, 
Brennan J’s approach in Spycatcher, which hinged on the public policy exclusion, identified 
the domestic policy implicated in a similar way to the joint majority’s — arguably more 
direct — approach. Brennan J pointed to ‘the exigencies of public policy under the law 
of New South Wales’ as ‘preclud[ing] an Australian court from enforcing a claim which is 
damaging to Australian security and foreign relations’.226 As Brennan J observed, a court 
was not in a position to assess whether the enforcement of a foreign government’s claim 
was detrimental to the interests of the forum.227 Prevented from making its own 
assessment, ‘the court is constrained to seek and accept the opinion of the 
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[Commonwealth Government]’ on the compatibility of the foreign government’s claim 
with national security and foreign relations.228 However, the courts’ adoption of this 
practice could ‘itself be a possible source of embarrassment to the Executive in the 
discharge of its responsibilities’.229 In view of this potential embarrassment, Brennan J 
concluded that it was better ‘to refuse to enforce all claims by a foreign government for 
the protection of its intelligence secrets and confidential political information’.230 The 
approach adopted by the joint majority avoided the vagaries of the public policy doctrine. 
It also reinforces the gradual narrowing of the public policy doctrine, which was 
considered in Chapter 7.  
Thirdly, the governmental interest approach extends the court’s consideration beyond 
a ‘law’ — as in the residual ‘other public law’ category — to an ‘interest’.231 Finally, the 
recast of ‘other public law’ to governmental interest recognised as cogent F A Mann’s 
distinction between prerogative and private rights belonging to sovereign.232 If a claim 
involved a sovereign asserting the ‘peculiar powers of prerogative’, it was not 
enforceable.233 However, if a sovereign was pursuing ‘a right that by its nature could 
equally well belong to an individual’, it was enforceable.234 
C Post-Spycatcher Cases:  Mbasogo v Logo and Islamic Republic of Iran v Barakat 
Galleries Ltd 
The residual category of ‘public laws’ was applied in Mbasogo v Logo, a 2006 decision of the 
English Court of Appeal. The key issue was the justiciability of a private law claim, 
brought by the Republic of Equatorial Guinea and its President, in England. The claim 
stemmed from an unsuccessful coup in Equatorial Guinea involving British mercenary, 
Simon Mann, and companies alleged to have been involved in the coup.235 Equatorial 
Guinea and its President, Obiang, sought an injunction restraining the defendants from 
another coup attempt. Further to that, damages were sought for the costs incurred to 
quell the coup; detain and prosecute suspects; preserve the commercial interests and 
infrastructure of Equatorial Guinea; and increase the country’s security.236 Suing in tort, 
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Obiang claimed general damages for ‘severe emotional distress’237 and for an alleged 
assault. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs’ claims for damages were not justiciable 
because ‘the claim is, in reality, an exercise of sovereign authority by Equatorial Guinea 
in the courts of England and Wales’.238 The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that the claim 
was non-justiciable because it involved the exercise or assertion of a foreign sovereign 
right.239  
In Mbasogo, the focus on jurisdiction in rule 3(1) was transformed into a question of 
justiciability. For the Court of Appeal, it was ‘more important to understand the rationale 
which lies behind rule 3 rather than to resolve the vexed questions as to what the editors 
meant by the reference to “other public law” in rule 3(1) or what is meant by rule 3(2)’.240 
The decisive question was whether the courts would ‘enforce or otherwise lend their aid 
to the assertion of sovereign authority by one state in the territory of another’.241 The 
Court agreed with F A Mann’s distinction between a foreign sovereign claim ‘that by its 
nature could equally belong to an individual’ and the enforcement of rights ‘founded upon 
[a sovereign’s] peculiar powers of prerogative’.242 Here, the claims of Equatorial Guinea 
were not based ‘on its property interests but were for losses suffered by virtue of an 
exercise of sovereign authority, which arose as a result of decisions taken by the state to 
protect the state and its citizens’.243 Although it was unnecessary for the Court of Appeal 
in Mbasogo to adopt the foreign governmental interest approach,244 it received the Privy 
Council’s tentative approval in a related case — President of the State of Equatorial Guinea v 
Royal Bank of Scotland International.245 
In Barakat Galleries, the Court of Appeal strongly approved of the Spycatcher test 
without, however, expressly adopting it. Iran brought an action for the tort of conversion 
in England, seeking to recovery from Barakat Galleries antiquities unlawfully excavated 
and exported from Iran. Title to the antiquities or movables was determined by Iranian 
law which was ‘the lex situs … at the time of derivation of… title’.246  Iran was found to 
have had an immediate right to possession247 required to maintain the tortious action. 
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Barakat Galleries contended that the applicable lex causae — Iranian law — was a penal 
or a public law that should not be recognised.248 In holding that the action could be 
maintained, the Court of Appeal accepted that the residual ‘other public law’ category had 
foundation in English law, though limited by the ratio in Mbasogo.249 The approach of the 
High Court in Spycatcher was considered ‘not only consistent with the English authorities, 
including the Mbasogo case in the Court of Appeal, but is a helpful and practical test’.250 
The ratio of Mbasogo was that ‘a claim involving the exercise or assertion of a sovereign 
interest is not justiciable’.251 Support continues for the test expressed in Mbasogo which is, 
as the Court of Appeal in Barakat Galleries observed, ‘not far removed from the test 
adopted by the High Court of Australia’ in Spycatcher.252 
D Present and Future Directions 
The approaches taken by Australian and English courts to the residual category in rule 
3(1) are converging. Previously expressed reservations about the existence of the third 
category have been replaced by a readier acceptance of it; however, it has not received 
direct approval from the highest court in the United Kingdom: the Supreme Court. Older 
and more recent authorities also disclose the weight that has been attached to F A Mann’s 
distinction between prerogative and private rights. Critically, adhering to this distinction 
has resulted in a largely consistent approach to the content and underlying rationale of 
the category reflected in the Australian ‘governmental interest’ and the English ‘sovereign 
authority’ approaches.  
The foregoing discussion has left one crucial question unanswered: is the ‘foreign 
governmental interests’ doctrine detached from the public policy exception? In the two 
leading Australian texts on private international law, the doctrine is treated as a standalone 
exception.253 The current editors of Nygh’s Conflict of Laws associate the Australian 
formulation with Dicey, Morris and Collins’ residual ‘other public law’ category.254 This 
residual category ‘recognises that the exercise by foreign states of governmental power 
cannot be confined to the traditional categories of revenue and penal laws’.255 It comprises 
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the Spycatcher example of denying the claim of a foreign State which ‘arises out of, and is 
secured by, an exercise of a prerogative of the Crown, that exercise being the maintenance 
of national security’.256  
Meanwhile, the account in Mortensen, Garnett and Keyes’ Private International Law in 
Australia elevates foreign governmental interests as part of ‘a broader approach to laws 
considered unacceptable in the forum’.257 This account, less wedded to Dicey, Morris and 
Collins’ residual ‘other public laws’ category, emphasises the Spycatcher majority’s focus on 
‘the substance of the [governmental] interest sought to be enforced, rather than the form 
of action’.258 As Mortensen, Garnett and Keyes observe, ‘[i]t is the object of the 
proceeding as a pursuit of a foreign governmental interest that prevents enforcement of 
the law, whether it would ordinarily be considered public or private’.259 On the strength 
of these two Australian texts, and with no signs of inconsistent treatment in Australian 
case law, the doctrine is detached from the public policy exception. 
IV CONCLUSION 
The discussion in this penultimate Chapter was split between two new species of 
exception in private international law: international law and the foreign governmental 
interest doctrine.   
Part II started with a discussion of recent English case law on the international law 
dimension of cross-border public policy. In both Belhaj and Law Debenture Trust, general 
reference was made to the concept of jus cogens. It was next observed that, while this 
recognition is a promising sign for the development of a distinct public international law 
exception, the concept of jus cogens merits greater judicial attention. To legitimise the 
concept, one of the final sections of Part II provided background to the concept and 
identified some  peremptory norms. English judges consider that, while public policy may 
be informed by international law, the exception is still domestic in nature. This led to a 
discussion of how public international law is received into dualist legal systems, which 
revealed a general judicial willingness by common law judges to consider public 
international law as an interpretative aid. Finally, Part II questioned the logic of public 
international law remaining as a category of cross-border public policy, effectively because 
an appeal to public international law would have the same outcome as an appeal to public 
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policy. Recent judicial discussion in the Anglo-common law world of jus cogens augurs well 
for the future of international law as a species of cross-border public policy — or, perhaps 
even, of a distinct exception in favour of public international law. The concept of jus cogens 
was emphasised in this Chapter for its functional equivalence to cross-border public 
policy. The concept could arguably supply some of the exclusion’s normative content. 
This would avoid elevating every rule of public international law to such importance as to 
constitute a fundamental interest of the state to block the application of a foreign law or 
preents the recognition of a foreign judgment.  
Meanwhile, Part III discussed the English and Australian approaches to other public 
laws and to foreign governmental interests. The analysis revealed that Dicey’s rule has 
gradually received acceptance in English courts with recent decisions leaning towards the 
more precise Australian Spycatcher formulation. Effectively, the Australian and English 
approaches are converging. While it may not be English law yet, the Spycatcher formulation 
of foreign governmental interests represents a species of autonomous exception in 




CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
I INTRODUCTION 
his thesis has examined the evolution of the public policy exclusion in the 
common law of private international law. Chapter 1 diagnosed an 
underdeveloped historical understanding of public policy as contributing to the 
exclusion’s poor image. The purpose of this thesis, as set out in Chapter 1, then was 
twofold. First, it sought to deepen existing scholarly understanding about the historical 
and theoretical development of the public policy exclusion in Anglo-common law private 
international law. Secondly, it set out to rehabilitate the image of public policy as an 
‘unruly horse’ by examining its modern — and, in fact, seriously constrained — content 
in Anglo-common law jurisdictions and by suggesting opportunities to curtail the 
exclusion even further.  
The doctrinal analysis in this thesis was accordingly conducted with four research 
questions in mind. The first question related to the content of the public policy exclusion 
over time. The second question concerned the extent to which, particularly Anglo-
common law, writers of private international law shepherded the development of cross-
border public policy in Anglo-common law private international law. The third question 
concentrated on the factors informing the known reluctance of Anglo-common law 
courts to invoke the public policy exception in multistate cases. The fourth research 
question asked whether there was any scope left for new exceptions to splinter off the 
public policy exclusion, or else the recognition of different functions of public policy. 
In response to the purposes and research questions, Part II of this concluding Chapter 
draws out and elaborates on three major themes addressed in this thesis.  
II MAJOR THEMES 
This Part identifies and expands on the three major themes of this thesis. The first theme 
concerns the creation of the public policy exclusion by institutional writers of Anglo-
common law private international law. The continued influence of natural law through 
the public policy exclusion is the second theme. The third thematic concern of this thesis 
has been the gradual narrowing of cross-border public policy in common law jurisdictions. 
Some related points to this final theme are the reasons for this contraction. 
T 




A The Architects of Cross-Border Public Policy 
The original architects of the public policy exclusion were the institutional writers of 
Anglo-common law private international law. These architects, particularly Story, 
designed the blueprint of cross-border public policy by merging disparate elements into a 
consolidated whole, and inspired the structural reinforcement of choice of law rules using 
a public policy foundation.1 Vestiges of this influence remain.  
In exploring this theme, this thesis laid some further groundwork to show that 
institutional writers’ accounts of public policy had a genuine impact on Anglo-common 
law jurisprudence. Chapters 4 and 5 showed that they did. Moreover, these chapters set 
out to explain how these writings secured that influence at common law.  
1 The Blueprint: Chapter 3 
The first theme clearly emerged in Chapter 3. Although the architecture of the 
institutional writers was expounded over several chapters, Chapter 3 in particular 
addressed the structure that historical private international law scholarship created for the 
public policy exclusion. This in turn responded to the first and second research questions 
set out in Chapter 1.   
First, Chapter 3 elaborated on the content of cross-border public policy and its 
interaction with the content of domestic public policy that was detailed in Chapter 2. The 
discussion in Chapter 3 revealed that the parallels between domestic public policy and 
cross-border public policy were not always discernible. That is, only some categories of 
domestic public policy identified in Chapter 2 corresponded with 19th century scholarly 
accounts of the private international law exclusion. In fact, in the case of one scholar, 
Story, his account could be closely identified with his natural law philosophy. Thus, 
natural law and Austinian positivism were seen, despite the way they contradict each 
other, to have exerted a considerable influence on scholarly accounts of public policy in 
the 19th century. 
Secondly, Chapter 3 explored the accounts of public policy in the works of Huber, 
Story, Westlake and Dicey, revealing the extent to which these writers fashioned the 
exclusion (in turn responding to the third research question). It was seen in Part II of 
Chapter 3 that Story fused the account of prejudicial laws in Huber’s 17th century 
framework for private international law with his Paleyan-inspired natural law philosophy. 
Outside prejudicial marriages and smuggling contracts, Huber’s prejudicial laws 
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reservation was in want of content which Story, in his scholarly account of the exclusion, 
supplied. Story interlocked certain categories of domestic public policy with his Paleyan-
influenced natural law norms, which were integrated with Huber’s prejudicial laws lacuna. 
While natural law influenced the form of Story’s public policy exclusion, Westlake and 
Dicey’s works attempted to divest the exclusion of its natural law influence. Both works 
embraced key elements of Austinian positivism, outlined in Part III(B) of Chapter 3, 
though Dicey was the more enthusiastic adopter. Austin’s views on international law and 
codification were outlined for further amplification in Chapters 4 and 5. Elements of 
Austinian positivism were more obvious in Westlake’s second edition than the first 
edition, which preceded the resurgence in popularity of Austin’s The Province of Jurisprudence 
Determined.2 The language of natural law was reprised in Westlake’s first edition through 
his discussion of the slavery case, Forbes v Cochrane.3 In his second edition, Westlake 
borrowed from the language of ordre public from various European codes to elevate public 
policy to the position of a controlling principle coupled with an intensifier (‘reservation 
in favour of stringent domestic policy’).4 From Westlake’s fifth edition (1905), the 
treatment of public policy aligned with recent English case law as well as the account in 
Dicey’s Conflict of Laws. 
Starting with the first edition of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws (1896),5 public policy was placed 
on a different footing to earlier scholarly and jurisprudential accounts of the exclusion. 
Dicey identified six classes of public policy, the least controversial of which was morality 
(because that category had appeared in previous accounts of public policy). Dicey 
considered that public policy was the foundation upon which common law rules relating 
to immovable property, procedure, torts, and the non-recognition of foreign penal status 
were made.6 Morris’ editorship saw this structure overhauled. From that point, public 
policy was an exclusion preventing ‘the enforcement or recognition of such right, power, 
capacity, disability or legal relationship [which] would be inconsistent with the fundamental 
public policy of English law’.7 Convenience became the new explanation for the other rules 
which Dicey supposed were founded on considerations of public policy.8 
                                                 
2  John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (John Murray, 1832). 
3  Forbes v Cochrane (1824) 2 B & C 448; 107 ER 450. 
4  John Westlake, Treatise on Private International Law (William Maxwell & Son, 1st ed rev, 1880) 39–40. 
5  A V Dicey, A Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws (Stevens and Sons, 1st ed, 
1896). 
6  Ibid 33–6. 
7  J H C Morris et al (eds), Dicey’s Conflict of Laws (Stevens & Sons Ltd, 7th ed, 1958) 12 (emphasis added). 
8  Ibid 13. 




The institutional writers’ influence on substantive public policy has, however, 
diminished. Anglo-common law judges have returned to instinct, limiting the 
circumstances in which public policy should conceivably arise and engaging with other 
better crystallised norms, such as foreign governmental interests and, more recently, 
public international law.  
2 Structural Reinforcement: Chapter 6 
Aside from Chapter 3, the first theme was also developed over other chapters. The 
categories of domestic public policy, set out in Chapter 2 and that were established before 
the publication of Story’s Conflict of Laws, supported the subsequent discussion featured 
in Chapter 3.  
Perhaps more meaningfully, the institutional writers’ structure for the public policy 
exclusion was actually applied by judges. Reasons for this judicial citation were examined 
from a general perspective in Chapter 4 and from a more specific private international 
law perspective in Chapter 5. The judicial application of the institutional writers’ structure 
was considered in Chapter 6. This Chapter explained the influence of the institutional 
writers on the public policy dimension of the choice of law rules for marriage and torts at 
common law. 
In the case of the choice of law rule for marriage, Story had a profound influence on 
the outcome in Brook v Brook.9 Excerpts from Story’s Conflict of Laws maintaining the lex 
loci celebrationis for the formal and essential validity of marriage — subject to three 
exceptions — figured prominently in the House of Lords’ decision. Save for the ‘general 
consent of Christendom’ exception, the House of Lords agreed entirely with Story’s 
passages attaching primacy to the lex loci celebrationis subject to a few limited exceptions. 
This challenged the view that the bifurcated choice of law rule for marriage that now 
predominates in Anglo-common law jurisdictions originated in Brook v Brook. Rather, it 
was argued that the rule was conceived later — in the complex Sottomayer v De Barros 
litigation. Indeed, in Sottomayor v De Barros [No 1],10 Cotton LJ in the Court of Appeal 
attached a new meaning to Lord Campbell LC’s rhetorical flourish in Brook v Brook, which 
merely reinforced Mr and Mrs Brook’s shared domicile before and after matrimony. 
Cotton LJ concluded that the requirement to judge matrimonial capacity by the parties’ 
                                                 
9  Brook v Brook (1861) 9 HL Cas 193; 11 ER 703 (HL). 
10  Sottomayor v De Barros [No 1] (1877) 3 PD 1 (CA). 
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domicile was a ‘well-recognised principle of law’,11 a result questioned by Sir James 
Hannen P in Sottomayer v De Barros [No 2].12 
In terms of the choice of law rule for torts, the first limb of the double actionability 
rule, established in Phillips v Eyre,13 concealed a public policy dimension by introducing an 
element of forum control. The first limb, requiring actionability under the lex fori, 
originated in the Privy Council’s opinion in The Halley.14 The Privy Council’s case was 
ultimately decided through an application of Story’s general ‘prejudicial laws’ maxim.15 
The application of this maxim was aberrant: the fifth edition of Story’s Conflict of Laws 
relied upon by the Privy Council did not mention torts. It also stood in stark contrast to 
the erudite analysis of German scholarship on foreign torts by Sir Robert Phillimore at 
first instance.16 
B Public Policy: A Natural Law Evaluation of Foreign Law 
A second recurring theme explored in this thesis was the continued influence of natural 
law on the public policy exclusion. Public policy operates as an ultimate escape device, 
trumping foreign laws or judgments that is morally unacceptable to the forum. Not only 
does this suggest that law has at least in one sense a minimum moral content, it suggests 
that late-19th century institutional writers did not entirely succeed in their task of divesting 
the private international law exclusion of its natural law foundation. A system of positive 
law is not likely to have a public policy exclusion unless an external moral evaluation is 
involved.  
The persistence of natural law in the exclusion was suggested in several chapters. Most 
obviously, Story’s framework of natural law in Chapter 3 showed the traditional rules of 
private international law that Story developed were based on the external standard of 
natural law. For example, marriage was consistent with the law of nature; however, a 
general right to divorce and incestuous or polygamous marriages was forbidden by the 
law of nature for the tendency they had to undermine institutions crucial to Story’s 
Paleyan philosophy. In addition, contracts founded in moral turpitude were contrary to 
the law of nature. 
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Despite this natural law influence, the first edition of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws 
incongruously associated Story with ‘the positive method’.17 Story did not, as Dicey 
claimed, ‘discover not what ought to be, but what is the law’.18 Story, moreover, did not 
treat rules of private international law as laws that ‘derive their authority from the support 
of the sovereign in whose territory they are enforced’.19 Story’s public policy exclusion 
responded to a limited set of circumstances that impaired institutions identified by Paley, 
and Story, as consistent with the law of nature. 
Dicey’s structure for public policy, though most influential, had incongruent features. 
In the first place, Dicey conceived public policy as having structural qualities in addition 
to its traditional exclusionary role. Secondly, Dicey maintained morality as a class of public 
policy but, consistent with the aims of an Austinian positivist, morality had to be 
‘supported by the law of England’ — held by English tribunals to be immoral and, given 
that tribunals had ruled, unlawful.20  
Modern judges are reluctant to use cross-border public policy in a way which would 
project the forum’s distinctive morality on foreign law. However, by using public 
international law, Anglo-common law judges have been able to implicate higher standards. 
With the passing of time, appeals to ‘generally accepted norms of [public] international 
law’21 — as a higher standard by which to evaluate foreign law — have matured.  
In Oppenheimer v Cattermole,22 the House of Lords engaged this category of cross-border 
public policy by considering, though it ‘need not have done so’,23 the validity of a racially 
discriminatory Nazi decree. The 1941 decree was considered ‘so grave an infringement of 
human rights that the courts of this country ought to refuse to recognise it as law at all’.24 
In Lord Salmon’s view, the depravity of the decree mitigated against the necessity of 
maintaining ‘international comity’.25 The international law dimension to public policy is 
not, however, confined to grave infringements of human rights.  
In Kuwait Airways [Nos 4 and 5], the House of Lords concluded that English courts 
could ‘[i]n appropriate circumstances… have regard to the content of international law in 
                                                 
17  Dicey (1896), ‘The Conflict of Laws’ (n 5) 18, 19. 
18  Ibid 19 (emphasis added). 
19  Ibid 18, 19. 
20  Ibid 34, 766. 
21  Belhaj v Straw [2017] AC 964, 1119 [154] (Lord Neuberger). 
22  Oppenheimer v Cattermole [1976] AC 249. 
23  Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co [Nos 4 and 5] [2002] 2 AC 883, 960 [274] (Brooke LJ) (‘Kuwait 
Airways [Nos 4 and 5]’). 
24   Oppenheimer v Cattermole (n 22) 278 (Lord Cross). 
25  Ibid 283 (Lord Salmon). 
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deciding whether to recognise foreign law’.26 Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait and confiscation 
of Kuwaiti property constituted ‘flagrant violations of rules of international law of 
fundamental importance’.27 More recently, English courts have resorted to peremptory or 
jus cogens norms which, as was observed in Chapter 8, is a promising sign for the 
development of a new exception detached from public policy. The main attraction of 
peremptory norms — higher level norms of public international law from which no 
derogation is permitted — has to be its similarity to the public policy exclusion. Jus cogens 
norms, as a body of ‘superior’ rules of public international law, are imbued with ethical 
and moral dimensions. 
In 1954, F A Mann prophetically observed that breaches of public international law 
were ‘liable to become… of considerable practical importance’ to municipal courts.28 
Indeed, Mann developed the argument that domestic courts should apply rules of public 
international law to foreign law ‘if and in so far as it expresses or results from an 
international delinquency’.29 Public international law would effectively function as a ‘super 
choice of law rule’, overriding the ordinary application of rules of private international 
law.30 Increasing encounters with ‘international’ delinquency may signal to Anglo-
common law courts that they are ready for a detached public international law exception 
— an exception which would unquestionably include peremptory norms.  
C The Taming of Cross-Border Public Policy 
The public policy exclusion in Anglo-common law private international law is hardly ever 
successfully invoked. Reasons for this occurrence were addressed in Chapter 7. This 
Chapter highlighted that the Anglo-common law courts have tamed the so-called ‘unruly 
horse’ of public policy in two important ways. First, the maintenance of international 
comity has emerged as a modern restraint on Anglo-common law courts invoking the 
public policy exclusion to exclude foreign law or to deny recognition of a foreign 
judgment at common law. By using comity, these courts are encouraged to show respect 
for the different legal solutions offered by different — but connected — legal systems. 
Arguments of comity restrain the moral evaluation that is inherent in appeals to public 
policy. The resolution of conflicting laws is, after all, the sine qua non of private 
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international law. Secondly, when rejecting arguments of ‘substantive’ public policy, 
Anglo-common law courts reinforce the high threshold to be met before the exclusion is 
engaged. However, the high threshold does not illuminate; indeed, it does little to explain 
public policy’s content. 
Chapters 7 and 8 thus considered the modern public policy exclusion at common law, 
revealing the restricted circumstances in which the exclusion is likely to be invoked. The 
restriction of public policy in Anglo-common law jurisdictions has been gradual. Time 
has allowed judges and scholars of the common law to consolidate their reluctance to 
apply public policy, to calibrate existing categories, and to forecast. Where a moral 
evaluation of foreign law has occurred, Anglo-common law judges have been more 
concerned with higher standards of norm. In recent years, English courts have singled 
out flagrant breaches of public international law and grave infringements of human rights. 
Through the use of peremptory norms, the content of the international law dimension of 
public policy has expanded. This offers a potentially important line of further enquiry. 
The modern public policy exclusion at common law is a remnant of what it used to 
be. Its substantive content has reduced to such an extent that the usefulness of the public 
policy exception in Anglo-common law jurisdictions must now be seriously questioned. 
As Chapter 7 revealed, Anglo-common law courts are signally disinterested in public 
policy arguments, save where flagrant breaches of public international law are implicated. 
In the case of Australian courts, this disinterest is far more pronounced. In the Marriage of 
El Ouiek is the only reported case in which an Australian court has applied the public 
policy exception.31 
When faced with a public policy argument in the Spycatcher case,32 the High Court of 
Australia chose to characterise the action as the attempted enforcement of a foreign 
governmental interest. The foreign governmental interests doctrine, as discussed in 
Chapter 8, is a more refined duplication of the pattern of public policy involving the 
protection of national interests, discussed in Chapter 7. Using this doctrine, a court is to 
characterise the action ‘by reference to the substance of the interest sought to be enforced, 
rather than the form of action’.33 The action fails if the interest sought to be enforced 
arises ‘from the exercise of certain powers peculiar to government’.34 
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The logic of public international law remaining a part of the public policy exclusion 
may also be challenged. Arguably, rules of public international law are now sufficiently 
concrete to justify a self-contained exception. Whether the Anglo-common law court 
appeals to public policy or a public international law exception, the outcome will be the 
same. That is, ultimately, a foreign law — and, every so often, a foreign judgment — is 
excluded.  
The image of public policy as an ‘unruly horse’ has been glorified in Anglo-common 
law private international law scholarship. Over the course of the 20th century, courts in 
the Anglo-common law jurisdictions selected for this thesis have steadily tamed the 
exception.35 The recognition of a public international law exception, detached from public 
policy, would merely reinforce contemporary assessments of cross-border public policy 
as severely constrained. Besides public international law, it is in any case difficult to 
imagine what other conduct would sufficiently engage the exception in Anglo-common 
law jurisdictions.36 
 
                                                 
35  One of the only outliers is Singapore. Courts in Singapore have applied domestic conceptions of public 
policy to refuse recognition to foreign judgments involving gambling. 
36  Cf Chapter 1, ‘Delimitation’ in which the substantive and procedural aspects of European public policy, 
as contained in several European Union private international law instruments, are mentioned. 
